Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2310 OF 2022
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8488 of 2022 )
HASMUKHLAL D. VORA & ANR. … APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU … RESPONDENT (S)
JUDGMENT
KRISHNA MURARI, J.
Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal is directed against the final order dated
23.08.2021 passed by the High Court of Madras (hereinafter referred to
as " High Court ”) in Criminal O.P. No. 6445 of 2018, where the
Appellants' plea under Section 482 of the Cr.PC to quash the criminal
complaint against them was dismissed.
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3. Briefly, the facts relevant for the purpose of this Appeal are as
follows:
I. Appellant No.1 is the proprietor of an established company under the
name of M/s. Chem Pharm, a trader of raw material chemicals used in
food, food supplements, medicinal preparations etc. Appellant No.2 is the
son and employee of Appellant No. 1.
II.
During the course of their business, the Appellants purchased 75 Kg of
pyridoxal-5-phosphate (as 3 x 25Kg packs) from one M/s Antoine &
Becouerel Organic Chemical Co., vide invoice dated 19.03.2013.
III. On 19.11.2013, the then Drug Inspector, Kodambakkam Range,
inspected the Appellants’ premises and alleged contravention of S.18(c)
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 read with Rule 65(5)(1)(b) of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945. It was claimed that the Appellants
broke up the bulk quantity of pyridoxal-5-phosphate and sold it to
different distributors.
IV.
It is alleged that the Appellant had broken up the bulk quantity of raw
materials into various pack sizes containing quantities 0.5kg, 1kg, 10kg
and 15kg and had sold the same to various drug manufacturers.
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V. On 30.03.2016, the Drug Inspector issued a show cause memo to the
Appellants after nearly three years. The Appellants, after the show cause
memo on 02.04.2016, submitted their reply to the same.
VI. On 11.08.2017, after a further lapse of one year and four months, the
Respondent, filed a complaint against the Appellants.
4. The Appellants, in the High Court of Madras, sought for quashing
of the above-mentioned complaint, and the same was dismissed vide
impugned order dated 23.08.2021 on the grounds that a trial was
necessary to ascertain the facts of the case, and an order was passed to
expedite the trial. The relevant part of the order is extracted below:
“Though several grounds have been raised by the learned
counsel for the Appellants, however, this Court is of the opinion
the issue is a triable issue and the grounds raised by the
counsel for the Appellants are all factual in nature, and it
requires an appreciation of evidence, and this Court cannot
decide the same in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
of Criminal Procedure Code. It is left open to the Appellants to
raise all the grounds before the Court, and the same shall be
considered on its own merits and in accordance with the law.
This Court is not inclined to interfere with the proceedings
pending before the Court below.”
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5. Being aggrieved by the same, the Appellants filed the present
Appeal, seeking to quash the criminal complaint against them.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
6. The Ld. Counsel Appearing on behalf of the Appellants contended
that:
a) The Respondent/ Drugs Inspector has prima facie failed to give any
evidence indicating that the substance “Pyridoxal 5 Phosphate”
(Hereinafter referred to as Impugned Substance) is a drug only falling
under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
b) The impugned substance is a bulk food substance falling under the
definition of “food” as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006 Rules and Regulations thereunder, and not a drug
under Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
c) The Respondent/ Drugs Inspector cannot exercise powers under
Section 22 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as it is subject to
Section 23 of the same Act.
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d) Schedule K and Rule 123 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
exempt all substances that are capable of being used both in food
manufacture and drug manufacture from all the requirements of Chapter
IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
e)
Even if the impugned substance is assumed to be a drug, the
Appellants have a valid Wholesale Drug License in forms 20B and 21 B
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.
f) The Respondent has provided no evidence to prima facie establish
that the Appellants broke open and repackaged the items, causing the
nature of the Act to become manufacturing.
ANALYSIS
7. We have heard the counsels appearing on behalf of the Appellants
and the Respondents in great detail.
8. For the quashing of a criminal complaint, the Court, when it
exercises its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider
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whether or not the allegations in the complaint disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence.
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9. This Court, in State Of Haryana & Ors. Vs Bhajan Lal & Ors . ,
has laid down broad guidelines for quashing a criminal complaint as
under:-
“In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles
of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating
to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or
the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we
have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
1 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335
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| do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a<br>case against the accused.<br>(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a<br>cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,<br>no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an<br>order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section<br>155(2) of the Code.<br>(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so<br>absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no<br>prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is<br>sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.<br>(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the<br>provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which<br>a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and<br>continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific<br>provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing<br>efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.<br>(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with<br>mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted<br>with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused<br>and with a view to spite him due to private and personal<br>grudge.” | do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a<br>case against the accused. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a<br>cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,<br>no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an<br>order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section<br>155(2) of the Code. | ||||
| (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so<br>absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no<br>prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is<br>sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. | ||||
| (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the<br>provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which<br>a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and<br>continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific<br>provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing<br>efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. | ||||
| (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with<br>mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted<br>with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused<br>and with a view to spite him due to private and personal<br>grudge.” | ||||
| 10. In State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy & Anr.2, this<br>Court elaborated on what evidence and material the High Court can get into in<br>cases where a prayer for quashing a complaint has been made. The Court held: | ||||
| "…..Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice,<br>and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to<br>produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse.<br>It would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow any<br>action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of |
2 (2004) 6 SCC 522
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| justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to<br>quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance<br>of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of<br>these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.<br>When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may<br>examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be<br>quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess<br>what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is<br>made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." | ||
|---|---|---|
| 11. In R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab3, this Court summarised some<br>categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash<br>the proceedings: |
| “It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a | |||||
| proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any | |||||
| court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily | |||||
| criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person | |||||
| must be tried under the provisions | of the Code | , and the High | |||
| Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said | |||||
| proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, | |||||
| desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which | |||||
| would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. | |||||
| However, we may indicate some categories of cases where | |||||
| the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for | |||||
| quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may | |||||
| be possible for the High Court to take the view that the | |||||
| institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against | |||||
| an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process | |||||
| of the court or that the quashing of the impugned | |||||
| proceedings would secure the ends of | justice. If the criminal | ||||
| proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to | |||||
| have been committed by an accused person and it | |||||
| manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the | |||||
| institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High |
3 (1960) 3 SCR 388
8
| Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that | |
|---|---|
| ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, | |
| furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise | |
| where the allegations in the First Information Report or the | |
| complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and | |
| accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence | |
| alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence | |
| arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or | |
| the First Information Report to decide whether the offence | |
| alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be | |
| legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be | |
| manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court | |
| to be issued against the accused person. A third category of | |
| cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court | |
| can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling | |
| under this category the allegations made against the | |
| accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is | |
| either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or | |
| evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the | |
| charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to | |
| bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is | |
| no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is | |
| manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation | |
| made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its | |
| appreciation may or may not support the accusation in | |
| question.” |
12. The Respondent, in the impugned complaint, stated that during the
inspection of the Appellants’ premises, it was found that the Appellants
had purchased 75 kg (as 3 x 25kg packets) of the impugned substance.
However, no stock of the impugned substance was found on the premise
of the Appellants.
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13. Subsequently, on verification of the sale invoices of the Appellants’
company, it was found that the Appellants had broken up the impugned
substance and packaged it into various smaller packs. These smaller
packs were then sold to various other drug manufacturers.
14. This alleged breaking up of the impugned substance into smaller
packages and further distribution of the same is being classified by the
Respondent as “manufacturing”, and hence a case is being made out
against the Appellants under Section 18(c) read with Section 3(f) of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
15. This Court in R.P. Kapur Vs State Of Punjab (Supra) , as
mentioned above, has clarified that the court can exercise its powers to
quash a criminal complaint, provided that the evidence adduced is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, or no legal evidence has been
presented.
16. Upon perusal of the legal nature of the impugned substance, it can
be seen that the impugned substance has been categorized as a bulk food
substance falling under the definition of food as per Section 3(1)(j) of the
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Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. The impugned substance has
specifically been mentioned as a food ingredient in Serial No.4(ii) of the
Schedule-I of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2016.
17. From a bare perusal of the relevant laws and regulations, it can also
be seen that the alleged substance is not included as a drug in the Indian
Pharmacopoeia.
The fact that it is mentioned as "food” as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006, further only proves that the impugned
substance does not require a specific license under the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940.
18. The Appellants claim that the impugned substance is a dual-use
substance, which can be used both for food and drug manufacture. For
such dual-use substances, Schedule K and Rule 123 of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940, clearly state that such substances are exempt from
the requirements of Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
19. It is also worth mentioning that the Respondent has made no effort
to prove that the alleged substance is only a drug and not a food-
manufacturing substance. No scientific evidence or otherwise has been
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furnished to prove that the alleged substance is solely used for
manufacturing drug and not food items. Prima Facie, due to the lack of
evidence adduced by the Respondent in the four-year period between the
initial enquiry and the complaint, this court cannot presume that the
alleged substance can only be classified as a “drug”.
20. If we were to go one step further and assume that the impugned
substance is solely used for drug manufacture, even then, the Appellants
would not be liable under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 since the
Appellants already have the necessary Wholesale Drug License as per
form 20B and 21B of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. In such a
scenario, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken in toto,
no case for an offence would still be made out, making the entire process
frivolous.
21. Further, it is more than apparent from the record that even though
the complaint was made by the Drug Inspector but no evidence has been
provided by the officer to sustain the complaint. No recovery has been
made from the premise of the Appellants, and no evidence has been
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provided to sustain the argument that the impugned substance is
categorized only as a drug and requires a specific license.
22. While the sale of the alleged substance is an admitted fact by the
Appellants, no efforts have been made by the officer to prove that the
alleged substance is a drug which comes only under the purview of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. No efforts have also been made to show
that the packaging of the impugned substance was broken up into
various-size packets different from the original packaging from the
original manufacturer. No recovery of the sold packets has been made to
ascertain whether the original packaging was tampered with.
23. There has been a gap of more than four years between the initial
investigation and the filing of the complaint, and even after lapse of
substantial amount of time, no evidence has been provided to sustain the
claims in the complaint. As held by this Court in Bijoy Singh & Anr. Vs
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State Of Bihar , inordinate delay, if not reasonably explained, can be fatal
to the case of the prosecution. The relevant extract from the judgment is
extracted below:-
4 ( 2002) 9 SCC 147
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“Delay wherever found is required to be explained by the
prosecution. If the delay is reasonably explained, no adverse
inference can be drawn, but failure to explain the delay would
require the Court to minutely examine the prosecution version
for ensuring itself as to whether any innocent person has
been implicated in the crime or not. Insisting upon the
accused to seek an explanation of the delay is not the
requirement of law. It is always for the prosecution to explain
such a delay and if reasonable, plausible and sufficient
explanation is tendered, no adverse inference can be drawn
against it.”
24. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for
the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site
inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence
of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister
motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings.
25. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of
a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such
length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds
for quashing a criminal complaint.
26. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at the
stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the accused
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has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of criminal
proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for the court to
expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating Authorities.
27. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the purpose of filing a
complaint and initiating criminal proceedings must exist solely to meet
the ends of justice, and the law must not be used as a tool to harass the
accused. The law, is meant to exist as a shield to protect the innocent,
rather than it being used as a sword to threaten them.
CONCLUSION
28. It must be noted that the High Court while passing the impugned
judgment, has failed to take into consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case. While it is true that the quashing of a criminal
complaint must be done only in the rarest of rare cases, it is still the duty
of the High Court to look into each and every case with great detail to
prevent miscarriage of justice. The law is a sacrosanct entity that exists to
serve the ends of justice, and the courts, as protectors of the law and
servants of the law, must always ensure that frivolous cases do not pervert
the sacrosanct nature of the law.
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29. In view of above facts and discussions, the impugned order dated
23.08.2021 passed by the High Court is not liable to be sustained and is
hereby set aside. The proceedings of C.C. No. 6351 of 2017 pending in
the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate-IV, Saidapet, Chennai stands
quashed.
30. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.
….......…………....……….,J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
….…..…....…................…,J.
(S. RAVINDRA BHAT)
NEW DELHI;
16TH DECEMBER, 2022
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