Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GANPAT RAM SHARMA & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. GAYATRI DEVI
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2016 1987 SCR (3) 539
1987 SCC (3) 576 JT 1987 (3) 99
1987 SCALE (2)46
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(h)--’Has
built’-’Has acquired’--’Has been allotted’--Interpretation
of--Eviction of tenant--When arises--Facts necessary to be
pleaded and proved by landlord--Whether tenant entitled to
protection once condition in clause (h) fulfilled.
Limitation Act, 1963: Article 66--Possession of immova-
ble property--Cause of action----When arises or accrues.
Words and Phrases:
’Has built’--’Has acquired’--’Has been allotted’--meaning
of.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent purchased the suit premises in April,
1973 and in September, 1973 applied to the Competent Author-
ity under the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act,
1956 for permission to evict the appellants who were induct-
ed into the premises by the erstwhile landlord. The permis-
sion was granted in December, 1974 and three eviction suits
were filed in April, 1975 on the grounds contained in Sec-
tion 14(1)(a), (h) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
1958 and the Additional Rent Controller held that the ground
under Section 14(1)(h) was made out against all the three
appellants. The Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the decree.
Before the High Court in revision, it was submitted that
when the landlady purchased the property she and her vendor
had also been aware that the tenants owned a house and that
on account of this knowledge the respondent had waived her
rights under clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act, that if
a tenant built a house or has been allotted a residential
accommodation, he must acquire/obtain vacant possession
before he was evicted under clause (h), and that the area
where the allotted quarter was situated was not governed by
the Act
540
and, therefore, the ground covered by clause (h) was not
available to the landlady.
The High Court construed Section 14(1)(h) of the Act to
mean that a building constructed by the tenant which is
outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the
date of application for ejectment, was yet within Section
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14(1)(h), and held that the word ’or’ showed the different
circumstances in which a tenant was liable to be evicted,
that it was not necessary for a landlord to prove either
that the tenant had built a house and acquired vacant pos-
session of the building or that he had been allotted and
taken possession of the allotted premises, and that there
was no substance in the argument advanced by the tenants
that on account of the knowledge of the landlady that the
tenants owned a house, she had waived her rights under
clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act, and dismissed the
Revision Petitions.
In the appeals, it was submitted that there must be a
suitable residence, one which is a good and a reasonable
substitute for the appellants or the landlord before evic-
tion could be ordered under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, this Court,
HELD: 1. The Rent Control Act is a beneficial legisla-
tion to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the
tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It
also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to
recover possession in stated contingencies. [550B-C]
2.1 The words ’has built’ or ’has acquired’ or ’has been
allotted’ in clause (h) of Section 14(1) clearly mean that
the tenant has already built, acquired or been allotted the
residence to which he can move and that on the date of the
application for his eviction, his right to reside therein
exists. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that
the words as they stood associated with each other in clause
(h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of
application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to
reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a
matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have
built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or
the same may have been allotted to him. The words ’built’
and ’allotted’ did not mean that after building a residence
or after allotment of a residence the tenant must also
acquire its possession. [548D-F]
2.2 The landlord, in order to be entitled to evict the
tenant, must
541
establish one of the alternative facts positively, either
that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of
or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the
three ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks
eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that
the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been
allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not and
whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation
for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of
the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts.
[549F-H]
2.3 The landlord must be quick in taking his action
after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his
inaction, the tenant allows the premises to go out of his
hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not
the tenant. [550A-B]
2.4 The High Court was right in holding that once the
condition stipulated in clause (h) was fulfilled by the
tenant, he was disentitled to protection. He cannot, there-
fore, claim that he should he protected. [547B-C]
3.1 Article 66 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulated
that for possession of immovable property the cause of
action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become
entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach
of condition. [550C-D]
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3.2 On the facts of this case it is clear that Article
66 would apply in this case because no determination is
necessary, as determination by notice under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary. [550D-
E]
In the instant case, the landlady purchased the property
on April, 9, 1973. She filed an application for permission
after about six months from the date of purchase, and filed
eviction application after about four months from the date
of the grant of the permission by the Slum Authority. Time
begins to run from the date of the knowledge. Knowledge in
this case is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any point
of view. There is, therefore, no question of limitation in
this case. [55OH; 551A]
Ved Prakash v. Chunilal, [1971] Delhi Law Times Vol. 7,
59; Smt Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [1970] Rent Control Re-
porter Vol. II, 71; Naidar Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain and anoth-
er. A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 509; Siri Chand v. Jot Ram, Punjab
Law Reporter Vol. LXIII, 1961, 915; Govindji Khera v. Padma
Bhatia Attorney, [1972] Rent Control Repor-
542
ter Vol. 4, 195: Harbans Singh and another v. Custodian of
Evacuee Property ’P’ Block and others, A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 82;
Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and another, A.I.R. 1941 Allaha-
bad 28, 30; Somdass (deceased) v. Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har
Jagdass Narokari, Punjab Law Reporter Vol. 85, 184 and K.V.
Ayyaswami Pathar and another v. M.R. Ry. Manavikrama Zamorin
Rajah and others, A.I.R. 1930 Madras 430, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 215052 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.1980 of the Delhi
High Court in S.A.O. No. 138 of 1979.
R.F. Nariman, P.H. Parekh and Suhail Dutt for the Appel-
lants.
Ashok Grover for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by special leave
are from the judgment and order dated 28th of August, 1980
of the High Court of Delhi. Three appellants, Jai Bhagwan,
Pearey Lal and Ganpat Ram, were inducted into premises No.
3240, Kucha Tara Chand, Daryaganj, Delhi by the then land-
lord, Shri Dina Nath. The families of the appellants con-
sisted of about 7 or 8 members per family living in one room
each on the ground floor of the said premises. Shri Pearey
Lal, one of the appellants, had one side store room along-
with the room and Shri Jai Bhagwan had one small tin shed on
the first floor. The appellants were also sharing the ter-
race.
In 1952 the land and building situated at No. A-6;25, at
Krishna Nagar, Delhi was purchased by one Nathu Ram, father
of the appellant Ganpat Ram and Pearey Lal together with the
appellant Jai Bhagwan, his son-in-law. The building consist-
ed of two room, two kitchens and a Barsati.
Three applications were made by the appellants under
Order 41 Rule 2 of C.P.C. on or about 4th of August, 1980.
The High Court pronounced its judgment without disposing of
these applications on or about 27th of August, 1980 and
proceeded to hold against the appellants on the basis of an
adverse inference that the three appellants had built the
house in Krishna Nagar, whereas a copy of the sale deed
543
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would show that the said house was bought and not built that
by Nathu Ram and Jai Bhagwan, and were not-by the two of the
three appellants.
In 1958 Ganpat Ram was allotted a D.D.A. Quarter No. 3 7
at Village Seelampur, Shahdara. By a notification dated 28th
of May, 1966. Village Seelampur, Shahdara was declared to be
an urban area. By Notification dated 27th March, 1979 issued
under section 1(2) of the Delhi Rent Act (hereinafter called
’the Act’) this village was subjected to the provisions of
the said Act. During 1967-68 one Mrs. Sushila Devi was
inducted into the quarter at Seelampur, consisting of a
room, a kitchen and a bath room. This lady had applied for
the allotment of the said quarter in her name sometime in
1974. On 20th of July. 1980. the authorities, in fact,
allotted the said quarter to her. In 1965-70 Ms. Dev Karan
and Kul Bhushan being the sons of Pearey Lal had been occu-
pying the portion of the house at Krishna Nagar together
with their family members and grand-father, Nathu Ram. Nathu
Ram died in 1969. The other portion was occupied by one Kalu
Ram and his family members being brother of Jai BhagWan.
There are 18 people residing at the relevant time in the
said house. The present landlord, the respondent herein,
purchased the suit premises from the erstwhile landlord,
Dina Nath on or about 9th April, 1973. On or about 28th of
September, 1973, the present landlord applied to the compe-
tent authority under the Slum Act for permission to evict
the appellants from the said premises. On 12th of December,
1974 the competent authority under the Slum Act granted
permission to the landlord to proceed in eviction against
the three appellants. On or about the 16th of April, 1975,
the respondent herein filed three eviction suits against the
appellants on the grounds contained in section 14(1)(a),(h)
& (j) of the Act. On 31st of January, 1977, it was held by
the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi that the ground under
section 14(1)(h) was made out against all the three appel-
lants. The ground under section 14(1)(a) was also upheld but
the appellants were asked to deposit arrears of rent within
a month from the date of the order so as to avail the bene-
fit of section 15(1) of the Rent Act which the appellants
availed of. On or about 24th April, 1979, the Rent Control
Tribunal confirmed the decree in ejectment on appeal under
section 14(1)(h) of the Act against the three appellants. On
further appeal the High Court construed section 14(1)(h) of
the Act to mean that a Building constructed by the tenant
which is outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Act on the
date of the application for ejectment, was yet within sec-
tion 14(1)(h) and the tenant was liable to be ejected.
544
In appeal before us, it was submitted on behalf of the
appellants that in none of the three judgments, there was
any finding as to the suitability of the residence that is
built, allotted or of which the tenant was acquired vacant
possession of. None of the courts has re-examined the size
of the space, the distance and inconvenience that might be
caused, the number of persons in the tenants’ families or
the state of residence built or allotted by or to the ten-
ants. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the High Court
dated 28th August, 1980, the tenants have come up in appeal.
In this case the learned Addl. Rent Controller had
passed an order of eviction under clause (h) of section
14(1) of the said Act against all the three appellants as
mentioned before. The said decision was upheld by the Tribu-
nal. It has been held by the courts below that the three
tenants have built and acquired vacant possession of the
residential house at A-6/25 Krishna Nagar, Lal Quarter,
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Delhi. It was held that Ganpat Ram, one of the tenants-
appellants has been allotted residential quarter at 317,
Seelampur III, Shahdara, Delhi. Before the High Court the
judgments of the Rent Controller as well as the Tribunal
were challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that none of the
three tenants had built or acquired vacant possession of the
residential house No. A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal Quar-
ter, Delhi. It was further submitted that in any case the
respondent-landlady was not entitled to claim eviction under
clause (h) on the grounds of waiver and laches. Counsel
submitted before the High Court that Ganpat Ram had not been
allotted the quarter at Seelampur and that in any case he
was not in possession of the same. He further submitted that
the Act was not applicable to the quarter alleged to have
been allotted to Ganpat Ram, tenant and as such grounds
covered by clause (h) were not available to the landlady.
Lastly it was submitted that all the three ingredients
mentioned in clause (h) of section 14 of the Act were ap-
plicable to the landlord. Section 14 of the Act is in Chap-
ter-III and controls eviction of the tenants. The said
section stipulates that notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or
decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall
be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord
against the tenant. Clause (h) deals with the situation
where the tenant has, whether before or after the commence-
ment of the Act, built or acquired vacant possession of or
has been allotted a residence.
The High Court noted the apparent purpose of providing
clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 14. The High Court
was of the opinion that on account of rapid growth of popu-
lation of Delhi, landlords were
545
tempted to terminate the tenancies of the existing tenants
and ask for their eviction in order to let out the premises
to the pew tenants at high rents. Rent Control Legislation
for Delhi and New Delhi was passed for the first time during
the second world war and since then there has been Rent
Control Legislation applicable to various urban areas in the
Union Territory of Delhi. The Rent Control Act was enacted
to provide for the control of rents and evictions. The
object of clause (h), as is apparent, is not to allow the
tenant more than one residence in Delhi. Therefore, it
provided that in case that tenant builds a residence, the
landlord could get his house vacated. It also provided that
if the tenant acquires vacant possession of any other resi-
dence, he is not protected. Lastly, it also stipulated that
if a residential premises has been allotted to a tenant, he
is not entitled to retain the premises taken on rent by him.
In the instant case, on the three causes on which the land-
lord can claim eviction were present against the tenant, the
High Court held that these causes are not joint. These need
not be conjointly proved or established. These were in the
alternative. Therefore, if the landlord is successful in
proving any one of the causes, he is entitled to an order of
eviction against the tenant. Counsel for the appellants
sought to urge before the High Court that if a tenant built
a house, he must acquire its vacant possession before he can
be evicted under clause (h). Similarly, it was submitted
that if residential accommodation was allotted to a tenant
then he must obtain vacant possession of the same. The word
’or’ showed, according to the High Court, that these were
different circumstances in which tenant was liable to be
evicted. These were (i) if the tenant had built a new resi-
dence, or (ii) if he had acquired vacant possession of it or
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(iii) if he had been allotted a residence.
The words ’built’ and ’allotted’ do not mean that after
building residence or after allotment of a residence, the
tenant must also acquire its possession. If a tenant builds
a house and does not occupy it, he is liable to eviction,
according to the High Court. Similarly, if a residence is
allotted to a tenant, but he does not occupy it and allows
others to occupy the same, he is not protected, according to
the High Court. The Act provides that building of a house by
tenant or allotment of residence to him is a ground of
eviction available to the landlord against his tenant. The
learned Judge of the High Court was of the view that it is
not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the tenant
has built and acquired vacant possession of the building or
that he has been allotted and taken possession of the allot-
ted premises.
The landlady in the eviction application alleged that the
tenants
546
had built and acquired vacant possession of a residential
house at A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal Quarter, Delhi. It
was denied by all the tenants but the Controller and the
Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record concluded
that the three tenants have built and have also acquired
vacant possession of the said residential premises. It was
further held that the relatives of the three tenants were in
actual physical possession of the said house at Krishna
Nagar. It transpired from the record that Dev Karan. Kul
Bhushan and Kalu Ram were admittedly related to the three
tenants and were in occupation of house at Krishna Nagar as
licensee of the three appellants-tenants. This is a finding
of fact and could not have been challenged in second appeal
before the High Court. Learned counsel for the tenants then
submitted before the High Court that the landlady was a
purchaser of the property from one Dina Nath and she and her
vendor had also been aware that the tenants were owners of
the house in Krishna Nagar. On account of this knowledge it
was argued that the landlady-respondent had waived her
rights under clause (h) of section 14(1) of the Act. The
High Court found that there was no substance in the
argument. There was no plea that the landlady ever waived or
was guilty of laches. No evidence was led by the parties.
The facts were that the respondent-landlady purchased this
property from Dina Nath on 9th of April, 1973. There was
nothing on record to show that Dina Nath was ever aware of
the fact about building or acquiring a house at Krishna
Nagar by the three tenants. The landlady on the 28th
September, 1973 filed applications against the three tenants
under section 19 of the Slum Area (Improvement & Clearance)
Act, 1956 seeking permission to institute eviction
proceedings. The required permission was granted by the
competent authority on 12th of December. 1974 and the
present eviction application out of which this appeal arises
was filed on 16th of April, 1975. Therefore, there was no
question of laches on the part of the landlady. She filed an
application for permission after about six months from the
date of purchase and she filed an eviction application after
about four months from the date of the grant of permission
by the Slum authority.
The landlady claimed eviction of Ganpat Ram, appellant-
tenant, on another ground also, namely, that he has been
allotted residential quarter at 317. Seelampur III. Shahda-
ra. Delhi. This fact was denied by the tenant. A.W. 1 Naresh
Chand, an Official of the D.D.A. brought the official record
relating to the allotment of this quarter. It was proved
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that the said quarter was allotted to him in 1958 and that
possession was delivered to him. It was deposed that it was
residential in nature. On behalf of the tenants, it was
submitted before the High
547
Court that the same was in possession of Sushila Devi.
Sushila Devi had appeared as a witness. She admitted that
the said quarter was allotted to the tenant, Ganpat Ram, the
appellant. After allotment Ganpat Ram was entitled to occupy
the allotted accommodation and possession was delivered to
him. According to the said witness, he was not now in
possession and somebody else was in possession. Evidence was
adduced on behalf of the tenant that he was not in
possession and somebody else was in possession. According to
the High Court, if once the condition stipulated in clause
(h) was fulfilled, by the tenant, he was disentitled to
protection under the Act He cannot thereafter claim that he
should be protected. We are of the opinion that the High
Court was right.
It was further alleged that Seelampur area known as
Seelampur where the allotted quarter was situated, was not
governed by the Act and therefore ground covered by clause
(h) was not available to the landlady. There is no plea and
the High Court found taking into consideration all the
relevant materials that there was no evidence to show that
it was situated within the area which was not governed by
the Act. We are in agreement with the learned Judge of the
High Court.
Before us in appeal, however, several points were sought
to be urged. It was urged that on a proper construction,
there must be a suitable residence, that is to say, a good
substitute for the petitioners or the landlord and a reason-
able substitute.
Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in
Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji and another, [
1969] 3 SCR 989. There the Court was concerned with the
sub-letting before the coming into force of the Act and was
concerned with section 13(1)(e) of the relevant Act which
used the expression "has sublet". The present perfect tense
contemplated a completed event connected in some way with
the present time. The words took within their sweep any
sub-letting which was made in the past and had continued up
to the present time. Therefore, this Court held that it did
not matter that the sub-letting was either before or after
the Act came into force.
The Delhi High Court in the case of Ved Prakash v.
Chunilal, [1971] Delhi Law Times Vol. 7, 59, where the
expression ’has’ in the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 in
section 14(1)(h) came up for consideration. It was held that
the word ’has in clause (h) carries in itself the force of
the present tense. It has therefore to be interpreted in
terms of the words employed in the opening part of the
proviso which are to the
548
effect that the Controller may on an application made to him
in the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of
the premises and those words meant that on the date of the
application the tenant must be having a residence either
because he might have built the same or might have acquired
vacant possession thereof or it might have been allotted to
him. Either of the three situations must be there on the
date of the application. If that is not so, then clause (h)
of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act
would have no application.
According to the learned single Judge of the Delhi High
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Court, the word ’has’ applied with the same force and veloc-
ity to the words ’built’, ’acquired vacant possession of’
and ’been allotted’. The last words ’a residence’ again
relate to all the three contingencies. The word ’has’ con-
tains in itself the meaning of presently possessing some-
thing. The ordinary English dictionaries while giving the
meaning of word ’has’ refer to the word ’have’, which in
turn means ’to hold’, ’possess’.
The words ’has built’ or ’has acquired’ or ’has been
allotted’ clearly mean that the tenant has already built,
acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move
and that on the date of the application for his eviction his
right to reside therein exists. It was therefore held that
the words as they stood associated with each other in clause
(h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the
application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to
reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a
matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have
built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or
the same may have been allotted to him.
In Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [1970] Rent Control
Reporter Vol. II, 71 Deshpande, J. of the Delhi High Court
had occasion to construe section 14(1)(h) of the Act. The
landlord there applied for eviction of his tenant on the
ground that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of
another residence within the meaning of section 14(1)(h) of
the Act. The tenant defended that he had not acquired any
residence and that the alleged residence had in fact been
acquired by his wife and his sister-in-law jointly. The Rent
Control Tribunal held that the view that under section
14(1)(h) the tenant was liable to be evicted only if he
himself had acquired the vacant possession of another resi-
dence and not by any other member of his family including
the wife. The question which came up before the Court for
decision was whether the acquisition of a separate residence
by the wife of the
549
tenant was sufficient ground for the eviction of the tenant
by the landlord under proviso (h) of sub-section (1) of
section 14: That, however, is not the question here.
In Naidar Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain and another, A.I.R. 1966
Punjab 509, the court had to construe, inter alia, section
13(1)(h) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
There under section 13(1)(h) of the said Act in order to be
liable for eviction, the tenant must have built a suitable
residence. The Court was of the opinion that merely because
the tenant had built a house, would not be a ground for
ejectment within the meaning of section 13(1)(h). The words
’suitable residence’ must be read with all the terms namely
’built’ ’acquired vacant possession of’ or ’been allotted’.
Although the onus to prove facts within the special knowl-
edge of a party must be on him, a landlord bringing a suit
for eviction under section 13(1)(h) of the said Act must
first allege the existence of grounds entitling him to a
judgment. The residence of the tenant must be suitable one.
In Siri Chand v. Jot Ram, (Punjab Law Reporter Vol.
LXIII, 1961 at page 915), the Punjab High Court had to
construe the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and it
was held that on the date of the suit for ejectment of the
tenant, in order to succeed, all that the landlord had to
show was that he was the landlord and secondly., that de-
fendant was his tenant and thirdly the tenant has, whether
before or after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent
Control Act, either built a suitable residence, or been
allotted a suitable residence.
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The decision of the Delhi High Court in Govindji Khera
v. Padma Bhatia Attorney, [1972] Rent Control Reporter, Vol
4. 195 to which our attention was drawn, does not advance
the case any further.
Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the
several decisions to which reference has been made above,
indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in
order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one
of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant
has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been
allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients
must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after
the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built
acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence,
whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be
really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not,
are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must
prove and establish those facts. The other aspect is that
apart from the question
550
of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the
landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accru-
al of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant
allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the
landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the
light of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in
the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite
apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time, this is a
beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and
the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable
eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limit-
ed rights to the landlord to recover-possession on stated
contingencies.
The next aspect of the matter is which article of the
Limitation Act would be applicable. Reference was made to
Article 66 and Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter called the Limitation Act) which stipulates
that for possession of immovable property the cause of
action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become
entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach
of condition. Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years
when the tenancy is determined. Article 113 deals with suit
for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in
this Schedule. On the facts of this case it is clear that
Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case
is necessary and that is well-settled now. Determination by
notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is
no longer necessary.
It is well-settled that time begins to run from the date
of the knowledge. See in this connection the decision of
Harbans Singh and another v. Custodian of Evacuee Property
’P’ Block and others, A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 82 though that was
a case under a different statute and dealt with a different
article. See also Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and another,
A.I.R. 1941 Allahabad 28 at page 30. The Division Bench of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdass (deceased). v
Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab Law Re-
porter Vol. 85., 184 held that in a suit for possession
under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, material date is
one on which the right to sue for possession arises.
In K.V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v.M.R. Ry. Manavik-
rama Zamorin Rajah and others, A.I.R. 1930 Madras 430, it
was held that where a claim is based upon a forfeiture of a
lease by reason of alienation of the demised land and noth-
ing else, the article applicable for the purpose of limita-
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tion was clearly Article 143 and the limitation commences to
run from the date of the alienation. Here
551
accrual of the right of the landlord is not challenged. The
knowledge is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any point
of view. There is no question of limitation in this case.
In the premises, we are of the view that the High Court
was right and the appeals must fail and are accordingly
dismissed with costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dis-
missed.
552