Full Judgment Text
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8031 OF 2001
Shri Jagjit Singh and others …Appellants
Versus
Mrs. Pamela Manmohan Singh …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. Whether the appellants, who claim to have purchased the property
described as 6-B, Jangpura, Mathura Road, New Delhi from Major K.V.
Kohli (one of the two heirs of Mrs. Rasheel Kohli) are entitled to contest
the application filed by the respondent - Mrs. Pamela Manmohan Singh
(the other heir of Mrs. Rasheel Kohli) for grant of letter of administration
is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against
order dated 22.1.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge of Delhi High
Court in Civil Revision No.791 of 1994 whereby he set aside the order
passed by Additional District Judge allowing an application filed by the
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appellants under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for
permission to file objections in Probate Case No.272 of 1993.
2. The property in question was leased out by the Government of
India to Mrs. Rasheel Kohli sometime in 1957 for a period of 90 years.
Mrs. Rasheel Kohli availed loans from Oriental Bank of Commerce and
Grindlays Bank and mortgaged the suit property. Oriental Bank of
Commerce filed Suit No.75 of 1979 in the High Court of Delhi against
M/s. Zirconium, K.V. Kohli and Mrs. Rasheel Kohli for the recovery of
their dues. Grindlays Bank also filed Suit No.259 of 1978 against K.V.
Kohli and others for recovery of Rs.9,58,195/-. In the second suit, a
statement was made by the counsel for the defendants that his clients will
not alienate property No.198, Golf Links, New Delhi and plot No.6,
Block – B, Jangpura, New Delhi or encumber the same till the next date.
After taking note of the counsel’s statement, the learned Single Judge
directed the defendants in the suit not to alienate or encumber the
property or realise or appropriate the rent.
3. In 1979, Mrs. Rasheel Kohli filed Suit No.180 of 1979 for eviction
of Khairati Lal, who had been inducted as a tenant. During the pendency
of the suit, Khairati Lal made a statement before the Court on 6.8.1984,
the relevant portion of which is extracted below:
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“A decree for possession of the plot in dispute be passed
against me in favour of the plaintiff together with a decree
st
for Rs.25,000/- as mesne profits upto 31 August, 1979. I
st
may be allowed time to vacate the plot in dispute upto 31
October, 1986. I give an undertaking to the Court that I shall
deliver vacant possession of the plot in dispute to the
st
plaintiff on 1 November, 1986. I further give an
undertaking that I will not alienate, transfer, in any manner,
or part with its possession in favour of any one, nor shall
create any charge till the vacant possession of the same is
delivered by me to the plaintiff. I also agree to pay mesne
st
profits at the rate of Rs.1250/- per month from 1 September,
1979 onwards.”
4. However, instead of abiding by the undertaking given by him in
the Court, Khairati Lal handed over possession of the suit property to the
partners of M/s. Texla Service Center with whom Mrs. Rasheel Kohli is
said to have entered into an agreement dated 30.8.1984 for sale of the suit
property for a sum of Rs.11 lacs and received a sum of Rs.5 lacs in cash
and Rs.6 lacs in the form of bank guarantee.
5. After taking possession from Khairati Lal, M/s Texla Service
Center filed Suit No.182 of 1986 for specific performance of the
agreement for sale. In that suit, the High Court directed the parties to
maintain status quo.
6. Mrs. Rasheel Kohli died on 11.10.1987. After about one month,
Shri K.V. Kohli (son of the deceased) executed three registered sale
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deeds dated 6.12.1988 in favour of the appellants, though, at that time,
warrant of attachment issued pursuant to order dated 2.11.1988 passed by
the Bombay High Court in Suit No.2951 of 1987 was in force.
7. On 30.11.1987, K.V. Kohli filed application for grant of probate by
claiming that his mother had executed Will dated 7.3.1986 in his favour.
The same was registered as Suit No.379 of 1987. The respondent also
filed an application dated 6.3.1989 for grant of letter of administration by
claiming that her mother had executed Will dated 7.3.1987 in her favour.
The application of the respondent was registered as P.C. No.106 of 1989.
Later on, the same was re-numbered as P.C. No.272 of 1993. The
appellants filed an application under Section 151 CPC for permission to
file objections to the grant of letter of administration in favour of the
respondent. By an order dated 26.3.1994, learned Additional District
Judge allowed the application. The relevant portions of that order are
extracted below:
“In the present case, deceased Smt. Raseel Kohli was the
owner of the property. She died leaving a son K.V. Kohli
and a daughter Pamela Manmohan Singh. Shri K.V. Kohli
is alleged to have acquired right in the property by virtue of
will of his mother dated 7.3.1986 and had sold one of the
properties to the present applicants by means of a registered
Sale-deeds dated 6.12.1988. Whereas the petitioner in the
present case claims that her mother had executed another
will dated 23.9.1987, which is a later will in her favour. The
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applicants who are the purchasers from the vendor legatee of
the first will, would be affected if the later will is upheld,
and as such they have locus standi to safeguard their
interests.
It was then contended that the sale was made after the
injunction order was granted. A perusal of the file shows
that the present petition though purports to have been drafted
on 30.9.1989 the respondent was restrained from transferring
the property till further orders, then proceedings on 23.3.89.
However, the present property has been transferred before
23.3.1989 and this circumstance will not affect the rights of
the applicants.
As regards delay, no doubt it appears that some other
litigation is pending between the parties, and the applicants
had knowledge of the present proceedings as appears from
the written statement dated November, 1990, filed by them
in suit No.695 of 1990, pending in Delhi High Court, and it
has been contended that the application is belated and mala
fide. However, as held above, the applicants have locus
standi to file caveat and to oppose the present proceedings
and as such they will also be entitled to move later on for
setting aside if the present petition for grant of probate is
allowed as that will affect their rights if the decision is taken
in their absence. That would unnecessarily involve the
parties in fresh litigation. It is also seen that original
objector Shri K.V. Kohli has since died and the proceedings
against his LRs are ex-parte. However, an application for
setting aside is pending. Otherwise, also the case is at initial
stages and even issues have yet not been framed. The
petitioner can be compensated by costs in delay.”
8. The respondent challenged the aforementioned order in Civil
Revision No.791 of 1994, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge
on the following grounds:
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(i) Probate case filed by K.V. Kohli was dismissed on 13.5.1992 in
default and, therefore, there was no question of any Will being
propounded by him.
(ii) The appellants had committed fraud in obtaining possession
from Khairati Lal contrary to the undertaking given by him on
6.8.1984 and they effectively prevented Mrs. Rasheel Kohli
from taking possession of the property.
(iii) K.V. Kohli executed the sale deed when there was an order of
injunction restraining him from alienating the property in
question and the whole case of the applicants is based on the
possession of the property through fraud committed by them.
(iv) When the applicants’ rights are under investigation, they cannot
claim to have any caveatable interest in the estate of Mrs.
Rasheel Kohli.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute
that the parties are governed by the provisions of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925 (for short, ‘the Act’). Section 283 of the Act reads as under:
“ 283. Powers of District Judge.– (1) In all cases the
District Judge or District Delegate may, if he thinks proper, –
(a) examine the petitioner in person, upon oath;
(b) require further evidence of the due execution of
the Will or the right of the petitioner to the
letters of administration, as the case may be;
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(c) issue citations calling upon all persons claiming
to have any interest in the estate of the deceased
to come and see the proceedings before the
grant of probate or letters of administration.
(2) The citation shall be fixed up in some conspicuous
part of the court-house, and also the office of the
Collector of the district and otherwise published or
made known in such manner as the Judge or District
Delegate issuing the same may direct.
(3)
Where any portion of the assets has been stated by the
petitioner to be situate within the jurisdiction of a
District Judge in another State, the District Judge
issuing the same shall cause a copy of the citation to
be sent to such other District Judge, who shall publish
the same in the same manner as if it were a citation
issued by himself, and shall certify such publication to
the District Judge who issued the citation.”
The term “caveatable interest” has not been defined in the Act, but
the same has been used and interpreted in some of the judicial decisions.
In Nobeen Chunder Sil and others v. Bhobosoonduri Dabee (1881)
ILR 6 Cal 460, a two-Judge Bench of Calcutta High Court considered
whether the persons who had obtained money-decree and got attached
share of one of the heirs of the deceased and mortgagees of the
immovable property left by the testator were entitled to oppose the grant
of probate on the basis of Will executed by the owner in favour of his
wife purporting to grant his entire property for her life and after her death
to his sons. The respondent applied for grant of probate of the Will of
Nobo Coomar Ganguli, who had died on 21.10.1877 leaving behind his
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widow and two sons. The appellant Nobeen Chunder Sil, who had
obtained money-decree against one of the sons and Brojo Mohun Ghose
and Obhoy Churn Sen in whose favour mortgage was executed by two
sons filed caveat against the grant of probate. The District Judge refused
to allow them to take part in the proceedings or oppose the grant. The
appeal preferred against the order of the District Judge was allowed by
the High Court of Calcutta. White, J., who was member of two-Judge
Bench referred to the judgments of Baijnath Shahai v. Desputty Singh
ILR 2 Cal 208 and Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle ILR 4 Cal
360 and observed:
It cannot be disputed that the appellants have a direct
“
interest in disputing the will. They alleged that the will is a
forgery, and has been concocted for the purpose of
overriding their mortgage and attachment. The authorities
show that, so long as the probate remains unrevoked, the
attaching creditor could not bring the attached property to
sale, nor could the mortgagees by any suit get the benefit of
their mortgage. Their proceedings in each case would be
defeated by the production of the probate, for they could not
raise the issue that the will was forged. "A probate
unrevoked," says Mr. Justice Williams in Vol. I Williams on
Executors, 7th edition, p. 549, "is conclusive both in the
Courts of law and equity, not only as to the appointment of
executors, but as to the validity and contents of the will, so
far as it extends to personal property." As a probate in India
extends to immoveable property, the doctrine applies in this
country to all the property left by the deceased. The only
grounds on which the appellants could impeach the probate
in a Civil Court would be those stated in the 44th section of
the Indian Evidence Act, namely,-that the probate was
granted by a Court not competent to grant it, or that it was
obtained by fraud or collusion, which means fraud or
collusion upon the Court, and perhaps also fraud upon the
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person disinherited by the will - Barnesly v. Powel ; but they
could not show that the will was never executed by the
testator or was procured by a fraud practised upon him. It is
obvious, therefore, that, unless the appellants have a locus
standi in the Probate Court, they are without remedy,
supposing their case against the will to be true.
Markby and Prinsep, JJ. in Komollochun Dutt v.
Nilruttun Mundle have virtually decided the question before
us, so far as the mortgagee-appellants are concerned. The
plaintiff there had purchased from a widow an estate which
she was supposed to have inherited from her husband.
Afterwards the brother of the husband obtained and
produced at the trial probate of a will of the husband, by
which he bequeathed the whole property to his brother. The
plaintiff sued to recover the property from the possession of
the brother, alleging that the will was a forgery. This Court
reversed a remand order of the District Judge, which
directed the first Court to try the question of the genuineness
of the will, and directed that the trial should be postponed in
order that the plaintiff might apply to the Probate Court of
the District Judge to revoke the grant of probate.
Markby, J. apparently based his decision upon the
language of Section 242 of the Indian Succession Act. But
that section, whilst stating that the probate shall be
conclusive as to the representative title, is silent as to its
effect with respect to the validity and contents of the will. Its
conclusive effect in the latter respects is really the legal
consequence of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Probate, as stated by Mr. Justice Williams in Vol. I,
Williams on Executors, p. 549. In the mofussil the District
Judges are the sole Courts of Probate, and it would be
obviously inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction
conferred upon them, that probates until revoked should not
be conclusive as to the due execution of the will to which
the grants relate.
The mortgagee-appellants in the present case stand
substantially in the same position as the plaintiff in
Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle ; they are purchasers
pro tanto and assigns of the immoveable estate of the
deceased, although only for the limited purpose of securing
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money which they have advanced to the testator's heirs. If,
according to the authority just cited, they might apply to
revoke the probate that has issued, it follows that they may
also enter a caveat and oppose the grant.
The case of an attaching creditor of the next-of-kin
was not before the Court in Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun
Mundle , but Markby, J., intimated an opinion that an
attaching creditor was also entitled to apply to revoke
probate. This point has been, recently decided in favour of
the attaching creditor in Umanath Mookhopadhya v.
Nilmoney Singh .
I am of opinion, therefore, that the appellants claim
respectively such interests in the estate of the deceased as
entitle them, upon proof of their interests, to file a caveat
and oppose the grant of probate of the will of Nobo Coomar
Ganguli, deceased.”
Field, J., who was the other member of the Bench referred to the
law prevailing in England, the provisions of the Indian Succession Act,
1865 and observed:
“………I am, therefore, of opinion that, whether the persons
interested came in the first instance to oppose the grant of
probate, or subsequently to have a grant revoked or
annulled, they must come to the Court of the District Judge;
and as this Court has thus an exclusive jurisdiction, it must
be careful not to deny all remedy to persons interested by
refusing to allow them to be made parties to its proceedings.
As to the text of what constitutes a sufficient interest to
entitle any particular person to be made a party, according to
the view which I have already stated, I think it comes to this,
that any person has a sufficient interest who can show that
he is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of the property
over which the probate would have affect under the
provisions of Section 242 of the Indian Succession Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
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10. In G. Jayakumar v. R. Ramaratanam A.I.R. 1972 Madras 212,
the learned Single Judge referred to some earlier judgments including the
judgment in Nobeen Chunder Sil and others v. Bhobosoonduri Dabee
(supra) and observed:
“I shall therefore examine the language of the relevant
sections of the Indian Succession Act in order to ascertain
the competency of both or either of the caveators in these
proceedings.
Section 283(1) of the Indian Succession Act provides
as follows:-
“In all cases the District Judge or District Delegate
may, if he thinks proper,……
(a) examine the petitioner in person, upon oath;
(b) require further evidence of the due execution of the
will or the right of the petitioner to the letters of
administration, as the case may be;
(c) issue citations calling upon all persons, claiming to
have any interest in the estate of the deceased to
come and see the proceedings before the grant of
probate or letters of administration”
It follows from clause (c) of Section 283(1) that “all persons
claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased”
may be issued citations. “Any interest in the estate of the
deceased” does not mean such interest in the estate as is
claimed through the deceased or as heir of the deceased.
The intention of the legislature as gatherable from the
expression is that any interest in the estate in respect of
which the deceased is alleged to have executed a testament
would entitle the holder of that interest to attend and oppose
the probate proceedings.
In my view, the words “of the deceased” have been used
only to identify and describe the estate in respect of which
the caveator claims interest and is not intended to limit the
caveator’s interest to or equate it with the interest which the
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deceased held in the estate. The provision of Section 283 is
intended to give the widest possible publicity to the probate
proceedings and to give an opportunity to any person having
the slightest and even the bare possibility of an interest in the
proceedings to challenge the genuineness of the will and
place before the court all the relevant circumstances before a
grant in rem is made in favour of the person claiming
probate. If this is the proper interpretation to be placed upon
Section 283(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act, I have little
doubt that both the caveators in this case are entitled to
intervene in these proceedings and challenge the proponent
of the will to give it in solemn form.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
It is true that in that suit Ramaratnam claims the property of
Ratnavelu Mudaliar in derogation of the settlement deed
executed in favour of Amaravathi Ammal. In other words,
he claims title paramount to Amaravathi Ammal and
contends that the testament executed by Amaravathi Ammal
in respect of the properties settled upon her by her husband
cannot affect him. If the more liberal interpretation which I
have put upon Section 283(1)(c) is correct, inasmuch as
Ramaratnam claims an interest in the estate in respect of
which Amaravathi Ammal is alleged to have executed the
testament, he would be a person entitled to a citation.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relied
upon a Division Bench ruling of Ramesam and Cornish, JJ.,
reported in Komalngiammal v. Sowbhagiammal, ILR 54
Mad 24 = (AIR 1931 Mad 37) in support of the proposition
that the interest which entitles a person to lodge a caveat in
an application for the probate of a Will must be an interest in
the estate of the deceased, that is to say, there must be no
dispute as to the title of the deceased to the estate. It is true
that this ruling would entail the dismissal of Ramaratnam’s
caveat because he claims title paramount and is not
possessed of any interest in the estate of the deceased
entitling him to oppose the grant of probate. But with great
respect, I must say I am unable to follow this ruling, because
it is in direct conflict with an earlier Division Bench ruling
13
of this court reported in Hanmantha Rao v. Latchamma, ILR
49 Mad 960 = (AIR 1926 Mad 1193). There, Devadoss and
Waller, JJ. construed the meaning of Section 69 of the
Probate and Administration Act which ran as follows:
“In all cases it shall be lawful for the District Judge, if
he thinks fit, to issue citations calling upon all persons
claiming to have any interest in the estate of the
deceased to come and see the proceedings before the
grant of probate or letters of administration.”
It may be noticed that Section 69 of the Probate and
Administration Act, is identical with Section 283(1)(c) of the
Indian Succession Act. Their Lordships, while construing
Section 69 of the Act, observed as follows:
“The words of Section 69 are ‘claiming to have any
interest in the estate of the deceased’. There is
nothing in the wording of the section to show that the
caveator should claim interest through the testator.
All that is necessary to entitle a person to enter caveat
is to claim interest in the estate of the deceased. The
words “interest in the estate” do not necessarily
convey the idea that the interest should be claimed
through the testator. If that was the intention of the
Legislature, the clause could have been differently
worded so as to make the meaning clear.”
In support of this view, their Lordships quoted the
observations of Field J., in the matter of the petition of
Bhobosoonduri Dabee, ILR (1881) 6 Cal 460 to the
following effect:-
“As to the test of what constitutes a sufficient interest
to entitle any particular person to be made a party,
according to the view which I have already stated, I
think it comes to this that any person has a sufficient
interest who can show that he is entitled to maintain a
suit in respect of the property over which the probate
would have effect under the provisions of Section 242
of the Indian Succession Act.”
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11. In Krishna Kumar Birla v. Rajendra Singh Lodha and others
(2008) 4 SCC 300, a two-Judge Bench of this Court categorized
caveatable interest, referred to the dictionary meanings of the words
‘caveat’ and ‘interest’ and large number of precedents including
Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera (1990) 3
SCC 333, Kanwarjit Singh Dhillon v. Hardyal Singh Dhillon (2007)
11 SCC 357, Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal
(2008) 1 SCC 267 and held that the probate court exercises a limited
jurisdiction and is not concerned with the question of title. If the probate
is granted, an application for revocation can be filed. The Court then
noticed the judgments of Calcutta and Madras High Courts to which
reference has been made hereinabove and observed:
“77. To the same effect is a decision of the Calcutta High
Court in Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas.
As would appear from the discussions made hereinafter, the
said view, to our mind, is not entirely correct. A caveatable
interest was claimed therein on the basis of acquisition of a
subsequent interest from the daughter of the testator. The
District Judge held that he did not have a caveatable interest.
The Calcutta High Court, interpreting Section 283(1)( c ) of
the 1925 Act, held:
“… And ‘possibility of an interest’ does not apply to
possibility of a party filling a character which would give
him an interest but to the possibility of his having an interest
in the result of setting aside the will.”
As the caveator acquired an interest from the daughter, he
was said to have a caveatable interest.”
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The two-Judge Bench then referred to some judgments relating to
caveatable interest of the reversioners and held:
“84. Section 283 of the 1925 Act confers a discretion upon
the court to invite some persons to watch the proceedings.
Who are they? They must have an interest in the estate of the
deceased. Those who pray for joining the proceeding cannot
do so despite saying that they had no interest in the estate of
the deceased. They must be persons who have an interest in
the estate left by the deceased. An interest may be a wide
one but such an interest must not be one which would not
( sic ) have the effect of destroying the estate of the testator
itself. Filing of a suit is contemplated inter alia in a case
where a question relating to the succession of an estate
arises.
85. We may, by way of example notice that a testator
might have entered into an agreement of sale entitling the
vendee to file a suit for specific performance of contract. On
the basis thereof, however, a caveatable interest is not
created, as such an agreement would be binding both on the
executor, if the probate is granted, and on the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased, if the same is refused.
86. The propositions of law which in our considered view
may be applied in a case of this nature are:
( i ) To sustain a caveat, a caveatable interest must be
shown.
( ii ) The test required to be applied is: Does the claim
of grant of probate prejudice his right because it defeats
some other line of succession in terms whereof the
caveator asserted his right?
( iii ) It is a fundamental nature of a probate proceeding
that whatever would be the interest of the testator, the
same must be accepted and the rules laid down therein
must be followed. The logical corollary whereof would
be that any person questioning the existence of title in
respect of the estate or capacity of the testator to
dispose of the property by will on ground outside the
law of succession would be a stranger to the probate
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proceeding inasmuch as none of such rights can
effectively be adjudicated therein.”
However, the propositions culled out in paragraph 86 were
substantially diluted by making the following observations in paragraph
103:
“What would be the caveatable interest would, thus, depend
upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. No hard-and-
fast rule, as such, can be laid down. We have merely made
attempts to lay down certain broad legal principles.”
The Bench then discussed the judgments of Calcutta High Court
and observed:
“92. In the context of the laws governing inheritance and
succession, as they then stood, the widest possible meaning
to the term “interest” might have been given in a series of
decisions which the learned counsel for the appellants rely
upon ranging from Nobeen Chunder Sil to Radharaman
Chowdhuri v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarty so as to hold that
a caveat would be maintainable even at the instance of a
person who had been able to establish “some sort of
relationship” and howsoever distant he may be from the
deceased which per se cannot have any application after
coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Ordinarily,
therefore, a caveatable interest would mean an interest in the
estate of the deceased to which the caveator would otherwise
be entitled to, subject of course, to having a special interest
therein.
106. The decisions which were rendered prior to coming
into force of the Hindu Succession Act, thus, may not be of
much relevance. Now, if on the interpretation of law, as it
then stood, a reversioner or a distant relative who could have
succeeded to the interest of the testator was entitled to file a
caveat, they would not be now, as the law of inheritance and
succession is governed by a parliamentary Act.
17
109. It is in that backdrop the question which is required to
be posed is: Did the Calcutta High Court or the other High
Court opine that even a busybody or an interloper having no
legitimate concern in the outcome of the probate proceedings
would be entitled to lodge a caveat and oppose the probate?
The answer thereto, in our opinion, must be rendered in the
negative. If anybody and everybody including a busybody or
an interloper is found to be entitled to enter a caveat and
oppose grant of a probate, then Sections 283(1)( c ) and 284
of the 1925 Act would have been differently worded. Such
an interpretation would lead to an anomalous situation. It is,
therefore, not possible for us to accede to the submission of
the learned counsel that caveatable interest should be
construed very widely.
110. A caveatable interest is not synonymous with the word
“contention”. A “contention” can be raised only by a person
who has a caveatable interest. The dictionary meaning of
“contention”, therefore, in the aforementioned context
cannot have any application in a proceeding under the 1925
Act.”
12. A little later another two-Judge Bench expressed an apparently
contrary view in G. Gopal v. C. Baskar and others (2008) 10 SCC 489.
This is evinced from paragraph 5 of the judgment, which is reproduced
below:
“The only question that was agitated before us by Mr
Thiagarajan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
challenging the judgment of the High Court revoking the
probate granted in respect of the will executed by the
testator, was that the respondents having no caveatable
interest in the estate of the deceased, the application for
revocation filed by them could not be allowed. We are
unable to accept these submissions made by Mr Thiagarajan,
18
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant only for
the simple reason that admittedly the respondents were
grandchildren of the testator and they have claimed the
estate of the deceased on the basis of a settlement deed
executed by the testator himself which admittedly was
revoked by the testator. That being the position, we must
hold that the respondents had caveatable interest in the estate
of the testator and, therefore, they are entitled to be served
before the final order is passed. It is well settled that if a
person who has even a slight interest in the estate of the
testator is entitled to file caveat and contest the grant of
probate of the will of the testator.
(emphasis supplied)
13. It is thus evident that apparently conflicting views have been
expressed by coordinate Benches of this Court on the interpretation of the
expression “caveatable interest”. In Krishna Kumar Birla’s case, the
Bench did not approve the judgments of Calcutta High Court in
Bhobosoonduri Dabee’s case and Madras High Court in G.
Jayakumar’s case wherein it was held that any person having some
interest in the estate of the deceased can come forward and oppose the
grant of probate. As against this, in G. Gopal’s case, the dictum that a
person who is having a slight interest in the estate of the testator is
entitled to file caveat and contest the grant of probate has been reiterated.
This being the position, we feel that the issue deserves to be considered
and decided by a larger Bench.
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14. The Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon’ble the
Chief Justice for appropriate order.
….………………….…J.
[G.S. Singhvi]
….………………….…J.
[C.K. Prasad]
New Delhi
March 10, 2010.