Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1289 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1585 of 2007)
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka …Appellants
Lokayuktha and Anr.
Versus
B. Srinivas …Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court accepting the
petition filed by the respondent under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’). Prayer
in the petition was to quash the order dated 12.6.2000 passed
by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha and
investigation pursuant to the said order, including lodging of
the first information report.
3. At the relevant point of time the respondent was working
as an Engineer-in-Chief of Rural Development Engineering
Department, Bangalore. The Lokayuktha police had
registered a case in respect of offences punishable under
Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act’).
4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Search was conducted in the house of the respondent on
th th
15 /16 June, 2000 and certain records and documents were
seized. Documents relating to the respondent, his son-in-law,
his daughter and son were seized. The Superintendent of
Police had authorized the Inspector of Police to conduct
investigation. The petition was filed essentially on three
grounds; firstly, the authorization given by the Superintendent
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of Police to conduct the investigation was contrary to the view
expressed by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v.
Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). The basis for
such stand was that no reason had been indicated as to why it
was entrusted to the Inspector. When the petition was finally
heard in the year 2006, second stand taken was that there
was inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the charge sheet. The
High Court accepted both the stands and quashed the
proceedings. The third stand was that exaggerated figures
were shown in the chargesheet. This aspect does not appear
to have been dealt with by the High Court. It, however,
permitted the prosecution to take action on the facts afresh
keeping in view certain aspects referred to in the judgment.
5. In support of the appeal, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned
counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court
erroneously exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code.
When the petition was initially filed, there was no question of
any delay. An amendment had been sought for in the petition
and prayer was to quash the order passed by the
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Superintendent of Police and further part of the investigation
done by the Inspector of Police-respondent No.2. It is pointed
out that the High Court erroneously observed that there was
delay in filing the charge sheet. In any event, the delay was
occasioned on account of the part played by the respondent
and delay, if any, alone cannot be a ground to quash the
legitimate proceedings. Further, it is pointed out that the High
Court has erroneously held that no reasons were indicated.
Reference is made in the order passed by the Superintendent
of Police to contend that reasons in fact had been indicated.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that though the High Court has not specifically referred to this
aspect, the fact that after completing investigation the amount
of alleged disproportionate asset which was initially stated to
be more than one crore has been sealed down substantially
cannot be lost sight of. Further, it is submitted that delay
itself can be a ground to quash the proceedings. It is also
submitted that the High Court has rightly observed that
reasons are not discernible from the order passed by the
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Superintendent of Police while authorizing investigation by the
Inspector.
7. We shall first deal with the question of alleged delay. It
is of some significance to note that an FIR was lodged on
12.6.2000 and few days thereafter the petition under Section
482 was filed. On the basis of FIR the house of respondent
th th
was searched on 15 and 16 June. The petition was filed on
11.7.2000. Application seeking permission to substitute
additional grounds was filed in the year 2005. It is not a case
where charge sheet had not been filed or that there was no
explanation for the delay. There is no general and wide
proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on
the part of the investigating agency in completing the
investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the
FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or
rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has
been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted
investigation would depend on various factors including
whether such a delay was reasonably long or caused
deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the
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accused or whether delay was inevitable in the nature of
things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the
accused. It would depend upon certain peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case i.e. the volume of evidence
collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of
the offence for which accused has been charge sheeted in a
given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above
factors is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the
accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of
protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to
establish that he had no role in the delay. Every delay does
not necessarily occur because of the accused.
8. A 7-Judge Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v.
State of Karnataka (2002 (4) SCC 578) affirmed the view taken
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC 225)
and clarified confusion created by certain observations in
‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of India (1996
(4) SCC 33), ‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of
India (1996 (6) SCC, 775), Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar
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(1998 (7) SCC 507) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar
(1999 (7) SCC 604). It was observed that the decision in A.R.
Antulay’s case (supra) still holds the field and the guidelines
laid down in said case are not exhaustive but only illustrative.
They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to
be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability
would depend on the factual situations of each case. It is
difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be
made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable nor
feasible nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an
outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings.
Whenever there is any allegation of violation of right to speedy
trial the Court has to perform by balancing the act by taking
into consideration all attending circumstances and to decide
whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given
case. As noted above, one month after the order relating to
investigation and lodging of FIR, a petition under Section 482
of Code was filed before the High Court.
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9. It is interesting to note that while the High Court
quashed the proceedings because of alleged delayed
investigation, it permitted the authorities to take decision to
continue the proceedings. Therefore, the first ground on
which the High Court interfered cannot be maintained.
10. The other question relates to the alleged deficiency in
authorization made by Superintendent of Police authorizing
the Inspector to investigate the case. The High Court placed
strong reliance on Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), more
particularly, in para 134. Though the High Court referred to
certain decisions of this Court, the decision in State of M.P.
and Ors. v. Ram Singh (2000 (5) SCC 88), was not followed. It
is to be noted that in Ram Singh’s case (supra) the view
expressed in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been explained
after referring to the relevant para.
11. The order passed by Superintendent of Police reads as
follows:
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“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
NO: KLA/PW/SP/City.Dn./99-2000 Superintendent of Police
City Division,
M.S. Buildings, Dr. Ambedkar
Veedhi, Bangalore-560 001.
Dated: 12th June, 2000.
M E M 0
Sub: Possession of Disproportionate Assets
to the known source of income by
Sri. B. Srinivasa, Engineer-in-chief,
Rural Development Engineering Department-reg.
Ref: Report of Sri. M.D. Khalander Presently
working as police Inspector, Police Wing,
City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta.
I have gone through the report of Sri. Md.
Khalander, presently working as Police Inspector, Police
Wing City division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore
relating to Inquiry report (IE) receipt of credible
information that Sri. B. Srinivas at present working as
Engineer-in-chief, Rural Development Engineering
Department has acquired properties disproportionate to
his known source of income to the extent of about Rs.
1,13,000,00/- and thereby committed offence U/s. 13
(12)(e) R/W. 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.
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From the materials placed before me with the
application of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie
case is made against Sri B. Srinivas U/s 13(1)(e) r/w 13
(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Therefore by virtue of the power vested in me, S.G.
Ramesh Superintendent of Police, Police Wing City
Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, order under
the provisions of S.C. 17 of the Prevention of corruption
Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander Police Inspector, Police
Wing City Dn. Karnataka Lokayukta Bangalore to
register a case U/s. 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the P.C.
Act, 1988 against Sri B Srinivas, Engineer-in-Chief,
Rural Development Engineering Department, Bangalore
and investigate the said case.
Further U/W.18 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander is authorised to inspect
the Bankers books, so far as it relates to money on
behalf of such person and take or cause to be taken
certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom and the
Bank concerned shall be bound to assist the Police
Inspector, Police wing City Dn., Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bangalore in the exercise of his powers under this
section.
To:
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M.D. Khalander Sd/-
Police Inspector, Superintendent
Police Wing, City Division, of Police, City
Division,
Bangalore Office of the Lokyukta
Bangalore.”
12. In Ram Singh’s case (supra) this Court indicated the
position lucidly after referring to Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) in
para 14. The same reads as follows:
“14. It may be noticed at this stage that a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in H.N.
Rishbud v. State of Delhi (AIR 1955 SC 196)
had held that a defect or illegality in
investigation, however serious, has no direct
bearing on the competence or the procedure
relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the
provisions of Sections 190, 193, 195 to 199
and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(1898) in the context of an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court
held:
“A defect or illegality in investigation, however
serious, has no direct bearing on the
competence or the procedure relating to
cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report
which results from an investigation is provided
in Section 190 Cr.P.C as the material on which
cognizance is taken. But it cannot be
maintained that a valid and legal police report
is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the
court to take cognizance. Section 190 Cr.P.C
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is one out of a group of sections under the
heading ‘Conditions requisite for initiation of
proceedings’. The language of this section is in
marked contrast with that of the other
sections of the group under the same heading,
i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.
These latter sections regulate the
competence of the court and bar its
jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in
compliance therewith. But Section 190 does
not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses ( a ),
( b ) and ( c ) of Section 190(1) are conditions
requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not
possible to say that cognizance on an invalid
police report is prohibited and is therefore a
nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall
either under clause ( a ) or ( b ) of Section 190(1),
(whether it is the one or the other we need not
pause to consider) and in any case cognizance
so taken is only in the nature of error in a
proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a
situation Section 537 CrPC which is in the
following terms is attracted:
‘Subject to the provisions
hereinbefore contained, no finding,
sentence or order passed by a court
of competent jurisdiction shall be
reversed or altered on appeal or
revision on account of any error,
omission or irregularity in the
complaint, summons, warrant,
charge, proclamation, order,
judgment or other proceedings
before or during trial or in any
inquiry or other proceedings under
this Code, unless such error,
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omission or irregularity, has in fact
occasioned a failure of justice.’
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a
police report vitiated by the breach of a
mandatory provision relating to investigation,
there can be no doubt that the result of the
trial which follows it cannot be set aside
unless the illegality in the investigation can be
shown to have brought about a miscarriage of
justice. That an illegality committed in the
course of investigation does not affect the
competence and the jurisdiction of the court
for trial is well settled as appears from the
cases in - ‘ Parbhu v. Emperor’(AIR 1944 PC (73)
and - ‘ Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. (AIR 1950 PC
26). ”
It further held:
“In our opinion, therefore, when
such a breach is brought to the
notice of the court at an early stage
of the trial, the court will have to
consider the nature and extent of
the violation and pass appropriate
orders for such reinvestigation as
may be called for, wholly or partly,
and by such officer as it considers
appropriate with reference to the
requirements of Section 5-A of the
Act. It is in the light of the above
considerations that the validity or
otherwise of the objection as to the
violation of Section 5(4) of the Act
has to be decided and the course to
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be adopted in these proceedings,
determined.”
In Bhajan Lal case (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
this Court had found on facts that the SP had
passed the order mechanically and in a very
casual manner regardless of the settled
principles of law. The provisions of Section 17
of the Act had not been complied with. As
earlier noticed the SP while authorising the
SHO to investigate had made only an
endorsement to the effect “Please register the
case and investigate”. The SP was shown to be
not aware either of the allegations or the
nature of the offences and the pressure of the
workload requiring investigation by an
Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in
cases against the respondents in these
appeals, even in the absence of the authority
of the SP the investigating officer was in law
authorised to investigate the offence falling
under Section 13 of the Act with the exception
of one as is described under sub-section (1)( e )
of the Act. After registration of the FIR the
Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals
is shown to be aware and conscious of the
allegations made against the respondents, the
FIR registered against them and pending
investigations. The order passed by the SP in
the case of Ram Singh on 12-12-1994 with
respect to a crime registered in 1992 was to
the effect:
“In exercise of powers conferred by
the provisions on me, under Section
17 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, I, P.K. Runwal,
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Superintendent of Police, Special
Police Establishment, Division I,
Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior
Division, Gwalior (M.P.), authorised
Shri D.S. Rana, Inspector (SPE),
Lak-Gwl (M.P.) to investigate Crime
No. 103 of 1992 under Sections 13
(1)( e ), 23(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri
Ram Singh, DO, Excise, Batul
(M.P.).”
Similar orders have been passed in the other
two cases as well. The reasons for entrustment
of investigation to the Inspector can be
discerned from the order itself. The appellant
State is, therefore, justified in submitting that
the facts of Bhajan Lal case were
distinguishable as in the instant case the
Superintendent of Police appears to have
applied his mind and passed the order
authorising the investigation by an Inspector
under the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The reasons for entrustment of investigation
were obvious. The High Court should not have
liberally construed the provisions of the Act in
favour of the accused resulting in closure of
the trial of the serious charges made against
the respondents in relation to commission of
offences punishable under an Act legislated to
curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the
public officers. It is brought to our notice that
under similar circumstances the High Court
had quashed the investigation and consequent
proceedings in a case registered against Shri
Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal
Appeal No. 1754 of 1986 was filed in this
Court which was allowed on 27-9-1986 by
setting aside the order of the High Court with
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a direction to the trial court to proceed with
the case in accordance with law and in the
light of the observations made therein.”
13. If one looks at the order passed, which formed the
subject matter of challenge in Ram Singh’s case (supra) it is
crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the
Superintendent of Police is more elaborate and as rightly
submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons
are clearly discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of Section
19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost
sight of by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the
High Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance.
14. The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by the
High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would
be in the interest of justice if the trial is completed on the
basis of the charge sheet filed as early as practicable
preferably by the end of February, 2009.
15. The appeal is allowed.
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……….………….……………….J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
………………….…………………J.
(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
August 18, 2008
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