Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board vs. Penjarla Vijay Kumar

2025 INSC 1452
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEALS NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.8684-8688 OF 2024]
TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT BOARD
1
…APPELLANT
VERSUS
PENJARLA VIJAY KUMAR & ORS. ETC. …RESPONDENTS
[ Respondents in Civil Appeal No._______ of 2025 @ SLP (C)
No.8684/2025 ]
R1: PENJARLA VIJAY KUMAR
R2: GANDU VIKRAM GOUD
R3: KAPPERA CHANDRAIAH
R4: THIRUNAGARI MURALI KRISHNA
R5: NALLAGONI SAGAR
R6: KARIJALA ANIL
R7: GUJJA MAHESH
R8: THONDA MALLESH
R9: KAVALI SADANANDAM
R10: MUTHINENI YAKANNA
R11: CHITYALA NAVEEN
R12: SARIKONDA GANESH KUMAR
R13: KADARI SRINIVAS
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2025.12.18
17:05:03 IST
Reason:
R14: KETHAVATH BHARATH
1
Common Appellant in all the appeals emanating from Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No.8684-
8688/2024.
1

R15: SUGURU SHIVUDU
R16: PALLELA VEERAIAH
R17: SHEIK RIYAZ
R18: SHEIK FAYAZ
R19: KETHAVATH HANUMA NAIK
R20: MAJLIKARJUN
R21: OSMAN
R22: DURGAM PRAVEEN KUMAR
R23: NAREDLU VENKATESH
R24: PATTIPATI MAHESH
R25: DUNN SAIKUMAR
R26: BATTHULA VENKATESH
R27: KOLA ROHITH
R28: G JAYARAMUDU
R29: BANDLA SANDEEP
R30: KANDRESAI CHARAN
R31: KYADASI KIRAN KUMAR
R32: REDDY PAVAN
R33: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY HOME DEPARTMENT
[ Respondents in Civil Appeal No._______ of 2025 @ SLP (C)
No.8685/2025 ]
R1: MANGA SHIVUDU
R2: K SRINIVAS
R3: GUGULOTH RAMESH
R4: KADEM SAIKIRAN
R5: CHIKKUDU PRASAD
R6: GANDA SIRI MAHESH
R7: MD MAZAHAR
2

R8: JETTY SAI KRISHNA
R9: KUMMARI KRISHNA
R10: SHAIK RAFI
R11: BONKURU SRINIVASULU
R12: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT HOME DEPARTMENT
[ Respondents in Civil Appeal No._______ of 2025 @ SLP (C)
No.8686/2025 ]
R1: GUMMA GANGARAJU
R2: THE STATE OF TELANGANA, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT
[ Respondents in Civil Appeal No._______ of 2025 @ SLP (C)
No.8687/2025 ]
R1: MOHAMMAD SADDAM HUSSAIN
R2: PESARI KARTHIK
R3: BANOTHU SANTHOSH KUMAR
R4: KUNCHAM ADITYA
R5: ANKURI LAVAKUMAR
R6: SOMIDI VENKATESH
R7: KETHAVATH HANMANTHU
R8: PANDYALA RAMESH
R9: GUNDU NAGENDRABABU
R10: SAPAVAT GOPAL
R11: ANUPATI NARESH
R12: DHURUMUTLA MADHU
R13: KISHAN VADTHYA
R14: BARLA ANIL KUMAR
R15: CHINAPANGU VINODKUMAR
3

R16: ARUTLA ADITYA
R17: GADIGE SRIKANTH
R18: CHIKATI SRINU
R19: MANDALL SATHEESH
R20: NAKKA VIJAY KUMAR
R21: RAPARTHI RAJU
R22: JANAGARI ASHOK
R23: DONTHULA RAVI
R24: MOLUGU SRIKANTH KUMAR
R25: YERRA RAJU
R26: VENKANNA DARAVATH
R27: PILLI SURYA PRAKASH
R28: MOGILL RAVI
R29: JADALA UPENDRABABU
R30: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVT, HOME DEPARTMENT
[ Respondents in Civil Appeal No._______ of 2025 @ SLP (C)
No.8688/2025 ]
R1: K. RAMESH
R2: NENAVATH ASHOK NAIK
R3: A. KRUSHNAIAH
R4: KOLA KRISHNA
R5: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME DEPARTMENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. __ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2025]
4

2
[@DIARY NO.12553/2024]
RAMAVATH SURESH AND ORS. ETC. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
PENJARLA VIJAY KUMAR AND ORS ETC. …RESPONDENTS
[ Parties in C.A. No.______ of 2025 @ SLP (C) No.________ of 2025 @
D.No. 12553 of 2024 against W.A. No. 877 of 2023 ]
A1: RAMAVATH SURESH
A2: LAKAVATH JEETHENDAR
A3: KONDA KOMARELLI
A4: CH. KUMAR
A5: SAPAVAT RAMARAO
A6: RAVULA KRANTHI
A7: BOBBILI PRANAY KUMAR
A8: JITENDER REDDY
A9: SURIGI SUDHAKAR
A10: GURRAM SATEESH
A11: BANDARI KALYAN
A12: PERA LAXMI NARAYANA
A13: NAGULA RANJITH
A14: THEEGALA VENKATA SAI
A15: GUNDA SRINIVAS
A16: MANCHALA KARTHEEK
A17: VILASAGARAPU HARISH
A18: MYADARABOINA YOHAN
A19: POTHARAVENI PRASHANTH
A20: THEDLA RAMCHANDAR
A21: K RAGHUNANDHAN GOUD
2
Directed against the Impugned Judgment in W.A. Nos.877, 972, 973, 974 & W.A.(SR) No.38269 of
2023.
5

A22: MUSINI RAMESH
A23: JANAPATI RAMESH
A24: BHUKYA VEERANNA
A25: KESUPAKA RAGHURAM
A26: PERNI NARESH
A27: AMMULA RAMESH
A28: BOLLOJU VENKATESWARA RAO
A29: KASANI SRIKANTH
A30: BANALA NARESH
A31: V. SAI RAM
A32: NAGARABOINA NAVEEN
A33: MD. SALEEM
A34: KOYYADA SATHEESH
A35: JANGAM RAJU
A36: G. RAJENDER GOUD
A37: KORRA SURESH
A38: PALLAPU SAI KUMAR
A39: KAVERI BANESH
A40: V. MOTILAL
VERSUS
R1: PENJARLA VIJAY KUMAR
R2: GANDU VIKRAM GOUD
R3: KAPPERA CHANDRAIAH
R4: THIRUNAGARI MURALI KRISHNA
R5: NALLAGONI SAGAR
R6: KARIJALA ANIL
R7: GUJJA MAHESH
R8: THONDA MALLESH
R9: KAVALI SADANANDAM
R10: MUTHINENI YAKANNA
6

R11: CHITYALA NAVEEN
R12: SARIKONDA GANESH KUMAR
R13: KADARI SRINIVAS
R14: KETHAVATH BHARATH
R15: SUGURU SHIVUDU
R16: PALLELA VEERAIAH
R17: SHEIK RIYAZ
R18: SHEIK FAYAZ
R19: KETHAVATH HANUMA NAIK
R20: MALLIKARJUN
R21: OSMAN
R22: DURGAM PRAVEEN KUMAR
R23: NAREDLU VENKATESH
R24: PATTIPATI MAHESH
R25: DUNN SAIKUMAR
R26: BATTHULA VENKATESH
R27: KOLA ROHITH
R28: G JAYARAMUDU
R29: BANDLA SANDEEP
R30: KANDRE SAI CHARAN
R31: KYADASI KIRAN KUMAR
R32: REDDY PAVAN
R33: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT
R34: THE TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT
BOARD
[Parties in C.A. No. _____ of 2025 @ SLP (C) No. _____ of 2025 @
D.No.12553 of 2024 against W.A. No.972 of 2023]
A1: RAMAVATH SURESH
7

A2: LAKAVATH JEETHENDAR
A3: KONDA KOMARELLI
A4: CH. KUMAR
A5: SAPAVAT RAMARAO
A6: RAVULA KRANTHI
A7: BOBBILI PRANAY KUMAR
A8: JITENDER REDDY
A9: SURIGI SUDHAKAR
A10: GURRAM SATEESH
A11: BANDARI KALYAN
A12: PERA LAXMI NARAYANA
A13: NAGULA RANJITH
A14: THEEGALA VENKATA SAI
A15: GUNDA SRINIVAS
A16: MANCHALA KARTHEEK
A17: VILASAGARAPU HARISH
A18: MYADARABOINA YOHAN
A19: POTHARAVENI PRASHANTH
A20: THEDLA RAMCHANDAR
A21: K RAGHUNANDHAN GOUD
A22: MUSINI RAMESH
A23: JANAPATI RAMESH
A24: BHUKYA VEERANNA
A25: KESUPAKA RAGHURAM
A26: PERNI NARESH
A27: AMMULA RAMESH
A28: BOLLOJU VENKATESWARA RAO
A29: KASANI SRIKANTH
A30: BANALA NARESH
A31: V. SAI RAM
8

A32: NAGARABOINA NAVEEN
A33: MD. SALEEM
A34: KOYYADA SATHEESH
A35: JANGAM RAJU
A36: G. RAJENDER GOUD
A37: KORRA SURESH
A38: PALLAPU SAI KUMAR
A39: KAVERI BANESH
A40: V. MOTILAL
VERSUS
R1: MANGA SHIVUDU
R2: K SRINIVAS
R3: GUGULOTH RAMESH
R4: KADEM SAIKIRAN
R5: CHIKKUDU PRASAD
R6: GANDA SIRI MAHESH
R7: MD. MAZAHAR
R8: JETTY SAI KRISHNA
R9: KUMMARI KRISHNA
R10: SHAIK RAFI
R11: BONKURU SRINIVASULU
R12: THE STATE OF TELANGANA
R13: THE TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT
BOARD
[Parties in C.A. No._____ of 2025 @ SLP (C) No. _____ of 2025 @ D.
No. 12553 of 2024 against W.A. No.973 of 2023]
A1: RAMAVATH SURESH
A2: LAKAVATH JEETHENDAR
A3: KONDA KOMARELLI
9

A4: CH. KUMAR
A5: SAPAVAT RAMARAO
A6: RAVULA KRANTHI
A7: BOBBILI PRANAY KUMAR
A8: JITENDER REDDY
A9: SURIGI SUDHAKAR
A10: GURRAM SATEESH
A11: BANDARI KALYAN
A12: PERA LAXMI NARAYANA
A13: NAGULA RANJITH
A14: THEEGALA VENKATA SAI
A15: GUNDA SRINIVAS
A16: MANCHALA KARTHEEK
A17: VILASAGARAPU HARISH
A18: MYADARABOINA YOHAN
A19: POTHARAVENI PRASHANTH
A20: THEDLA RAMCHANDAR
A21: K RAGHUNANDHAN GOUD
A22: MUSINI RAMESH
A23: JANAPATI RAMESH
A24: BHUKYA VEERANNA
A25: KESUPAKA RAGHURAM
A26: PERNI NARESH
A27: AMMULA RAMESH
A28: BOLLOJU VENKATESWARA RAO
A29: KASANI SRIKANTH
A30: BANALA NARESH
A31: V. SAI RAM
A32: NAGARABOINA NAVEEN
A33: MD. SALEEM
10

A34: KOYYADA SATHEESH
A35: JANGAM RAJU
A36: G. RAJENDER GOUD
A37: KORRA SURESH
A38: PALLAPU SAI KUMAR
A39: KAVERI BANESH
A40: V. MOTILAL
VERSUS
R1: GUMMA GANGARAJU
R2: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY HOME DEPARTMENT
R3: THE TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT BOARD
[Parties in C.A. No. _____ of 2025 @ SLP (C) No. _____ of 2025 @ D.
No. 12553 of 2024 against W.A. No.974 of 2023]
A1: RAMAVATH SURESH
A2: LAKAVATH JEETHENDAR
A3: KONDA KOMARELLI
A4: CH. KUMAR
A5: SAPAVAT RAMARAO
A6: RAVULA KRANTHI
A7: BOBBILI PRANAY KUMAR
A8: JITENDER REDDY
A9: SURIGI SUDHAKAR
A10: GURRAM SATEESH
A11: BANDARI KALYAN
A12: PERA LAXMI NARAYANA
A13: NAGULA RANJITH
A14: THEEGALA VENKATA SAI
A15: GUNDA SRINIVAS
11

A16: MANCHALA KARTHEEK
A17: VILASAGARAPU HARISH
A18: MYADARABOINA YOHAN
A19: POTHARAVENI PRASHANTH
A20: THEDLA RAMCHANDAR
A21: K RAGHUNANDHAN GOUD
A22: MUSINI RAMESH
A23: JANAPATI RAMESH
A24: BHUKYA VEERANNA
A25: KESUPAKA RAGHURAM
A26: PERNI NARESH
A27: AMMULA RAMESH
A28: BOLLOJU VENKATESWARA RAO
A29: KASANI SRIKANTH
A30: BANALA NARESH
A31: V. SAI RAM
A32: NAGARABOINA NAVEEN
A33: MD. SALEEM
A34: KOYYADA SATHEESH
A35: JANGAM RAJU
A36: G. RAJENDER GOUD
A37: KORRA SURESH
A38: PALLAPU SAI KUMAR
A39: KAVERI BANESH
A40: V. MOTILAL
VERSUS
R1: MOHAMMAD SADDAM HUSSAIN
R2: PESARI KARTHIK
R3: BANOTHU SANTHOSH KUMAR
R4: KUNCHAM ADITYA
12

R5: ANKURI LAVAKUMAR
R6: SOMIDI VENKATESH
R7: KETHAVATH HANMANTHU
R8: PANDYALA RAMESH
R9: GUNDU NAGENDRABABU
R10: SAPAVAT GOPAL
R11: ANUPATI NARESH
R12: DHURUMUTLA MADHU
R13: KISHAN VADTHYA
R14: BARLA ANIL KUMAR
R15: CHINAPANGU VINODKUMAR
R16: ARUTLA ADITYA
R17: GADIGE SRIKANTH
R18: CHIKATI SRINU
R19: MANDALL SATHEESH
R20: NAKKA VIJAY KUMAR
R21: RAPARTHI RAJU
R22: JANAGARI ASHOK
R23: DONTHULA RAVI
R24: MOLUGU SRIKANTH KUMAR
R25: YERRA RAJU
R26: VENKANNA DARAVATH
R27: PILLI SURYA PRAKASH
R28: MOGILL RAVI
R29: JADALA UPENDRABABU
R30: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVT, HOME DEPARTMENT
R31: THE TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT
BOARD
13

[Parties in C.A. No. _____ of 2025 @ SLP (C) No. _____ of 2025 @ D.
No. 12553 of 2024 against W.A. No.38269 of 2023]
A1: RAMAVATH SURESH
A2: LAKAVATH JEETHENDAR
A3: KONDA KOMARELLI
A4: CH. KUMAR
A5: SAPAVAT RAMARAO
A6: RAVULA KRANTHI
A7: BOBBILI PRANAY KUMAR
A8: JITENDER REDDY
A9: SURIGI SUDHAKAR
A10: GURRAM SATEESH
A11: BANDARI KALYAN
A12: PERA LAXMI NARAYANA
A13: NAGULA RANJITH
A14: THEEGALA VENKATA SAI
A15: GUNDA SRINIVAS
A16: MANCHALA KARTHEEK
A17: VILASAGARAPU HARISH
A18: MYADARABOINA YOHAN
A19: POTHARAVENI PRASHANTH
A20: THEDLA RAMCHANDAR
A21: K RAGHUNANDHAN GOUD
A22: MUSINI RAMESH
A23: JANAPATI RAMESH
A24: BHUKYA VEERANNA
A25: KESUPAKA RAGHURAM
A26: PERNI NARESH
A27: AMMULA RAMESH
A28: BOLLOJU VENKATESWARA RAO
14

A29: KASANI SRIKANTH
A30: BANALA NARESH
A31: V. SAI RAM
A32: NAGARABOINA NAVEEN
A33: MD. SALEEM
A34: KOYYADA SATHEESH
A35: JANGAM RAJU
A36: G. RAJENDER GOUD
A37: KORRA SURESH
A38: PALLAPU SAI KUMAR
A39: KAVERI BANESH
A40: V. MOTILAL
VERSUS
R1: K. RAMESH
R2: NENAVATH ASHOK NAIK
R3: A. KRUSHNAIAH
R4: KOLA KRISHNA
R5: THE STATE OF TELANGANA REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME DEPARTMENT
R6: THE TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT BOARD
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Delay condoned in Diary No.12553/2024.
15

2. I.A. No.74279/2024 seeking permission to file Special Leave Petitions
is allowed in Diary No.12553/2024.
3. Leave granted in all petitions.
4. By way of the instant appeals, challenge is laid to the common Final
Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2023 in WA No.877/2023 (against WP
No.8571/2023), WA No.972/2023 (against WP No.8927/2023), WA
No.973/2023 (against WP No.2365 of 2023), WA No.974/2023 (against WP
No.6914/2023) and WA(SR) No.38269/2023 (against WP No.8988/2023)
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) passed by a learned
Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’), whereby the Writ Appeals filed
by the Appellant have been dismissed, affirming the Common Order dated
30.06.2023 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ
Petitions No.8571, 8927, 2365, 6914 and 8988 of 2023. Though from the
record it transpires that Writ Petitions No.7834, 7872, 8345, 8354, 8360,
8368, 8390, 8566, 8825, 8856 and 8859 of 2023 were also disposed of in
similar terms as Writ Petitions No.8571, 8927, 2365, 6914 and 8988 of
2023 by the Single Judge, but writ appeals thereagainst were not preferred.
16

The reasons, we have been informed by learned counsel for the Appellant,
are that before such appeals could be filed, the Judgment impugned was
rendered by the Division Bench.
5. The first batch of Civil Appeals arising from SLP (Civil) Nos.8684-
8688/2024 is directed against the Impugned Judgment of the Division
Bench affirming the Judgment passed by the Single Judge, by which the
underlying writ petitions filed by persons who claimed eligibility on the
3
ground that though their driving licences had expired within a period which
was two years prior to the date of Notification in continuity but who had got
the same renewed after some gap, were allowed, holding them eligible for
the recruitment process in question, whereas the Civil Appeals emanating
from Diary No.12553 of 2024 are by persons challenging the Impugned
Judgment, who possessed valid driving licences continuously for a period
of two years prior to the date of the Notification(s), without any intervening
disqualification/expiry.
3
We must clarify here that we have utilised both variants of the word in question, that is, ‘ licence ’ as also
‘ license ’ and their plurals, in this Judgment.
17

6. As the core issue involved is the same, these Civil Appeals are dealt
with collectively. For the sake of convenience, facts in the Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (C) Nos.8684-8688 of 2024 are noticed.
FACTUAL OVERVIEW:
7. Briefly stated, the material facts are that on 25.04.2022 the
Appellant/Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board issued a
Recruitment Notification to fill up 100 posts of Stipendiary Cadet Trainee
(SCT) Police Constable (Drivers) (Men) in the Police Transport
Organization. The Appellant issued another Notification dated 20.05.2022
to fill up 225 posts of Driver Operator in the Telangana State Disaster
Response and Fire Services Department. In all, 325 posts of Drivers, as
above, were notified to be recruited. One of the essential qualifications
stipulated in the Notification dated 25.04.2022 was that the candidate must
have possessed either Light Motor Vehicle, LMV (Transport with Badge
Number) or Heavy Motor Vehicle licence (HMV Licence), or both together,
continuously for a period of full two years and above as on the date of the
Notification and similar condition in Notification dated 20.05.2022 was that
18

one must have possessed valid HMV Licence continuously for a period of
two years and above as on date of the Notification.
8. The selection method consisted of skill test for 100 marks and written
examination for 200 marks. Skill test was conducted between 02.03.2023
to 24.03.2023 and only those who had valid driving licences were allowed
to participate in the written examination which was supposed to be held on
02.04.2023.
9. The private respondents were not allowed to participate in the written
examination as they were not holding driving licences valid continuously for
two years as on the date of the said Notifications due to which the private
respondents approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition No.8571 of
2023 and analogous cases. The learned Single Judge by interim Orders
dated 13.03.2023 and 28.03.2023 directed the Appellant to allow the
private respondents who had renewed their driving licences within one year
from the dates of expiry of their driving licences to participate in the future
selection process of driving test and final written examination, but not to
announce the results.
19

10. On 30.06.2023, the learned Single Judge allowed Writ Petition
No.8571 of 2023 and analogous cases holding that there was no break in
holding the driving licences, since post-renewal the validity of the licences
take place from their dates of expiry and not dates of renewal. The learned
Single Judge directed the Appellant to consider the candidatures of the
private respondents by treating them as having valid driving licences for a
continuous period of two years and to declare their results and then to
proceed further in the selection process, in accordance with merit and in
accordance with the terms and conditions as stipulated in the Notifications.
11. Against the Final Judgment/Order of the learned Single Judge dated
30.06.2023, the Appellant filed Writ Appeals No.877/2023, 972/2023,
973/2023, 974/2023 and WA(SR) No.38269/2023 before the Division
Bench. By way of the Impugned Judgment, the Division Bench dismissed
the Writ Appeals filed by appellant.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
12. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that, pre-
amendment, the proviso to Section 14 of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
20

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1988 Act’) provided that the licence shall
continue to be effective for 30 days after expiry. Further, Section 15(1) of
the 1988 Act provided that if an application for renewal is made within 30
days after the expiry of the licence, it may be renewed from the date of
expiry. However, the first proviso to Section 15(1) of the 1988 Act stated
that if the application was made after 30 days from the date of expiry, then
the renewal shall be from the date of such renewal.
13. Learned senior counsel contended that the 1988 Act was amended
by Parliament by passing Act No.32 of 2019 being The Motor Vehicles
(Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Amendment Act,
2019’). Relevant provisions of the Amendment Act, 2019 came into force on
01.09.2019, having been published in the Official Gazette on 09.08.2019,
whereby the proviso to Section 15(1) of the 1988 Act was amended to the
effect that the renewal shall be deemed to be effective from the date of the
renewal and not from the date of expiry, in the event the application for
renewal is made either one year prior to the date of its expiry or within one
year after the date of its expiry.
21

14. Learned senior counsel submitted that if the application for renewal is
made one year prior to the date of its expiry or within one year after the
date of its expiry, the renewal date shall be deemed to be the date of actual
renewal. It was submitted that through the Amendment Act, 2019, the
Legislature has removed the grace period of 30 days, as noted
hereinbefore. The proviso to Section 14 of the 1988 Act, which stated that
the licence shall continue to be effective for 30 days after its expiry was
deleted by the Amendment Act, 2019. Therefore, the post-amendment
language adopted by the Legislature is clear and unambiguous; that the
actual date of renewal shall be the effective date in all cases where the
application is made either one year prior to date of expiry or within one year
after the date of expiry, with the only distinction that if the application to
renew the licence is made after one year from the date of its expiry, the
authority shall refuse to renew the licence, unless fresh test of competence
is undertaken by the applicant concerned.
15. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant argued that the Amendment
Act, 2019 does not extend the 30 days grace-period, which was earlier
provided, to one year. In fact, through the amendment, the Legislature has
completely changed the language with the intent not to allow any grace
22

period for drivers to drive with expired licences. Therefore, to construe the
one-year period in the amended Section 15 of the 1988 Act as a liberty to
drive even after expiry of licence is a flawed and distorted interpretation of
law. It was urged that adopting such interpretation would be against the
legislative intent.
16. Learned senior counsel emphasised that in the pre-amendment
situation, there existed a grace period of 30 days after the expiry of the
driving licence in terms of the proviso to Section 14 of the 1988 Act.
Further, if the renewal application was made before 30 days from the expiry
of the licence, the date of renewal may be counted from the date of expiry,
however, if the application is made after 30 days from the date of expiry of
the licence, the renewal was deemed valid from the date of renewal.
Reliance was placed on the following cases:
a) Order dated 24.04.2025 in The Divisional Manager New India
Assurance Company Ltd. v Shaanabasappa & Ors. , Special Leave
4
Petition (Civil) Nos.19830-19832 of 2022 [passed by this Court] :
‘ 7. The provision of Section 15(1) of the Act is very clear
and it provides for the renewal of driving licenses. It lays
down that a licensing authority may, on an application
made to it, renew a driving license issued under the Act
from date from its expiry. But the first proviso to the
4
Where one of us, Hon. S. V. N. Bhatti, J., was part of the coram .
23

above provision clearly states that where application for
renewal of a license is not made within the prescribed
period of 30 days or is made after the expiry of 30 days,
the driving license shall be renewed with effect from the
date of its renewal. ’
b) Ram Babu Tiwari v United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2008) 8 SCC
165 :
‘ 16. Section 15 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for
renewal of a driving license. Sub-section (1) of Section
15 and the first proviso appended thereto read as under:
“15. Renewal of driving licenses— (1) Any
licensing authority may, on application made to
it, renew a driving license issued under the
provisions of this Act with effect from the date
of its expiry:
Provided that in any case where the
application for the renewal of a licence is
made more than thirty days after the date of its
expiry, the driving licence shall be renewed
with effect from the date of its renewal:
Provided further that where the application is
for the renewal of a licence to drive a transport
vehicle or where in any other case the
applicant has attained the age of forty years,
the same shall be accompanied by a medical
certificate in the same form and in the same
manner as is referred to in sub-section (3) of
Section 8, and the provisions of sub-section
(4) of Section 8 shall, so far as may be, apply
in relation to every such case as they apply in
relation to a learner's licence.”
xxx
18. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that only in the
event an application for renewal of licence is filed within
a period of 30 days from the date of expiry thereof, the
same would be renewed automatically which means that
even if an accident had taken place within the
24

aforementioned period, the driver may be held to be
possessing a valid licence. The proviso appended to
sub-section (1) of Section 15, however, clearly states
that the driving licence shall be renewed with effect from
the date of its renewal in the event the application for
renewal of a licence is made more than 30 days after the
date of its expiry. It is, therefore, evident that as on
renewal of the licence on such terms the driver of the
vehicle cannot be said to be holding a valid licence, the
insurer would not be liable to indemnify the insured.
19. The second proviso appended to sub-section (4) of
Section 15 is of no assistance to the appellant. It merely
enables the licensing authority to take a further test of
competent driving and passing thereof to its satisfaction
within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 9. It
does not say that the renewal would be automatic. It is,
therefore, a case where a breach of the contract of
insurance is established. This aspect of the matter has
been considered by this Court in National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Kusum Rai [(2006) 4 SCC 250: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri)
214] holding: (SCC p. 254, para 11)
“11. It has not been disputed before us that the
vehicle was being used as a taxi. It was,
therefore, a commercial vehicle. The driver of
the said vehicle, thus, was required to hold an
appropriate licence therefor. Ram Lal who
allegedly was driving the said vehicle at the
relevant time, as noticed hereinbefore, was
holder of a licence to drive a light motor
vehicle only. He did not possess any licence to
drive a commercial vehicle. Evidently,
therefore, there was a breach of condition of
the contract of insurance. The appellant,
therefore, could raise the said defence.”
It was furthermore held: (SCC p. 255, para 14)
“14. This Court in Swaran Singh [(2004) 3
SCC 297: 2004 SCC (Cri) 733: AIR 2004 SC
1531] clearly laid down that the liability of the
insurance company vis-à-vis the owner would
depend upon several factors. The owner
25

would be liable for payment of compensation
in a case where the driver was not having a
licence at all. It was the obligation on the part
of the owner to take adequate care to see that
the driver had an appropriate licence to drive
the vehicle.”
It was opined: (SCC p. 256, para 16)
“16. In a case of this nature, therefore, the
owner of a vehicle cannot contend that he has
no liability to verify the fact as to whether the
driver of the vehicle possessed a valid licence
or not.” ’
c) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v Suresh Chandra Aggarwal , (2009)
15 SCC 761 :
‘ 12. Before we deal with the rival contentions, it would be
appropriate to briefly refer to the relevant provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”). Section
3(1) of the Act inter alia stipulates that:
“3. Necessity for driving licence.—(1) No
person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public
place unless he holds an effective driving
licence issued to him authorising him to drive
the vehicle;”
xxx
16. Special Condition 5 reads as follows:
“5. Persons or classes of persons entitled to
drive.—
(a) The insured,
(b) Any other person who is driving on
the insured's order or with his permission:
Provided that the person driving holds or
had held and has not been disqualified from
holding an effective driving licence with all the
required endorsements thereon as per the
Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made
thereunder for the time being in force to drive
26

the category of motor vehicle insured
hereunder.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is manifest that the said condition contemplates that
apart from the insured, any other person, authorised by
the insured, could also drive the vehicle provided the
person driving the vehicle “holds or had held and has not
been disqualified” from holding an effective driving
licence. ’
d) Ishwar Chandra v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2007) 10 SCC 650 :
‘ 9. From a bare perusal of the said provision, it would
appear that the licence is renewed in terms of the said
Act and the rules framed thereunder. The proviso
appended to Section 15(1) of the Act in no uncertain
terms states that whereas the original licence granted
despite expiry remains valid for a period of 30 days from
the date of expiry, if any application for renewal thereof is
filed thereafter, the same would be renewed from the
date of its renewal. The accident took place 28-4-1995.
As on the said date, the renewal application had not
been filed, the driver did not have a valid license on the
date when the vehicle met with the accident. ’
17. Learned senior counsel summed up by canvassing that the
Notifications mandated that the candidate-drivers had to possess driving
licences continuously for the immediate previous two years from the dates
of the Notifications. As such, contended learned senior counsel, non-
renewal of licences by the applicants during the said time and the existence
of a time-gap between expiry and renewal made it apparent that the
applicants did not possess eligibility, in terms of the Notifications. It was
prayed that the appeals be allowed.
27

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:
18. Learned senior counsel for the private respondents, per contra ,
5
contended that a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amendment Act, 2019 would make it very clear that the law-makers were
conscious of the fact that delays occur in issuing driving licence and its
renewal. In order to overcome the same, it was submitted, a liberal view
5
‘ The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act), was enacted with a view to consolidate and amend the laws
relating to motor vehicles. The Act was enacted to give effect to the suggestions made by the Supreme
Court in M.K. Kunhimohammed Vs P. A. Ahmedkutty (1987) 4 SCC 284.
2. The Act was amended several times to adapt to the technological upgradation emerging in road
transport, passenger and freight movement and in motor vehicle management. With rapidly increasing
motorisation, India is facing an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The emotional and
social trauma caused to the family which loses its bread winner, cannot be quantified. India is signatory to
the Brasilia Declaration and is committed to reduce the number of road accident fatality by fifty per cent.
by the year 2020. The road transport sector also plays a major role in the economy of the country.
3. Numerous representations and recommendations in the form of grievances and suggestions from
various stakeholders have been received in the Ministry, citing cases of increase in road accidents, delay
in issue of driving licences, the disregard of traffic rules and regulations, etc. Therefore, in order to
improve road safety and transport system, certain amendments are required to be made in the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 to address safety and efficiency issues in the transport sector.
4. In view of the above, it has become necessary to amend certain provisions of the said Act. The
proposed Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Bill, 2019 seeks to address the issues relating to road safety,
citizen facilitation, strengthening public transport, automation and computerisation.
5. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Bill, 2019, inter alia, provides for the following, namely:—
(a) to facilitate grant of online learning licence;
(b) to replace the existing provisions of insurance with simplified provisions in order to provide
expeditious help to accident victims and their families;
(c) to increase the time limit for renewal of driving licence from one month to one year before and
after the expiry date;
(d) to increase the period for renewal of transport licence from three years to five years;
(e) to enable the licensing authority to grant licence even to the differently abled persons;
(f) to enable the States to promote public transport, rural transport and last mile connectivity by
relaxing any of the provisions of the Act pertaining to permits;
(g) to increase the fines and penalties for violation of provisions of the Act; and
(h) to make a provision for protection of Good Samaritans.
6. The Notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives. ’
(sic)
28

was taken by the law-makers and provision to increase the time limit for
renewal of driving licence from one month to six months before and after
the expiry date was taken into consideration and accordingly, the (earlier)
‘ thirty days ’ prescribed in the unamended Section 15 of the 1988 Act was
enhanced to ‘ one year ’ for renewal of driving licence. The learned Single
Judge has taken these factors into account and rightly concluded that the
private respondents were holding valid driving licences as on the date of
the said Notifications. Thus, the Writ Petitions were rightly allowed in favour
of the private respondents.
19. Learned senior counsel argued that since the private respondents,
who were having valid driving licences continuously had applied for
renewal thereof within one year of their driving licences having expired, the
time-gap in renewals ranging from 1 day to 294 days, all the private
respondents’ applications for renewal were within the period of one year
from the date of expiry in accordance with Section 15 of the 1988 Act, as
amended by the Amendment Act, 2019.
20. Learned senior counsel stressed that Clause 19(iv) of the Notification
dated 25.04.2022, stipulates that the candidates who qualify in the physical
29

efficiency test are to subsequently appear in and qualify a driving test. The
Chairman of the Appellant was to constitute a committee for conducting this
Test with Officers from Police Transport Organization, Road Transport
Corporation and Road Transport Authority. It specifies that candidates must
clear the test by obtaining minimum 50 out of 100 marks, which itself
reflects that irrespective of a candidate already holding a valid continuous
driving licence, the candidate must again qualify in the driving test. The
private respondents possessed driving experience for a considerable
period and having such experience, the Appellant ought not have rejected
the candidature of the private respondents at the very threshold. It was
urged that the appeals be visited with dismissals, upholding the Impugned
Judgment.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PRIVATE APPELLANTS IN THE CIVIL
APPEALS EMANATING FROM DIARY NO.12553 OF 2024:
21. The private appellants adopted the contentions urged by the
Appellant/Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
30

22. Having heard learned counsel for the contesting parties, perused the
records and considered the matters in depth, we are of the considered view
that the Judgment impugned warrants interference. We are, in the instant
batch of appeals, concerned with as to how the technical qualification with
regard to possessing either a LMV (Transport with Badge Number) or HMV
Licence, or both put together, continuously for a period of full two years and
above as on the date of the Notifications, is to be construed.
23. The Appellant’s categoric stand is that the stipulations in the
Notifications must be read to mean that the person/candidate possessed
the licence uninterruptedly without any break for at least two years prior to
the date(s) of the Notifications viz . 25.04.2022 and 20.05.2022. The
subsequent Notification dated 20.05.2022 is related to Drivers in the
Telangana State Disaster Response and Fire Services Department and the
technical qualification is possession of a valid HMV Licence continuously
for a period of two years and above as on the date of the Notification,
whereas in the Notification dated 25.04.2022, which was for the post of
Stipendiary Cadet Trainee (SCT) Police Constable (Drivers) (Men) in Police
31

Transport Organization, where it was either LMV (Transport with Badge
number) or HMV or both.
24. At this juncture, it is relevant to indicate that both sides are ad idem
on the issue that the licence possessed must be valid continuously for at
least two years prior to the date(s) of the Notifications and continuing.
However, the difference of opinion between both sides is whether a licence
which may have expired within the last two years followed by renewal
would automatically result in a situation, though deemed, where despite the
licence getting renewed post-facto, but from the date of its expiry, would
make it continuous in nature for the purposes of the recruitment in question
or otherwise. Thus, the core issue would be as to whether, during the
period when the licence expired and admittedly was renewed
subsequently, the said period should be condoned, upon renewal, so as to
bring it within the criterion of being a continuous licence for a full period of
two years prior to the date(s) of the Notifications.
25. It is important to quote the requirement, as set out in the Notifications
dated 25.04.2022 and 20.05.2022:
I. Notification dated 25.04.2022:
32

II. Notification dated 20.05.2022:

26. Sections 14 and 15 of the 1988 Act, before and after the Amendment
Act, 2019, are reproduced hereunder:
33

34

35

(emphasis supplied)
27. The relevant change brought about in Section 14 of 1988 Act by the
Amendment Act, 2019 is that the proviso (highlighted supra ) has been
36

omitted by the amendment. In Section 15 of the 1988 Act, by the
Amendment Act, 2019, the first proviso to sub-section (1) has been
modified. Earlier, in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15, after
the words, ‘ licence is made ’, the words ‘ more than 30 days after the date of
its expiry ’ occurred, which now has been changed to ‘ either one year prior
to the date of its expiry or within one year after the date of its expiry. ’
Another change effected is that in sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the 1988
Act, in place of the words ‘ thirty days ’, ‘ one year ’ has been substituted.
28. The last proviso to Section 14 of the 1988 Act which read ‘ Provided
that every driving licence shall, notwithstanding its expiry under this sub-
section, continue to be effective for a period of 30 days from such expiry ’
stood omitted by the Amendment Act, 2019.
29. Thus, going by the plain words of the statute, as is the first rule of
interpretation, it would mean that Section 14 of the 1988 Act, as it stands
today, does not provide for the licence to continue after its expiry even for a
single day; however, before the Amendment Act, 2019, the then-existing
proviso made the date extendable automatically by a further period of 30
days from the date of its expiry.
37

30. Moving on, Section 15 of the 1988 Act only extends the period by
which an expired licence would be renewed, meaning thereby, that the
same licence would continue, but is silent about what happens during the
interregnum i.e., after expiry but before renewal. The 1988 Act, as it stands
now, the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15, gives a window to a
person for renewal of his existing licence, which starts one year prior to the
date of the expiry of the licence and continues for one year post-expiry.
Earlier, before the Amendment Act, 2019, this period used to be only within
30 days of the date of expiry. Moreover, the stipulation in the said proviso
requiring the licence to be renewed with effect from the date of its renewal
remains unchanged. The changes made in sub-sections (3) and (4) of
Section 15 of the 1988 Act relate only to the fee payable for renewal, which
have no bearing on the present cases.
31. When Sections 14 and 15 of the 1988 Act are harmoniously
construed, keeping in mind the principles restated in A Raja v D Kumar ,
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033 , it is clear, to our minds, that a licence no

38

more automatically extends beyond the period of its expiry, as was
provided for in the unamended last proviso to Section 14 of the 1988 Act.
This deliberate omission by the Legislature cannot be labelled cosmetic. In
this regard, State of Uttar Pradesh v Malik Zarid Khalid , (1988) 1 SCC
145 is instructive:
‘ 10.  We are unable to accept the appellant's contention.
The interpretation placed by the Full Bench of the High
Court on Section 3(o) equates the position under the
statute after the amendment of 1976 to the position both
as it stood prior to the 1976 amendment and also as it
stood after the 1983 Ordinance. Such an approach fails
to give any effect at all to the change in language
deliberately introduced by the 1976 amendment. No
doubt, prior to the amendment, only buildings of which
the government was owner or landlord were excluded
from the Act. But the legislature clearly intended a
departure from the earlier position. If the intention was
merely to extend the benefit to premises owned or let out
by public corporations, it could have been achieved by
simply adding a reference to such corporations in
Section 2(1)(a) and (b) as they stood earlier. Reading
Section 2(1)(a) and (b) as they stood before amendment
and the definition in Section 3(o) side by side, the
departure in language is so wide and clear that it is
impossible to ignore the same and hold that the new
definition was just a re-enactment of the old exemption.
The exclusion was earlier restricted to buildings owned
by the government and buildings taken on lease or
requisitioned by government and granted by it by
creating a tenancy in favour of someone. The
amendment significantly omitted the crucial words
present in the earlier legislation which had the effect of
restricting the exclusion to tenancies created by the

(emphasis supplied)
39

government, either as owner or as landlord. Full effect
must be given to the new definition in Section 3(o) and to
the conscious departure in language in reframing the
exclusion.
xxx
14.  It is true that there are situations in which courts are
compelled to subordinate the plain meaning of statutory
language. Not unoften, courts do read down the plain
language of a provision or give it a restricted meaning,
where, to do otherwise may be clearly opposed to the
object and scheme of the Act or may lead to an absurd,
illogical or unconstitutional result. But we think that this
mode of construction is not appropriate in the context of
the present legislation for a number of reasons. In the
first place, such an interpretation does not fit into the
legislative history we have traced earlier. It does not
explain why the legislature should have, while enacting
the 1976 amendment, omitted certain operative words
and used certain wider words instead. As we have
pointed out earlier, if the idea had only been to add to the
exclusion buildings owned or let out by public sector
corporations, that result could have been achieved by a
minor amendment to Section 2(1)(a) as it stood earlier. A
conscious and glaring departure from the previous
language must be given its due significance. Secondly,
the Rent Act is a piece of legislation which imposes
certain restrictions on a landlord and confers certain
protections on a tenant. It could well have been the
intention of the legislature that the government, local
bodies and public sector corporations should be free not
only from the restrictions they may incur as landlords but
also that they need not have the protection given to other
ordinary tenants. To say that the legislature considered
the government qua landlord to be in a class of its own
and hence entitled to immunity from the restrictions of
the Act but that, qua tenant, it should be on the same
footing as other tenants will be an interpretation which
smacks of discrimination. The legislature could have
certainly intended to say that the government, whether
landlord or tenant, should be outside the Act. Thirdly,
40

while it is true that the result of the interpretation we
favour would be to facilitate easy eviction of government,
local authorities and public corporations, there is nothing
per se wrong about it because, with their vast resources
or capacity to augment their resources, these bodies
would not be in as helpless a position as ordinary
tenants for whose benefit the legislation is primarily
intended. On the other hand, the ultimate result of the
interpretation accepted by the Full Bench will be to
practically deny a landlord, who has given his premises
on rent to these bodies, any remedy to get back
possession of his premises. The contingencies for which
eviction is provided for in Section 20 are hardly likely to
arise in the case of such tenants; Section 21(1)(a) is
taken out by Section 21(8); and, virtually, the only ground
on which eviction can be sought by a landlord of such a
building against such a tenant, on the interpretation
urged by the petitioner, would be the one contained in
Section 21(1)(b). It is debatable whether the legislature
could have contemplated such a situation either.
Fourthly, in this case, the legislature has applied its mind
to the situation more than once subsequently. If its
intention in carrying out the amendment had been
misunderstood by the High Court or found ambiguous,
the legislature was expected to rectify the situation by a
piece of retrospective or declaratory legislation. The
1977 Ordinance was, but the later Ordinances and the
1985 Act are not, of this nature. They neither are, nor
purport to be, declaratory or retrospective from 5-7-1976.
At least, if the 1985 Act had been made retrospective
from 5-7-1976, one could have thought it was a
clarificatory piece of legislation. But the legislature has
advisedly given these enactments effect only from 18-5-
1983. This means that the amendment of 1976 was
intended to be effective between 5-7-1976 and 18-5-
1983 and it also means that the amendment of 1983
onwards is not intended to be read back for that period.
Lastly, in any event, the interpretation given by us will
create no lasting difficulties for the government and other
organisations which are tenants only, since after 18-5-
41

1983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities
available to other tenants under the Act. ’
(emphasis supplied)
32. Hypothetically, a case may arise where a person renews his licence
regularly, such that he may have a licence for many years in continuity
inasmuch as the initial licence granted to him gets renewed from time to
time, before the existing licence expires. This could operate in a cycle,
where the said person keeps renewing the licence before expiry. Such
person would come within the scope of eligibility as prescribed in the
Notifications. However, after the Amendment Act, 2019, as per the 1988
Act, from the very next day after the date of expiry, without renewal, the
person holding an expired licence is incompetent to drive the vehicles he
had such licence for, meaning thereby, that there is a legal disability for
driving. Coming back to the present case, the Notifications are for
recruitment to the posts of Driver. It cannot be lost sight of or denied that
driving is not merely a qualification on paper but also involves hands-on
experience coupled with regular practice. A lack of practice may hinder a
person’s capability of being able to drive a vehicle, especially if the vehicle
is to be used for police purposes and/or for disaster response/recovery, as
is the case herein. Thus, on an overall consideration, the
42

requirement/condition that for the last two years continuously preceding the
date(s) of the Notifications, the candidates should possess driving licences
cannot be termed unreasonable. The matter can be looked at from another
lens. Licences, under the unamended provision, were issued for not less
than 3 years at the first instance and/or on renewal until the time a person
attained the age of 50 years. Thus, once a licence was issued for a
minimum of 3 years, if the intention of the Appellant was that a person
should merely possess a licence for the last two years, the usage of the
term ‘ continuously ’ was redundant in the Notifications. As such, we would
have to afford due weightage to the same in context of the Notifications at
hand.
33. The Act as it stands now clearly stipulates that from the date of
expiry of licence, its holder is barred under law from driving. The theory that
once a licence is renewed, even after a gap, the renewal would operate
from a back date implying that the licence was continuing and valid even
for and during the interregnum cannot be countenanced. For instance,
even if the licence is continuously valid for more than two years preceding
the date of Notifications, there can be a situation where the holder of the
licence may be inflicted with debarment/suspension of licence, in the
43

context of Sections 19 to 23 of 1988 Act, for a period of time. Stricto sensu ,
the same licence, once such period of time elapses, would be valid but as
per the Notifications, the said person would be ineligible to even apply for
the posts of driver, if such debarment/suspension was within two years
from the date(s) of the Notifications. Thus, we have no doubt in mind that
for the term ‘ continuously ’ for the previous two years has to be given a
straight-forward interpretation as per the literal meaning showing the actual
legal and uninterrupted capacity of the person concerned for driving for at
least two years continuously prior to the date(s) of the Notifications. We
need not look too far or delve too deep for the meaning of the term
‘ continuously ’, as for the purposes of the present adjudication, it would
th
suffice to refer to Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised 4 Edition, 1968 at Page
393, which defines the said term as ‘ Uninterruptedly; in unbroken
sequence; without intermission or cessation; without intervening time; with
continuity or continuation ’.
34. A contention was urged on behalf of the respondents that even after
qualifying the physical proficiency test, candidates will be required to
appear and qualify the driving test and thus, when their
proficiency/efficiency in actual driving is being tested by conducting a
driving test, the requirement of the person being a fit and capable driver is
44

already taken care by the driving test. It was contended that, as such, the
said stipulation be read to mean that the requirement of possessing a
driving licence for a period of at least two years prior to the date of the
Notification continuously would include persons, who after a break in
renewal upon expiry of the licence, later got their licences renewed, with
effect from the dates of expiry. We are afraid such contention cannot be
accepted. The requirement of possessing a licence continuously for a
period of two years prior to the dates of the Notifications cannot be negated
only because in the driving test, a person may pass. There are two reasons
for this. Firstly , that persons who were otherwise similarly-situated to the
private respondents/writ petitioners, upon proper appreciation of the terms
and conditions of the Notifications may not have applied under the bona
fide and genuine belief that they were not eligible, which as we have held,
was correct. Thus, persons who despite not being eligible having applied
just because they may qualify in the driving test that too having benefited
under an erroneous interim Order of the High Court cannot be allowed to
get an undue benefit over all similarly-situated persons who did not apply.
Profitable reference can be made to Rakesh Kumar Sharma v State (NCT
7
of Delhi) , (2013) 11 SCC 58 and Sudhir Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh ,

45

8
(2024) 12 SCC 647 in this context. Secondly , the driving test is by way of
abundant caution to verify and ensure that the candidate is in regular
practice of driving. It cannot be construed as waiving the requirement of
having a valid driving licence continuously for a period of two years prior to
the date(s) of the Notifications. Obviously, the driving test is aimed at
filtering out candidates who may possess valid driving licences but may not
be competent, regular or well-versed in actual driving due to various
reasons, which we need to dwell upon. This argument, if accepted, would
amount to putting the cart before the horse! Arguendo , assuming a person
is able to clear the subsequent stages of a recruitment process, the same
cannot be taken as entitling the said person to claim competence despite
not meeting the entry/threshold criterion. At the very least, not in the extant
factual prism.
35. For the reasons aforesaid and in the background of the discussions
made hereinabove, the appeals stand allowed. The Impugned Judgment,

(emphasis supplied)
46

the Final Order/Judgment dated 03.10.2023 and the interim Orders dated
13.03.2023 and 28.03.2023 passed by the Single Judges are set aside.
Resultantly, the underlying writ petitions stand dismissed. We are
constrained to record that the Division Bench did not engage with the issue,
as after noting the rival submissions advanced at the Bar, the Impugned
Judgment merely extracted the Single Judge’s Final Order/Judgment dated
30.06.2023, without assigning any reasons as to why it was ‘ not inclined to
interfere ’ with the said Order/Judgment. As much time has elapsed, the
recruitment process be completed by the Appellant expeditiously and at
any rate, within three months reckoned from today.
36. No order as to costs.
37. The Civil Appeals arising from Diary No.12553/2024 shall also stand
allowed in terms similar to Civil Appeals arising from SLP (C) Nos.8684-
8688/2024.
….………………..................…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

….………………..................…..J.
[S. V. N. BHATTI]
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 18, 2025
47