Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3246 of 2008
PETITIONER:
SREE AYYANAR SPINNING & WEAVING M.LTD.
RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/2008
BENCH:
S.H. KAPADIA & B. SUDERSHAN REDDY
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3246 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 10576 of 2007)
SREE AYYANAR SPINNING & WEAVING M.LTD. ...APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ...RESPONDENT(S)
ORDER
Leave granted.
In this Civil Appeal filed by the assessee - appellant, we are required to deci
de the
scope of Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short the said Act).
The assessee is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
It
carries on the business of manufacture of cotton and man made fiber yarn.
For the Assessment Year 1989-90, assessment under Section 143(3) was framed by
the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Madurai, wherein the said authority determined
the taxable total income for 21 months ending 31st March, 1989 at Rs.45,92,240/-. This ord
er
was passed on 27th February, 1992. The determination of the taxable total income was based
on Section 115J of the Act. In the said assessment order the total income of the assessee
was
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computed at Rs. 42,98,019/- and on scrutiny of the said
computation and the balance-sheet along with the return the Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax reworked the computation as indicated at page 63 of Volume II in this case.
Suffice it to state that the total profit was reworked at Rs.1,53,07,444/-. Thirty per cen
t
thereof was reworked at Rs.45,92,239/-. In the process of reworking the computation under
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Section 115J, the Deputy Commissioner added to the profit the excess depreciation which
was debited in the profit and loss account in view of the difference which arose due to the
change in the method of accounting adopted by the assessee for the claim of depreciation on
machinery retrospectively from the year ending 30th June, 1983. The assessee had changed its
method of claiming depreciation from Straight Line Method (SLM) to Written Down Value
Method and in that connection it was argued by the assessee that the profit stood computed
correctly in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and, therefore,
relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. Vs. C.I.T. (225 ITR
273) the assessee submitted that the Assessing Officer had no authority to go beyond the
book profits, correctly computed by the assessee in accordance with the provisions of the
Companies Act, 1956.
Suffice it to state at this stage that in this Civil Appeal we are not concerned
with
the merits, i.e., reworking of the computation by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax.
However, in that connection the Department contends that the judgment of this Court in
Apollo Tyres was not applicable to the facts of the present case because in that case the
issue involved was regarding admissibility of deduction relating to extra shift depreciation
for
past years which were not claimed by Apollo Tyres in the relevant years, whereas in the
present case the claim of the assessee arose due to the change in the rate of depreciation
brought about by Schedule XIV to the Companies Act which was inserted with effect from
2nd April, 1987. It is urged on behalf of the Department that the judgment of this Court in
the case of Apollo Tyres (supra) was not applicable as in the present case the assessee had
debited excess depreciation of Rs.1,10,09,445/- to the profit and loss account for the perio
d
1.7.1987 to 30.6.1988 which consisted of Rs.19,24,684/-. According to the Department the
excess depreciation of Rs.19,24,683/- was due to the change in the method of claiming
depreciation from Straight Line Method to Written Down Value Method and, therefore, the
judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres case was not applicable. We have referred to the
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submissions of both sides on merits with which we are strictly not concerned. In
this
case we are only concerned with the interpretation of Section 254(2) regarding powers of the
Tribunal in the matter of rectification of mistakes apparent from the record.
This
controversy has arisen because on 9th December, 1996, ITAT in ITA No. 719(MDS)/94 had
passed an order upholding the order of CIT (Appeals) on computation of income under
Section 115J of the said Act. By the said order ITAT had dismissed the appeal of the
assessee on the ground that the profit and loss account of the assessee did not reflect corr
ect
picture for the Assessment Year 1989-90. On 2nd August, 2000 assessee had moved
Miscellaneous Application bearing No. 40/2000 praying for recall of the order dated 9th
December, 1996 by mainly relying upon the judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres’ case. At
this stage, it may be noted that the miscellaneous application dated 2nd August, 2000 was fi
led
within four years from the date of the Tribunal’s Order dated 9th December, 1996. To
complete the chronology of events, it may be stated that on 31st January, 2003 following the
judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres Limited the Tribunal allowed the rectification
application filed by the assessee against which the Department carried the matter in appeal
to
the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
By the impugned judgment the High Court came to the conclusion that under
Section 254(2) the Tribunal could not have allowed rectification beyond four years. That, th
e
Tribunal had no power to rectify the mistake after four years which time is set out in Secti
on
254(2) itself for passing an order of rectification either suo motu or an application filed
either
by the assessee or by the Assessing Officer. The High Court did not go into the merits of th
e
case. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal only on the
ground of limitation. Hence, this Civil Appeal by Special Leave.
In the light of the above controversy we set out hereinbelow provisions of Sectio
n
254(2) of the 1963 Act which read as follows:-
"The Appellate Tribunal, may at any time within four years from the date
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of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend
any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the
mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer."
Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view that Section 254(2) is in two
parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from
the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order
passed by it under sub-section (1). Under the second part of Section 254(2) reference is to
the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) when the mistake is
brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short, the fir
st
part of Section 254(2) refers to suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the
Tribunal whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application
being made by the Assessing Officer or the assessee pointing out the mistake apparent from
the record. In this case we are concerned with the second part of Section 254(2). As stated
above, application for rectification was made within four years. Application was well within
four years. It is the Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application.
Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that the application
could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four years.
In this connection, our attention is also invited to the judgment of the Rajastha
n
High Court in the case of Harshvardhan Chemicals and Minerals Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Another (2002 (256) ITR 767) wherein an identical controversy arose for determination and
the view taken by that Court was as follows:-
"Once the assessee has moved the application within four years from the
date of appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four
years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application before
the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four years from the
date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on the merits and
not on the ground of limitation. Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, lays
down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four years from the date of
the order rectify the mistake apparent from the record but that does not mean that if
the application is moved within the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains
pending before the Tribunal, after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the
application on the ground of limitation."
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We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the
case of Harshvardhan Chemicals and Minerals Ltd. (supra).
For the aforesated reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
and restore T.C.(A) No. 2/2004 on the file of the Madras High Court for fresh decision on th
e
merits of the matter as indicated hereinabove. All contentions on merits are expressly kept
open. We express no opinion on the merits of the case whether rectification application was
at all maintainable or not and whether the judgment in the case of Apollo Tyres was or was
not applicable to the facts of this case. That question will have to be gone into by the Hig
h
court in the above T.C.(A) No. 2/2004.
Accordingly, the Civil Appeal filed by the assessee stands allowed with no order
as
to costs.
....................J.
[ S.H. KAPADIA ]
New Delhi, ....................J
May 01 , 2008 [ B. SUDERSHAN REDDY ]