Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAJ SINGH & ANR. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/07/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (7) 194 1996 SCALE (5)688
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO 9522 OF 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.3626 of 1996)
O R D E R
IN C.A.9522/96
( @ SLP (C) No.3626/96)
leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of
the learned single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jaipur made on December 15, 1995 in Miscellaneous (Def)
No.631 of 1993. It is enough to narrate the salient facts
for the purpose of disposal of this case.
Notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land
Acquisition Act, 1953 was published on January 18, 1982
acquiring a total extent of 2570 bighas 15 biswas of land in
village Desh, Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur for public purpose. On
reference, the land Acquisition Court determined the
compensation by its award and decree dated July 28, 1992. An
application for supply of certified copies of judgment and
decree was filed and on supply of a copy of the judgment the
appeal had been filed with a delay of 147 days. When the
matter had come up before the court, it was pointed out by
the court by order dated October 6, 1993 that the decree had
not been filed along with the memorandum of appeal and the
court, therefore, directed the appellant to produce the
decree within three weeks from that date. It would appear
and an affidavit was filed in the High Court that in spite
of the appellant filing an application for furnishing
certified copy of the decree, the civil court had not drawn
up the decree. The matter came up again for orders on
January 11, 1995 and the learned Advocate General had
pointed out the omission on the part of the civil Court to
draw up the decree, in spite of their having applied for
supply of the certified copy of the decree. Thereon, by
order dated January 31, 1995 the High Court directed the
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civil court to prepare the decree within four weeks from
that date and to supply the same. Accordingly, decree was
prepared by the civil Court on January 31, 1995 and the same
came to be filed on supply in the High Court as directed by
order dated January 11, 1995. When the matter had come up
before another learned Judge, by the impugned order he had
recalled the orders of the court dated October 6, 1993 and
January 11, 1995 and dismissed the application for
condonation of delay. Thus these appeals by special leave.
It is contended by Shri Aruneshwar Gupta, learned
counsel for the State, that there is no delay in the eye of
law since the appeals were already filed before the
limitation began to run. The decree was prepared by the
court on January 31, 1995 by which date the memorandum of
appeal was already filed and that the limitation had to run
from the date when the decree was supplied. We find force in
the contention. Shri Jain, learned senior counsel for the
respondents, contended that by operation of Section 26(2) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the
Act’), the award is a decree and there is no need to obtain
any separate decree as such and that,therefore,when the
appeal was filed with a delay of 147 days, it was the duty
of the appellant to satisfactorily explain every day’s
delay, in this case, there is no such explanation and that,
therefore, the High Court was right in recalling the orders
and holding that the appellant had not explained the delay.
We find no force in the contention.
Section 53 of the Act provides that:
"Save in so far as they may be
inconsistent with anything
contained in this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil
procedure 1908 shall apply to all
proceedings before the Court under
this Act."
Order 41, Rule 1 CPC provides that:
"Every appeal shall be preferred in
the form of a memorandum signed by
the appellant or his pleader and
presented to the Court or to such
officer as it appoints in this
behalf. The memorandum shall be
accompanies by copy of the decree
appealed from and unless the
Appellate Court dispenses therewith
of the judgment on which it is
founded."
Section 2(2) of CPC defines ’decree’ to mean "the
formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as
regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the
rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the
matters in controversy in the suit and may be either
preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the
rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question
within Section 144, but shall not include... "
Section 54 of the Act gives right of appeal against the
award passed by the civil Court under Section 26 of the Act.
Section 26(2) of the Act prescribes that:
"Every such award shall be deemed
to be a decree and the statement of
the grounds of every such award a
judgment within the meaning of
Section 2, clause (2) and Section
2, clause (9) respectively, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
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It would thus be seen that an appeal filed under
Section 54 of the Act shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of grounds together with the judgment and decree as
envisaged under Order 41 Rule 1, CPC unless the copy of the
judgment is dispensed with. Thus, filing of a decree along
with the appeal filed under Section 54 of the Act is a pre-
condition for taking further steps in an appeal filed under
Order 41, Rule 1, CPC. It is true that by fiction of law the
award of the civil Court made under Section 26(1) shall be
deemed to be a decree. The statement of the grounds in the
said award shall be a judgment But there is no inconsistency
in the provisions of the Act and Order 41 and the provision
of the Act as regards the appeal filed under Section 54. It
would thus be clear that a formal decree in terms of Section
2, clause (2), CPC as mandated by Order 41, Rule 1, shall be
drawn by the civil Court. When it supplies a memorandum of
the award which is a judgment for filing an appeal under
Section 54 of the Act, a copy of the decree duly certified
is required to be supplied and filed with memorandum of
grounds of appeal. Admittedly, the civil court had not
supplied the decree drawn as required under Order 2, Rule 2.
The limitation begins to run from the date of the supply of
the certified copies of the judgment and decree. The time
taken by the court for their supply from the date of
application till the date of supply should be excluded in
computation of the period of limitation. Even if application
for certified copies of judgment and decree were separately
filed, the combined period would be excluded. Therefore, the
right to file an appeal arises only from the date when the
decree was supplied.It is seen that the High Court had
passed a judicial order on January 11, 1995 directing the
trial Court to prepare the decree and supply the same within
four weeks. Earlier, it was not supplied though the
appellant had applied for. Accordingly, the decree was
prepared on January 31, 1995 and the same was filed as soon
as it was supplied. It would thus be clear that no delay was
brooked in filing the appeal since the appeal must be deemed
to have been filed after the supply of the decree by the
trial Court. The learned single Judge had no power to recall
the orders passed by the High Court on October 6, 1993 and
January 11, 1995 except in accordance with due procedure.
Dismissal of the petition in the impugned order is obviously
illegal. The learned single Judge was oblivion to and has
not addressed himself to the correct legal position in
proper perspective.
The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High
Court stands set aside. Accordingly, the matter is remitted
to the High Court. The High Court would dispose of the
appeal on merits according to law.
IN C.A. 9783 /95
(@ SLP (C) No.5670/95)
Leave granted.
Following the decision rendered in the appeal above,
this appeal is disposed of and the matter is remitted to the
High Court. The High Court would dispose of this appeal on
merits according to law. No costs.