THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH vs. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 905 of 2010  THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH       …APPELLANT Versus RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. …RESPONDENTS WITH Criminal Appeal No. 906 of 2010  THE STATE OF TRIPURA        …APPELLANT Versus RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS   …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T INDU MALHOTRA, J.   1. The issue  which has  arisen  for consideration in the  present Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RACHNA Date: 2019.10.05 12:45:23 IST Reason: Criminal   Appeals   is   whether   the   Gauhati   High   Court   was justified in issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be 1 dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“M.V. Act”), and in holding that in cases of road traffic or motor   vehicle   offences,   prosecution   under   the   provisions   of Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”) is without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in law? 2. The Gauhati  High   Court,   Agartala  bench   vide   the   impugned judgment dated 22.12.2008 held that: i. Sections 183 and 184 of the M.V. Act, which relate to driving   of   motor   vehicles   at   excessive   speeds   and dangerously, and other offences under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act are compoundable before the Police, or in court, and that no further proceeding shall be taken against the accused after he has pleaded guilty. On this premise, it was held “ that the provisions of Cr.P.C must succumb to the   statutory   provisions   to   the   M.V.Act,   and   any investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to the same, would ”.   [Para   14   of   the be   illegal   and   unsustainable   in   law impugned judgment]. ii. The IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C”) are placed in Entry No. 1 and 2 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The 2 M.V. Act,1988 falls under Entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List. Hence, the status of the M.V. Act is at par with the IPC and Cr.P.C, and it cannot be presumed that M.V. Act is either a subordinate legislation, or inferior to the IPC and Cr.P.C in status.  [Para 21 of the impugned judgment] iii. Section 5 of the IPC removes any kind of ambiguity about the   conviction   and   punishment   of   offenders   under   a special enactment, which covers the field. Section 208 of the   M.V.   Act   has   laid   down   a   special   procedure   for disposal of road traffic offences. Hence, recourse to the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC.  Section 5 of the IPC recognizes the supremacy of the special laws, which cannot be diluted under the garb of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 24­ 26 of the impugned judgment] iv. The prosecution of road traffic offences under the IPC is not permitted, since it has no sanction of law. The only exception to this rule would be where the offence cannot be adequately punished under the M.V. Act.  [Para 24­26 of the impugned judgment] v. Since   road   traffic   offences   can   be   regulated   and adequately   dealt  with  under   the provisions   of   MV  Act, 3 resort to the provisions of the IPC, which is a general law should be avoided. [Para 28 of the impugned judgment] vi. Sections   183   to   188   of   the   MV   Act,   which   relate   to punishment for driving at excessive speed or dangerously or   in   a   drunken   condition,   etc.,   are   silent   about   the outcome of the accidents. These penal provisions do not prescribe any separate punishment for causing hurt to people or for damaging any property. However, this does not mean that the Legislature was not aware or totally oblivious to the consequences of dangerous driving while enacting   the   M.V.   Act.   [Para   30   of   the   impugned judgment]  vii. If a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any person   while   driving   a   motor   vehicle   in   a   rash   and dangerous   manner   under   the   MV   Act,   then   the   said offender cannot also be convicted under the IPC, since the IPC does not expressly take within its purview road traffic offences. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment] viii. To   permit   the   prosecution   of   offenders   under   the provisions of any other penal law other than the M.V. Act in   cases   of   motor   vehicle   offences   would   amount   to overriding  the  M.V.  Act,  which is  a special enactment framed   by   Parliament   for   motor   vehicle   offences.   By 4 invoking provisions of the IPC for motor vehicle offences, the basic character and structure of the M.V. Act would get distorted, and would not help in curbing the rising rate of motor vehicle accidents.  [Para 33 of the impugned judgment] ix. Prosecution of offenders in cases of road traffic accidents must be carried out under the M.V. Act as a general rule subject to one exception i.e to try offenders in cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under S. 304 IPC,   because   sentence   of   imprisonment   of   6   months provided under the M.V. Act appears to be inadequate, going by the rising rate of violent road accidents.  The prosecution of offenders under the provisions of the   IPC   is   violative   of   settled   principles   of   law   and contrary to the legislative intent of the M.V. Act. [Para 37 and 37.1 of the impugned judgment] x. The High Court directed the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya,   Manipur,   Tripura,   Mizoram   and   Arunachal Pradesh,   and   to   issue   appropriate   directions   to   all subordinate officers to ordinarily register cases against offenders   of   motor   vehicle   accidents   only   under   the provisions of the M.V. Act subject to the exception under S. 304 IPC.  5 3. The present Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the States of Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh before this Court, wherein vide  Orders dated 12.05.2009 and 31.07.2009, the operation of the impugned judgment was stayed.  This   Court   vide   Order   dated   26.04.2010   granted   special leave to appeal, and  directed that the stay of the impugned judgment would continue to operate during the pendency of the appeals.  4. Despite service of notice, none appeared for the Respondents. Since there is no contest to the adjudication on the merits of the case, we are not touching upon that part of the judgment.  5. The M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation, the primary objective being to provide a statutory scheme for compensation of victims of motor vehicle accidents; or, their family members who are rendered helpless and disadvantaged by the untimely death or injuries caused to a member of the family, if the claim is found 1 to   be   genuine.   The   Act   provides   a   summary   procedure   for claiming compensation for the loss sustained in an accident, which is otherwise applicable to suits and other proceedings 2 while prosecuting a claim before a civil court.   1 The New India Assurance Co. Ltd . vs. C. Padma and Ors . (2003) 7 SCC 713; Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd . (2004) 5 SCC 385 2 Vimla Devi and Ors . vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 186 6 5.1 The M.V. Act repealed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The need   was   felt   to   take   into   account   changes   in   road transport   technology,   pattern   of   passenger   and   freight movements,   development   of   the   road   network   in   the country   and   particularly   improved   techniques   in   motor vehicle management.  3 In  M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and Ors . , this   Court   made   suggestions   for   raising   the   limit   of compensation payable in motor vehicle accidents wherein death and permanent disablement had occurred, even in the event of there being no fault on the part of the person driving   the   offending   vehicle,   and   also   in   hit   and   run accidents.   The   said   suggestions   were   taken   into consideration  by   the   Legislature   and   incorporated   in  the M.V. Act, 1988.  5.2 Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, 1988 deals with “Offences, Penalties and Procedure”. It deals with offences relating to contraventions of the provisions of the M.V. Act, or any rule,   regulation   or   notification   made   thereunder.   It primarily deals with offences relating to licenses, driving of vehicles   by   unauthorized   persons,   control   of   traffic, 3 (1987) 4 SCC 284: AIR 1987 SC 2158 7 maintenance   of   motor   vehicles,   using   a   vehicle   in   an unsafe condition, or without registration or permit, driving beyond speed limits, driving dangerously or driving by a drunken person, or by a person under the influence of drugs, etc.  5.3 The relevant provisions of the M.V. Act,1988 (as they stood at the time of commission of the offence in question) which are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below:

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(b) such failure was brought about by the conduct of the accused.” 5.4 Section 183 provides for the offence of driving a vehicle at excessive speed in contravention of the speed limits referred in Section 112 of the M.V. Act; while Section 184 M.V. Act deals with the offence of driving dangerously. In order to constitute   an   offence   under   Section   184,   the   following 10 ingredients   are   required   to   be   proved:  (a)   the   accused should be driving a motor vehicle; (b) the vehicle should be driven at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public  having   regard  to all  the   circumstances  of   a  case, including the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the volume of traffic at the time of the accident or which might reasonably be expected to be in the place.  Section 183 and 184 must be read with  Section 209  of M.V.   Act,   which   provides   that   a   warning,  notice   or summons, is mandatorily required to be given for an offence punishable under Section 183 or 184. 5.5 Section   185   of   the   M.V.   Act   pertains   to   the   offences   of driving   after   consuming   alcohol,   or   driving   under   the influence   of   drugs.   Any   person   who   while   driving   or attempting to drive, (a) has alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. present in his blood, detected by a breath analyser; or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent that he is incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle, shall be guilty of an offence under Section 185 of the M.V. Act. 5.6 Section 187 pertains to offences arising from accidents. The offence is for breach of duty and failure to comply with the 11 provisions of Section 132(1)(c) or Section 133 or Section 134 of the M.V. Act.  Clause (c) of Section 132 (1) was omitted by S. 40 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994   (w.e.f. 14­11­ 1994); Section 133 relates to the duty of the owner to give information regarding the name and address of, and the licence held by, the driver or conductor, who is accused of any offence under this Act on the demand of any police officer; while Section 134 relates to the duty of the driver in case   of   an   accident   and   injury   to   a   person,   to   take   all reasonable steps to secure medical attention for the injured person, by conveying him to the nearest medical practitioner or   hospital,   and   providing   necessary   information   to   the police and insurer of the vehicle about the accident.  5.7 The offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act provide a summary   procedure   for   disposal   of   cases,   which   are compoundable in nature under Section 208 (3) of the M.V. Act. Section 208(3) provides that if an accused pleads guilty and deposits the fine imposed, then “ no further proceeding in respect of offence shall be taken against him nor shall he 12 be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence ”. by reason of his having pleaded guilty 5.8 The IPC, on the other hand, is punitive and deterrent in nature. The principal aim and object is to punish offenders for   offences   committed   under   the   IPC.   The   relevant provisions of the IPC which are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below: 5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act .- Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the provisions of any special or local law.

304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder . Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. - Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished 13 with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. 338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. - Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 5.9 Section   279   IPC   falls   under   Chapter   XIV   –   “ Offences affecting Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency And ”,   and   provides   for   offences   relating   to   rash   and Morals negligent driving which endanger human life.  Section 279 IPC makes rash driving, or riding on a public   road,   punishable   if   such   rash   driving   or   riding endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. It is the rash or negligent manner of driving or riding which endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person, which constitutes an offence under Section 279 IPC.  5.10 Sections   304  Part II,  304A,  337  and  338  IPC fall under Chapter XVI – “ Offences Affecting the Human Body ” which makes provision for offences relating to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing death by negligence by doing   any   rash   or   negligent   act,   and   causing   hurt   or 14 grievous hurt, by endangering the life or personal safety of others.  5.11 Where   the   rash   or   negligent   driving   results   in   hurt   or grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under Section 337 or 338 IPC is committed.  5.12 Where the rash or negligent driving, results in the death of a person, without the knowledge that the said act will cause death,   Section   304A   IPC   would   be   applicable.   In   other words,   Section   304A   applies   to   cases   where   there   is   no intention to cause death, and no knowledge that the act done   in   all   probability   will   cause   death.   Negligence   and 4 rashness are essential elements of Section 304A.   The   three   ingredients   of   Section   304­A,   which   are required to be proved are: (1) the death of a human being; (2) the accused caused the death; and (3) the death was caused by the doing of a rash or negligent act, though it did 5 not amount to culpable homicide of either description. The requirement of culpable rashness under S.304A IPC is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law 6 of tort to create liability.    Criminal or culpable rashness means   hazarding   a   dangerous   or   wanton   act   with   the 4 Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. (2008) 1 SCC 791; Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka , (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 5 Alister Anthony Pareira v . State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 6 N.K.V Bros (P) Ltd. v . M. Karumai Ammal & Ors . (1980) 3 SCC 457 15 knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton, and the further knowledge that it may cause injury, but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that the act would 7 probably cause. 5.13 When   a   person   drives   a   vehicle   so   recklessly,   rashly   or negligently   that  it  causes   the   death  of   a   person,   and   of which he had knowledge as a reasonable man, that such act was dangerous enough to cause death, he may be attributed with the knowledge of the consequence, and may held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.  5.14 Sections 279, 304­A, 337 and 338 IPC may be invoked only if the act of the accused is a negligent or rash act. It is manifest from the scheme of Sections 279, 304­A, 336, 337 and 338 IPC that these offences are punishable because of the   inherent   danger   of   the   acts   specified   therein, irrespective of the knowledge or intention of the offender.  With   respect   to   Section   304   Part   II   IPC,   the prosecution has to prove that the death of the person was caused   by   the   act   of   the   accused,   and   that   he   had 8 knowledge   that   such   act   was   likely   to   cause   death.   To 7 Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka , (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 8 Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 16 constitute an offence under this Section, the knowledge of the offender as required under Section 300 IPC is to be proved and established.  6. In our view there is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the MV Act. Both the statutes operate in entirely different spheres.   The   offences   provided   under   both   the   statutes   are separate and distinct from each other. The penal consequences provided   under   both   the   statutes   are   also   independent   and distinct from each other. The ingredients of offences under the both statutes, as discussed earlier, are different, and an offender can be tried and punished independently under both statutes. The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act. 7. It is pertinent to mention that there is no provision under the M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causing death, or grievous  hurt,  or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of motor vehicle accidents.  Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hurt, to persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same; whereas Sections 279, 304 Part II, 17 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have been specifically framed to deal with such offences. 8. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, “Where an act   or   omission   constitutes   an   offence   under   two   or   more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”  It is well settled that an act or an omission can constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an offence under any other law. The finding of the High Court that the prosecution of offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V. Act and the IPC, is unsustainable and contrary to law, is therefore, set aside.  A   similar   issue   arose   in   the   case   of   T.S.   Baliah   v.   T.S. 9 Rangachari  , wherein the appellant was prosecuted both under Section 177 of the IPC, and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court held as follows: “6. We proceed to consider the next question arising in this case viz. whether the appellant can be prosecuted both under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 52 of the 1922 Act [Income Tax Act, 1922] at the same time. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of the provisions of Section 26 of the General clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) the appellant can be prosecuted either under Section 52 of the 1922 Act or under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and not 9 (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 : (1969) 72 ITR 787 18 under both the sections at the same time. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 26 of the General clauses Act states: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.— Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.” [emphasis supplied] 10 Similarly, in  State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan , the accused was prosecuted under Sections 26 and 30 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 as well as Sections 188, 272, 273 and 328 of the IPC for transportation and sale of prohibited gutka/pan masala . The High Court held that Section 55 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 being a specific provision made   in   a   special   enactment,   Section   188 of   the   IPC   was inapplicable.   The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court, and held that : “ 8 . There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both 10 Criminal Appeal No. 1195-1207 of 2018, Decided on September 20, 2018 19 enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. The High Court ought to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more enactments -Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 9. In Hat Singh's case this Court discussed the doctrine of double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act to observe that prosecution under two different Acts is permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the prosecution of the Respondent therein for offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 and Indian Penal Code, this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and cognizable offences. A perusal of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that there is no bar for prosecution under the IPC merely because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the first point.” [emphasis supplied] 9. The legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular Chapter XIII   of   the   MV   Act,   was   not   to   override   or   supersede   the provisions of the IPC in so far as convictions of offenders in motor vehicle accidents are concerned. Offences under Chapter XIII   of   the   MV   Act,   cannot   abrogate   the   applicability   of   the provisions under Sections 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The offences do not overlap, and therefore, the maxim of 20 “ generalia specialibus nonderogant ” is inapplicable, and could not have been invoked. The offences prescribed under the IPC are independent of the offences prescribed under the M.V. Act. It cannot be said that prosecution of road traffic/motor vehicle offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC, as held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for offences under the M.V. Act is concerned. 10. Considering   the   matter   from   a   different   perspective,   offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act are compoundable in nature in view of Section 208(3) of the MV Act, whereas offences under Section 279, 304 Part II and 304A IPC are not.  If the IPC gives way to the MV Act, and the provisions of CrPC succumb to the provisions of the MV Act as held by the High   Court,   then   even   cases   of   culpable   homicide   not amounting to murder, causing death, or grievous hurt, or simple hurt   by   rash   and   negligent   driving,   would   become compoundable.   Such   an   interpretation   would   have   the consequence   of   letting   an   offender   get   away   with   a   fine   by pleading guilty, without having to face any prosecution for the offence committed.  11. This   Court   has   time   and   again   emphasised   on   the   need   to strictly punish offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle 21 accidents. With rapidly increasing motorisation, India is facing an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The financial loss, emotional and social trauma caused to a family on losing a bread winner, or any other member of the family, or incapacitation of the victim cannot be quantified.  12. The   principle   of   proportionality   between   the   crime   and punishment   has   to   be   borne   in   mind.   The   principle   of   just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal 11 offence.    The maximum imprisonment for a first time offence under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, is up to only six months; whereas  the  maximum  imprisonment  for  a  first time  offence under the IPC in relation to road traffic offences can go upto 10 years   under   Section   304   Part   II   of   the   IPC.   The   sentence imposed   by   the   courts   should   be   commensurate   with   the seriousness of the offence, and should have a deterring effect on 12 wrong­doers.   The   punishment   of   offenders   of   motor   vehicle accidents   under   the   IPC   is   stricter   and   proportionate   to   the offence committed, as compared with the M.V. Act.  13. We   thus   hold   that   a   prosecution,   if   otherwise   maintainable, would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since both the statutes   operate   with   full   vigour,   in   their   own   independent

22 spheres. Even assuming that some of the provisions of the MV Act and IPC are overlapping, it cannot be said that the offences under both the statutes are incompatible.  14. The High Court has given a contradictory finding by holding on the one hand that the provisions of the Cr.P.C must succumb to the provisions of the M.V. Act, as executive authorities cannot take away a beneficial provision under a special law enacted by Parliament (para 14 of the impugned judgment), while on the other hand, it has opined that the M.V. Act is not a complete code in itself, and there is no complete bar to investigate road traffic offences under the provisions of Cr.P.C. (para 23 of the impugned judgment).  15. In our considered view the position of law is well­settled. This Court has consistently held that the M.V. Act,1988 is a complete 13 code   in   itself   in   so   far   as   motor   vehicles   are   concerned. However, there is no bar under the M.V. Act or otherwise, to try and prosecute offences under the IPC for an offence relating to motor vehicle accidents. On this ground as well, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.  13 National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria , (2008) 3 SCC 464 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 99 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 945; Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2007) 13 SCC 446 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 662 23 16. The object behind punishing persons found guilty of causing motor vehicle accidents has been succinctly stated by this Court 14 in  Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana  in the following words:

14 (2000) 5 SCC 82 24

that there is a constant concern of the Court on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences in cases of motor vehicle accidents. In that case, the appellant was found guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 337, 338, 279 and 304­A IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months along with fine. The Court held that:

17. In view  of   the   above   discussion,   we   set  aside   the   directions issued   by   the   Gauhati   High   Court   to   the   States   of   Assam, Nagaland,   Meghalaya,   Manipur,   Tripura,   Mizoram   and Arunachal  Pradesh  to   issue   appropriate   instructions   to   their 15 (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 25 subordinate   officers   to   prosecute   offenders   in   motor   vehicle accidents   only   under   the   provisions   of   the   Motor   Vehicles Act,1988 and not the IPC. 18. The Criminals Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. The interim   order   passed   on   26.04.2010   is   made   absolute.   All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.  Ordered accordingly. .......................................J. (INDU MALHOTRA) ...…...............………………J. (SANJIV KHANNA) New Delhi; October 4, 2019. 26