JUPUDY PARDHA SARATHY vs. PENTAPATI RAMA KRISHNA .

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2007 Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Appellant(s) versus Pentapati Rama Krishna and others Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y. Eqbal, J. : This appeal by special leave is directed against order dated 21.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, who allowed the appeal preferred by JUDGMENT Defendant no.1 and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit preferred by the appellant. 2. The only question that needs consideration in this appeal is as to whether the High Court is correct in law in 1 Page 1 interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in arriving at a conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba

operation of Section 14 of the Act. 3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property originally belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had three wives. Only the second wife was blessed with two sons and one daughter, including defendant-Narasimha Rao. Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P. Venkata Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba Rao executed a Will in the year 1920(Exh.A2) in favour rd of his 3 wife Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will JUDGMENT dated 14.7.1971 (Exh.B1) in favour of defendant-Pentapati Subba Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976. The case of the defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff. 2 Page 2 4. The plaintiff’s-appellant’s case is that he purchased the suit property from one P. Narasimha Roa who was having a vested remainder in respect of the said suit property on the

According to the plaintiff-appellant, during the life time of Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after her death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff. 5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the parties that Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata Subba Rao in favour of Veeraghavamma but she had limited interest to enjoy the property during her life time and thereafter the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to JUDGMENT enjoy the said property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma. However, the trial court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma under the Will did not become enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act and the vested remainder in favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get 3 Page 3 extinguished in respect of the scheduled properties. Accordingly, the suit was decreed.

no.1 - P. Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court holding that Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) and she had every right to bequeath the said property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first defendant under Exhibits B1 and B2. 7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the JUDGMENT plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, first defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record and are arrayed in the present appeal as respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant no.3, and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was defendant no.4, were brought on record after his death during 4 Page 4 pendency of this appeal. Rest respondents were brought on record as legal representatives of second defendant, who died during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has

on 6.7.2006, appellant has moved before us an application for deletion of respondent no.4 from the array of parties. It is ordered accordingly. 8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal we would like to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1) which is as under:- “I, Pularvathi Venkata Subba Rao, S/o late Pularvathy Venkamma Vysya, Business, R/o Rajahmundhry, have executed the Will dt. 24.08.1920 with good consciousness and wisdom. I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less physical strength and consequently I may not survive for longer period, hence I have proposed to give all my properties both movable and immovable mentioned in the schedule below by way of this Will. JUDGMENT My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two sons by name Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a nd daughter by name Nagarathnamma. My 2 wife also died. Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and she is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have house property bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5 shop rooms abutting to them with vacant house site covered by D.No.6/870 in Innespeta, Rajahmundry Village, Rajahmundry Sub 5 Page 5 Registry, E.G. Dist.I have wet land of extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram Sub Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed property was in the nd name of my 2 wife and after her life time my two sons mentioned above got the same mutated it in their names.

My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled house with site and compound wall and with half right in the well covered by municipal D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry nd and after life time of my wife my 2 son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift, sale etc. My second son Narasimha Rao shall have absolute rights such as gift and sale in respect of the tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms covered by D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above two properties with Chavidi and one Big latrine out of the two and that my wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after her life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute right. The said Veeraraghavamma is entitled to fetch water from the well situated in back yard of house bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so Maniyarao shall have absolute rights such as gift and sale etc., in respect of ac 15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk and my eldest son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/- which I am liable to pay to her and thus either Nagarathnamma or any one has got no right in the said property. JUDGMENT The amount receivable from the Insurance Company referred above shall be recovered and my two sons, daughter and my wife, all the four shall share the same equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or demand for any oweties against another. (Emphasis given) This Will I have executed with full and good consciousness and the same shall come into force after my life time. The properties mentioned in this Will are all my 6 Page 6 self acquired properties and I did not get any ancestral properties. I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during my life time. Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao Attesting Witnesses

With his own handwriting The contents of the said will shall come into force after my life time. Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao” 9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this Court in the case of V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) but held that in that case on the basis of compromise the Hindu widow was allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily applicable to that case. JUDGMENT Whereas, the trial court held that the decision of this Court in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. , (AIR 1971 SC 745), is applicable because in that case the Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her husband on the strength of Will where under she was given life estate 7 Page 7 in the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the trial court’s judgment are quoted thus:-

26. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (A.I.R. 1977 SC 1944) a Hindu widow obtained a decree for maintenance against the brothers of her deceased husband and was executing the said decree for maintenance. During that time, the Hindu Widow and the brothers of her deceased husband entered into a compromise where under the Hindu widow was allotted immovable properties to be enjoyed only as limited owner power of alienation. It was a case where the Hindu Widow was allotted properties expressly in lieu of her maintenance and satisfaction of her maintenance decree. Therefore, Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily applicable to that case. On the other hand, in the decision reported in Mst Karmi vs. Amro ( A.I.R. 1971 SC 745) a Hindu widow succeeded to the properties of her husband on the strength of a Will where under she was given life estate in the properties. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the Hindu widow having succeeded to the properties of her husband on the strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these JUDGMENT 8 Page 8

27. In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2251) the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her. Similarly, in the decision reported in Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh (1991 (1) L.W.15) the Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act where the wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai (A.I.R. 1979 SC 993) also the Hindu widow obtained possession of the property in default of payment of maintenance to her. So, the Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act to that case.” JUDGMENT 10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the decision quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the High Court, the trial court held that the life estate of Veeraghavamma under Exhibit A-2 will not become enlarge into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu 9 Page 9 Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders interest of Narasimha Rao in the suit property.

decided by this Court in the decisions noted by the trial court and also other decisions of this Court, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the case falls under Section 14(1) of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the said property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao under Exhibits B-1 and B-2. The High Court held that:- “In view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble Justice Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of the Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the reasoning given by the trial Court, that as there is no specific wording in the instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in lieu of a pre-existing right or right of maintenance the same do not become enlarged into absolute estate, is not relevant and is quite contrary to the aforesaid judgment. JUDGMENT Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as the guardian of P. Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff it could not be said that Veeraraghavamma had no pre-existing right or right of maintenance in respect of the property in which a limited interest had been created in her favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having properties other than the property in question, after the death of his 10 Page 10

As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she had right to bequeath the said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P. Narasimha Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority to sell the said property under Ex.A1 sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. As the limited interest of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into absolute right, bequeathing the said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and B2 is legal and valid. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the limited interest to enjoy the property during the lifetime of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into an absolute right in accordance with Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and the vested remainder created in favour of the vendor of the plaintiff is nullified.” JUDGMENT 12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant, confined his argument to the question of law as to whether the High Court erred in law in holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the widow 11 Page 11 Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in the properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:-

(ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors . (1972)4 SCC 86), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held to the effect that a widow who succeeded to the property of her deceased husband on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights in the property other than those conferred by the will.. “The life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act” (iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99, this Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment in Tulsamma case. JUDGMENT (iv) V. Tulsamma’s case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it may not be applicable to cases of testamentary succession. However, in terms of law declared therein, 12 Page 12 a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in a property to the widow on the ground that the widow has a pre-existing right of maintenance.

(vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors . (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therein that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or under the statutory law. (vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal . (viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh’s case and followed subsequently, therefore, appears to be that the question as to whether Section 14(1) applies to a Will granting life interest to a widow hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of maintenance. This leads to the second arguments.” JUDGMENT 13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the fact that the life interest in property granted to the widow by way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to 13 Page 13 be specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court based on examination of evidence and material on record.

decision in G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao , (2008) 12 SCC 392, learned counsel submitted that issues are required to be framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of maintenance. 15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be JUDGMENT maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be 14 Page 14 maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. 16. The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate, Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. 17. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy , AIR 1977 SC 1944, three Judges Bench of this Court has JUDGMENT elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:- “Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and 15 Page 15 characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance:

(2) though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right, to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow’s right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and JUDGMENT (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.” 16 Page 16 18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, their Lordships observed: -

(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section ( 2 ) of Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held by this Court in Badri Pershad case . (3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and female in matters of intestate succession; (4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision.” JUDGMENT 19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the law and different authorities came to the following conclusions:- “We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above on the question of law involved in this appeal as 17 Page 17

JUDGMENT 18 Page 18

JUDGMENT 19 Page 19 20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru (1972 Vol. 4 SCC 86). In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that

Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of the property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his entire estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and thereafter, the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The properties were mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960. On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the basis of Will, but the appellant claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali under her Will of 1958. On these JUDGMENT facts, it was held that Nihali having succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on the strength of Will cannot claim any right in those properties over and above that was given to her under the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 20 Page 20 21. The facts in Karmi’s case (supra) and that of the present case are fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the Will

his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He, then, married to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of the properties owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the widow Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water from JUDGMENT the well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for his third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule property till her life. The intention of the executant is therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to his third wife Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the 21 Page 21 suit property for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executant directed that his entire estate will devolve upon his widow Veeraraghavamma. 22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others , AIR 1962 SC 1493, while interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act observed:- “16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The expression includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognised as owner, but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far JUDGMENT 22 Page 22

23. Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench JUDGMENT decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In that case, by a registered document of partition, the related right was given to the widow - the user of the land with the condition that she will have no 23 Page 23 right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the case falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-

24. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma , (1991) 4 SCC 312, life estate was granted to a JUDGMENT Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Following the ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case, their Lordships held that the decision in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held:- 24 Page 24

JUDGMENT 25 Page 25 25. Reference may also be made to the decision of three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390, where a Hindu

the condition that she would not have power to alienate the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. On this fact their Lordships following the ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case (supra) held that by virtue of Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property. 26. Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for JUDGMENT the respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case of Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another , (2008) 1 SCC 465, Subhan Rao and Others vs. Parvathi Bai and Others , (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68. 26 Page 26 27. In Santosh’s case (supra), this Court followed the decision given in Nazar Singh’s case, (1996) 1 SCC 35, and

limited interest became an absolute interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. 28. A similar question arose for consideration before this Court in Subhan Rao case (supra), where a portion of suit property was given to the plaintiff-wife for her maintenance subject to restriction that she will not alienate the land which was given to her maintenance. The question arose as to whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the JUDGMENT owner of the suit property. Considering all the earlier decisions of this Court, their Lordships held that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the pre-existing right in lieu of her right to maintenance transformed into absolute estate. 27 Page 27 29. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 35, this Court following the decision in Tulasamma’s case held as under:-

JUDGMENT 28 Page 28

30. In Sadhu Singh’s case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts of the case were quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu Singh’s case, this Court proceeded on the basis that the JUDGMENT widow had no pre-existing right in the property, and therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will cannot get enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act. 29 Page 29 31. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant’s last contention was that in the absence of any pleading and proof from the side of the appellant to

the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit A-2 is a document which very categorically provided that the property in question was given to Veeraraghavamma to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the genuineness of the said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that Veeraraghavamma was enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our considered opinion, unless the factum of JUDGMENT bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and her continuous possession are disputed, the question of pleading and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the arrangement made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of maintenance. 30 Page 30 Hence, the ratio decided in G. Rama’s case (supra) does not apply.

Veeraraghavamma was issueless and she has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his property. He further realized that physically he was weak and may not survive for long period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family members. For the maintenance of his third wife Veeraraghavamma, he gave the tiled house with site and compound wall with the stipulation that she shall enjoy the property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities. JUDGMENT Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. In view of the admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right to the suit property. 31 Page 31 33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has elaborately discussed the facts of the case and the law

court committed serious error of law in holding that by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not become absolute. 34. Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance life interest has been created in favour of Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever form a limited interest is created in her favour who was having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same has become an JUDGMENT absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 35. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and the judicial pronouncements of this Court in a series of 32 Page 32 decisions, we hold that the impugned judgment of the High Court is perfectly in accordance with law and needs no interference by this Court.

dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. …………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal) …………………………….J. (C. Nagappan) New Delhi November 06, 2015 JUDGMENT 33 Page 33