Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
LAKSHMI NARAIN AGARWAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, U.P. & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/09/1967
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
SHAH, J.C.
SHELAT, J.M.
CITATION:
1968 AIR 410 1968 SCR (1) 635
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 47(3) and 64A-Regional
Transport Authority if should consider representations of
existing operator before passing order under s. 47(3)-Order
under s. 47(3) if revisable under s. 64A.
Constitution of India, 1950, Art, 136--Discretion under.
HEADNOTE:
The Regional Transport Authority, by an order under s. 47(3)
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fixed the number of stage
carriages, by increasing their number on a particular route.
The appellant, an existing operator, filed a revision
against that order to the State Transport Authority, under
s. 64A, but the State Transport Authority held that a
revision did not lie. The appellant then filed a writ
petition in the High Court and the High Court dismissed it,
holding that: (1) at the stage of s. 47(3), existing
operators were not entitled to be heard by the Regional
Transport Authority, and (2) since the order of the Regional
Transport Authority was good on merits, it was not necessary
to decide whether a revision lay to the State Transport
Authority.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) Unlike s. 47(1), s. 47(3) does not say
expressly that representations could be made by existing
operators and others. The expression in s. 47(3) that ’the
Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the
matters mentioned in sub-s. (1)’, only means that the
Authority shall have regard to the matters mentioned in sub-
cls. (a) to (f) of s. 47(1) and has nothing to do the right
of making representations. [638F-H]
(2) But whether or not an existing operator has an implied
right to be heard before an order under s. 47(3) is made he
can be aggrieved by an order made under that section
increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages
depending on the circumstances of the case, and has
therefore a right of revision under s. 64A, the only
condition for filing a revision being that it should be
against an order made by the Regional Transport Authority
against which no appeal lies. [639C-D, F-H]
Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523, re-
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ferred to.
(3) Since a revision could be filed under s. 64A against
the order under s. 47(3) the aggrieved operator need not
approach the Regional Transport Authority first to review
its order. [640B-C]
(4) The High Court should have directed the State Transport
Authority to dispose of on merits the revision petition
against the order under s. 47(3), and not gone into its
merits itself, but, in view of the time that lapsed since
the order was passed (five years, during which the demand
for stage carriages must have increased), this Court would
not interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.
136. [640C-E]
636
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 636 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment all order dated
November 11. 1966 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
in Writ Petition No. 226 of 1963.
S. T. Desai, J. P. Goyal, D. N. Jha and G. S. the
appellant.
Sarjoo Prashad and O. P. Rana, for the respondents. Judgment
of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment, dated November 11, 1966, of the Division Bench
of tile Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition
filed by tile appellant seeking to quash tile order of the
State Transport Authority. dated March 20/21. 1963. The
State Transport Authority had by this order rejected the
appellant’s revision petition against the decision of the
Regional Transport Authority oil the ground that a mere
decision of the Regional Transport Authority limiting the
number of stage carriages under S. 47(3) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as
the Act could not form the subject matter of a revision
application’. It was of the view that "when the Regional
Transport Authority actually proceeds to fill Lip the
vacancies, which it has decided to create, then the persons
whose interests would be adversely affected, would have a
right of representation before the Regional Transport
Authority, and in the case of their representation being
rejected by the Regional Transport Authority the will
have a right of appeal before the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal."
The High Court was of the view that an existing operator had
no say in the matter of determination of the strength on a
route under sub-s. (3) of s. 47, and, it was in the
discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to determine
the strength on a route, after considering various matters
enumerated in cls. (a) to (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 47. The
High Court further observed that is the order passed under
S. 47(3), to revise which the appellant had filed a
revision tinder s. 64-A, was a good order and did not call
for any interference, it did not consider it necessary to
decide whether a revision lay against such an order under s.
64-A of the Act.
The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. T. Desai, con-
tends that an order under S. 47(3) of the Act, whether it is
quasijudicial or administrative, does affect the existing
operators on the route and their representations must be
considered by the Regional Transport Authority before
passing an order tinder s. 47(3). He further submits that a
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revision lay under S. 64-A of the Act and the same should
not have been dismissed on the ground that no revision lay.
637
The relevant statutory provisions are s. 47 and s. 64-A, of
the Act, and read thus;
"47. Procedure of Regional Transport
Authority in considering application for stage
carriage permit:-
(1) A Regional Transport Authority shall,
in considering an application for a stage
carriage permit, have regard to the following
matters, namely:---
(a) the interests of the public generally’,
(b) the advantages to the public of the set-
vice to be provided, including the saving of
time likely to be effected thereby and any
convenience arising from journeys not being
broken;
(c) the adequacy of other passenger
transport services operating or likely to
operate in the near future, whether by road or
other means, between the places to be served;
(d) the benefit to any particular locality
or localities likely to be afforded by the
service;
(e) the operation by the applicant of other
transport services. including those in respect
of which applications from him for permits are
pending;
(f) the condition of the roads included in
the proposed route or area;
and shall also take into consideration any
representations made by persons already
providing passengers transport facilities by
any means along or near the proposed route or
area. or by any association representing
persons interested in the provision of road
transport facilities recognised in this behalf
by the State Government, or by any local
authority or police authority within whose
jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or
area lies:
Provided that other conditions being equal, an
application for a stage carriage permit from a
co-operative society registered or deemed to
have been registered under any enactment in
force for the time being shall, as far as may
be, be given preference over applications from
individual owners.
(2) A Regional Transport Authority shall
refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it
appears from any time table furnished that the
provisions of this Act relating to the speed
at which vehicles may be driven are likely to
be contravened:
638
provided that before such refusal an
opportunity shall be given to the applicant to
amend the time table so as to conform to the
said provisions.
(3) A Regional Transport Authority may,
having regard to the matters, mentioned in
sub-section (1), limit the number of stage
carriages generally or of any specified type
for which stage carriage permits may be
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granted in the region or in any specified area
or on any specified route within the region."
"64-A. Revision---The State Transport
Authority may, either on its own motion or on
an application made to it, call for the record
of any case in which an order has been made by
a Regional Transport Authority and in which no
appeal lies, and if it appears to the State
Transport Authority that the order made by the
Regional Transport Authority is improper or
illegal, the State Transport Authority may
pass such order in relation to the case as it
deems fit:
Provided that the State Transport Authority
shall not entertain any application from a
person aggrieved by an order of a Regional
Transport Authority, unless the application is
made within thirty days from the date of the
order:
Provided further that the State Transport
Authority shall not pass an order under this
section prejudicial to any person without
giving him a reasonable opportunity of being
heard."
It would be noticed that sub-s. (3) of s. 47 does not
expressly say whether any representations can be made by
persons already providing transport facilities or by
associations representing persons interested in the
provision of the transport facilities or by any local
authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction the
route or area lies. This is expressly mentioned in s.
47(1). The learned counsel contends that the expression
"matters mentioned in sub-section (1)" occurring in sub-s.
(3) refers back not only to matters mentioned in sub-cls.
(a) to (f) to sub-s. (1) in S. 47 but also the right of
representation mentioned in sub-s. (1). We are unable to
accept this line of reasoning as being sound. Even under s.
47(1), the Regional Transport Authority can only have regard
to the matters mentioned in sub-cls. (a) to (f), and those
matters may be brought to the notice of the Regional
Transport Authority by representations. It could not have
been the intention that representations would contain
matters which the Regional Transport Authority could not
take into consideration under s. 47(1). This is not to say
that the matters mentioned in
639
sub-cls. (a) to (f) are exhaustive, but this point does
not arise and we need not say anything as to this.
Therefore, this line of reasoning does not assist the
appellant.
This Court in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey(1) held
that "where a limit has been fixed under s. 47(3) by the
Regional Transport Authority, and thereafter the said
authority proceeds to consider applications for permits
under s. 48 read with s. 57, the Regional Transport
Authority must confine the number of permits issued by it to
those limits and on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved
person, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority
must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the
limits fixed under s. 47(3)". But this Court did not feel
it necessary to decide whether under s. 64-A, inserted by
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act No. 100 of 1956, it was open
to the State Transport Authority to vary a general order
passed under s. 47(3). If we look at the section, it would
be noticed that s. 64-A is very wide in terms; the only
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condition necessary for filing a revision is that it should
be against an order made by the Regional Transport Authority
and against which no appeal lies. The word "order" is wide,
and there is no doubt that an order made under s. 47(3) is
an order within s. 64-A because, as held by this Court in
Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey (1) it binds the Regional
Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority in
dealing with applications under s. 48. read with s. 57, of
the Act.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, the learned counsel for the State, con-
tends that no revision lies at the instance of an existing
operator because he cannot be called an aggrieved person,
and secondly, that even if a revision lies, the appellant is
not entitled to any relief on the facts of this case, under
Art. 136 of the Constitution, because the appellant never
approached the Regional Transport Authority in the first
instance. We are unable to say that no existing operator
can be aggrieved by an order made under s. 47(3), increasing
or decreasing the number of stage carriages; it would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a
particular case it may be to his advantage and he then would
not file a revision against it, but if he files a revision
when an order made under s. 47(3) is prejudicial to his
interests, there is no ground for denying him the right to
approach the revisional authority and seeking its order. An
order under s. 47(3) affects the future working on a route
and we are of the view that such an order would have
repercussion on the working of the existing operators,
whether for their good or not. The High Court, as stated
above, was of the view that at the stage of s. 47(3)
existing operators would- not be entitled to be heard by the
Regional
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523.
640
Transport Authority. But assuming that it is so, this does
no affect the right of revision conferred by s. 64-A. We
need not in this case decide whether it is implied that
existing operators would be entitled to be heard by the
Regional Transport Authority before an order under s. 47(3)
is made.
The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that
a decision under s. 47(3) is a tentative decision and can be
revised. But assuming that it can be revised by the
Regional Transport Authority, till the order is in operation
it is binding on everybody and if a revision can be filed
against the order under s. 64-A, the aggrieved operator
cannot be compelled to approach the Regional Transport
Authority first to revise its order. ’This argument, in a
way, concedes that an operator can be a person aggrieved by
an order under s. 47(3).
The learned counsel for the appellant contends that if it is
held that a revision lies under s. 64-A against an order
passed under s. 47(3) of the Act, the State Transport
Authority should be directed to hear the revision on merits.
He says that the High Court had no right to go into the
merits of the order itself. Ordinarily what Mr. Desai
contends is correct, but here the facts are that the order
under s. 47(3) was passed as long ago as November. 17. 1962.
During the last five years demand for stage carriages on
this route would have, in the ordinary course, increased by
now. and further it has not been shown that the Regional
Transport Authority has made any glaring mistake.
For the aforesaid reasons. in exercising our discretion
under Art. 136 of the Constitution we consider that we
should not interfere with the order passed by the High
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Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
641