Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5048 of 2000
PETITIONER:
The State of West Bengal and Ors
RESPONDENT:
M/s Veejay International (India) & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court holding that
clauses 9 and 10 of the Notification No.4784-
F.S./FS/Sectt/Food/148-1/97, dated 19.12.1997 issued in
exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 (in short the ’Act’) read with
Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
(Department of Food) Order No. G.S.R. 800 dated 8th June,
1978 was contrary to the policy declared under the Foreign
Trade Development and Regulation Act, 1992 (in short
’Foreign Trade Act’). Accordingly, it was held as follows:
"In view of our findings aforementioned it must
be held that the order does not conform to the
policy laid down by the Central Government in
exercise of its power conferred upon it under
Section 5 of the 1992 Act inasmuch as in
terms thereof, the Central Government could
not even itself interfere with the proclaimed
policy relating to import and export adopted by
it in terms of Section 5 of the 1992 Act."
By the abovesaid notification order in question was made
which was called West Bengal Rice and Paddy Control Order,
1997 (for short ’the Control Order’).
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The notification in question was issued purportedly with
a view to regulate the price and availability of rice in the State
of West Bengal. The State Government in exercise of delegated
power given under the Act, by the notification No.G.S.R. 800
dated 8th June, 1978 promulgated West Bengal Rice and
Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1981 (in short
’Movement Order’).
Clause 5 of the said order authorizes Officers to enter
into any premises and make search and seizure of essential
commodities or vehicle etc. Vires of the said orders were
considered by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court.
Thereafter, the Control Order was issued. Clauses 9 and
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10 of the said Control Order are relevant for the purpose of the
present dispute. They read as follows:-
"9. Regulation of storage of rice and paddy for
export \026
(1) No person shall store or attempt to store or
transport any quantity of rice or paddy
procured for export without a valid permit
in Form ’D’ granted by the Director or by
the Controller, if so authorized by the
Government.
(2) In the case of transshipment of stocks
from one vehicle to another in exigencies, by
an exporter without a valid permit such
transshipment shall be made only with the
prior permission of the nearest Controller,
stating in total the reason for such
transshipment.
10. Regulation of export of rice produced in
West Bengal -
No person shall export or attempt to
export any rice or paddy produced or grown in
West Bengal without a written authority
granted by the Government in this behalf, and
if the Government or such authorized officer is
satisfied that such export of rice will not
adversely affect the price and availability of
rice in the local market, the Government or
such authorized officer may grant authority for
export of specified quantity and variety of rice
as may be determined by the Government or
such authorized officer."
Respondent filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High
Court questioning the legality of the aforesaid clauses
primarily on the ground that they were repugnant and
inconsistent with the policy declared by the Foreign Trade Act.
The State took the stand that the clauses in question are
regulatory in nature and do not suffer from any infirmity.
The High Court accepted the challenge and, inter alia,
concluded as follows:
"Clause 9(1) of the Control Order deals
with restriction on transport whereas; clause
4.21 of the export and import policy framed by
the Central Government under Section 5 of the
1992 Act clearly states that items allowed for
export shall not be withheld/delayed for any
reason by any agency of the Central or State
Government. Both the provisions, thus, are in
direct conflict with each other. Clause 9.2,
provides for a prior permission of the nearest
controller when transshipment takes place
from one vehicle to another. If clause 9.1 is
bad, clause 9.2 cannot survive independently.
Clause 10 of the Control order is in
mandatory form. It totally prohibits export or
import. It confers absolute unguided,
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unbridled and uncontrolled power upon the
authorities named therein to consider as to
whether a permit for export should be granted
or not. By reason of an order made under the
delegated notifications no authority of the
State Government can authorize to issue
permit for export. Such a contingency is
contemplated only in terms of paragraph 5 of
the 1992 Order. Once in terms of EXIM policy
non Basmati rice is considered to be free for
export which decision must have been taken
into consideration by the Central Government
upon taking into consideration all aspects of
the matter viz. availability thereof in the
country, the quantum of production and the
requirement within the courts, the State
Government in exercise of its delegated power
cannot be held to have any say in the matter.
If the State Government has any difficulty in
relation thereto, it may bring the same to the
notice of the Central Government so that at
the time of registration of such contract
entered into by and between the exporter and
the foreign country, the same may borne in
mind by the appropriate authority so as to
restrict number of registrations of contract by
and between the exporters from India and the
Foreign Countries."
As noted above, an escape route was suggested as would
be seen from the quoted portion of the High Court’s order.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the High Court completely lost sight
of the fact that the two clauses were regulatory in nature.
There was no complete ban on export or import and, it cannot
be said that there was any absolute, unguided, unbridled and
uncontrolled power upon the authorities to decide whether the
permit for export shall be granted or not. The purpose was to
ensure that the export does not affect the price in the local
market and the availability of stock. As a matter of fact, there
was no conflict as was held by the High Court.
In K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (1985
(2) SCC 116) it was held as follows:
"The appellants impugned clause 3(1-A) of the
1982 Order on the grounds that it was ultra
vires the State Government being in excess of
the delegated powers. It was urged (i) that the
delegation of a specific power under Section
3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act by the
Central Government notification dated June 9,
1979 issued under Section 5 of the Act to
regulate the storage, transport, distribution,
disposal, etc. of an essential commodity, in
relation to foodstuffs, does not carry with it the
general power of the Central Government
under sub-section (1) of Section 3 to regulate
or prohibit the production, supply and
distribution thereof and trade and commerce
therein, and (ii) that the word ’regulating’ in
clause (d) of Section 3(2) of the Act does not
take in ’prohibiting’ and as such there cannot
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be a total prohibition on transport, movement
or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas
in question under clause (d) but only
regulation of such activities in the course of
trade and commerce by grant of licences or
permits."
Decision in Harishankar Bagla and Anr. v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 465) throws considerable light
on the controversy. Para 7 of the judgment read as follows:-
"7. The first question canvassed by Mr.
Umrigar was that the provisions of Section 3 of
the Control Order infringed the rights of a
citizen guaranteed in sub-clauses (f) and (g) of
Article 19(1) of the Constitution. These sub-
clauses recognize the right of a citizen to
dispose of property and to carry on trade or
business. The requirement of a permit to
transport by rail cotton textiles to a certain
extent operates as a restriction on the rights of
a person who is engaged in the business of
purchase and sale of cotton textiles. Clause
(5) of Article 19 however permits such
restrictions to be placed provided they are in
the public interest. During the period of
emergency it was necessary to impose control
on the production, supply and distribution of
commodities essential to the life of the
community. It was for this reason that the
Legislature passed the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act authorizing the
Central Government to make orders from time
to time controlling the production, supply and
distribution of essential commodities.
Clause 3 of the Control Order does not
deprive a citizen of the right to dispose of or
transport cotton textiles purchased by him. It
requires him to take a permit from the Textile
Commissioner to enable him to transport
them. The requirement of a permit in this
regard cannot be regarded as an unreasonable
restriction on the citizen’s right under sub-
clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19(1). If transport
of essential commodities by rail or other means
of conveyance was left uncontrolled it might
well have seriously hampered the supply of
these commodities to the public. Act XXIV of
1946 was an emergency measure and as
stated in its preamble, was intended to provide
for the continuance during a limited period of
powers to control the production, supply and
distribution of, and trade and commerce in,
certain commodities. The number of
commodities held essential are mentioned in
Section 2 of the Act, and the requirement of a
permit to transport such commodities by road
or rail or other means of transport, cannot, in
any sense of the term, be said, in a temporary
Act, to be unreasonable restriction on the
citizens’ rights mentioned in clauses (f) and (g)
of Article 19(1). The High Court was therefore
right in negativing the contention raised
regarding the invalidity of the Control Order as
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abridging the rights of the citizens under
Article 19 (1) of the Constitution."
Section 5 of the Foreign Trade Act authorizes the Central
Government to formulate and announce, by notification in the
Official Gazette, the export and import policy as also to amend
the same in like manner. If the clauses 9 and 10 of the Control
Order and Section 5 of the policy of the Foreign Trade Act are
harmonized, that rules out any conflict. As a matter of fact,
Section 6 of the Act is also of relevance and it reads as follows:
"6. Effect of orders inconsistent with other
enactments - Any order made under section 3
shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any
enactment other than this Act or any
instrument having effect by virtue of any
enactment other than this Act."
The Control Order was passed in exercise of power
available under the Act. "Export" under the Foreign Trades
Act involves several activities. It includes transport,
international contract between parties, interstate movement
and delivery to the buyer outside the country. The impugned
clauses of the Control Order relate to certain restrictions on
some parts of the activities. By no stretch of imagination they
can be considered to be opposed to the policy of export. The
clauses are regulatory in nature and character without in any
manner affecting the policy flowing from Section 5 of the
Foreign Trade Act. It is not that any unbridled and/or
arbitrary power was given to the authorities as held by the
High Court. In fact, the parameters of exercisable of power are
inbuilt in Clause 10. Reasons were required to be recorded.
This was to be done objectively and not subjectively as
appears to have been concluded by the High Court. Looked at
from any angle, the High Court’s judgment is indefensible and
is set aside.
The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.