State Of U.P. vs. Mohd. Arshad Khan

2025 INSC 1480
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5610__ OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025)
STATE OF U.P. & ANR. ...APPELLANT (S)
Versus
MOHD ARSHAD KHAN & ANR. ...RESPONDENT (S)
WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _5611__ OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 17579 OF 2025)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5612__ OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No. 18150 OF 2025)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2025.12.19
16:56:56 IST
Reason:
Leave Granted.
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 1 of 17

2. The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the
judgments and orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in petitions for quashing preferred by accused persons
th
in connection with common FIR dated 24 May 2025 in Case
Crime No. 33 of 2025 registered at Police Station, Nai Ki Mandi,
District Agra under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian
1
Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act 1959.
Before us in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No.17272 of 2025, is
2
Mohd. Arshad Khan , in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No.
3
17579 of 2025 is Sanjay @Sanjay Kapoor and in Criminal
Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No.18150 of 2025 is Muhammad Zaid
4
Khan . They shall be collectively referred to as the accused-
respondents.
3. The case arises from an investigation directed by the
Senior Superintendent of Police, STF Headquarters, Lucknow,
pursuant to an anonymous petition which, during inquiry,
culminated in a statutory complaint dated 31st July 2024. The
complaint alleged that certain persons had procured and used
arms licenses by submitting forged documents and false
affidavits. Acting on these directions, the STF conducted an
inquiry on the basis of documentary records, reports submitted by
the Additional District Magistrate (City), Arms Section, Agra,
1 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘IPC’
2 Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12162 of 2025
3 Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12526 of 2025
4 Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12173 of 2025
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 2 of 17

statements of complainants and accused persons, and scrutiny of
licence files and related documents. The investigation found
st
serious irregularities and in terms of report dated 31 January
2025, it was recommended that a criminal case be registered and
further investigation be conducted hereinto. The FIR subject
matter of these cases, thus came to be registered. Below is an
encapsulation of the content of the FIR regarding the three
accused-respondents before us.
With respect to Zaid Khan, son of Sher Khan, it was found
during the investigation that arms licence number 1227/03 had
been obtained by submitting forged documents and false
affidavits. In the licence records, his date of birth was shown as
25th November 1975, whereas his actual date of birth was found
to be 25th November 1972. This discrepancy was detected on the
basis of documentary evidence examined during the inquiry, and
it is alleged that the arms licence was issued on the strength of
these false particulars.
In relation to Arshad Khan, son of Ahmed Ali, the
investigation revealed that he procured five arms licences bearing
numbers 6365, 6491, 6415, 6316 and 6248 - all Tajganj, by using
forged PAN card, Aadhaar card and driving licence. In these
documents, his date of birth was shown as 15th January 1985,
whereas official records indicate his year of birth as 1988. Prior
to the issuance of the licences in the year 2006, his date of birth
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 3 of 17

in the records was 15th January 1988. It is alleged that the
alteration in the date of birth was made deliberately to show a
lower age, with the object of presenting himself as a skilled
marksman, obtaining undue benefits, and enabling the import of
arms and ammunition from abroad on the basis of multiple arms
licences. During the investigation, despite repeated notices, he
did not furnish purchase invoices, import documents or passport
details and did not cooperate fully with the inquiry. It is further
alleged that the arms licences were obtained by knowingly using
forged documents.
As regards Sanjay Kapoor, who was serving at the relevant
time as Arms Clerk in the office of the Additional District
Magistrate, Agra, and who has since retired under the Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, the investigation prima facie found that he,
along with the concerned arms licence holders, was involved in
acts relating to forgery, concealment of material facts and
submission of false affidavits in connection with the processing
and issuance of arms licences.
4. All three accused - respondents filed petitions before High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which were,
th th th
by orders dated 4 July 2025, 16 June 2025 and 4 July 2025
respectively, closed as disposed of, and not allowed, as was
desired by them, it was directed that the investigating officer
complete the investigation into the alleged offence within 90 days
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 4 of 17

and that they would not be arrested till the concerned court takes
cognizance of the matters. This was done by way of identically
worded orders, relying on the same case, i.e., Shobhit Nehra v.
5
State of U.P. For reference, one of the impugned orders is
reproduced herein below:
“1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
AGA for State-respondents.
2. The present writ petition has been preferred with the
prayer to quash the impugned First Information Report
dated 24.05.2025 registered as Case Crime No.33 of
2025, under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC and
Section 3/25/30 of Arms Act, Police Station- Nai Ki
Mandi, District Agra and for a direction to the
respondents not to arrest the petitioner in pursuance of
impugned First Information Report.
3. With regard to the allegations made in the F.I.R.,
investigating officer of the police is investigating the
matter. 4. After hearing the rival contentions, totality of
facts and circumstances of this case and in view of the
judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in
Criminal Misc. Writ petition No. 7463/2024 (Shobhit
Nehra Vs. State of U.P.), the above noted writ petition
is disposed of directing the investigating officer to
conclude the investigation of this case within period of
90 days.
5. During the period of investigation and till cognizance
is taken on the police report by the court concerned, the
petitioner shall not be arrested.
6. In case of non-cooperation with the police
investigation by the petitioner, it shall be open for
either of the respondents to file recall application of this
order.”
5. Shobhit Nehra (supra) was a case before the High Court,
where, in a manner similar to the present case, the High Court
5 Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 7463 of 2024
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 5 of 17

had, a) refused quashing; b) directed time bound completion of
investigation; and c) granted protection from arrest till the taking
of cognizance by the concerned court. The background of the
said case was a long-standing family dispute over property. One
faction had filed a first information report against the other, and
as such the other group went to Court seeking quashing and
protection from arrest. On the three aspects regarding which this
judgment was followed in the impugned orders, the reasoning can
be summarized as under: -
The High Court explained that protection from arrest was
justified because the case was still on the investigation stage and
the allegations were not free from doubt, especially given the
backdrop of an ongoing civil dispute. It noted that an FIR cannot
be treated as unquestionable truth and that personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed merely
because the allegations technically disclose cognizable offences.
The Court observed that forcing the accused to seek anticipatory
bail, (which it alluded to was difficult in view of certain
judgments of the High Court which necessitated that the trial
Court must consider such applications first, only then could the
High Court do so,) such circumstances could lead to unnecessary
harassment and would weaken constitutional protections. At the
same time, it made clear that shielding the accused from arrest
does not mean paralyzing the investigation and that liberty and
investigation must coexist in a balanced manner.
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 6 of 17

On the question of limiting the duration of this protection,
the Court reasoned that liberty cannot be protected in an open-
ended way if it risks undermining the investigative process. It
was observed that investigations must be conducted promptly and
efficiently, and that any interim protection must therefore be
structured in a manner that it does not become an obstacle to a
timely investigation. Fixing a time frame was seen as a necessary
safeguard to ensure that protection from arrest remains
proportionate and does not turn into a means of delaying the
process. The Court underlined that protection from arrest is
inherently conditional and depends on the accused acting in good
faith. It observed that the right to liberty cannot be used as a
shield to avoid or frustrate investigation, and that unconditional
protection would risk abuse of the judicial process. It allowed the
possibility of recall in cases of non-cooperation in the
investigation.
6. The State is in appeal, opposing the protection from arrest,
bring contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Neeharika
6
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra . It is further
submitted that the imposition of timelines is not justified as its
risks prejudice to the investigation of a serious offence, and
neither is the reliance on Shobhit Nehra (supra) without
reference to facts, among other grounds. The parties, through
counsel, were heard.
6 (2021) 19 SCC 401
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 7 of 17

7. The question before us is whether the direction for time
bound investigation and protection from arrest while disposing of
a petition for quashing without granting the relief actually prayed
for, is justified, legally sustainable or not.
8. It is well settled that the writ jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide and extends
to criminal matters as well. The most common example we see of
writs being employed in the sphere of criminal justice is in cases
where the High Courts are called upon to intervene to prevent
abuse of the criminal process or to secure the ends of justice. In
7
this context, this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
recognized that High Courts may exercise writ jurisdiction to
interdict criminal proceedings at the threshold in appropriate
cases. This approach was reiterated in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
8
Special Judicial Magistrate and innumerable other
judgments/orders. Beyond these commonly encountered
instances, the writ jurisdiction has also been exercised in criminal
matters for purposes other than quashing. In cases involving
illegal detention or custodial violations, the writ of habeas corpus
has been invoked to protect personal liberty, as recognized in
9
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Nilabati Behera v.
10
State of Orissa . High Courts have also issued writs in the nature
7 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
8 (1998) 5 SCC 749
9 (1978) 4 SCC 494
10 (1993) 2 SCC 746
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 8 of 17

of mandamus to ensure fair investigation or to address police
11
inaction, with the Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P .
clarifying that while remedies under the CrPC should ordinarily
be pursued, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court
remains available in appropriate cases. Further, writ jurisdiction
has been used to enforce procedural safeguards during arrest and
12
detention, as laid down in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and
13
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal . These decisions indicate
that Article 226 continues to operate as a constitutional remedy in
criminal law, enabling High Courts to address questions of
legality and protection of fundamental rights alongside the
statutory criminal process.
9. In exercise of these wide-ranging powers - was it justified
to direct time bound completion of investigation? The
investigation of an offence is a long, winding road. It is full of
ups and downs and is not, possibly, even for a moment,
predictable in the true sense. There can be delays in the
investigation, witnesses who at one point in time appeared
confident, may begin to hesitate or completely resile from their
statement, documentary evidence on which much hope was
pinned, may turn out to be unusable or so many other such
possibilities may occur. Legal proceedings frequently intersect
with the investigation and affect its pace and direction.
11 (2008) 2 SCC 409
12 (1994) 4 SCC 260
13 (1997) 1 SCC 416
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 9 of 17

Applications for anticipatory bail, regular bail, or the like can
result in temporary pauses or changes in strategy. Courts may call
for further investigation, ask for clarification on specific aspects
or even direct a change of the investigating officer. Each such
intervention requires the investigating agency to revisit its work
and sometimes take a fresh path altogether. So, it can be seen that
the investigative process is at times straight, at other times one of
lots of twists, turn and recalibrations and in yet others,
frustratingly round-about like, before it can come to a somewhat
definitive conclusion to present the case for trial before the
concerned, and sometimes, even at that time the definitive
conclusion, at least from an investigator’s standpoint, remains
elusive.
While all this may undoubtedly be true, it is also
unquestionably so that it cannot be an excuse for avoidable delay.
Speedy trial, which necessarily includes timely and diligent
investigation, has been recognized as an integral part of Article
21 of the Constitution and is essential to the fairness and
credibility of the criminal justice system. Undue delay prejudices
not only the accused, whose liberty and reputation remain under a
cloud, but also the victim and society at large, for whom justice
loses meaning when it is endlessly deferred. The challenge,
therefore, lies in balancing the practical realities of investigation
with the constitutional mandate that criminal proceedings, from
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 10 of 17

investigation through trial, be conducted with reasonable
promptitude and care. It is this balancing role that the judiciary
plays. It is for those reasons that while on the one hand there is a
statutorily laid down process in place which is generally
followed, powers such as that of Article 226 of the Constitution
14
and Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been
kept open in their widest sense possible- to secure the ends of
justice.
10. Courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-
bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the
norm. Investigation is, as can be seen from the above discussion,
a product of many factors and happenings apart from the crime
itself, that lend to it a sense of uncertainty and the law therefore
accords investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. At
the same time, the Constitution does not permit investigations to
remain open-ended. The Supreme Court has long held that the
right to a speedy trial, which necessarily includes a timely and
diligent investigation, forms an essential part of Article 21, as
first recognized by a Constitution Bench in Hussainara Khatoon
15
(1) v. State of Bihar , and later elaborated by another
16
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak . It
is in this constitutional setting that courts have, in appropriate
cases, intervened where delay itself begins to cause prejudice.
14 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’
15 (1980) 1 SCC 81
16 (1992) 1 SCC 225
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 11 of 17

Where there is evident stagnation, unexplained inaction, or a
pattern of delay that cannot be justified by the nature or
complexity of the case, judicial directions fixing timelines have
17
been considered warranted. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India ,
the Court emphasized the need for prompt and effective
investigation, particularly where delay risks allowing serious
matters to drift without resolution. More recently, in Robert
18
Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar , the Court
reaffirmed that investigations cannot be allowed to continue
endlessly, and that prolonged and unexplained delay between the
registration of an FIR and the filing of a chargesheet may itself
infringe Article 21, especially where such delay keeps an
individual under a continuing cloud of suspicion without
meaningful progress. Courts have also been mindful of the
impact of prolonged investigation on personal liberty, particularly
where coercive measures or extended custody are involved. In
such cases, fixing timelines is viewed not as an intrusion into the
investigative domain, but as a safeguard against inertia and
arbitrariness. At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned
against routine or mechanical directions for time-bound
investigation, reiterating in Union of India v. Prakash P.
19
Hinduja , that the manner and pace of investigation ordinarily
lie within the investigator’s domain. What emerges, therefore, is a
17 (1998) 1 SCC 226
18 2025 INSC 1339
19 (2003) 6 SCC 195,
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 12 of 17

balanced approach: courts respect the practical realities of
investigation, yet intervene where delay itself threatens fairness,
liberty, or the integrity of the criminal justice process.
11. The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the above
discussion is that timelines are not drawn by the Court to be
followed by the investigators/the executive right from the
beginning, for that would clearly amount to stepping on the toes
of the latter. Timelines are therefore imposed at a point where not
doing so would have adverse consequences i.e., there is material
on record demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or the like. In
sum, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically.
As such, the timelines imposed by the High Court need to be
interfered with and set aside. Ordered accordingly.
12. The next aspect is the protection from arrest till the taking
of cognizance by the concerned Court. On this count too, we are
of the considered view that the High Court fell into error. The
reason why the Court may have been justified in doing so in the
factual context of Shobhit Nehra (supra) is that inter alia the
criminal action therein, had the pretext of a long-standing civil
dispute along with familial animosity. The dispute in that case has
already made its way up to this Court way back in 1998, and even
today proceedings of one nature or another are on the docket of at
least two courts. Given that background, arrest on the basis of
FIR simpliciter, arguendo , may have had an impact on Article 21
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 13 of 17

rights of the accused therein. How the directions issued therein
apply to the instant facts is unclear, for the impugned orders do
not discuss the same.

important for our purposes here. We quote:

This proposition has been referred to with approval in a
number of judgments of this Court including State of Orissa v.
21
Sudhansu Sekhar Misra , Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
22
Ranjan , All India Haj Umrah Tour Organisers Assn. v. Union
23
of India .
14. When a Court in its order or judgment, or when a counsel
appears before a court reference to and reliance upon a judgment
is made, it is not a mechanical exercise. It needs to and should
reflect application of mind. This application of mind is in
connection with the evaluation of material facts of the two cases,
since they are essential to decision making. Only those facts that
bear a direct nexus to the legal principle applied constitute the
20 [1901] AC 495
21 1967 SCC OnLine SC 17
22 (2005) 2 SCC 42
23 (2023) 2 SCC 484
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 14 of 17

material factual substratum of the precedent. This exercise is ex
facie absent in the impugned orders. The directions in Shobhit
Nehra (supra), which were justified in the said factual context,
have been applied without appropriate reference to the facts of
this case. The same cannot be said to be in accordance with law.
15. Now, in so far as the protection from arrest is concerned,
we find that Neeharika (supra) absolutely clarifies the position . It
was observed by a Bench of three Judges therein, as follows:-
“ 24. This Court in Habib Abdullah Jeelani [ State of
Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC
779 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 142] , as such, deprecated
such practice/orders passed by the High Courts,
directing police not to arrest, even while declining to
interfere with the quashing petition in exercise of
powers under Section 482CrPC. In the aforesaid case
before this Court, the High Court dismissed [ Habib
Abdullah Jeelani v. State of Telangana , 2014 SCC
OnLine Hyd 1299] the petition filed under Section
482CrPC for quashing the FIR. However, while
dismissing the quashing petition, the High Court
directed the police not to arrest the petitioners during
the pendency of the investigation. While setting aside
such order, it is observed by this Court that such
direction amounts to an order under Section 438CrPC,
albeit without satisfaction of the conditions of the said
provision and the same is legally unacceptable. In the
aforesaid decision, it is specifically observed and held
by this Court that “it is absolutely inconceivable and
unthinkable to pass an order directing the police not to
arrest till the investigation is completed while declining
to interfere or expressing opinion that it is not
appropriate to stay the investigation”. It is further
observed that this kind of order is really inappropriate
and unseemly and it has no sanction in law. It is further
observed that the courts should oust and obstruct
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 15 of 17

unscrupulous litigants from invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court on the drop of a hat to file an
application for quashing of launching an FIR or
investigation and then seek relief by an interim order. It
is further observed that it is the obligation of the court
to keep such unprincipled and unethical litigants at bay.
…
26. We are at pains to note that despite the law laid
down by this Court in Habib Abdullah Jeelani [ State of
Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC
779 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 142] , deprecating such orders
passed by the High Courts of not to arrest during the
pendency of the investigation, even when the quashing
petitions under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are dismissed, even thereafter
also, many High Courts are passing such orders. The
law declared/laid down by this Court is binding on all
the High Courts and not following the law laid down by
this Court would have a very serious implications in the
administration of justice.
…
28. Thus, it has been found that despite absolute
proposition of law laid down by this Court in Habib
Abdullah Jeelani [ State of Telangana v. Habib
Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC 779 : (2017) 2 SCC
(Cri) 142] that such a blanket order of not to arrest till
the investigation is completed and the final report is
filed, passed while declining to quash the criminal
proceedings in exercise of powers under Section
482CrPC, as observed hereinabove, the High Courts
have continued to pass such orders. Therefore, we again
reiterate the law laid down by this Court in Habib
Abdullah Jeelani [ State of Telangana v. Habib
Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC 779 : (2017) 2 SCC
(Cri) 142] and we direct all the High Courts to
scrupulously follow the law laid down by this Court
in Habib Abdullah Jeelani [ State of Telangana v. Habib
Abdullah Jeelani , (2017) 2 SCC 779 : (2017) 2 SCC
(Cri) 142] and the law laid down by this Court in the
present case, which otherwise the High Courts are
bound to follow. We caution the High Courts again
against passing such orders of not to arrest or “no
coercive steps to be taken” till the investigation is
Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) Page 16 of 17

completed and the final report is filed, while not
entertaining quashing petitions under Section 482CrPC
and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. The text of the order in no way provides or attempts to
provide, as in Shobhit Nehra (supra), any justification for
granting protection from arrest despite the position of law laid
down in Neeharika (supra) . Without going further into the issue,
we set aside the condition.
17. The State’s Appeals are allowed. Interim protection in
favour of the respondents herein shall continue to operate for the
next two weeks, after which, all actions as permissible in law will
follow.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
…..………………………………………… J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…….…………………………………….…. J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi
December 19, 2025
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