Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 587
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.18035 of 2025)
ISHWAR CHAND SHARMA & OTHERS … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANOTHER … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the
accused/appellants aggrieved by the impugned order dated
15.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Application
U/S 528 BNSS No.34442 of 2025 wherein the High Court refused
to quash the criminal proceedings against them, arising out of
Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 pending adjudication before the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2026.05.29
15:43:55 IST
Reason:
Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional Sessions Judge,
1
Meerut (hereinafter referred to as “trial court”). The said complaint
was lodged by respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “the
complainant”) under Sections 65, 74, 352, 351(2), 115 of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNS”) and under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act”).
Factual Background:
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that accused/appellant
No.1 is the husband of the complainant whereas the
accused/appellant No.2 is the mother-in-law of the complainant.
The accused/appellant No.3 and accused/appellant No.4 are
sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant respectively.
The said accused/appellants hereinafter are collectively referred to
as “the appellants”. Appellant No.1 and his brother, one late
Praveen got married to the complainant and her younger sister
respectively in the year 2008 according to Hindu rites and
ceremonies. A daughter, the prosecutrix, was born on 08.06.2009
out of the wedlock between appellant No.1 and the complainant,
followed by a son thereafter.
2
3.1 Owing to matrimonial discord between the parties, in the year
2011, the complainant and her sister left the matrimonial home
whereupon the care and custody of the two children of appellant
No.1 and the complainant continued to be undertaken by the
appellants. Following their separation, the parties were embroiled
in multiple criminal and civil proceedings against each other. The
allegations and claims contained in the said cases are not germane
for the adjudication of the present case. Suffice it to say that the
complainant had filed FIR No.93 of 2011 under Sections 498-A,
323, 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) read
with Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in which
appellants have been granted bail. A Complaint Case No.443 of
2013 had also been filed under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Furthermore, Case No.134 of 2024 under Sections 326, 327, 323,
504, 506 and 354 IPC was filed by the complainant in which the
appellants have obtained bail. On the other hand, appellant No.1
has filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 being Case No.1325 of 2022. Furthermore, FIR
No.105 of 2016, under Sections 307, 452, 323, 326 and 504 IPC,
FIR No.238 of 2018 under Sections 302, 328 and 329 IPC and FIR
3
No.228 of 2024 under Sections 75, 352, 115(2), 351(2) and 351(3)
BNS were filed against the complainant and her family. The list of
said cases filed by the parties against each other have been placed
in a tabular format below:
S.
No.
Case No. Case Title Sections
1. FIR No.93/2011 State vs Ishwar
498A/323/324 IPC and 3/4
of Dowry Prohibition Act.
Chand
2. Complaint Case
XXX vs Ishwar
12/17/18/19/20/21/22 of
the Domestic Violence Act.
No.443/2013
and ors.
3. FIR No.105/2016 State vs Rahul
307/323/504/326/452 of
the IPC.
and ors.
4. FIR No.238/2018 State vs Ashok
302/328/329 of IPC
etc.
5. HMA
No.1325/2022
Ishwar Sharma
13(1) of Hindu Marriage Act.
Vs. XXX
6. FIR No.228/2024 State vs Pankaj
75/115(2)/ 351(2)
/351(3)/352 of Bhartiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
etc
7. Complaint Case
XXX vs. Ishwar
65,74,352,351(3), 115 of
BNS and section 3 & 4 of
POCSO Act.
No.43/2024
and ors.
8. Complaint Case
XXX vs Ishwar
65, 74, 352, 351(2), 115 of
BNS and Sections 3 & 4 of
POCSO Act.
No.60/2024
and ors.
9. Complaint Case
Pramita vs.
326,327,330,504, 506, 354
and 120B of IPC.
No.134/2024
Ishwar etc.
10. CR No.660/2024 Ishwar etc vs.
326,327,330,504, 506, 354
and 120B of IPC.
Pramita etc.
4
3.2 Thereafter, on 10.09.2024, the complainant filed a complaint
before the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Meerut, Uttar Pradesh
against the appellants under Sections 65, 74, 115, 352, 351(2) of
BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of POCSO Act alleging that the
prosecutrix i.e. the minor daughter of the complainant and
appellant No.1 was sexually harassed by the latter and appellant
No.4 and was further abused and beaten up by the appellants. The
allegations contained in the said complaint are encapsulated as
follows:
i. Appellant No.1, the father of the victim, an alcoholic, used to
make the prosecutrix watch pornographic videos and
thereafter raped her when she was fourteen years old and
subsequently, when the prosecutrix tried to complain about
the said incident, she was brutally beaten up by appellant
Nos.2 and 3.
ii. Appellant No.1 along with appellant No.2 tried to kill the
prosecutrix and hence on 18.03.2024, she was forcefully sent
to the house of appellant Nos.3 and 4 in Meerut.
iii. Appellant No.4 also raped the prosecutrix on multiple
occasions and upon complaining about the same to appellant
5
No.3, the prosecutrix was verbally abused and sexually
assaulted by appellant No.3 by beating her and inserting the
handle of a hammer into her private parts.
iv. On 06.05.2024, the prosecutrix managed to run away from the
house of appellant Nos.3 and 4 and thereafter called the
complainant who then brought her to her home after which
she became mentally and physically ill.
v. On 30.05.2024, a complaint was made by the complainant and
the prosecutrix to the SSP, Meerut regarding the said incidents
of sexual abuse and assault but no action was taken.
vi. On 03.06.2024, the prosecutrix along with her aunt went to
Ghaziabad Court for the hearing of a dowry case where she met
appellant No.1 who threatened the prosecutrix saying that if
she did not withdraw her application, he would cut her into
pieces and throw her into the canal. Upon hearing this, the
prosecutrix became terrified and feared for her life and safety.
vii. Thereafter, the present complaint was filed on 10.09.2024.
3.3 Upon perusing the complaint, the Trial Court by order dated
07.02.2025 proceeded to take cognizance of the same which
6
culminated in Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 and thereafter, on
18.08.2025, the Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act), Meerut, Uttar
Pradesh proceeded to issue summons to appellant Nos.1 and 4
under Section 65(1) BNS and Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act; and
to appellant Nos.2 and 3 under Section 115(2) of BNS for the
purpose of trial.
3.4 Aggrieved by the cognizance order dated 07.02.2025 and the
summoning order dated 18.08.2025 in Complaint Case
No.05/2025, the appellants preferred Application U/S 528 BNSS
No.34442/2025 before the Allahabad High Court praying for
quashing of the said orders.
3.5 By the impugned order dated 15.09.2025, the High Court
refused to quash the summons and other proceedings arising out
of the Complaint Case No.05/2025. While refusing to grant the
reliefs sought by the appellants herein, the High Court observed
that upon perusal of the statements made by the complainant and
prosecutrix under Sections 223 and 225 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Surakshta Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”), there
appeared no material contradictions that went to the root of the
matter so as to justify the quashing of criminal proceedings. It was
7
further observed that the statement under Section 223 of BNSS of
the complainant supported the case of the prosecution and that
the prosecutrix, in her statement under Section 225 of BNSS, had
made specific allegations against appellant Nos.1 and 4 and
therefore the issues were prima facie triable. It was further held
that other defences raised by the appellants, such as, there being
no medical examination of the prosecutrix, the complaint being a
counterblast to the already long list of complaints and cross-
complaints filed by the parties, could be adjudicated by the trial
court after the conclusion of the trial. Lastly, with respect to
allegations contained in the complaint against appellant Nos.3 and
4, the High Court directed them to prefer a discharge application
at an appropriate stage before the trial court.
3.6 Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court, the
appellants have preferred the present appeal. At this juncture, we
find it apposite to mention that with respect to the appellants, the
trial court had proceeded to issue non-bailable warrants directing
them to appear before the Special Court on 18.12.2025. In the
circumstances, this Court vide order dated 15.12.2025, had
8
directed stay of further proceedings arising out of Complaint Case
No.05/2025.
Submissions:
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants,
learned counsel for respondent No.1-State and the learned counsel
for the complainant.
4.1 Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
the subject complaint was filed as a counterblast to exact revenge
upon the appellants and was a part of a string of FIRs and
complaints that were filed against them by the complainant to
pursue personal vendetta and to harass them. It was argued that
it was highly inconceivable, improbable and rather unimaginable
that appellant Nos.1 and 4 who happen to be the father and uncle
of the prosecutrix would outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix
and rape her. It was further submitted that the allegations against
the appellants contained in the complaint were vague, omnibus
and general in nature as there was no date mentioned as to when
the victim was subjected to her modesty being outraged, along with
the fact that there was no medical report available on record to
support any injury that was caused to her. Furthermore, it was
9
contended that a bare perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix
revealed that she had been tutored and mentored by the
complainant and hence the same deserved to be disregarded at the
very threshold. Lastly, it was submitted that no explanation had
been given by the complainant as to why she left her children at
the matrimonial home when they were one to two years old, and
made no efforts to meet them or seek their custody during the
intervening period of fourteen years and hence a complaint after
such a long period of time reeked of mala fide intentions and ran
foul of the facts and circumstances of the case.
4.2 Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
allegations contained in the complaint do not make out any
offences in the instant case and the complainant has sought to
wreak mayhem against the appellants herein by concocting false
allegations against them which are serious in nature. A reading of
the complaint in juxtaposition with the provisions of the Act on the
basis of which the offences are alleged against the appellants would
clearly indicate that the said offences are not at all made out
against the appellants herein. Learned counsel for the appellants
10
therefore submitted that the impugned order may be set aside and
this appeal may be allowed.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1-State
vehemently opposed the plea of the appellants and submitted that
the impugned order of the High Court is perfectly valid and is in
accordance with the settled principles of law and therefore does not
merit any interference by this Court. It was submitted that as per
the statements of the complainant and the prosecutrix recorded
under Sections 223 and 225 of BNSS respectively, it was apparent
that the appellants had thrown the complainant out of her
matrimonial home; that appellant No.1 was an alcohol addict, who
used to show indecent videos to the prosecutrix after which he
proceeded to rape her. Furthermore, placing reliance upon the said
statements, learned counsel submitted that appellant Nos.2 and 3
assaulted the minor prosecutrix and threatened to kill her if she
disclosed any of the said incidents to anyone. Learned counsel also
submitted that appellant No.4 was also guilty of sexually
assaulting the prosecutrix on multiple occasions when she was
residing with him in Meerut. Subsequently, when she tried to
complain about his acts to appellant No.3, she was further
11
harassed and abused after which appellant no.3 inserted the
handle of a hammer inside her vagina. Finally, it was forcefully
contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
present case and bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations
and averments made against the appellants, it was not a fit case
for the grant of relief of quashment of the proceedings but rather
this Court should permit the trial to continue and allow it to reach
its logical conclusion.
5.1 Learned counsel for the complainant vehemently argued that
the allegations of sexual abuse against the appellants have no
connection with the ongoing matrimonial and other disputes
between the parties. It was submitted that since the children were
in the sole custody of the father and his family, she had no
proximity or occasion to tutor or manipulate them. Rather, it was
argued at the bar that the minor child was taken away from
appellant No.1’s house by appellant No.3 after which she was
subjected to repeated sexual abuse by appellant No.4. It was
contended that the prosecutrix’s statement recorded by the Special
Judge has been consistent with the case of the prosecution and
therefore the defence of the appellants regarding the absence of
12
medical evidence and the possibility of tutoring by the complainant
of the prosecutrix could only be gone into after the commencement
of the trial. Lastly, learned counsel for the complainant submitted
that medical examination of the prosecutrix not being done is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution as there are offences under the
POCSO Act that may not result in any physical injury and therefore
keeping the facts and circumstances of the present case in mind,
it would be in the interest of justice if this appeal preferred by the
appellants is dismissed.
Offences Alleged:
6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties and upon a careful perusal of the material placed on record,
we note that in order to understand the nature of the offences and
to correlate the same with the allegations contained in the said
complaint, the relevant provisions under the BNS as well as the
POCSO Act are necessary to be extracted hereunder:
“ 65. Punishment for rape in certain cases. —(1)
Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years
of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural
life, and shall also be liable to fine:
13
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to
meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-
section shall be paid to the victim.
(2) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years
of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural
life, and with fine or with death:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to
meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-
section shall be paid to the victim.”
6.1 Section 74 of the BNS provides for definition and
punishment for assault or use of criminal force to a woman with
the intent to outrage her modesty. The relevant provision is
extracted as hereunder:
“ 74 . Assault or use of criminal force to woman with
intent to outrage her modesty. —Whoever assaults or
uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her
modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than one year
but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable
to fine.”
6.2 Section 115 of the BNS provides for definition and
punishment for voluntary causing hurt. The relevant provision is
extracted as hereunder:
14
“ 115. Voluntarily causing hurt.— (1) Whoever does any
act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any
person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to
cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to
any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section
(1) of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.”
6.3 Section 351 of the BNS provides for definition and
punishment for criminal intimidation. The said provision is
extracted as hereunder:
“ 351. Criminal intimidation.— (1) Whoever threatens
another by any means, with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any
one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause
alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act
which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any
deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section
(2) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
(3) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by
threatening to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the
destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence
punishable with death or 107 imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years,
or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
15
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
6.4 Further, Section 352 of the BNS provides for definition and
punishment of intentional insult with the intent to provoke breach
of peace. The said provision is extracted as hereunder:
“ 352. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach
of peace.— Whoever intentionally insults in any manner,
and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him
to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.”
6.5 Lastly, Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act provide for the
definition of penetrative sexual assault and its punishment thereof.
The said provisions are reproduced as follows:
“ 3. Penetrative sexual assault.— A person is said to
commit “penetrative sexual assault” if—
(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina,
mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do
so with him or any other person; or
(b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the
body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or
anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or
any other person; or
(c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as
to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any
part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with
him or any other person; or
16
(d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus,
urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such
person or any other person.
4. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault.— (1)
Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which shall not be less than ten years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.
(2) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child
below sixteen years of age shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for
life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of
natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just
and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical
expenses and rehabilitation of such victim”
6.6 Before proceeding with the facts of the case, it is pertinent to
underline key ingredients of the sections extracted above. An act
or an omission to be considered punishable as an offence as per
Section 65 of BNS has to satisfy the rigours of Section 63 of BNS.
Since the ingredients of Section 63 (a to d) of BNS and Section 3 of
the POCSO Act are in pari materia , they shall be dealt
conjunctively. To establish the offence of rape as per the POCSO
Act, the prosecution has to satisfy two key ingredients: first, there
was sexual assault and second, the said sexual assault was against
a minor. Sexual assault is defined in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d)
17
of Section 3 of POCSO Act which explains that sexual assault is
committed when a person either penetrates his penis into vagina,
mouth, urethra or anus of a child or inserts any object or a part of
the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus
of the child or manipulates any part of the body of the child so as
to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of
body of the child or applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus,
urethra of the child. If the act of a person is proved to fall within
any of the aforementioned four categories, he is liable to be
punished under Section 4 of POCSO Act.
6.7 Now, coming to Section 74 of BNS, the said section penalises
any act or omission that outrages the modesty of a woman. To
apply the said Section, there must be an assault or use of criminal
force on a woman. Such assault or use of criminal force must be
made with an intention to outrage her modesty or with the
knowledge that her modesty is likely to be outraged. Mere
knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is
sufficient without any deliberate intention. Therefore, the essential
ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 74 of BNS are
that the person assaulted should be a woman, and the accused
18
must have used criminal force on her intending thereby to outrage
her modesty. The ultimate test for ascertaining whether the
modesty of a woman has been outraged, assaulted, or insulted is
that the action of the offender should be such that it may be
perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency
of a woman.
6.8 Section 115 of BNS penalises the act of voluntarily causing
hurt whereby any voluntary act or omission either causes bodily
pain, disease or infirmity. There must be some kind of hurt,
voluntarily inflicted. A person can be convicted only when the
prosecution is able to prove that the said acts were done
intentionally or with knowledge that such acts would cause hurt to
the victim. Coming to Section 351 of BNS, it defines and punishes
the offence of criminal intimidation. The Section is divided in two
parts: the first part refers to the act of threatening another with
injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or
reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested; while the
second part refers to the intent with which the threatening is done
and this is further classified into two parts wherein the first part
relates to one’s intent to cause alarm to the person threatened and
19
the second is to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is
legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of
threat.
6.9 Lastly, Section 352 of BNS seeks to punish a person who
intentionally insults to provoke breach of peace. The offence
contemplated by this Section requires intentional insult and the
said insult must be such as to give provocation to the person
insulted. Furthermore, there should be intention or knowledge that
such provocation would cause or is likely to cause the person so
insulted to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere
abuse, unaccompanied by an intention to cause breach of peace or
knowledge that breach of peace it is likely to be caused does not
come within the ambit of this section.
Discussion:
7. Coming to the facts of the present case, upon a bare perusal
of the allegations made in the complaint preferred by the
complainant, it is seen that serious and grave sexual offences have
been alleged against the father i.e. appellant No.1 and uncle i.e
appellant No.4 of the prosecutrix-minor daughter whereas the
20
complainant has alleged the offence of hurt and criminal
intimidation against appellant Nos.2 and 3 who are the
grandmother and aunt respectively of the prosecutrix.
7.1 We shall first deal with the allegations of sexual assault made
against appellant Nos.1 and 4. Learned counsel for respondent
No.1-State and the complainant respectively vehemently alleged
that appellant No.1 is an alcoholic and he had raped the minor
prosecutrix when she was fourteen years of age. Upon carefully
examining the said allegation in conjunction with the materials
produced before this Court, we do not find any basis upon which
the said allegations have been made. To establish the case of rape
punishable under Section 65 of BNS or Section 4 of POCSO Act,
the prosecution has to satisfy the ingredients contained in the said
Section i.e the alleged acts fall within one of the four categories as
laid down in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sections 3 and 4 of
POCSO Act. In other words, the material on record has to prima
facie show that there was either penetration, insertion of penis or
any object or application of mouth or any other such act committed
by the accused upon the prosecturix. Therefore, in order to invoke
the offence of rape, one has to establish that there were
prima facie
21
specific positive acts committed by the accused persons so as to
fall under one of the four categories as defined under Section 63 of
BNS or Section 3 of POCSO Act. Upon a perusal of the complaint
filed by the complainant, this Court is unable to discern any
specific act or series of acts that have been allegedly carried out by
appellant Nos.1 or 4 against the prosecutrix so as to qualify as rape
as defined under Section 63 of BNS.
7.2 The complainant merely alleged that the appellant No.1 was
a habitual drinker and had raped the prosecutrix. Nothing has
been said about the date of the alleged incident. Furthermore, no
detail has been mentioned as to the alleged rape or what were the
series of acts that led to the alleged acts or what was the
prosecutrix's response after the alleged behaviour. Upon further
examination of the complaint, it is apparent that the allegation of
rape is a generic one. A blanket statement stating that appellant
Nos.1 and 4 had raped the prosecutrix, cannot, without any other
supporting material, be considered sufficient to invoke such a
grave and serious charge against them. We underline that although
any complaint or FIR cannot be an encyclopaedia so as to contain
even the minutest of details but nevertheless, a complaint cannot
22
be filed with allegations and averments when the same have not
been backed by any specific factual detail or prima facie material
evidence. Therefore, by merely stating that the prosecutrix was
raped by appellant Nos.1 and 4, the Courts cannot set into motion
the wheels of criminal prosecution. The Courts have to be
extremely careful before taking cognizance of complaints made
while invoking the provisions of rape, especially in cases where
parties have already been heavily embroiled in matrimonial
litigation, since the scope of manipulation, fabrication and
vexatious litigation is exponentially high due to pre-existing bad
blood between the parties who are often emotionally charged
against one another and allegations of rape becomes an aid
towards arm twisting tactics.
7.3 In the present case, the appellants and the complainant
already have more than ten civil and criminal cases pending
against each other. A casual invocation of a grave charge of rape,
that too, against the father of the prosecutrix, carries with it a
greater social taboo and stigma that cannot be washed off easily. A
man is a sum total of his reputation and how he is perceived in the
society. Such perception cannot be distorted by a mere casual
23
invocation of law that has the potential of ruining his reputation,
social status and public image. A blanket statement, without
narrating any ancillary act or post facto development, in our
judicial conscience cannot be allowed to stand against the father
and uncle in the instant case. Mere throwing an allegation of a
grave and serious nature without any other supporting factual
detail cannot per se result in setting in motion a criminal
proceeding against the accused.
7.4 At this juncture, we find it pertinent to mention that the
prosecutrix had been living with the appellants for a considerable
period of time and was fourteen years of age when the impugned
complaint was filed alleging the aforesaid acts. Before the filing of
the said complaint, there has not been even a whisper of any
allegation of sexual misconduct against either appellant No.1 or 4
whereas it was only after multiple FIRs and complaints that were
filed by the parties against each other, that the present Complaint
No.05/2025 was filed before the Special Court. Therefore, after
carefully considering and distilling the averments made in the
complaint along with the surrounding attenuating circumstances,
this Court is of the opinion that merely stating that appellant No.1
24
raped his daughter, is not sufficient to allow the impugned
complaint to sustain especially when there is dearth of material
facts and preliminary evidence on record to even form a prima facie
opinion.
7.5 Similarly, upon perusing the materials and documents on
record, this Court is able to discern that the complainant alleged
that appellant No.4 (uncle of prosecutrix), upon hearing about the
allegation of rape allegedly committed by appellant No.1 upon the
prosecutrix, himself proceeded to rape her on multiple occasions.
However, upon close inspection, we again find that the said
allegation in the complaint has not been supported by any other
document or material evidence on record. To support the said
allegation, learned counsel for the complainant has placed reliance
upon the statement of the prosecutrix recorded by the Special
Judge. Upon perusal and close scrutiny of the said statement of
the prosecutrix, this Court cannot but notice that the said
statement, is almost word by word similar to what the complainant
has stated in her complaint recorded by the Special Judge which
indicates the possibility of tutoring at the hands of the complainant
and her family. The contention of the counsel for the complainant
25
that she did not have custody or any access to the child so as to
allow for any fruitful or meaningful interaction to allow for such
tutoring or manipulation does not impress us because as per the
records of the case and as per the admission of the complainant
and prosecutrix, the minor girl had left the house of the appellants’
on 06.05.2024 and has been in custody of the complainant since
then, whereas the complaint was filed before the Special Judge only
on 10.09.2024 i.e. four months later.
7.6 Furthermore, the statements of the complainant and the
prosecutrix were recorded by the Special Judge only on 28.02.2025
and 18.03.2025 respectively i.e nearly six to seven months from
the date of transfer of custody of the prosecutrix from the
appellants to the complainant and therefore giving ample time and
opportunity to the complainant and her kin to sway and colour the
mind of the prosecutrix, who, due to her tender and impressionable
age was prone to such tutoring and mentoring. It is reiterated that
upon a reading of the complaint dated 10.09.2024, complainant’s
statement dated 28.02.2025 and prosecutrix’s statement dated
18.03.2025, it becomes clear that the same facts have been
narrated in all the three documents in the exact same order, tone
26
and vigour. There has been no alteration, addition or subtraction
from either of the three statements making each of them virtually
identical to one another. This is not a case of there being
consistency in all the statements but a case of verbatim
reproduction of statements almost parrot-like, as a result of
tutoring by the complainant and possibly her family.
7.7 Keeping the surrounding circumstances in mind, along with
history of litigation between the two parties, one cannot brush
away the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the
said complaint is a figment of imagination and is a piece of fiction
created by the complainant so as to implicate the appellants herein
and thereby prejudice the Courts in other proceedings. It is trite
that whenever an event is recounted and narrated by different
witnesses at different points of time, there are usually
dissimilarities, even contradictions that might crop up due to lapse
of memory with the passage of time and such other circumstances.
There would not be a photogenic or verbatim repetition of facts.
But in the present case, the statements reflect a stark repetition of
the same facts in the same order which gives an impression to this
Court that the same is a deliberate attempt to concoct facts with
27
collaboration, narrated with an oblique motive against the
appellants herein and therefore strikes at the very root of the case
of the prosecution.
7.8 Now, we turn our attention to the allegations made against
appellant Nos.2 and 3. Learned counsel for the complainant has
vehemently argued that the allegations qua the said appellants are
grave and serious in nature. From a perusal of the record of the
case, it is apparent that appellant No.2 is the grandmother of the
prosecutrix against whom it has been alleged that after the alleged
acts of rape were committed by appellant Nos.1 and 4 on the minor
granddaughter, appellant Nos.2 and 3 abused the prosecutrix in
filthy language and then, in order to coerce her into silence, she
was beaten up by both of them. Furthermore, it has been alleged
that when the prosecutrix complained about the alleged rape
committed by appellant No.4, appellant No.3, his wife, proceeded
to abuse the prosecutrix and thereafter inserted the handle of a
hammer into her vagina. These allegations, no doubt grave and
serious in nature, fly in the teeth of the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case and material available on record. It is
trite law that in order to establish an offence of voluntarily causing
28
hurt, punishable under Section 115 of BNS, prosecution has to
satisfy the key ingredients of the said Section, that is to say, the
prosecution has to produce material in order to show prima facie
that bodily pain, disease or infirmity was caused by the accused
persons, in order to qualify as voluntarily causing hurt. It is
observed that no material in terms of an injury report or any
medical report has been filed so as to further substantiate the said
allegations. In this regard, the prosecution has produced merely
the statements of the prosecutrix and complainant to substantiate
their claims. Although production of an injury report is not a sine
qua non for proving an offence under Section 115 of BNS and even
if there are no visible injuries, the offence has to be established by
other evidence to show that bodily pain, disease or infirmity was
caused but at the same time, a trial cannot be allowed to proceed
merely on a bald statement of allegation that the prosecutrix was
hurt when no other detail or specific acts have been mentioned or
alleged. A mere bald allegation without any supporting detail or
materials cannot straight away lead to setting criminal law in
motion.
29
7.9 The complainant has further failed to produce any material
in support of the allegations of abuses meted out by appellant
Nos.2 and 3 to the prosecutrix. It has been merely stated that she
was abused and threatened that she may be killed. It has been time
and again held by this Court that in order to establish an offence
of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 351 of BNS
merely stating that the victim was abused is not sufficient. For the
essential ingredients to satisfy invocation of the said offence, the
prosecution has to produce material to the effect that the accused
specifically threatened the victim and that such threat consisted of
some specific injury to his person, reputation or property or to the
person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was
interested. It further needs to be satisfied that the said specific act
or omission was done with an intent to cause alarm to that person
or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally
bound to do or to omit to do any act which he or she was legally
entitled to do. A plain reading of the complaint reveals that the
same did not specify the abusive words used or anything specific
that was said to the prosecutrix. Rather, it has been merely stated
that appellant Nos.2 and 3 abused and threatened the prosecutrix.
No material has been produced which specify what the threat
30
actually was, how the said threat was carried out and what was
actually stated in terms of the threat. Vague and general
allegations are not sufficient to sustain criminal charges formed
under the said provision as there have to be cogent facts,
discernible from the general accusation so as to show that the said
threat was meted out to the prosecutrix, without which, this Court
cannot allow continuance of criminal prosecution against the
appellants herein.
7.10 With respect to Section 352 of BNS, the prosecution has
failed to place any material on record which supports its allegation
that there was any intentional insult made towards either the
prosecutrix or the complainant that would in turn, lead to breach
of peace. The Section is intended to deal with persons who are
responsible for breach of peace or commission of acts that incite or
abet any such incident of breach of peace. The material placed
before us fails to demonstrate how alleged abuses that were uttered
to the prosecutrix led to breach of peace. Nothing has been
specified so as to what the alleged abuses were. Mere unspecified
and vague allegation of abuse unaccompanied by any intention to
cause breach of peace or knowledge that breach of peace is likely
31
to occur does not come under the ambit of this Section and
therefore the prosecution, with respect to the said Section cannot
be allowed to proceed as the same tantamounts to an abuse of the
process of law.
7.11 Furthermore, it has been vehemently argued by learned
counsel for the complainant that as against appellant No.3 the
allegation that she inserted a hammer rod into the vagina of the
prosecutrix is specific and grave in nature and owing to the gravity
of the said offence, the appeal should be dismissed. Although, we
agree that the said allegation by itself is very grave and serious, we
fail to find any substance in the same as it has not been
substantiated by any other material, either documentary or
otherwise on record. The act of insertion of a hammer rod is a very
serious and critical act that can cause a very grave injury to the
victim for which she might require immediate medical attention
and treatment. However, the prosecution has failed to place on
record any medical evidence in the form of a medical report to
substantiate the said injury or to show that any medical assistance
was provided to the prosecutrix. The prosecution has also failed to
elaborate upon the aftereffects of the alleged injury. Rather, it has
32
been merely stated that after the said alleged offence was
committed against her, the prosecutrix was disturbed physically
and mentally. No specific details have been mentioned about
whether the prosecutrix was taken to the hospital especially when
it is stated by the complainant that after the said incident, the
prosecutrix left the house of the appellants and began living with
the complainant. It is but natural that upon narration of the said
incident by the prosecutrix to the complainant, the first instinct of
any parent would have been to have a medical examination of the
prosecutrix so as to prevent any further medical complication being
caused to her. However, nothing has been placed on record to show
that the prosecutrix was made to undergo any medical
examination. In fact, the same is true with respect to the offence
of rape alleged against appellant Nos.1 and 4. No medical evidence
has been annexed to further substantiate the said allegations. It
has been contended by counsel for the complainant that a
conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
but we observe that each case has to be determined and
adjudicated upon bearing in mind the peculiar facts and
circumstances of that case. In the present case, the statement of
the prosecutrix also has not been able to convince us so as to
33
permit the trial against the appellants to go on as the same, in our
opinion, would be against the interest of justice and would
tantamount to an abuse of the process of law.
8. At this juncture, we find it pertinent to make reference to the
recommendations and observations made by the Justice J.S.
Verma Committee Report on “Amendments to Criminal Law” that
was submitted on January 23, 2013. In the said report, the
Committee underlined the importance of the medical examination
and medical reports of rape victims wherein the Committee opined
as under:
“19. We are also of the opinion that the medical
examination report must be prepared, preferably
immediately after the examination, but most certainly on
the same date as the examination and must be forwarded
to the investigating agency forthwith without delay. The
DNA and other samples should be sent to the concerned
Forensic Science Labs or DNA Profiling Centres within two
days of the incident. We are also of the opinion that any
dereliction of duty on part of the examining doctor(s) to
undertake the medical examination properly and
forwarding the report to the IO without any delay, and any
dereliction of duty on the part of the investigating agency
in collecting the report or causing the victim to be taken to
the nearest hospital for examination, would be punishable
as offences (in respect of the investigating agency) and by
way of disciplinary proceedings (in respect of the
examining doctor).”
34
Such is the importance of the medical report and medical
examination in real time as it ensures timely collection of forensic
evidence, ensuring immediate health care and aid to the victim and
assisting in the progress of the legal proceeding in order to link the
offence to the accused person. But, in the present case, absence of
medical examination of the prosecutrix is fatal to the case of the
prosecution as the allegations have not been supported, even
remotely by any other corroborative material and therefore, in our
view, continuation of criminal proceedings in the face of such
glaring contradictions as noticed above does not subserve the
interest of justice.
8.1 Keeping the aforesaid observations and judicial dicta laid
down by this Court in mind, coupled with the lapses on the part of
the prosecution, the allegations against the accused-appellants
seem highly improbable and implausible, and therefore it is neither
expedient nor in the interests of justice to permit the continuation
of the present prosecution emanating from Complaint Case
No.05/2025.
8.2 In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in
the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)
35
SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph
102 wherein this Court observed as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases
by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
36
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
8.3 On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the appellants
herein are not made out and therefore, the judgment of this Court
in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely applies to the facts of this case
having regard to sub-paragraphs 3, 5, and 7, and therefore, this
Court, in exercise of its discretion on the facts of this case deems
it neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the
continuation of the present prosecution emanating from Complaint
Case No.05/2025. Hence, the criminal complaint and the
37
proceeding emanating from it are liable to be quashed. At this
juncture we hasten to observe that the observations made during
the course of this judgment by this Court are strictly confined to
the facts and circumstances of the present case and in no way
should they be construed to apply generally to other cases wherein
similar allegations may have been made against accused persons
genuinely. We say so while being mindful of the fact that rape and
sexual abuse of minors and violence against women and children
remain one of the most gruesome and violent examples of human
nature that shake the very conscience and moral fabric of the
society. Therefore, courts and public authorities should come down
heavily upon perpetrators of such offences, and such cases should
be dealt with swiftly and vigorously to serve the interests of justice.
Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation:
9. In the backdrop of the facts of the present case, we wish to
underline a worrying trend that has come to our attention. Parties
involved in matrimonial or commercial relationships with one
another are resorting to filing of frivolous and vexatious claims and
allegations of a criminal nature to settle personal scores and
grudges against each other and therefore turn to nefarious/oblique
38
means to attain the said objective. We also painfully take judicial
cognizance of the fact that the courts of law are being misused and
overburdened by such vague and vexatious litigations between
spouses as many a times, the recourse to law and police is taken,
in an oblique way so as to antagonise, pressurise, hound and
harass the other spouse and their family members in order to
retaliate and exact revenge that is carried out due to sheer hatred
and disdain for the said spouse and their family members.
9.1 While we are cognizant of the fact that there are genuine and
bona fide cases in the courts wherein the aggrieved parties are
genuinely looking for relief and respite from the actions and
omissions of their spouses, that often require immediate care and
attention of the courts of law and public authorities, such cases
get frequently overshadowed and obscured by the overwhelming
number of false and frivolous cases filed by spouses against one
another as an ‘arm-twisting’ method so as to reach a more
favourable outcome or settlement or more lucrative monetary
settlement. The onus is on courts to be careful and cautious so as
to separate the wheat from the chaff and separate the genuine
cases of matrimonial oppression, rape and offences against women
39
from the cases wherein the legal process and procedure is being
used as a tool to file false and frivolous cases out of vengeance.
While doing so, care should be taken to ensure that the rights and
freedoms of innocent parties are not trampled or arbitrarily taken
away by unscrupulous and baseless litigation.
9.2 We are conscious of the fact that there are many instances
where women are gravely affected by matrimonial disputes and
violence that they have to endure at the hands of the spouse and
in-laws and other family members. Such cases deserve our utmost
attention and judicial scrutiny so as to make sure that the ends of
justice are met and the offenders do not go scot-free and rather get
the punishment they deserve. However such a zeal to meet the ends
of justice should be countenanced, by courts of law and executive
authorities of the State, with a pragmatic approach bearing in mind
the recent trend of criminal litigation in this country wherein the
legal machinery and statutes are being used as a tool by
mischievous litigants so as to create unnecessary hurdles and
punish unsuspecting and often innocent citizens particularly in
the sphere of matrimonial disputes. The litigating parties and their
advocates should also be cognizant of the fact that such vexatious
40
filing of false and frivolous claims and cases cast unnecessary
burden on the already overburdened machinery and apparatus of
the State and Judiciary. This factor also diverts the attention of
courts and its resources whereas genuine cases of the parties with
actual verifiable grievances are not being able to be adjudicated in
time owing to the time spent in adjudicating upon phantom claims
of mischievous litigators seeking to create litigation out of thin air
or in the absence of a cause to do so.
9.3 One particular offshoot or a species of vexatious and frivolous
litigation is in family disputes, particularly, a ‘matrimonial
bouquet’ that is presented by the estranged wife against the
husband and his family out of personal animosity and spite once
the relationship turns sour and rancorous and vice versa . This
‘matrimonial bouquet’ often includes claims of dowry demands;
cruelty under 498A IPC; harassment by in-laws and domestic
violence, made by the complainant against her spouse and in-laws.
This set of cases frequently include bogus and empty allegations
and false claims of harassment, cruelty and marital hardships
that, more often than not, contain little to no substance at all and
are usually not backed by any material or other documentary
41
evidence. A tell-tale sign of such vexatious cases is that often they
contain vague and sweeping general allegations that are not
specific in nature but rather are aimed at arraying several family
members if not all of the spouse’s family, including those who are
old and ailing, as accused and consequently cast the prosecution
net as wide as possible by invoking multiple provisions of law by
using general, vague and omnibus allegations that are not backed
either by fact or law. We say so while being mindful of the fact that
although any complaint or a FIR is not an encyclopaedia of
evidence and factual circumstances so as to contain all details of
the alleged incident, by no means can it be a general
conglomeration of statements made by the disgruntled spouse with
a mala fide intent, containing little or no details of the alleged
criminal acts that often lack a chronology of events. Further,
sweeping allegations and vexatious claims often fail to highlight
and elaborate upon how the alleged acts happened, the manner in
which such acts were undertaken, the aftermath of such incidents
etc.
9.4 In this regard, we would be remiss to not highlight the recent
upswing in the false and frivolous matrimonial cases which have
42
unfortunately brought to the fore the uglier side of litigation. A
recent trend in this regard is when the wife resorts to filing false
complaints and cases under POCSO Act alleging that the husband,
who is also the father of the minor child, has committed wanton
acts which are sexual in nature especially against the minor
daughter. At the centre of this sort of litigation is a child who is
often used by her mother against her father, against her will and
wishes, so as to make false and vexatious complaints against her
father and other male members of her paternal family in order to
exact revenge or as an arm-twisting tactic to obtain a higher
monetary settlement or to simply harass.
9.5 There are also instances where in cases of enmity between the
members of a family, between neighbours or business partners or
associates, or even between borrowers and lenders of financial
assistance, a weapon of harassment being resorted to is a
complaint under the POCSO Act at the instance of a parent of a
child (in most cases being the daughter) so as to wreak vengeance
or to get over civil disputes between the parties by a subdued
accused under the said Act yielding to the demands of the
complainant. Also, the threat of a false complaint under the POCSO
43
Act is used as a means to escape legal consequences arising out of
a commercial transaction, a matrimonial dispute or such other
disputes.
9.6 While we are conscious of the fact that there are instances
and a plethora of cases that are true and deserve the utmost
attention and deft handling on the side of authorities and Courts
and which should be pursued vigorously to reach a logical
conclusion, on the other side of the spectrum, are cases invoking
such serious and heinous allegations which are prima facie vague,
omnibus and general in nature and thereby lacking any material
backing or evidence which should be shunned at the very
threshold. We say so for the reason that if a person is made an
accused and forced to face a criminal trial on general and sweeping
allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of
criminal conduct, it would tantamount to an abuse of the process
of law and court. Hence, legal practitioners who tender advice in
such cases must restrain parties from filing such false/frivolous
complaints when requested to do so. Further, lawyers/advocates
must also not advise filing of criminal complaints which are
false/concocted so as to keep the opposite parties under a tight
44
leash so that they could come forward for a settlement on the terms
dictated by their parties or else, to face a criminal prosecution
which can prolong for years. When such is the trend, on the other
side, efforts are made to seek anticipatory bail by persons
apprehending arrest owing to a false/frivolous complaint being
lodged which sometimes reach the portals of this Court after being
unsuccessful at the level of the trial court and High Court. Also,
steps are taken for seeking quashing of such false/frivolous
complaints before the High Court which has its own saga of
uncertainties causing undue pressure, harassment, stress and
tension on the so-called accused. The consequence of all this is
docket explosion and burden on Courts resulting in genuine
complaints and cases not being given due time and attention that
they need.
9.7 Courts then owe a duty to subject the allegations levelled in
the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to ascertain if a prima facie
case is made out or not, and whether there is any kernel of truth
in the allegations or whether the said allegations have been made
only with the sole intent of spite so as to harass the opposite party
with a prolonged process of criminal litigation, arrest and
45
sometimes a conviction which later on may result in an acquittal
by a higher Court or in a worse case, no relief at all being given to
an innocent party. This stands more true when prosecution arises
from a matrimonial dispute.
9.8 We are also cognisant of the fact that a genre of matrimonial
litigation is on the rise in this country which inevitably includes,
within its ambit, a rise in filing of false, frivolous and vexatious
cases with a mala fide intent and ulterior motive to wreck havoc
and vengeance on the spouse and in the bargain seek the best
compromise. Therefore, the Courts have to exercise utmost caution
and restraint while entertaining such suits and criminal
proceedings as any misstep and overreach can have a cascading
effect on the health, both mental and physical, of the parties
involved and the sanctity of the institution of marriage itself. At
this juncture, we find it appropriate to quote the observations of
this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar,
(2025) 3 SCC 735 which is extracted as under:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a
criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without
specific allegations indicating their active involvement
should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,
borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a
tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s
46
family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution.
Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent
misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid
unnecessary harassment of innocent family members…
xxx
30. … However, in recent years, as there have been a
notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within the
institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a
growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A
of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta
against the husband and his family by a wife. Making
vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial
conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal
processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting
tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse
is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the
husband and his family in order to seek compliance with
the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this
Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting
the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima
facie case against them.”
9.9 In this aspect, we also find it pertinent to highlight some
important reflections made in Geddam Jhansi vs. State of
Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263 wherein this Court,
speaking through one of us, observed:
“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with
penal consequences involving coercive measures, which
can be permitted only when specific act(s) which
constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or
any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the
accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with
47
equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic
disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific
allegations and credible materials to support the same
may have disastrous consequences for the institution of
family, which is built on the premise of love, affection,
cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family
constitutes the core of human society. ...”
10. Before parting we observe that Indian society treats the
institution of marriage as sacrosanct and as a sublime union of two
individuals. This status or position ascribed to marriage comes
from deep historical and sociological roots where the institution of
marriage is considered the very foundation of society and family
being the most fundamental social unit and conglomeration of
humans.
10.1 Vexatious litigation in the realm of matrimonial disputes
based on frivolous and false allegations should be discouraged by
the courts and the members of the bar. Advocates ought to advise
their clients against the initiation of frivolous criminal proceedings
against their spouses rather than encouraging them to do so. In
this aspect, we find it appropriate to quote the observations of this
Court in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756
wherein this Court observed that:
“... the learned members of Bar have enormous social
responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fiber
48
of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must
ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should
not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the
complaints are filed either on their advice or with their
concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong
to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions
and should treat every complaint under section 498A as a
basic human problem and must make serious endeavour
to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of
that human problem. They must discharge their duties to
the best of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace
and tranquility of the society remains intact. The members
of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should
not lead to multiple cases.”
10.2 It is pertinent to underscore the important role played by the
legal fraternity in bringing down the overall pendency of the cases
in the Family Courts and criminal cases which are an adjunct to
matrimonial disputes by weeding out unimportant and vexatious
proceedings undertaken in pursuance of a personal vendetta by
unscrupulous litigants so as to fillip attention of the courts towards
genuine litigation and pressing issues and adjudication of claims.
This would lead to increasing the overall efficiency and disposal of
cases while at the same time preventing infraction of the interests
of justice and abuse of process of law.
11. In the aforementioned circumstances, keeping the judicial
dicta laid down by this Court in mind, the impugned order dated
15.09.2025 of the High Court is set aside and consequently,
49
Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 dated 10.09.2024, cognizance order
dated 07.02.2025 and the summoning order dated 18.08.2025
before the Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional District
& Sessions Judge, Meerut thereto stand quashed qua the
appellants herein.
11.1 It is needless to observe that the observations made in the
present appeal shall not come in the way of any matrimonial or
other proceedings pending between the parties herein which shall
be decided on their own merits and in accordance with law.
11.2 The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 29, 2026.
50