Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAMESHWAR RATHOD
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/07/1990
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 1849 1990 SCR (3) 263
1990 SCC (4) 21 JT 1990 (3) 298
1990 SCALE (2)88
ACT:
Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Section 6A--Whether
prospective or retrospective.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898/1973: Sections 516A and
523/451 and 457--Whether criminal court has jurisdiction to
return vehicle seized by police under Essential Commodities
Act, 1955 pending final decision of criminal case.
Interpretation of Statutes: Rule of construction--Provi-
sion in statute normally prospective--Could be retrospective
depending on nature of statute and purpose of provision.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent’s truck was seized by the police on 10th
December, 1974 for alleged contravention of the provisions
of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 on the night of 15th
March, 1972. The respondent fried applications before the
High Court for quashing the orders of the Judicial Magis-
trate First Class and the Sessions Judge rejecting his
request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security
and also for quashing the order of the Collector and re-
straining him from proceeding further in pursuance of notice
issued by him under Section 6B of the Act for confiscation
of the vehicle or directing the District Judicial Magistrate
to dispose of his application in accordance with law.
Allowing the applications and directing the return of
the vehicle, the High Court held that Section 6A of the Act,
as amended by Section 4 of the Amendment-Act, 1974 was only
prospective and that the Criminal Court had jurisdiction to
entertain applications under Section 523 read with 516A of
the Criminal Procedure Code, for the return of the vehicle
seized by the police pending final decision of the criminal
case.
Dismissing the appeal by the State, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 The normal rule of construction is that a
provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective.
However, in the case of statutes which are merely declarato-
ry or which relate to only matters of
264
procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect
if there are indications to that effect or the manifest
purpose compels one to construe the Act as such. [265G-H]
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1.2 The High Court examined Section 4 of the Essential
Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974 alongwith Section 6A of
the Principal Act and came to the conclusion that there was
no retrospective effect. Not only that there were no specif-
ic words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect,
but the positive provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 1
were to the effect that the amendment must he deemed to have
come into effect on a particular date. The High Court was,
therefore, right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment
Act, 1974 was only prospective and not retrospective.
[266B-C]
In the instant case, the contravention of the provisions
of the Act is alleged to have occured on 15th March, 1972,
whereas the vehicle was seized on th December, 1974. There-
fore, the provisions of Section 6A of the Essential Commodi-
ties Act, 1955 as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were
applicable to the present case and Section 4 of the Amend-
ment Act, 1974 could not he applied as the Act was not in
force on the date of offence. [266D]
2. Normally, under the Criminal Procedure Code, the
Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the
ouster of the ordinary criminal court in respect of a crime
can only he inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion
flowing from necessary implication of the new Act. In view
of the language used and in the context in which this lan-
guage has been used, the High Court was right in coming to
the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction
and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction. [266H;
267A-B]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 679 of
1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9. 1976 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 63 of 1976.
S.K. Agnihotri for the Appellants.
Nemo for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
265
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, dated 30th September, 1976 in Miscellaneous
Petition No. 63 of 1976.
The respondent was the owner of a truck which was seized
by the Police Sorwa on 10th December, 1974 for alleged con-
travention of the provisions of the Essential Commodities
Act, 1955 (hereinafter called ’the Act’) in connection with
Crime No. 42 of 1972. The respondent made applications under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to the
High Court to quash the orders of the Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Alirajpur and the Sessions Judge, Jhabua re-
spectively rejecting. his request for the return of the
vehicle on furnishing security and to quash the order of the
District Collector and restrain him from proceeding further
in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section 68 of
the Act for confiscation of the vehicle and ask for return
of the vehicle, or in the alternative to direct the District
Judicial Magistrate to dispose of the application in accord-
ance with law
The High Court after setting out the facts addressed
itself to three questions, namely, (1) whether Section 6A of
the Essential Commodities Act as amended by the Amendment
Act No. 30 of 1974 was prospective or retrospective? (2)
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whether in the facts and circumstances, the criminal Court
had jurisdiction to entertain an application under section
523 read with section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code
for the return of the vehicle seized by the Police pending
final decision of the criminal case? and (3) whether the
respondent was entitled on the merits for the return of the
vehicle as prayed for?
On the first question, the High Court was of the view
that it was a fundamental rule of law that no Statute should
be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a
construction appeared very clearly in the terms of the Act,
or arose by necessary implication, direct or indirect. The
High Court referred to several decisions which it is not
necessary for us to refer to. It is well settled that the
normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute
is prospective but not retrospective, however, in the case
of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to
only matters of procedure or of evidence, it may have retro-
spective effect if there are indications to that effect or
the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as
such.
On an examination of the statute and the provisions
referred to herein, the High Court found that there was no
retroactivity. We are
266
of the opinion that for the reasons given by the High Court,
it is difficult to accept the position that there was no
retroactivity. Indeed, Mr Deshpande appearing for the appel-
lant did not seriously challenge this finding of the High
Court. There is no dispute in this case that the contraven-
tion of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken
place in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972.
The vehicle was seized on 10th December, 1974. The High
Court examined Section 4 of the Amendment Act, along with
Section 6A of the Principal Act and came to the conclusion
that there was no retrospective effect. We are of the opin-
ion that the High Court was right in holding that Section 4
of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and not
retrospective. Not only that there were no specific words to
indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the
positive provisions of sub-section (2) of section 1 were to
the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have come in
effect on a particular date, is a pointer and that puts the
matter beyond doubt. The provisions of section 6A as it
stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the
present case and section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 could
not, therefore, be applied as the Act was not in force on
the date of offence. The challenge to the High Court order
on this aspect cannot, therefore, be entertained.
It was next contended by the respondent before the High
Court that the Criminal Court was empowered under section 7
of the Act to confiscate the vehicle after due and proper
inquiry and therefore the proceedings by the District Col-
lector under section 6A and Section 6B of the Act should be
quashed. Reliance was placed on several decisions and au-
thorities. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the
Mysore High Court in the case of The State v. Abdul Rasheed,
AIR [1967] Mysore 231; Sri Bharat Mahey & Ors. v. The State
of U. P. & Ors., [1975] Crl. L.J 890 as well as the decision
of the learned Single Judge in State of M.P. v. Basant
Kumar, [1972] JLJ Short Note No. 99. On a consideration of
the relevant authorities, the High Court came to the conclu-
sion that the criminal Court had jurisdiction to deal with
the matter. Mr. Deshpande sought to argue that in view of
the enactment of the provisions of Section 6A as well as
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section 7 of the Act, it cannot be held that the criminal
Court continued to retain jurisdiction. He submitted that in
view of the enactment of these provisions, it would be
useless to hold that the criminal Court continued to retain
jurisdiction, otherwise the very purpose of enacting section
6A read with section 7 would be defeated. We are, however,
unable to accept this contention because normally under the
Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Courts of the country
have the jurisdiction and the ouster of
267
the ordinary criminal Court in respect of a crime can only
be inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion flowing
from necessary implication of the new Act., In view of the
language used and in the context in which this language has
been used, we are of the opinion that the High Court was
right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court
retained jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the
jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the High Court was
therefore right in passing the order under consideration and
in the facts and circumstances of the case to return the
vehicle to the respondent on furnishing the security In the
premise the appeal must fail and is dismissed. There win,
however, be no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
268