UNIVERSITY OF DELHI vs. UNION OF INDIA

                REPORTABLE                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.    9488­9489      OF 2019    (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581­5582 of 2019) University of Delhi                 .…Appellant(s) Versus Union of India & Ors.              ….  Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T          A.S. Bopanna,J. Leave granted. 2. These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the appellant­University   of   Delhi   through   its   Registrar   to challenge   the   common   judgment   and   order   dated 29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to condone   the   delay   of   916   days   in   filing   the   appeal   to challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the learned   Single   Judge   had   dismissed   the   W.P   (C) No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.  Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date: 2019.12.17 16:00:40 IST Reason: 3. The challenge in the writ petition was,  inter alia,  to the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Page 1 of 34 Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short) who had allowed respondent no.13­M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd.  to construct a high­rise multistory group housing society in the control zone  of Zone­C in the University campus, without any height restriction. The construction permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi Metro   Rail   Corporation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the, “DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares as a separate  entity from the  total 3 hectares of  land, acquired for the metro station.   4. The   principal   contentions   of   the   appellant­ University on the merits of the challenge were as follows:   a)  the permission sought by Respondent No. 13 (namely, M/s Young Builders Private Limited) for   the   proposed   construction   of   a   group housing society on the land originally owned by the   Ministry   of   Defence   in   the   University enclave   is   violative   of   the   MPD­2021   and   is against the larger public interest, given the fact that the project site in question and its vicinity are within the North Campus of the University and   that   it   contains   various   historical   and archaeological   buildings,   apart   from   it   being Page 2 of 34 the centre of higher education and advanced learning; and  b)   the change in the character of the subject land is impermissible in law, since the land having been   acquired   for   public   purpose   for construction   of   the   metro   rail   project,   has suddenly been diverted to private commercial use   and   auctioned   to   private   builder   for building a group housing society in a manner contrary   to   the   purpose   and   charter   of incorporation   of   the   Delhi   Metro   Rail Corporation (DMRC) c)      The   restriction   on   certain  developments   for Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of Delhi   –   2021   (‘MPD’   for   short)   was   also   a contention raised by the writ petitioner which imposed   ban   on   construction   of   high­rise buildings   in   the   control   zone   of   the   Delhi University.     The   location   of   various   ladies’ hostels of the University in close vicinity of the proposed construction site was highlighted as an important privacy concern. The impediment to access of thousands of students, teachers at the entrance of the University was the other main contention raised in the writ petition.   5.  On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that after   construction   of   the   University   Metro   Station,   2 Page 3 of 34 hectares of land remained surplus and the housing project was intended to generate revenue for the DMRC as per the policy of the Government.  The formal application made to the   authorities   for   change   of   land   use   and   approval secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was also highlighted by the DMRC. 6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire sequence   refused   to   entertain   the   writ   petition   of   the University including on the ground of delay and laches.  In the   judgment   dated   27.04.2015   the   Court   however observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and implementation   of   the   Master   Plan   and,   necessary approvals   have   been   taken   from   various   statutory authorities for the housing project.  It was also observed that   the   change   in   the   land   use   from   “public”   to “residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High Court’s   Division   Bench   Judgment   in   Adil   Singh   vs. Union of India   (2010) 171 DLT 748.   According to the Writ court, since   it was a policy decision taken by the Government body and since the appellant­University has Page 4 of 34 failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide in the decision making by the authority, interference of the Court with the policy decision, would not be justified.   7. It is the case of the appellant that following the dismissal of the writ petition and being concerned about the   future   use   of   the   subject   land,   the   University Authorities   constituted   a   Committee   to   recommend   the appropriate course of action to be taken by the University. The Committee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated to   have   been   laid   before   the   Executive   Council   of   the University and after due consideration of the report and the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Executive Council of the University through their resolution dated 28.02.2017/07.03.2017 decided to prefer an intra­Court   Appeal in the High Court.  8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility concern to the University’s Metro Station area was raised under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by persons with disabilities.   The University also received a report on preventive measures to be taken in the accident­ prone  area  of the  Metro Station. With  these and  other Page 5 of 34 projection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days, together with the C.M.No.8654/2018 for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 9.  The   delay   of   916   days   caused   in   preferring   the Appeal   was   explained   in   the   application   seeking   delay condonation   and   the   rejoinder   to   the   reply   to   said application to the following effect; (i) Non­convening of Executive Council and delay occasioned   due   to   non­availability   of   Vice­ Chancellor.   The   case   in   the   present   LPA   is different from other routine litigation preferred or contested by the appellant.   It is the only case where, the approval from the Executive Council of the University of Delhi was required to be taken and   before   such  approval,   various   deliberations preceded so as to appraise the Executive Council of   the   different   shades   of   the   subject   matter. Being a statutory body, an adherence to the just method of decision making requires consultations with affected departments of the University itself Page 6 of 34 and therefore, the final say in the matter rests with the Executive Council which is constituted under   Section   21   of   the   Delhi   University   Act, 1922.     The   Council   includes   the   senior   most Deans,   democratically   elected   representatives   of teachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and the Vice­Chancellor.   (ii)      The judgment of learned Single Judge was sent by the Counsel representing the University quite late and it was, then, place before the Legal Cell of the University for examining the matter. After going through the voluminous paper book, it was opined that the matter be referred to the Vice­ Chancellor   for   consideration   and   pursuant thereto,   a   meeting   was   held,   wherein   it   was decided that the matter needs to be dealt with holistically, having regard to all the issues decided and connotations thereof.   The issue could not be taken up for consideration as the post of Vice­ Chancellor   had   fallen   vacant   w.e.f.   28.10.2015 and could be considered only after the new Vice­ Page 7 of 34 Chancellor had assumed office and taken stock of things.   On 10.03.2016, the new Vice­Chancellor joined the office and in order to ensure democratic functioning   of   the   University,   he   decided   to constitute   a   Committee   comprising   of   senior faculty persons representing different sections of the University. The terms of reference of the Five­ member   Committee   were,   to   recommend   the course of action to the University in the light of the   dismissal   of   the   Writ   Petition   filed   by   the University in the DMRC matter.   (iii)     On   11.11.2016,   the   above   constituted Committee gave its Report. Based  on  the   Report of the five­member Committee, it was decided by the Competent Authority that the subject matter of the present case be referred to the Executive Council of the University for its final decision. In the   Executive   Council   meeting   held   on 28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item was   again   discussed   in   the   Executive   Council meeting   held   on   7.3.2017   (continued   meeting), Page 8 of 34 where the members of the Council referred to the earlier   discussions   and   decisions   of   both   the Academic Council and the Executive Council with respect to the same matter and  it was decided unanimously   to   prefer   an   Appeal   against   the Order   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   dated 27.04.2015 after adequate preparation. (iv)    In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly put forth by the disabled students and faculty in the light of the proposed project by the private builder at the very main entrance of the University of Delhi.  Such representations were received from individuals as well as groups which the University had to consider and were therefore forwarded to the Equal Opportunity Cell for consideration. The Equal Opportunity Cell, University of Delhi, which looks after the welfare of disabled students and others, in the light of the new enactment on the Rights   of   Persons   with   Disabilities   Act,   2016, analyzed   the   probable   outcome.   After   detailed deliberations,   the   Equal   Opportunity   Cell Page 9 of 34 submitted   its   Report   on   28.04.2017   which   was brought to the notice of Competent Authorities for their consideration. The Report was considered at various   levels   of   the   University   including   the Office   of   the   Dean,   Student   Welfare,   the Department   of   legal   affairs,   the   Office   of   the Proctor,   the   Engineering   Department,   and   the Department   of   Environmental   Studies.   Holding discussions and deliberations among these bodies and considering their inputs involved further time and it involved co­ordination and interaction with various   authorities   and   stake   holders.   All   this exercise   involved  a  further   period   of   five  to  six months   before   a   considered   opinion   could   be generated by the University of Delhi. Hence the representations   and   the   Report   of   the   Equal Opportunity   Cell  could  be  finally  considered  by the   University   of   Delhi  around  the   end   of   year 2017.  (v)      In the interregnum, the accidents occurred at   Chhatra   Marg   in   December   2017   led   to   the Page 10 of 34 need for the preparation of a Report by the Office of the Proctor of the University dated 05.02.2018 wherein the Proctor recommended the area to be declared as accident prone.     Both the Reports ­ one by the Equal Opportunity Cell and the other by the Office of Proctor ­­ were sent to the Counsel concerned   who   was   holding   the   brief   for   the preparation   of   the   Appeal   memorandum.     Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the draft appeal and petition was prepared which was thereafter   got   vetted   and   settled   by   the   Senior Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again considered at the highest level at the University to take the final decision, which entailed some time. On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi High Court. 10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus, Page 11 of 34 aggrieved the appellant­University has filed this appeal.  11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the implication of the rejection of the writ petition and the LPA without considering the substantial contention raised by the University on merits would cause grave injury to the public institution.   The learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that   the   University Authorities   have   been   pursuing   the   issue   with   due diligence but decision had to be taken after consultation with   all   the   stakeholders   and   therefore,   the   delay   in preferring   the   LPA   should   not   be   attributed   to   any inaction, much less a deliberate inaction.  The endeavor of the Courts according to Shri Parasaran should be to do substantial justice to the parties by deciding the matters on merits  but  in the  present  case,  neither  the  learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court had considered   the   merit   of   the   contention   raised   by   the appellant­University.     Shri   Parasaran   argues   that   the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law of limitation in a meaningful manner.  He also projects that since the builders are yet to Page 12 of 34 start   their   construction,   the   delayed   filing   of   the   LPA should   not   have   resulted   in   non­consideration   of   the contention on merits, as major public interest issues have been raised in the present matter.   The learned Senior Counsel argues that important questions effecting public interest   cannot   be   defeated   on   technical   objection, inasmuch   as   the   proposed   site   for   construction   was originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the land was acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now sought to be given over to a private builder, for a profit oriented   motive.     The   said   contentions   are   also supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani and Shri Ramji Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates. 12. Ms.   Meenakshi   Arora,   learned   Senior   Counsel representing the applicants/intervenors submits that six girl hostels are located near to the project site and if high rise apartments are allowed to be constructed, the privacy of the hostel residents would be compromised.  Ms. Arora also   refers   to   the   letter   dated   25.10.1943   of   the   Joint Secretary, Government of India, Department of Education addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying Page 13 of 34 the decision of the Government of India to ensure that no tall   buildings   are   erected   inside   the   Delhi   University Campus and also the necessity of protecting University area, as an enclave.  The Senior Counsel then refers to the Zonal Development Plan for Zone­“C” (Civil Lines Zone) of the   DDA   as   approved   by   the   Ministry   of   Urban Development   to   point   out   that   the   authorities   have recognized   the   existence   of   number   of   old   historical buildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University Campus and effort should be made to convert the Delhi University into an integrated Campus with restriction on tall buildings.  13.       Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for respondent   No.13­   M/s   Young   Builders     would   at   the outset contend that though the learned Senior Counsel for the   appellant   has   referred   to   the   merits   of   the   case, keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay and   laches,   that   aspect   of   the   matter   would   require consideration at the threshold.  He would assert that the delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of more than two Page 14 of 34 and   a   half   years   and   in   such   event   the   principle   of applying the usual test for “sufficient cause” would not arise as it is not merely the number of days requiring condonation but also amounts to laches in filing the writ petition, as well as the LPA.   Mere contention that the proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest would   not   advance   the   case   inasmuch   as   the   learned Single   Judge   having   adverted   to   all   these   aspects   has arrived at the conclusion that the petition suffers from laches in addition to there being no merit and in such circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by 916   days   the   Division   Bench   was   justified   in   its conclusion.   It is pointed out that the said delay of 916 days is as against the period of 30 days which is allowed in law for filing the LPA.  It is contended that the cause of action if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the area was converted into residential, but the writ petition was filed only on 07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition having been disposed of on 27.04.2015 the LPA was filed only on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days.  The reason assigned that a decision to file the LPA could not be taken Page 15 of 34 as   the   office   of   Vice­Chancellor   had   fallen   vacant   also cannot   be   accepted   since   such   vacancy   arose   only   on 28.10.2015   while   the   writ   petition   had   already   been disposed of on 27.04.2015 and there was sufficient time to file the LPA if they had the intention to do so.  The learned Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of cases that was filed on behalf of the University during the said period.  It is contended that while considering condonation of delay the prejudice that would be caused to the opposite side is also one of the aspects to be considered.   If that situation is kept in view, in the instant case the request for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified on 23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on 13.08.2008 and the lease being for 90 years, already 11 years have passed and by such belated proceedings the project is prejudicially hampered.  The respondent No.13 has already spent Rs.233 crores being the lease amount paid   to   the   DMRC   and   also   for   securing   appropriate approvals.  It is contended that the respondent No.13 had to face earlier litigation as well which has been taken note by the learned Single Judge and the respondent cannot be Page 16 of 34 exposed to such repeated litigations. 14. Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   No.11­DMRC,   has contended that the Ministry of Urban Development as a matter of Policy of the Government of India had permitted the   DMRC   to   generate   its     own   resources   through property development and has accordingly permitted to carry out property development on the land transferred to it by the Government.  In such event when the DMRC has taken such steps not only in the instant case but also in several other projects, any interference at this stage more particularly   when   there   is   belated   challenge   of   the present nature, it would have a serious impact on the projects   undertaken.     It   was   submitted   that   due   to certain   changes   affected   in   the   manner   in   which   the Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was some excess   land   which   has   been   put   to   use   to   generate resources for the project and in that regard when there is a contractual relationship with respondent No.13 if the much belated petition is entertained at this stage, there would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to Page 17 of 34 the   public   exchequer   and   in   such   event   the   public interest   would   be   better   served   by   not   condoning   the delay in such matters.  Moreover, it is not a case of mere delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition itself was filed after 7­8 years and in such event if the discretionary orders passed in the writ jurisdiction is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court, it would set a bad precedent. 15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches and supplement the arguments advanced by the learned Solicitor   General.     He   would   further   contend   that  the Union of India being the owner of the land which was acquired does not have objection for the project and in such event interference at the instance of the appellant herein would not be justified. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned Counsel submitted in support of the contentions raised by the respondents. Page 18 of 34 16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in reply   to   the   said   contention   would   reiterate   the contentions put forth relating to the explanation of delay and would contend that the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is fallacious inasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves had   filed   a   writ   petition   raising   certain   disputes   with regard to the limit of FAR through the Notification dated 20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondent No.13 had come to an end on 18.05.2011 and the NOC etc. were obtained subsequently, after which the writ petition was filed by the appellant herein in the year 2012.  Hence the delay and laches has been explained and it is not a case of negligence.  It is contended that the stand of the DMRC that it would be put to financial loss cannot be accepted at this point since the question as to whether they would be liable to pay interest or not are matters which   would   have   to   be   considered   in   appropriate proceedings.   Hence, he contends that the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and the matter should have been considered on its merits. Page 19 of 34 17. Though   we   have   exhaustively   referred   to   the pleadings and the contentions of the parties, including contentions   put  forth   on  merits,   the   same   is   only   for completeness and to put the matter in perspective before considering the issue relating to delay and laches.  In the instant case, considering that the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay of   916   days,   that   aspect   of   the   matter   would   require consideration at the outset and the facts on merits is noted to the limited extent to find out whether in that background the public interest would suffer.  The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon this   Court   the   principle   relating   to   consideration   of “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the factors that are required to be kept in view, has relied on the decision   in   the   case   of   Collector,   Land   Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors.,   1987(2) SCC 107 wherein it is held as hereunder: “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be Page 20 of 34 admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common-sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is Page 21 of 34 capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non- grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” Page 22 of 34 18. Further  the   decision   in  the   case   of     M/s   Dehri Rohtas   Light   Railway   Company   Ltd.   Vs.   District Board, Bhojpur & Ors . (1992) 2 SCC 598 is relied upon, wherein   this   Court   has   indicated   the   real   test   to determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. 19.  The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case of    Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr.  1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as hereunder:

Page 23 of 34 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 20. From   a   consideration   of   the   view   taken   by   this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay.  The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so   as   to   apply   a   different   yardstick   but   the   ultimate consideration should be to render even­ handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be   kept   in   perspective.       In   that   background   while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation Page 24 of 34 would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed   carefully   by   the   Courts   based   on   the   fact situation.     In   the   case   of     (Supra)   the   entire Katiji conspectus   relating   to   condonation   of   delay   has   been kept in focus.  However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in   a   case   where   there   was   delay   of   four   days   pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.  21.  As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in   filing   the   LPA   is   916   days   and   as   such   the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of Page 25 of 34 the position of law.   That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal.   In addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches in   filing   the   appeal   is   contended   on   behalf   of   the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the  writ petition itself  at  the  first instance  from which the present appeal had arisen.   In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in the  writ petition  as  well as  the  LPA to  arrive  at  a conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified. 22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days is twofold, i.e. the non­availability of the Vice­ Chancellor   due   to   retirement   and   subsequent appointment of new Vice­Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had Page 26 of 34 caused the delay.  The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the appellate   remedy   and   not   the   original   proceedings requiring   such   deliberation   when   it   was   a   mere continuation of the proceedings which had already been filed   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   herein,   after   due deliberation.  Significantly, the Vice­Chancellor who was at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till 28.10.2015, for about six months which was a long enough period as compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal.  In that circumstance when the said Vice­Chancellor who had prosecuted the writ petition was available, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that unseen hands are likely   to   have   prevented   the   filing   of   the   appeal   also cannot be accepted.   Secondly, the reason sought to be put forth about the decision required to be taken by the Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the matter of filing the appeal.  In fact, in the writ petition an affidavit was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and Page 27 of 34 173   of   Academic   Council   and   Executive   Council authorising for filing writ petition.  When the writ petition was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of the appellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be accepted that the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable to file the appeal, that too when the same Vice­Chancellor was available   for   six   months   after   dismissal   of   the   writ petition.     Hence   the   reasons   put   forth   cannot   in   our opinion constitute sufficient cause. 23. That   apart,   as   rightly   noticed   by   the   Division Bench   in   the   LPA,   the   approval   from   the   Executive Council was obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018 after an year from   the   said   date   which   only   indicates   the   casual approach which is now sought to be overcome with the plea of public interest despite there being no explanation for the delay at every stage.  It is true that as held in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’s delay need not be explained with such precision but the fact remains Page 28 of 34 that   a   reasonable   and   acceptable   explanation   is   very much necessary.  The Division Bench apart from noticing these   aspects   had   also   noted   that   the   learned   Single Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by delay and laches. 24. In   that   backdrop,   a   perusal   of   the   order   dated 27.04.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge would indicate that the learned Single Judge in para – 65 of the order with reference to his earlier observation has arrived at   the   categorical   conclusion   that   the   petition   suffers from laches and has been filed with delay of 7­8 years. The   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant   while seeking to dispel such conclusion by the learned Single Judge contended that the respondent No. 13 themselves had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted FAR   and   the   said   writ   petition   was   disposed   only   on 18.05.2011 and the need for the appellant herein to file the   writ   petition   arose   only   thereafter.     The   said contention is also not acceptable if the entire sequence is noticed. Page 29 of 34 25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact that   the   Respondent   No.   13   being   aggrieved   by   the decision   of   DDA   had   filed   a   petition   bearing   W.P. No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated 19.08.2009 and the same was disposed of only on 18.05.2011 but the appellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain the laches.  This is because much water had flown under the bridge before the said development and those events ought   to   have   triggered   action   from   the   appellant   in challenging, more so when there were other litigations relating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of the learned Single Judge. 26. In the present matter, the land was converted to residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC had invited bids and public auction was conducted on 28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of the land into residential development was in public domain even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the approval request of DMRC are Page 30 of 34 internal process and not be known to the appellant.  In fact, the learned Single Judge while taking note of the challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken note of an earlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011 filed by the Association of Metro Commuters wherein also the residential development was an issue, which came to be   dismissed   by   order   dated   14.02.2011.     Similarly, another petition in W.P(C) No.6624­6625/2012, though challenging the acquisition was filed, the same was also dismissed.   Thereafter the writ petition of the appellant filed in the year 2012 was pending till it was disposed on 27.04.2015.  27.   Despite   the   writ   petition   having   been   filed belatedly   in   respect   of   certain   actions   which   had commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ petition   was   filed   after   obtaining   approval   of   the Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition.  In such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and laches cannot be ignored.  The decisions referred by the Page 31 of 34 learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant   noted   Supra cannot,  therefore,  be  applied  in the  present  facts and circumstance inasmuch as the consideration hereunder was not merely the explanation for the delay of few days in filing the appeal.  Though contention is put forth that the delay is required to be condoned since public interest is involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken place thus far would indicate that the matter has been examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on merits, they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the matter before the Court.   28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with.   In that regard,   rather   than   taking   note   of   the   hardship   that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11 Page 32 of 34 – DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The respondent No.11­   DMRC   is   engaged   in   providing   the   public transport   and   for   the   said   purpose   the   Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources   through   property   development   and   in   that regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a sum of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008.  The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the commuting public.  In such circumstance, if at this stage the   inordinate   delay   is   condoned   unmindful   of   the lackadaisical   manner   in   which   the   appellant   has proceeded  in  the  matter,  it  would   also  be  contrary  to public interest.  29.   Therefore,   taking   into   consideration   all   these aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition  inter alia  is hit by delay and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on Page 33 of 34 the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do not call for interference.   30. Accordingly,   the   appeals   being   devoid   of   merits stand dismissed with no order as to costs.   All pending applications shall stand disposed of.    ……………………….J. (R. BANUMATHI) ……………………….J.                                               (A.S. BOPANNA)           ……………………….J.                                                   (HRISHIKESH ROY)  New Delhi, December 17, 2019 Page 34 of 34