Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SHIV CHANDER KAPOOR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
AMAR BOSE
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1989
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
OJHA, N.D. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 325 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 299
1990 SCC (1) 234 JT 1989 (4) 471
1989 SCALE (2)1168
CITATOR INFO :
R 1990 SC1133 (2,3)
RF 1990 SC1725 (21)
RF 1991 SC1233 (5,10,13)
RF&E 1992 SC1555 (2,15,16,18,19)
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958--Section 2 l’Controller’Per-
mission to create.tenancy--Grant of--Duty of tenant to raise
plea of invalidity--Enquiry by controller--Scope of.
HEADNOTE:
This is a land-lord’s appeal. By an agreement in writing
between the parties, the second floor of the premises bear-
ing no. 19/10, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi was let out to the
Respondent for a limited period of three years w.e.f. June
8, 1980, with the permission of the Rent Controller obtained
under section 21 of the Act. The Respondent-tenat having
failed to deliver vacant possession of the premises in
question, after the expiry of the stipulated period, the
appellant moved an application before the Rent Controller
for execution of his order by delivery of possession of the
premises to him. The Respondent-tenant filed an objection to
the said application to which the appellant replied duly.
The Rent Controller rejected the appellant’s application
taking the view that the permission granted under section 21
of the Act was invalid and thus the tenant could not be
evicted on the expiry of 3 years. The Rent Controller there-
by upheld the tenant’s objection that the landlord’s son
being aged only 19 or 20 years, on the date of the expiry of
the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age pre-
scribed by law for marriage being 21 years the ground that
the premises were needed for the son’s marriage was not
tenable. The Rent Controller accordingly held that creation
of limited tenancy amounted to fraud and misrepresantation
by the landlord which rendered the permission invalid. The
appellant’s appeal to the Tribunal as also to the High Court
having failed, he has filed this appeal after obtaining
Special Leave. The Tribunal and the High Court affirmed the
view of the Rent Controller treating the grant of permission
by the Controller to be mechanical and without application
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of mind.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: The object of enquiring into the validity of the
Control-
300
ler’s permission under section 21 is only to ensure that
essentials of a limited tenancy existed and the same was
genuine; and it is not meant to permit raising of frivolous
pleas which would frustrate the very object of its enact-
ment. This view protects the honest tenants and only curbs
the frivolous and vexatious pleas. [310H; 311A]
Controller’s permission when granted to create a limited
tenancy under sec. 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid
unless declared otherwise. It is, therefore, for the person
assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a
proper forum in a proper proceedings. Unless this is done,
the order remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the
tenant himself to raise the pleas of invalidity and unless
the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforce-
ability cannot be doubted. [31lB-C]
All that has to be seen is whether the period of limited
tenancy was indicated by the landlord with reference to a
foreseeable future event and the estimate of time of its
occurrence was not unreasonable. [312B]
When the period of limited tenancy is stated on the
basis of a future event the happening of which is reasonably
certain at that time though the precise date of the future
event cannot be predicted with precision, the landlord’s
estimate of the period after which the event is expected to
happen, unless unreasonable must be accepted for this pur-
pose as genuine. This would satisfy the test of a genuine
limited tenancy if there be no other factor indicating it to
be a mere pretence adopted by the landlord. [312C-D]
The enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this behalf
is not the same as that for determining existence of ground
of bona fide need of the landlord for an order of eviction
under section 14 of the Act, and section 14 is expressly
superseded by section 21. The scope of enquiry is limited
only to the existence of the jurisdictional facts at the
time of grant of the permission when its validity is chal-
lenged subsequently. [312F]
The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not
having been proved by the respondent-tenant even after
objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period
of limited tenancy, there was no ground to refuse restora-
tion of possession to the landlord. [313C]
S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCR 281;
V.S. Rahi & Anr. v. Smt. Ram Chambeli, [1984] 2 SCR 290;
Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 SCC 1; Inder Mohan
Lal v.
301
Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 SCC 1; S.K. Lata v. R.C. Chhiba &
Anr,, [1988] 4 SCC 709 and J.R. Vohra v. India Export Hlouse
(P) Ltd. & Anr., [1985] 2 SCR 899, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4779 of
1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.8.1987 of the Delhi
High Court in S.A.O. No. 393 of 1986.
Ashok Sen, Ms. S. Janani and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the
Appellant.
G.C. Lalwani and P.N. Misra for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VERMA, J. Leave granted.
The landlord Shri Shiv Chander Kapoor has preferred this
appeal by special leave against the judgment dated August 3,
1987 passed by the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 393 of
1986 whereby the High Court dismissed the landlord’s appeal
against the Order dated October 14, 1986 of the Rent Control
Tribunal affirming in appeal the order dated August 9, 1985
of the Rent Controller dismissing the landlord’s application
dated October 12, 1983 for restoration of possession of the
premises let out for residence to the tenant Amar Bose for
the limited period of three years w.e.f. June 8, 1980 under
section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter
referred as the ’Act’). The true scope of the enquiry con-
templated when the tenant assails validity of the Rent
Controller’s permission granted under section 21 of the Act
for creation of a tenancy for limited period arises for
determination in the present case.
The premises is the second floor of the building beating
No. 19/10, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi comprising of two
rooms, a kitchen, bathroom and lavatory let out for resi-
dence on a monthly rent of Rs.800 apart from electricity and
water charges. The landlord offered to let out the premises
for three years only w.e.f. June 8, 1980 for the reason that
it would be needed by his family thereafter when his son got
married, to which the tenant consented. Accordingly, by an
agreement in writing between the parties the premises was so
let out for the limited period of three years w.e.f June 8,
1980 with the
302
permission of the Rent Controller obtained under section 21
of the Act. The order of the Rent Controller is as under:
"In view of the statements of the parties made
above, I am satisfied that there is no collu-
sion or fraud. I am also satisfied that the
petitioner does not require the suit premises
for a limited period of three years. Permis-
sion, therefore, is hereby granted to the
petitioner Sh. Shiv Chander Kapoor to let out
his premises No. 19/10, situated at Old Ra-
jinder Nagar, New Delhi, the details of which
are given in the site plan Ext. AI to the
respondent for residential purpose for a
limited period of three years with effect from
8.6.1980".
On failure of the tenant Amar Bose to restore possession
of the premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of
limited tenancy, an application dated October 12, 1983 was
filed by the landlord before the Rent Controller praying for
execution of the aforesaid order by delivery of vacant
possession of the premises to the landlord. The tenant filed
his objection to the execution application which was replied
by the landlord. The Rent Controller by order dated August
9, 1985 rejected the landlord’s application taking the view
that the permission granted under section 21 of the Act was
invalid so that the tenant could not be evicted on expiry of
the period of three years. The landlord’s further appeal to
the Rent Control Tribunal and then to the Delhi High Court
failed. Hence this further appeal.
The Rent Controller upheld the tenant’s objection that
the landlord’s son being aged only about 19 or 20 years on
the date of expiry of the period of limited tenancy while
the minimum age prescribed by law for marriage being 21
years the ground that the premises would be needed on the
son’s marriage after three years was untenable. On this
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basis it was held that creation of tenancy for the limited
period of three years amounted to fraud and misrepresenta-
tion by the landlord rendering invalid the permission grant-
ed under section 21 of the Act. This view has been upheld by
the Rent Control Tribunal and then the Delhi High Court,
treating the grant of permission by Controller to be mechan-
ical and without application of mind. The tenant also con-
tended that the landlord was in possession of the remaining
building which comprises of sufficient accommodation to meet
the bona fide need of the landlord’s family; and that the
premises were constructed in 1972 and the second floor of
the building was never occupied by the landlord being let
out to other tenants from time to time. In substance
303
the grounds taken by the tenant were two, namely (1) the
landlord’s son was below the prescribed minimum age for
marriage of 21 years on the date of the expiry of the period
of three years of the limited tenancy which showed that the
reason given was false, and (2) absence of bona fide need of
the landlord for occupying the premises, namely, the second
floor of the building. The High Court’s order is based only
on the first ground.
The scope of enquiry contemplated under section 21 of
the Act when the tenant assails validity of the Controller’s
permission to create a limited tenancy thereunder was seri-
ously debated at the heating of this appeal. On behalf of
the appellant/landlord it was urged that the scope is limit-
ed to examining only the existence of jurisdictional facts
which permit grant of permission to creat a tenancy for
limited period and no more. On this basis, learned counsel
for the appellant contended that the above first ground
alone was within the scope of enquiry which too has been
wrongly decided by the High Court on a misconstruction of
Section 21. On the other hand it was contended on behalf of
the respondent-tenant that the enquiry extends also to
examining the other ground viz. existence of landlord’s bona
fide need to occupy the premises on expiry of the period of
limited tenancy. The same earlier decisions of this Court on
the point were relied on by both sides with equal vehemence
in support of the rival contentions.
Section 21 is as under:
"Recovery of possession in case of tenancies
for limited period.--(1) Where a landlord does
not require the whole or any part of any
premises for a particular period, and the
landlord, after obtaining the permission of
the Controller in the prescribed mannner, lets
the whole of the premises or part thereof as a
residence for such period as may be agreed to
in writing between the landlord and the tenant
and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the
said period, vacate such premises, then, not-
withstanding anything contained in Section 14
or in any other law, the Controller may, On an
application made to him in this behalf by the
landlord within such time as may be pre-
scribed, place the landlord in vacant posses-
sion of the premises or part thereof by evict-
ing the tenant and every other person who may
be in occupation of such premises.
(2) While making an order under sub-section
(1), the Con-
304
troller may award to the landlord such damages
for the use or occupation of the premises at
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such rates as he considers proper in the
circumstances of the case for the period from
the date of such order till the date of actual
vacation by the tenant".
Chapter III of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 compris-
ing of Sections 14 to 25 contains provisions relating to
control of eviction of tenants. The object of enacting the
Rent Control laws is well-known and it does not need an
elaborate enunciation. Suffice it’ to say that in view of
acute shortage of housing accommodation, more particularly
in the bigger cities, these laws have been enacted to regu-
late the letting of the available premises and an attempt
has been made to reconcile the conflicting interests of
landlords and the need for the protection of tenants. Sec-
tion 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act gives protection to
the tenants against eviction and specifies the grounds on
which alone the landlord can obtain an order of the compe-
tent authority to recover possession of any premises let out
to a tenant. Apparently, it was realised that some premises
may be available for being let only for a limited period
where the landlord did not require the same during that
period alone provided the landlord was assured of restora-
tion of possession on expiry of the limited period. However,
while enacting a provision permitting the creation of a
tenancy for limited period to utilise such premises and
alleviate to some extent the suffering of persons needing
residential accommodation, it was necessary also to ensure
that the provision was not misused by capricious landlords
to circumvent Section 14 of the Act. It was to achieve this
dual purpose that Section 21 was enacted in the Delhi Act to
encourage landlords who did not need any premises for a
limited period only, to let it out for such period with the
assurance of restoration of possession at the end of that
period without being required to satisfy Section 14 of the
Act. The provision also contains an internal check upon an
unscrupulous landlord by requiting the Rent Controller’s
permission to be granted in the given circumstances only.
The conditions on which permission can be granted by the
Rent Controller under Section 21 are specified in Section 21
itself. A fortiori when the question arises about the valid-
ity of the Rent Controller’s permission it can be tested
only with reference to the specified conditions subject to
which alone permission can be granted by the Controller. No
outside factor can be imported either for grant of the
permission thereunder or for adjudicating its validity at a
subsequent stage. Section 21 being in the nature of an
exception to the ordinary mode of
305
eviction of tenants prescribed under section 14 of the Act,
it must be strictly construed and the scope thereof limited
to its contents. Section 1 of the Act is by itself the
complete provision relating to the creation of a tenancy for
limited period and recovery of possession on expiry of that
period. Thus, Section 21 is a self-contained code in this
behalf.
Section 21 permits the creation of a tenancy for limited
period "Where the landlord does not require the whole or any
part of premises for a particular period"; and it is to be
let for ’residence’. These words of the provision specify
the jurisdictional facts which alone permit creation of a
tenancy for limited period. The remaining provision provides
the machinery for doing so by an agreement in writing be-
tween the landlord and the tenant on the basis of which
permission of the Controller is obtained. The provision
further says that if On expiry of the said period the tenant
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does not vacate such premises, then ’notwithstanding any-
thing contained in Section 14 or in any other law’ the Con-
troller may on an application by the landlord place the
landlord in vacant possession of the premises by evicting
the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation
of such premises. The enquiry contemplated at the stage of
grant of permission by the Controller under this provision
requires the Controller to be satisfied that the landlord
does not require such premises for a limited period only;
and the said premises is to be let as a residence in terms
of an agreement in writing between the landlord and tenant.
On satisfaction of the existence of these facts, the Con-
troller grants permission for creation of tenancy for a
limited period under this provision. When recovery of pos-
session of the premises is sought thereafter by the landlord
under this provision then the Controller is to restore
possession to the landlord "notwithstanding anything con-
tained in Section 14 or in any other law" subject only to
the requirements of this provision.
Obviously it is the existence of a valid permission of
the Controller for creation of a tenancy for limited period
under this provision which brings into existence a valid
limited tenancy and, therefore, such valid permission is a
sine qua non of Controller’s jurisdiction to order restora-
tion of possession on expiry of that period under the second
part of Section 21. It is, therefore, the obligation of the
Controller to examine the question of validity of his earli-
er permission, if such an objection is raised before he
orders restoration of possesion to the landlord on expiry of
the limited term. However, that enquiry must be limited only
to the existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at
the time of grant of permission and no more. This is quite
evident from the expression ’notwithstanding anything con-
tained in Section 14 or in any
306
other law’. in the second part of Section 21 itself. This is
the inbuilt safeguard in the provision against its misuse.
We have no doubt that the language of Section 21 of the
Act clearly forbids the Controller from embarking on an
enquiry beyond the ambit of Section 21 itself which may
impinge into the sphere of Section 14 of the Act or any
other law. We have no hesitation in holding that it is the
existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at the time
of grant of permission to create a limited tenancy which
alone is required to be determined by the Controller, if and
when, validity of his permission is assailed at a subsequent
stage. This being the scope of his enquiry while granting
permission, the scope of enquiry at the subsequent stage
cannot be wider. For this reason any objection to the valid-
ity of the permission on a ground other than non-existence
of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permis-
sion is untenable and beyond the scope of the Controller’s
power to examine validity of his earlier permission before
directing restoration of possession to the landlord under
section 21 of the Act.
In short, the scope of enquiry before the Controller
when validity of the permission granted by him is assailed
is to determine: whether, the permission accorded by him
earlier was not really to the creation of a genuine tenancy
for limited period but to a mere pretence of the landlord
for circumventing the provisions of Section 147 If so, such
an act being a fraud on the statute, it does not bind the
tenant whose consent to the sham transaction is obtained
taking advantage of his unequal bargaining power, and he can
assail the permission. It is equally plain that the object
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of enacting Section 21 to permit creation of tenancies for
limited period should not be frustrated by unduly enlarging
the scope of that enquiry at the behest of a tenant who
having given his free consent to the creation of a genuine
limited tenancy thereafter attempts to thwart restoration of
possession to the landlord by raising untenable pleas in-
spite of the clear prohibition made by the words "notwith-
standing anything contained in Section 14 or in any other
law" This delicate balance between the two conflicting
interests has to be borne in mind, in order to give true
effect to Section 21 and thereby to promote the object of
its enactment.
We may now refer to the decisions of this Court. S.B.
Naronah v. Prem Kurnari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCR 281 is the
first decision on the point which deals comprehensively with
the scope of Section 21 of the Act. Krishna lyer, J. speak-
ing for the Bench said as follows:
307
"Parliament was presumably keen on maximising
accommodation available for letting, realising
the scarcity crises. One source of such spare
accommodation which is usually shy is poten-
tially vacant building or part thereof which
the landlord is able to let out for a strictly
limited period provided he has some credible
assurance that when he needs
he will get it back ........ The problem is
felt most for
residential uses.
So the law has to make itself credit-worthy.
Section 21 is the answer".
"Section 21 overrides Section 14 precisely
because it is otherwise hedged in with drastic
limitations and safeguards itself against
landlords’ abuses .....
What, then, are those conditions and safe-
guards? The first condition is that the land-
lord does not require the demised premises
"for a particular period" only ..... The
Controller must be satisfied that the landlord
means what he says and it is not a case of his
not requiring the property indefinitely as
distinguished from a specific or particular
limited period of say one year, two years
or five years. If a man has a house available
for letting for an indefinite period and he so
lets it, even if he specifies as a pretence, a
period or term in the lease, Section 21 cannot
be attracted. On the other hand, if he gives a
special reason why he can let out only for a
limited period and requires the building at
the end of that period .....
it is good compliance. The second condition
is that the letting must be made for a resi-
dential purpose. The house must be made over
’as a residence’ ."
"The fact that a landlord and a potential
tenant together apply, setting out the formal
ingredients of Section 21, does not relieve
the Controller from being vigilant to inquire
and satisfy himself about the requisites of
the landlord’s non-requirement "for a particu-
lar period" and the letting itself being ’as a
residence’. A fraud on the statute cannot be
permitted ..... "
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"If he makes a mindless order the Court, when
challenged
308
at the time of execution, will go into the
question as to whether the twin conditions for
sanction have really been fulfilled. Of
course, there will be a presumption in favour
of the sanction being regular, but it will
still be open to a party to make out his case
that in fact and in truth the conditions which
make for a valid sanction were not
present ..... "
" ..... the sanction granted under Section
21, if it has been procured by fraud or collu-
sion, cannot withstand invalidity because,
otherwise, high public policy will be given
and hostage to successful collusion .....
Collusion between the strong and the weak
cannot confer validity where the mandatory
prescriptions of the law are breached or
betrayed".
(emphasis supplied)
S.B. Naronah’s case has thereafter been consistently
followed by this Court and treated as the correct analysis
of Section 21. With respect, we concur and reiterate that
the scope of Section 21 is succinctly summarised in the
above extracts. There is nothing in this decision to support
the respondent-tenant’s contention in this appeal that the
scope of enquiry is wider permitting determination of the
landlord’s bona fide need of the pemises as if such a ground
for eviction specified in Section 14 of the Act has to be
proved. Extending the enquiry to that extent will indeed be
against the express prohibition enacted in Section 21 it-
self.
The next decision in V. S. Rahi and Anr. v. Smt. Ram
Chambeli, [1984] 2 SCR 290. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then
was) speaking for the Bench applied the decision in S.B.
Naronah’s case and pointed out that even though the initial
presumption was that the permission granted by the Control-
ler under section 21 of the Act was regular yet the material
produced should be examined in order to be satisfied that
there has not been any misuse of the said provision by the
landlord taking advantage of the helpless situation of the
tenant due to house scarcity. Facts of that case show that
the scope of enquiry was limited only to examining existence
of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permis-
sion by the Controller.
In Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 SCC 1, it was
held on the facts of that case that permissions for letting
out to the same tenant for limited period obtained more than
once after expiry of each said
309
period was by itself not sufficient to establish that the
premises was available for being let out for an indefinite
period; without showing absence of landlord’s intention to
occupy the premises. Notice was taken of the common knowl-
edge that it is not possible for a man to plan his future
life with any degree of definiteness and changing circum-
stances may justify such a course. The principle applied was
the same and the ultimate conclusion was reached on the
particular facts of that case.
In Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 SCC 1, it
was held that the presumption of validity of the permission
given by the Controller was not rebutted by the tenant since
there was no evidence to show non-existence of any of the
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essential conditions which enable the permission to be
granted. The earlier decisions of this Court starting with
Naronah’s case were referred and the test indicated therein
was applied.
In S.K. Lata v. R.C. Chhiba and Another, [1988] 4 SCC 709,
the permission given by the Controller for creation of
tenancy for a limited period was held to be vitiated on the
ground of fraud on statute because the permission was ob-
tained without disclosing that the tenant had already been
inducted under an oral lease and was in possession of the
premises prior to the application made before the Control-
ler. It was, therefore, held applying the same test that an
essential condition for grant of sanction under section 21
by the Rent Controller did not exist.
Now the only remaining point is the requirement of
notice during enquiry into validity of the Controller’s
permission before ordering restoration of possession to the
landlord. A decision of this Court on this point isJ. R.
Vohra v. India Export House (P) Ltd. & Anr., [1985] 2 SCR
899. In J.R. Vohra’s case it was reiterated that the condi-
tions specified for grant of permission by the Controller
under section 21 must be ’truely fulfilled and not by way of
any make-belief before the Controller grants his permission
for the creation of such limited tenancy’. After reiterating
this position the Court proceeded to consider the require-
ment of a notice to the tenant before issuing warrant of
possession in favour of landlord. It was held that the
competing claims of the landlord and the tenant can be
harmonised not by insisting upon service of a prior notice
on the tenant before the issuance of the warrant of posses-
sion to evict him but by insisting upon his approaching the
Rent Controller during the currency of the limited tenancy
for adjudication of his pleas no sooner he discovers facts
and
310
circumstances that tend to vitiate ab initio the initial
grant of permission. It was observed that there is no reason
for the tenant to wait till the landlord makes his applica-
tion for recovery of possession to raise his plea. It was
further observed that in case the tenant comes to know,
aliunde, of the landlord’s application for recovery of
possession even without notice to him, he may raise his plea
at that stage and the Controller would enquire into the same
but in that situation the tenant may run the risk of getting
his plea rejected as an after-thought. It was expressly held
in this decision that there is no obligation on the part of
the Rent Controller to serve a notice on the tenant before
issuing the warrant of possession on the landlord’s applica-
tion made after expiry of the period of limited tenancy for
recovery of possession.
It is obvious from the decision in J.R. Vohra’s case
that the tenant is expected to raise such a plea during
currency of the limited tenancy and on such a plea being
raised by the tenant enquiry into it is contemplated. Even
though it is not expressly said in Vohra’s case, it is
implicit that on such an application being made by the
tenant requiring adjudication by the Controller, it is the
Controller’s obligation to issue notice of the same to the
landlord and then to make the adjudication with opportunity
to both sides to prove their respective contentions.
As for the requirement of notice to the tenant before
issuing the warrant of possession in favour of the landlord
on his application for recovery of possession on expiry of
the limited tenancy, it appears to us also that no notice to
the tenant at that stage is either contemplated or expedi-
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ent. This appears to be the reasonable view which is in
accord with the scheme of Section 21. Obviously notice is to
be given of a fact which may otherwise be not known to the
notice. The period of limited tenancy and the date of its
expiry are known to the tenant from the very inception. The
tenant is equally aware of his own default in restoring
vacant possession of such premises to the landlord on expiry
of that period. It is only these facts, well known to the
tenant, which compel the landlord to apply for recovery of
possession pursuant to the tenant’s default. The plea of
invalidity, if any, of Controller’s earlier permission must
equally be known to the tenant at least by then coupled with
his knowledge that unless a declaration is made at his
instance that the Controller’s permission is invalid, he
must vacate, the limited tenancy having expired. Why then
should a notice to him at that stage be necessary and for
what useful purpose? We cannot think of any good reason to
require a notice to the tenant at that stage. The object of
enquiring into the validity of the Controller’s permission
under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a
limited tenancy
311
existed and the same was genuine; and it is not meant to
permit raising of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the
very object of its enactment. This view protects the honest
tenants and only curbs the frivolous and vexatious pleas.
There is another aspect of the matter. The Controller’s
permission when granted to create a limited tenancy under
section 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless de-
clared otherwise. It is, therefore, for the person assailing
its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum
in a proper proceeding. Unless this is done, the order
remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the tenant
himself to raise the plea of invalidity and unless the order
is declared invalid at his instance, it is enforceability
cannot be doubted.
In Wade’s Administrative Law, 6th Edn. at pp 35 1-353,
there is an illuminating discussion of this topic. It has
been pointed out that ’void’ is meaningless in an absolute
sense; and ’unless the necessary proceedings are taken at
law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it
quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for
its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders’. In
the words of Lord Diplock, "the order would be presumed to
be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent
legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue".
For the above reasons, we are in respectful agreement
with the view taken in J.R. Vohra’s case (supra) that there
is no obligation on the Controller to issue notice to the
tenant of the landlord’s application for recovery of posses-
sion made on expiry of the period of tenancy for a limited
period under section 21 of the Act, but an enquiry on the
tenant’s plea has to be made to the extent indicated, if the
tenant assails validity of the Controller’s permission even
at that stage.
We shall now consider the merits of this case on the
basis indicated above. The High Court has upheld rejection
of the landlord’s application for recovery of possession
under section 21 of the Act on the ground that the land-
lord’s son would be about 19 or 20 years old on expiry of
three years period of limited lease but he could not be
married till he attained the prescribed minimum age of 21
years which showed that the Controller’s order granting
permission was mindless and was obtained by fraud. The
permission has, therefore, been held invalid. In our opin-
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ion, the High Court as well as the authorities below it
misconstrued the requirements of Section 21 of the Act. It
is not a case where the landlord did not have a son who was
expected to be
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married some time after three years. In substance the reason
for availability of the accommodation for the limited period
of three years only given by the landlord was that the
premises was not needed by the landlord till his son got
married some time after three years. The reason was not to
be construed as a statement that the son was to be married
exactly on the date on which three years expired. The date
of son’s marriage could not be foreseen or estimated with
such precision as to coincide with the date of expiry of the
limited lease. All that has to be seen is whether the period
of limited tenancy was indicated by the landlord with refer-
ence to a foreseeable future event and the estimate of time
of its occurrence was not unreasonable. When the period of
limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a future event,
the happening of which is reasonably certain at that time
though the precise date of the future event cannot be pre-
dicted with precision, the landlord’s estimate of the period
after which the event is expected to happen, unless unrea-
sonable must be accepted for this purpose as genuine. This
would satisfy the test of a genuine limited tenancy if there
be no other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence
adopted by the landlord. This test is fully satisfied in the
present case. Merely because the son’s age then was about
one year below the prescribed minimum age for marriage the
estimate of landlord that he would not need the premises for
three years only till his son’s marriage cannot be treated
as a pretence. One year’s period for settling and arranging
performance of the marriage is nothing unusual since exist-
ence of the basic facts is undisputed. Existence of this
jurisdictional fact to justify the permission has not been
negatived and no material has been produced by the tenant to
substantiate his plea.
The other ground taken by the respondent-tenant is that
the existing accommodation available with the landlord is
sufficient for the needs of his family. It is sufficient to
state that the enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this
behalf is not the same as that for determining existence of
the ground of bona fide need of the landlord for an order of
eviction under section 14 of the Act, and Section 14 is
expressly superceded by Section 21. This question is, there-
fore, beyond the scope of the present enquiry.
The respondent-tenant also contended that the premises
was constructed in 1972 and the landlord had never occupied
this premises viz., the second floor of the building for his
personal use and had even let out the first floor prior to
1980. In the present case the respondenttenant did not
produce any material to prove letting out of any part of the
building much less this premises i.e. second floor of the
building.
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After the arguments were concluded before us and the judg-
ment was reserved, the respondent has filed an application
under order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 15 1 C.P.C. for
admitting additional evidence to show letting out of the
second floor of the building. It has been stated that the
evidence could not be produced in the Courts below since the
objections were not listed for investigation by the Courts.
No cogent ground is shown to permit any additional evidence
when no attempt to produce any evidence was made in any of
the Courts below upto the High Court or even here till
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conclusion of the hearing before us. The application is
rejected. The lease for limited period of three years ex-
pired in 1983 and more than six years have been spent since
then in this litigation at the stage of recovery of posses-
sion. The facts of the case indicate that the respondent’s
plea is a clear after-thought and is baseless.
The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not
having been proved by the respondent-tenant even after
objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period
of limited tenancy there was no ground to refuse restoration
of possession to the landlord. More than twice the period of
the limited lease has expired even after the date of expiry
of the lease. We see no reason to delay any more the relief
due to the landlord.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders
passed by the Rent Controller, Rent Control Tribunal and the
High Court are set aside and the landlord’s application for
recovery of possession is allowed.
The respondent-tenant shall also pay Rs.2,000 as costs to
the appellant-landlord in addition to an amount equal to
that calculated on the basis of the monthly rent for the
entire period till the date of restoration of possession.
Y. Lal Appeal
allowed.
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