The State Of Jharkhand vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra

Reportable
2025 INSC 412

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.………………… OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19223 OF 2024]

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. APPELLANTS

VS.

RUKMA KESH MISHRA RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
T HE A PPEAL
2. Appellants - the State of Jharkhand and three of its officers – assail
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the judgment and order dated 24 November, 2023 of a Division Bench
2
of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in this civil appeal. By the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.03.28
16:56:37 IST
Reason:

1
impugned order
2
High Court
Page 1 of 26




3
impugned order, the Division Bench dismissed an intra-court appeal
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carried by the appellants from the judgment and order dated 20 April,
4
2023 of a Single Judge, allowing a writ petition instituted by the
respondent - Rukma Kesh Mishra.
HE UESTION
T Q
3. We are tasked to decide a solitary legal question: whether the order
by which the respondent was dismissed from service, following
disciplinary proceedings, should have been interdicted by the High Court
on the specious ground that the charge-sheet had not been approved by
5
the Chief Minister of Jharkhand ?
B RIEF R ESUME OF F ACTS
4. Facts giving rise to this appeal are not too complicated. While the
respondent had been functioning as a civil service officer, it came to light
that he had indulged in diverse activities of dishonesty, financial
irregularities, forgery of documents, etc. constituting misconduct. It was
proposed to proceed against him departmentally. Along with the proposal
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dated 13 January, 2014, which was initiated by the appellant no. 3 – the
Deputy Commissioner, Koderma – seeking approval of initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, the draft charge-sheet containing 9 (nine)
charges proposed to be levelled against the respondent (contained in
form ‘K’) was placed before the Chief Minister together with proposals

3
LPA No. 572 of 2023
4
WP (S) No. 4781 of 2017
5
Chief Minister
Page 2 of 26




that the respondent be suspended from service with immediate effect and
that in the inquiry to be initiated against the respondent, the officers
named therein be appointed as the inquiry officer and the presenting
st
officer. The Chief Minister approved all the proposals on 21 March, 2014.
st
On 31 March, 2014, the appellant no.2 – Deputy Secretary to the
Government of Jharkhand (Personnel, Administrative and Rajbhasha
6
Department) – suspended the respondent from service. Appellant no.2
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thereafter issued charge-sheet dated 4 April, 2014 under Rule 55 of the
7
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 for the
purpose of an inquiry to be conducted into the respondent’s conduct vis-
à-vis the 9 (nine) articles of charges drawn up against him. Respondent
having denied and disputed the material allegations in the charge-sheet,
an inquiry came to be conducted with the appellant no.4 – described in
the array of appellants as the Departmental Enquiry-cum-Conducting
Officer – as the inquiry officer. Respondent duly participated in such
inquiry whereafter a report of inquiry was submitted by the appellant no.4
st
on 31 July, 2015. Appellant no.4 held the respondent guilty of all but 3
(three) of the charges. A second show cause notice was issued to the
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respondent on 11 April, 2016, followed by a reminder. Respondent
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replied to the second show cause notice on 24 September, 2016.
Apropos a proposal containing detailed reasons why the report of the
appellant no.4 called for acceptance and the respondent dismissed from
service on proof of majority of the charges of misconduct levelled against

6
relevant department
7
1930 Rules
Page 3 of 26




8
him, the same was placed before the Cabinet of the State Government in
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its meeting held on 13 June, 2017. The Cabinet having approved such
proposal, the respondent was dismissed from service vide an order of the
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Governor contained in memo dated 16 June, 2017 issued by the Joint
Secretary of the relevant department. The order of dismissal recorded
that the Government had taken the decision to dismiss the respondent
based on proof of the charges against him in terms of Rule 14(xi) of the
Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)
9
Rules 2016 and that under Rule 18(7) thereof, due consent of the
Jharkhand Public Service Commission for imposing such punishment had
been obtained.
5. After obtaining information through the machinery provided by the
Right to Information Act, 2005 that approval of the Chief Minister being
the competent authority has not been “accorded at the time of
issuing/signing of the memo of charge” , the respondent challenged the
order of dismissal from service before the High Court by invoking its writ
jurisdiction primarily on the ground of absence of approval by the Chief
Minister at or about the time of issuance of the charge-sheet. He also
challenged the disciplinary proceedings on the grounds that there was no
application of mind and the appellants had failed to take into
consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case; also, that
the punishment imposed was excessive and disproportionate to the

8
Cabinet
9
2016 Rules
Page 4 of 26




allegations levelled and gravity of the misconduct found proved.
Accordingly, the respondent prayed that by issuing a writ of certiorari, the
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order of dismissal dated 16 June, 2017 be quashed and a mandamus be
issued directing the appellants to reinstate him in service.
HE UDGMENTS OF THE IGH OURT
T J H C
6. Perusal of the writ petition (Annexure P22 of the paper book) does
not reveal reference to any provision of law premised whereon the
respondent contended that the charge-sheet could not have been issued
without the approval of the Chief Minister, being the competent authority
in case of the respondent.
7. Be that as it may, it is only on this ground that the writ petition of
the respondent succeeded. The Single Judge, who heard the writ petition,
unequivocally recorded that initiation of disciplinary proceedings against
the respondent was duly approved by the competent authority but
“nowhere from the counter affidavit it appears that Chargesheet was ever
approved by the competent authority” . Placing reliance on the decisions of
10
this Court in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath and State of Tamil
11
Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IAS , the Single Judge held that it is the
“requirement of law that charge has to be approved by the competent
authority and the same was not done here, which is dehorse (sic, dehors)
the Rule” . Based on such findings, while quashing the order of dismissal

10
2014 (1) SCC 351
11
2018 (17) SCC 677
Page 5 of 26




the Single Judge directed reinstatement of the respondent in service with
all consequential benefits. The writ petition, thus, stood allowed.
8. The Division Bench, while dismissing the intra-court appeal of the
appellants, proceeded to record the following findings:
“12. * However, on scrutiny of the materials on record, we find that
before a decision was taken to start a departmental proceeding against
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the respondent and Resolution dated 4 April 2014 was issued thereof,
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charge memo was already prepared on 13 January 2014. Not only that,
the competent authority had accorded his approval to the charge memo
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on 21 March 2014. That is, before a decision was taken to start the
departmental proceeding against the respondent and approval thereon of
the competent authority was taken. Apparently, the charge memo was
incompetent and therefore the subsequent proceedings taken in the
departmental inquiry against the respondent were also rendered illegal.
13. In view of this procedural error which is not a curable irregularity,
th
the writ Court rightly interfered with the termination order dated 16 June
2017”.

After extracting paragraph 41 of the decision in B. V. Gopinath (supra)
and paragraph 21 of the decision in Promod Kumar (supra), the Division
th
Bench held the writ court’s interference with the order dated 6 June,
2017 to be perfectly valid and, accordingly, dismissed the intra-court
appeal.
NALYSIS AND EASONS
A R
9. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dvivedi, learned counsel for the
appellants and Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
respondent, at some length.
10. Respondent, without exhausting the alternative remedy of
appeal/revision challenging the order of dismissal from service, had
Page 6 of 26




invoked the writ jurisdiction before the High Court. For reasons assigned
hereafter, we find that the writ petition could have been entertained by
the High Court having regard to the jurisdictional issue raised by the
respondent.
11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty
12
Satyanarayana has held that ordinarily no writ lies against a show
cause notice or charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause
notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action, because
it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party
unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do
so (emphasis supplied). Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and
hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised
by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very
rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a show cause notice
or charge-sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some
other reason it is wholly illegal (emphasis supplied). However, ordinarily
the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.
12. Having read the decision in Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), we
are of the view that it was open to the High Court to examine the
question of jurisdiction to issue the charge-sheet to the respondent since
he had invoked the writ jurisdiction after suffering the order of dismissal

12
(2006) 12 SCC 28
Page 7 of 26




from service and not at an initial stage of the inquiry. The writ petition,
therefore, could not have been thrown out at the threshold.
13. Now, while addressing the question arising for decision, it would be
worthwhile to notice paragraphs ‘41’ and ‘21’ of the decisions in B. V.
Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), respectively.
14. In B.V. Gopinath (supra), this Court intervened and quashed the
charge-sheet on the ground of want of the Finance Minister’s approval.
Paragraph ‘41’ reads as follows:
“ 41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were initiated
in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3) clearly lays down
that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant
under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause
to be drawn up the charge-sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the
disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the
government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents
including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to
be proved. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested by the
Additional Solicitor General, that once the disciplinary authority approves
the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge-sheet can be
drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would
destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the
Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the
protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no
public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair
procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to
meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. Such a charge-sheet
can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance
Minister”.
(italics in original)
15. B.V. Gopinath (supra) was followed in Promod Kumar (supra).
Paragraph ‘21’ of the latter decision being relevant, is quoted below:
“ 21. It is clear that the approval of the disciplinary authority was taken for
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is also clear from the affidavit
Page 8 of 26




that no approval was sought from the disciplinary authority at the time
when the charge memo was issued to the delinquent officer. The
submission made on behalf of the appellant is that approval of the
disciplinary authority for initiation of disciplinary proceedings was
sufficient and there was no need for another approval for issuance of
charge memo. The basis for such submission is that initiation of
disciplinary proceedings and issuance of charge memo are at the same
stage. We are unable to agree with the submission in view of the
judgment of this Court in B.V. Gopinath . In that case the charge memo
issued to Mr Gopinath under Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was quashed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Finance Minister
did not approve it. The judgment of the Tribunal was affirmed by the High
Court. The Union of India, the appellant therein submitted before this
Court that the approval for initiation of the departmental proceedings
includes the approval of the charge memo. Such submission was not
accepted by this Court on an interpretation of Rule 14(3) which provides
that the disciplinary authority shall “draw up or cause to be drawn up” the
charge memo. It was held that if any authority other than the disciplinary
authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in
destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India”.

16. Having read excerpts from the decisions in B. V. Gopinath (supra)
and Promod Kumar (supra), heavily relied on by the High Court for
allowing the writ petition of the respondent, we propose to first examine
whether the law laid down therein had any application to the facts
pleaded in the writ petition and how far the same is relevant for deciding
this appeal. Next, we propose to consider whether, on facts, initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent suffered from any
infirmity warranting interference. Finally, we propose to consider the
contours of Article 311 of the Constitution and the legal requirements of
who should ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to draw up’ the charge-sheet signifying
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer/employee prima
facie found to be delinquent.
Page 9 of 26




A PPLICABILITY OF B. V. Gopinath (supra) A ND Promod Kumar (supra)
17. It is not in dispute that at the time the appellants resolved to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, the 1930 Rules
were in force. The Single Judge noticed this fact, although the Division
Bench has not adverted to it. Under the 1930 Rules, disciplinary
13
proceedings could be initiated in terms of Rule 55 thereof. The effect
that Rule 55 would have on the merits of the plea raised by the
respondent, in the ultimate analysis, is what appears to be clinching.
18. Bare perusal of Rule 55 reveals that it does not expressly specify
the authority, who is competent to issue the charge-sheet. On the
contrary, the decisions of this Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and
Promod Kumar (supra) dealt with different rules which expressly
specified who could issue the charge-sheet. We have noted with some
measure of disappointment that long-standing precedents of this Court,

13
55. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no
order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement Vide Notification no.13213-A, dated
th
the 17 October, 1957 (or reduction) shall be passed on a member of a Service (other
than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a
Court-Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is
proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending
himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form
of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged
together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and on any
other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on
the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of
his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if
the authority concerned so direct an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral
evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person
charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and
to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer, conducting the
inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a
witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a
statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.
*
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which did lend sustenance to the impugned charge-sheet, were neither
placed before the Division Bench nor the Single Judge for consideration.
This is one reason why we are persuaded to interfere.
19. Respondent was a member of the civil service of the State. Thus, he
could legitimately claim that the safeguards enshrined in Article 311 of
the Constitution be scrupulously followed prior to ordering his dismissal
including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner required by the
relevant law.
20. It would, therefore, be profitable to note what is the law declared by
this Court on the point as to who can issue the charge-sheet.
21. As far back as in 1970, this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
14
Shardul Singh held that Article 311(1) does not in terms require that
the authority empowered by that provision to dismiss or remove an officer
should initiate or conduct the inquiry. This decision could count as the
parent decision on the topic, declaring the law in paragraphs ‘6’ and ‘10’.
The said paragraphs are quoted below for ease of understanding as to
how Article 311(1) was construed:
“ 6. Article 311(1) provides that no person who is a member of Civil
Service of the Union or of an All-India Service or Civil Service of a State or
holds civil post under the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by
an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. This Article
does not in terms require that the authority empowered under that
provision to dismiss or remove an official, should itself initiate or conduct
the enquiry preceding the dismissal or removal of the officer or even that
that enquiry should be done at its instance. The only right guaranteed to a
civil servant under that provision is that he shall not be dismissed or
removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

14
(1970) 1 SCC 108
Page 11 of 26




But it is said on behalf of the respondent that that guarantee includes
within itself the guarantee that the relevant disciplinary inquiry should be
initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in the Article. The
High Court has accepted this contention. We have now to see whether the
view taken by the High Court is correct.
*
10. But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution even in
respect of matters provided therein, rules could have been framed under
Article 309. The provisions in Article 311 confer additional rights on the
civil servants. Hence we are unable to agree with the High Court that the
guarantee given under Article 311(1) includes within itself a further
guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or
removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the
authorities mentioned in that Article”.
(emphasis supplied)
22. Then came the decision in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller
15
and Auditor General , where this Court reiterated that a departmental
proceeding need not be initiated only by the appointing authority and that
initiation by a subordinate authority, in the absence of rules, is not
vitiated. We consider it appropriate to extract paragraph ‘4’ hereunder:
“ 4. Article 311(1) says that no person who is a member of a civil service
of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds
civil post under the Union or a State “shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed”. Whether this
guarantee includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary
proceeding should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well
known that departmental proceeding consists of several stages: the
initiation of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled
against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the
conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311(1) guarantees that no person who is
a member of a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or
removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
But Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding
must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, it is open to
Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that
even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an
officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such rule shall not
be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount
to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil

15
1993 (1) SCC 419
Page 12 of 26




post. But in absence of any such rule, this right or guarantee does not
flow from Article 311 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that
initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer
concerned with any evil consequences, and the framers of the Constitution
did not consider it necessary to guarantee even that to holders of civil
posts under the Union of India or under the State Government. At the
same time this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as
that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a
decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a
rule, any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling
authority, can initiate such proceeding”.
(emphasis supplied)
23. Yet again, in Transport Commissioner v. A. Radhakrishna
16
Moorthy , this Court clearly declared the law as follows:
“ 8. Insofar as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to the
appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now that it is
unobjectionable. The initiation can be by an officer subordinate to the
appointing authority. Only the dismissal/removal shall not be by an
authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Accordingly it is held
that this was not a permissible ground for quashing the charges by the
Tribunal”.
(emphasis supplied)
24. All these decisions were considered by this Court in Inspector
17
General of Police v. Thavasippan , and it was ruled as follows:
“ 9. … Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the charges should be
framed by the authority competent to award the proposed penalty or that
the enquiry should be conducted by such authority. We do not find
anything in the rules which would induce us to read in Rule 3( b )( i ) such a
requirement. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal that in a case
falling under Rule 3( b ) the charge memo should be issued by the
disciplinary authority empowered to impose the penalties referred to
therein and if the charge memo is issued by any lower authority then only
that penalty can be imposed which that lower authority is competent to
award, is clearly erroneous. We, therefore, allow this appeal”. …
(emphasis supplied)


16
(1995) 1 SCC 332
17
(1996) 2 SCC 145
Page 13 of 26




25. Later decisions of this Court in Government of Tamil Nadu v. S.
18 19
Vel Raj and Commissioner of Police v. Jayasurian also declare the
law in the same vein, albeit in respect of different discipline and appeal
rules, that a charge-sheet need not be issued by the appointing authority;
any other authority, who is the controlling authority, can initiate
departmental proceedings by issuing a chargesheet.
26. At this stage, we are reminded of the Latin phrase stare decisis et
non queta movere meaning, stand by what has been decided and do not
disturb what has been settled. While it is true that courts are not
restrained by any principle of law from expressing a different view on a
point of law or to distinguish precedents (a topic we wish to advert to
briefly a little later), stare decisis need not be disregarded to unsettle
settled positions. We would read these precedents (referred to in
paragraphs 21 to 25, supra) as settling the law that unless the relevant
discipline and appeal rules applicable to an officer/employee of an
authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution so require,
disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge-sheet cannot be faulted
solely on the ground that either the Appointing Authority or the
Disciplinary Authority has not issued the same or approved it. These
precedents have stood the test of time and having full application to the
case at hand, could not have been lightly overlooked. A holistic
consideration of all these precedents by the High Court was certainly the

18
(1997) 2 SCC 708
19
(1997) 6 SCC 75
Page 14 of 26




need of the hour. Thavasippan (supra) had considered the precedents in
Shardul Singh (supra), P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) and A.
Radhakrishna Moorthy (supra) and P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra)
was placed before the coordinate Bench in B.V. Gopinath (supra). We
are anchored in a belief that had the High Court looked into these
precedents, the conclusion would have certainly been otherwise.
27. Be that as it may, the governing rules in B.V. Gopinath (supra)
and Promod Kumar (supra) being different, notwithstanding the
similarity in language of Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Services
20
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and Rule 17(3) of the
2016 Rules, reliance placed by the Division Bench on the ratio of the said
two decisions seems to be wholly inapt. An erroneous conclusion was
arrived at contrary to the settled position of law and we have no
hesitation to conclude that the impugned order is manifestly flawed and
hence, unsustainable.
O N FACTS , WAS THERE ANY INFIRMITY IN INITIATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS ?
28. The second reason for which we propose to hold the impugned
order to be indefensible turns on the facts.
29. It is found that during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings
against the respondent, the 2016 Rules came into force with effect from

20
1965 Rules
Page 15 of 26




rd 21
3 February, 2016. Sub-rule (3) of rule 32 on ‘Repeal and Savings’
saved actions taken under the 1930 Rules. In the light thereof, although
the disciplinary authority of the respondent had initiated disciplinary
proceedings against him under the 1930 Rules, there was no obligation to
take such proceedings to a logical conclusion in terms of the 2016 Rules.
If the 2016 Rules contemplated additional safeguards over and above
what were provided by the 1930 Rules, it is debatable whether the
charged officer could, as of right, claim such safeguards to be extended
though nothing prevents the disciplinary authority in its discretion to
extend the same. Even otherwise, the Division Bench referred to Rule
22
17(3) laying down the ‘Procedure for imposing major penalties’ for the
purpose of invalidating the order of the respondent’s dismissal from
23
service but, in the process, completely overlooked Rule 16 (which dealt
with ‘Authority to institute proceedings’ and inter alia empowered ‘any

21
32(3) Anything done or any action taken in exercise of the powers under the Civil
Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and The Bihar and Orissa
Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 shall be deemed to have been
done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under those Rule (sic, Rules), as
if those Rules were in force on the day on which such thing or action was done or taken.

22
17(3). Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under
this rule, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up:
i) The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite
and distinct article of charge.
ii) A statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of
each article of charge, which shall contain:-
*

23
16. The Government or Appointing Authority or any authority to which the Appointing

Authority is subordinate or any other authority empowered by general or special order of
the Government may – (a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government
servant; (b) direct a Disciplinary Authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against
any Government servant on whom that Disciplinary Authority is competent to impose
any of the penalties specified in rule 14 under these Rules.

Page 16 of 26




24
other authority’ to institute disciplinary proceedings), Rule 2(k) defining
Disciplinary Authority as well as Rule 32(3) (supra) of the 2016 Rules. In
the first place, the complaint of the respondent that the charge-sheet had
not been issued by the competent authority could not have been decided
looking at the 2016 Rules. Secondly, even if such Rules had any
application, still the procedure for imposing major penalties in Rule 17
could not have prevailed over the provision in rule 16 laying down the
particulars of authorities competent to institute proceedings. As per the
scheme of the 2016 Rules and in terms of Rule 16(1) thereof,
notwithstanding that the Disciplinary Authority could be subordinate to an
Appointing Authority in a given case, any authority empowered by general
or special order of the Government could have instituted disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent. In any event, assuming that Rule
17(3) was applicable, the Chief Minister himself having approved initiation
of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, question of absence of
approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister separately was a non-
issue.
30. Reverting to Rule 55 of the 1930 Rules, it is observed that the same
did not specify any particular authority to be under an obligation to issue
the charge-sheet against a civil servant. In such view of the matter and
having regard to the law settled by this Court, it is axiomatic that any

24
2(ka) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the rules of a particular cadre,
‘Disciplinary Authority’ means Appointing Authority or any other Authority authorised by
it who shall be competent under these Rules to impose on a Government Servant any of
the penalties specified in rule 14 of these Rules.
Page 17 of 26




officer holding a rank subordinate to the respondent’s appointing
authority but superior in rank than the respondent could have issued the
charge-sheet. Admittedly, the facts do reveal initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent having the approval of the Chief
st
Minister dated 21 March, 2014. The draft charge-sheet was part of the
th
proposal dated 13 January, 2014. Once the draft charge-sheet was on
record before the Chief Minister, approval of the proposal to initiate
disciplinary proceedings should have been read as including the Chief
Minister’s assent not only to the draft charge-sheet, as drawn up, but also
to the other proposals to suspend the respondent as well as appointment
of an inquiry officer and presenting officer. In such circumstances,
reference by the Division Bench to Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules appears
to be wholly misplaced since the charge-sheet was not issued under such
sub-Rule.
31. In a parliamentary democracy like India where the Constitution
permits each of the Governments – Central as well as the States – to
have their own Rules of Business framed, it was incumbent for the
respondent to prove to the satisfaction of the High Court with reference to
the rules prevalent in the State of Jharkhand that the procedure
prescribed thereunder for the file to be placed before the Chief Minister
was observed in the breach. Also, by referring to any other relevant law,
it ought to have been shown that the draft charge-sheet should not have
been prepared prior to the date of approval of the proposal to initiate
disciplinary proceedings and also that, such preparation should not have
Page 18 of 26




been left to be undertaken by the departmental officers; instead, the
charge-sheet should have been drafted after the proposal were approved
and that the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings
should have himself proceeded to draft and issue the same. No law in this
behalf has been shown to have been breached. Therefore, no issue could
have legitimately been urged in relation to the departmental officers
entrusted with the work of preparing papers for seeking approval to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against an officer prima facie found to be
delinquent and in drafting the charge-sheet to be issued to him as part of
the requisite groundwork for the Chief Minister to signify his approval to
such proposal.
32. We, thus, find an erroneous approach having been adopted by the
High Court while dealing with the writ petition as well as the intra-court
appeal rendering its decision liable to interdiction in appeal.
HAT IS THE REQUIREMENT OF RTICLE OF THE ONSTITUTION AND WHO SHOULD
W A 311 C
‘ DRAW UP ’ OR ‘ CAUSE TO DRAW UP ’ THE CHARGE - SHEET ?
33. The final reason for interdicting the impugned order stems from
non-consideration of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India in its
correct perspective by the Division Bench. If one looks at Article 311(1),
the sole safeguard that it provides to any member, inter alia, of a civil
service of a State or the holder of a civil post under the State is that he
shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed (emphasis supplied). Clause (1) does not on its
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own terms require that the disciplinary proceedings should also be
initiated by the appointing authority. This is what Shardul Singh (supra)
and P.V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) have articulated, with which we
wholeheartedly agree.
34. The Division Bench noticed that Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules were
pari materia Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules and, therefore, what was held
in paragraph ‘41’ of the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra) would clearly
be applicable to resolve the controversy at hand. In B.V. Gopinath
(supra), certain office memoranda were under consideration apart from
Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules. Submissions advanced on behalf of the
charged officers, recorded in paragraphs ‘20’ and ‘21’, would reveal that
the Court was addressed with regard to the fact situation where approval
to initiate disciplinary proceedings had been obtained but subsequent
thereto, the charge-sheet that was drawn up had not been approved by
the Finance Minister. This is where the Division Bench again committed a
clear error in failing to appreciate the facts, which bear vital importance.
As noted above, in the present case, the draft charge-sheet was there on
record when the Chief Minister accorded his approval and there appears
to be no valid reason as to why approval of the proposal to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent would not be regarded as
grant of approval to the draft charge-sheet too. We are unhesitatingly of
the view that according approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings
against the respondent, in this case, did amount to approval of the draft
charge-sheet.
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35. It has been observed by this Court in several decisions that each
decision is an authority for what it decides and not what could logically be
deduced therefrom. Mechanical reliance on precedents, as if they are
statutes, has been deprecated. Whenever a precedent is cited laying
down a principle of law having application to the facts of the case in hand
and having binding effect, it is customary and expected of courts to be
bound by the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution. However, the courts are free not to place blind reliance on
whatever precedent is cited by the parties since facts of two cases are not
seldom alike. It is the duty of the court, if it considers the precedent not
to be applicable, to refer to factual dissimilarities that are found and
thereafter to distinguish the precedent cited before it by assigning brief
but cogent reasons. It is always well to remember in this context the
dictum of this Court in Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India
25
v. Pawan Kumar Dubey :
“ 7. ... It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and
circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some
conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One
additional or different fact can make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in
each case to similar facts”.

36. Since invocation of the provisions in Discipline and Appeal Rules
similar to Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules or Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules
and citing failure to adhere to the same to invalidate orders terminating
services of officers/employees is not too infrequent, we consider it proper

25
(1976) 3 SCC 334
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to briefly touch upon the requirement thereof. The Disciplinary Authority
is mandated by the law to ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to be drawn up’ the
substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior as a definite
and distinct article of charge together with the statement of such
imputations. The phrases ‘draw up’ and ‘cause to be drawn up’ do have
different meanings in the context of disciplinary proceedings, though both
relate to drawing up of a charge-sheet. By ‘draw up’, what is express is
that the Disciplinary Authority itself is responsible for preparing the
substance of imputation and the statement of allegations in support
thereof, whereas ‘cause to be drawn up’ would enable the Disciplinary
Authority to instruct or direct someone else to prepare the substance and
statement. The effect of it is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may not
prepare the document but rather delegate the task to someone else. If
the delegation is proved to have been made in favour of an authority
holding an office superior to that of the officer/employee proposed to be
proceeded against, nothing much is required to be done and the courts
ought to exercise restraint.
37. Lest confusion continues to prevail, thereby obfuscating the course
of justice, we also consider it expedient to clarify as regards the efficacy
of the decisions in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra)
as binding precedents. Both these decisions by coordinate Benches of two
Hon’ble Judges of this Court. All other decisions on the topic are also by
Benches of coordinate strength. Before the Bench in B.V. Gopinath
(supra), out of the 6 (six) decisions referred to by us in paragraphs 21 to
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25 (supra), only the decision in Thavasippan (supra) was placed by
counsel wherein one would find reference to the earlier decision in P. V.
Srinivasa Sastry (supra). Though Thavasippan ( supra) had considered
all the earlier decisions, it was not even distinguished in B.V. Gopinath
(supra). Importantly, the Bench after noting the law laid down in P. V.
Srinivasa Sastry (supra), extracted two sentences from paragraph ‘4’,
quoted above, to support the conclusion which the Bench intended to
record. Having read what P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) in paragraph ‘4’
laid down and our agreement therewith, we see good reason to opine that
there could be a healthy debate on the correctness of the ratio decidendi
of the decision in B. V. Gopinath (supra), or for that matter, Promod
Kumar (supra), in the light of the precedents which were binding on the
Benches deciding the same. However, for the purpose of deciding this
appeal, we need not venture that far to declare the decisions in B. V.
Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra) as not laying down good
law or that its efficacy as binding precedents stands eroded for not
considering the law declared in Shardul Singh (supra) on Article 311(1)
of the Constitution, as well as the other decisions that we have referred to
above, speaking in a different voice. Nonetheless, we are of the
undoubted view that whatever be the ratio decidendi of B. V. Gopinath
(supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), for its application in future cases,
the same have to be read and understood as confined to interpretation of
the rules governing the disciplinary proceedings in each of the two cases,
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the facts and law presented before the coordinate Benches, and the
exposition of law by this Court for over half a century till this date.
38. Turning focus once again to the factual narrative, it is worthy of
being noted that it was the Cabinet which approved the proposal to
dismiss the respondent. Respondent’s service having been terminated
based on such approval, the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench
should have been loath to hold the dismissal illegal on acceptance of the
specious plea raised by the respondent by its misplaced reliance on B.V.
Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra).
39. Viewed from whichever angle, we are unable to support the finding
returned by the Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench, that
the charge-sheet did not have the approval of the competent authority
though both the Benches indubitably agreed that the proposal to initiate
disciplinary proceedings did have such approval. We repeat, the entire
proposal of initiating disciplinary proceedings inclusive of the draft
charge-sheet, to suspend the respondent pending such proceedings and
the names of the officers who would conduct the inquiry and present the
case of the department in such inquiry having been approved by the Chief
Minister, the Single Judge seems to have occasioned a grave miscarriage
of justice in interfering with the order of dismissal on the wholly untenable
ground of lack of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister; and
the Division Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed to
the failure of justice.
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40. For the foregoing reasons, there can be and is little hesitation for us
to hold that the impugned order of the Division Bench upholding the
judgment and order of the Single Judge of allowing the writ petition as
well as the latter is fundamentally incorrect and patently illegal. The
judgments of the High Court under challenge, thus, cannot be sustained
in law, with the result that the writ petition of the respondent must be
and has to be dismissed.
41. Realizing the difficulty in having the impugned order sustained, as a
last-ditch effort, Dr. Singhvi contended that the respondent has been out
of service for nearly 8 (eight) years, which is sufficient punishment for
him, and that the direction of the High Court ordering his reinstatement
need not be disturbed upon recording that the respondent would not
claim any arrears of salary.
42. We are not impressed, to say the least. Prima facie , at this stage,
we see no reason to hold the order of dismissal to have been vitiated on
any count. Directing the respondent’s reinstatement despite finding no
error in the proceedings drawn up against him would render such valid
dismissal order ineffective and inoperative.
R ELIEF
43. The impugned order of the Division Bench as well as the judgment
and order of the Single Judge are set aside, resulting in the respondent’s
writ petition on the file of the High Court being dismissed.
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44. However, considering the fact that the charge-sheet was interdicted
by the High Court, at both tiers, on the ground of jurisdictional error and
the respondent might not have pursued the appellate/revisional remedy
provided under the 1930 Rules/2016 Rules labouring under a
misconception that he was forced to face proceedings and answer a
charge-sheet which did not have the approval of the competent authority,
we grant him liberty to appeal against the impugned order of dismissal or
to seek a revision thereof by filing an appeal/memorial, whichever is
permissible under the relevant Rules, within a period of one month from
the date of pronouncement of this judgment. If an appeal/revision is
presented by the respondent before the competent appellate/revisional
authority within such period, the same shall be decided on merits and in
accordance with law, as early as possible, waiving the bar of limitation. All
points except the point of validity of the charge-sheet, decided by us, are
kept open.
C ONCLUSION
45. The appeal, accordingly, stands allowed. Parties shall, however,
bear their own costs.

…………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)


…………………………J.
(MANMOHAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 28, 2025.
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