Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S. VENKITACHALAM IYER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S. RAMA IYER
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1991
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
KULDIP SINGH (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 243 1991 SCR Supl. (1) 21
1992 SCC Supl. (2) 133 1991 SCALE (2)623
ACT:
Tamil Nadu Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921: Sections 9 and
10--Tenant--Eviction of--Decree passed--Compensation for
superstructure built by tenants predecessor-in-interest and
purchased by tenant--Execution proceedings pending--Right of
tenant to require the landlord to sell the land for benefi-
cial enjoyment of the superstructure--Whether affected.
HEADNOTE:
The lands in question owned by a Trust, of which the
appellant was the Managing Trustee, were leased to respond-
ent. On his failure to pay rent the Trust filed a suit for
his ejectment. The District Munsiff passed the decree on
condition that the appellant would pay the respondent, costs
of the building or superstructure, which had been built by
the respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, and which the
respondent had purchased from him. The litigation went upto
High Court, which ultimately upheld the decree. During the
pendency of second appeal, the respondent filed before the
District Munsiff an application under Section 9 of the Tamil
Nadu Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 as amended by Act XIX of
1955 and Tamil Nadu Adaptation of Laws Order, 1969. The
provisions of the said Act were extended to the town in
which the lands were situated. In the said application he
prayed for the issue of a direction to the appellant to sell
to the respondent the said property, the land adjoining the
building, as it was necessary for the beneficial enjoyment
of the building. The application was rejected on the ground
that such a prayer had been rejected earlier. The respond-
ent’s first appeal was allowed by the Subordinate Judge. The
respondent had not surrendered the possession of the proper-
ty despite the deposit of the compensation amount by the
appellant and the execution proceedings had remained stayed.
Hence the appellant filed an appeal in .the High Court
which, however, held that the respondent was entitled to
file the application under Section 9 of the Act during the
pendency of the execution proceedings, and the right of the
respondent had not been affected by the deposit of the
compensation amount.
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appel-
lant Managing Trustee, it was contended that the respondent
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was not entitled to exercise his right to purchase the land
immediately adjoining the superstructure as might be re-
quired for the beneficial enjoyment of the said structure as
the
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said structure had not been put up by him, and ’that al-
though the respondent might have been in possession at the
relevant time, he had lost the possession thereafter and
hence he had lost his right under Section 9.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 Under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Tenants’
Protection Act, 1921, any tenant, as defined in Section
2(4)(ii)(a), who is entitled to compensation under Section
3, and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted
or proceedings under Section 41 of the Presidency Small
Causes Court Act, 1882, taken by the landlord may, within
one month from the date of the Madras City Tenants’ Protec-
tion (Amendment) Act, 1955, coming into force, or the date
with effect from which this Act is extended to the municipal
town or village in which the land is situated, or within one
month after the service on him of summons, apply to the
Court for an order that the landlord be directed to sell for
a price to be fixed by the court, the whole or part of the
extent of land specified in the application. Section 10 of
the Act makes the provisions under Section 9 applicable to
cases where decree for ejectment has not been executed
before the date from which the provisions of the Act are
extended to the area in question. [25 C-E]
1.2 In the instant case, although the decree for eject-
ment was passed against the respondent, as he had continued
to remain in possession of the property and the decree had
remained unexecuted till the date on which the provisions of
the said Act had been extended to the area in question, the
right of the respondent under Section 9 was not lost. [25 F]
1.3 As regards the superstructure, it was put up by the
predecessor in interest from whom the respondent had pur-
chased. Thus, the High Court was entitled to take the view
that it was put up by a predecessor-in-interest of the re-
spondent. [25 G]
1.4 In these circumstances, the respondent was certainly
a tenant, within the meaning of Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the
Act, which takes within its ambit a tenant whose tenancy has
been determined but continues to remain in possession,
entitled to compensation under Section 3 of the Act and was,
therefore, entitled to make an application under Section 9
of the Act. [25 H, 25 B]
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2. The plea that although the respondent might have been
in possession at the relevant time, but since he lost it
thereafter, he lost his right under Section 9 cannot be
allowed to be raised in this Court since this has not been
pleaded in or considered in any of the courts below. [26 A-
B]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1317 of
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.1983 of the
Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 2797 OF 1979.
T.S. Krishnamurthy lyer, P.N. Ramalingam and A.T.M.
Sampath for the Appellant.
S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad, R. Raghavan and Vijay Kumar
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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KANIA, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the
decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court
in Civil Revision Petition No. 2792 of 1979 filed in that
Court. We propose to set out only the few facts necessary
for the disposal of the appeal.
The appellant is the managing trustee of a trust. The
said trust owned two properties comprising 60 cents and 29
cents of land at Nagercoil in Tamil Nadu. The said lands
were leased by the appellant to one Padakalingam in 1930 who
in turn assigned the lease in favour of one Ramaswamy Mudal-
iar in 1931. Swami Mudaliar secured a further assignment of
the said lease from the said Ramaswamy Mudaliar. Swami
Mudaliar put up a building on the said land and the respond-
ent herein purchased the building from him in 1943 for a sum
of Rs. 4,475. In 1944 the trust had leased out the said
property in favour of the respondent for six years. The
terms of the lease are not relevant for the purposes of
resolving the controversy raised before us. As the respond-
ent failed to pay the rent to the Trust, the Trust fried a
suit for ejectment against the respondent which suit was
later transferred to the District Munsifs Court, Nagercoil.
The said suit was decreed by the learned District Munsif.
The decree for eviction was passed by the learned District
Munsif on condition that the appellant will pay to the
respondent the costs of the building- or the superstructure.
This litigation was carried upto the High Court in Second
Appeal. The decree of the trial Court for eviction was
upheld by the High
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Court. During the Pendency of the second appeal an applica-
tion was filed by the respondent under Section 9 of the
Tamil Nadu Tenants Protection Act, 1921, as amended by Act
XIX of 1955 and Tamil Nadu Adaptation of Laws Order, 1969
(hereinafter referred to as" the said Act"). The provisions
of the said Act were extended to Nagercoil town in respect
of non- residential buildings by a government order which
was published in the Gazette on June 29, 1975. In the said
application under Section 9 of the said Act the respondent
claimed that the appellant should be directed to sell out of
the said property, the land adjoining the said building and
necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the building on
such terms and conditions as might be fixed by the Court.
This application was resisted by the appellant. The District
Munsif’s Court, Nagercoil, dismissed the said application of
the respondent on the ground that a previous application
with the said prayer had been dismissed and hence, a fresh
application for the same relief was barred. The respondent
preferred an appeal to the SubCourt at Nagercoil which was
allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge. The High Court
took the view that the decree in favour of the appellant was
simple decree of ejectment and did not take away the right
of the respondent to the building or superstructure. It
further took the view that the deposit of the amount of
costs of the superstructure by the appellant did not affect
the right of the respondent. The respondent had not surren-
dered the possession of the property despite the deposit of
amount of compensation by the appellant and the appellant
had been compelled to resort to the court. The execution
proceedings were stopped. The High Court held that in these
circumstances, the respondent was entitled to make an appli-
cation under Section 9 of the said Act during the pendency
of the execution proceedings. The High Court also dismissed
the review petition preferred by the appellant.
Only two submissions were made before us by Mr. Krishna-
murthy Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant. The first
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was that the respondent was not entitled to exercise his
right to purchase the land immediately adjoining the super-
structure as might be required for the beneficial enjoyment
of the said structure as the said structure had not been put
up by him.
As we have already pointed out earlier, the said super-
structure was purchased by the respondent from Swami Mudali-
ar who had put up the said structure and was an assignee of
the lease. The respondent himself obtained a lease of the
land subsequently. We now come to the relevant provisions of
the said Act. We propose to set out the effect of the rele-
vant sections so far as it is necessary for the purposes of
this case. Under clause
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(ii) (a) of sub-section (4) of section 2, a person referred
to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession after the
determination of his tenancy agreement is included in the
term ’tenant’. The inclusive definition of the term ’tenant’
under Section 2(4)(ii)(a) takes within its ambit a tenant
whose tenancy has been determined but continues to remain in
possession. Section 3 of the said Act provides that every
tenant as defined under the said Act shall, on ejectment, be
entitled to be paid as compensation the value of any build-
ing which may have been erected by him or by any of his.
predecessors-in-interest, or by any person not in occupation
at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either
of them, and for which compensation has not already been
paid. Again, very briefly stated, Section 9 prescribes that
any tenant who is entitled to compensation under Section 3
and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted or
proceedings under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes
Court Act, 1882, taken by the landlord may, within one month
from the date of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amend-
ment) Act, 1955, coming into force, or the date with effect
from which this Act is extended to the municipal town or
village in which the land is-situated, or within one month
after the service on him of summons, apply to the Court for
an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell for a
price to be fixed by the court, the whole or part of the
extent of land specified in the application, as set out in
the said section. It may be mentioned that the land which
the tenant is entitled to require to be sold to him is the
minimum land required for the beneficial enjoyment of the
building. Section 10 of the said Act makes the provisions
under Section 9 applicable to cases where decree for eject-
ment has not been executed before the date from which the
provisions of the Act are extended to the area in question.
Thus, although the decree for ejectment was passed against
the respondent, as he had continued to remain in possession
of the property and the decree had remained unexecuted till
the date on which the provisions of the said Act had been
extended to the area in question, the right of the respond-
ent under Section 9 was not lost.
As far as the superstructure is concerned, the said
superstructure was put up by Swamy Mudaliar from whom the
respondent had purchased it as pointed out earlier. Thus, as
far as the building or superstructure is concerned, the High
Court was/entitled to take the view that it was put up by a
predecessor in interest of the respondent. In these circum-
stances, the respondent was certainly a tenant entitled to
compensation under Section 3 of the said Act and was enti-
tled to make an application under Section 9 of the said Act.
The submissions of Mr. Krishnamurthy lyer to the contrary
cannot be accepted.
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It was next submitted by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that,
as averred in the special leave petition, although the
respondent might have been in possession at the relevant
time yet he has lost possession thereafter and hence, he had
lost his right under Section 9. This fact has not been
pleaded in or considered in any of the courts below and
hence, we decline to permit Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer to raise
this contention before us.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There
will be no order as to costs. The application of the re-
spondent under Section 9 will be disposed of on merits and
according to law. The amount of compensation which will have
to be paid by the respondent to the appellant will be deter-
mined as provided under the said Act.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
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