Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11
PETITIONER:
NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1972
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1579 1973 SCR (1) 40
1972 SCC (2) 1
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1991 SC1289 (16)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Scope of-
’Workman’, if includes one whose services have been
terminated.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, an employee of the appellant was suspended
and ’the suspension remained in force till the date of his
dismissal. He applied to the Labour Court under s. 33C(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for computation of the
benefits and amounts he was entitled to receive during the
period of suspension, and the Labour Court decided in his
favour.
On the question whether the section can be invoked by a
dismissed workman in respect of, benefits and salary due to
him for the period prior to the date of dismissal,
HELD: The sub-section provides that where any workman is
entitled to receive from the employer any money or any
benefit which is capable of being- computed in terms of
money and if any question arises as to the amount due, then
the question may be decided by the appropriate ’Labour
Court. The definition of ’workman’ in s. 2(s) of the Act
includes within its fold, only for the purpose of a
proceeding under the Act in relation to an industrial
dispute, persons who have been dismissed, ,discharged or
retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that
dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has
led to that dispute. The definition specifically excludes
from its purview four categories of persons employed in an
industry, who would have otherwise been within the periphery
of the definition. But, because the definition includes
only specified types of dismissed, discharged or retrenched
workmen for limited purposes and expressly excludes certain
categories of persons, it cannot, on that account, be
contended that the definition is precise and exact and
cannot be extended to other dismissed, discharged or
retrenched workmen, whose claim requiring computation is in
respect of an existing right arising out of his relationship
as an industrial workman of his employer. [50B-E, 51A-C]
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11
The definition section begins with the clause, ’unless there
is anything repugnant in the subject or context.’ The
context and the subject matter are accordingly important
factors, because, all parts of the Act have to be in harmony
with the statutory intent. The object of enacting the
section was to enable individual workmen to implement,
enforce or execute their existing individual rights against
their employers without being compelled to have recourse to
s. 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is
obviously a lengthy process. It clothes the Labour Court
with powers similar to those of an executing court so that
the concerned workman gets speedy relief. It therefore
calls for a broad and beneficial construction, consistent
with the other provisions of the Act, which should serve to
advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. The
mischief which the section was designed to suppress was the
difficulty faced by individual workmen in getting relief in
respect of their existing
41
rights without, having, resort to s. 10 of the Act.
Therefore, the term workman’ as used in the sub-section must
include all persons whose claim, requiring compuation under
the sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising
from his relationship as an industrial workman with his
employer. Otherwise, it would always be open to an unfair,
unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the
services of his employee in order to deprive him of the
benefit conferred by the section and compel him to have
resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under s.
10, thereby defeating the very purpose and object of
enacting the provision. [5lE-A, 52-A-E]
Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v.Rameshwar &
Ors. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140, U.P. Electric Supply Co. v. R.
K. Shukla, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 237, R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand
Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1972
S.C. 451 and Bennet Coleman & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya
Das Gupta, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 131, referred to.
Central Bank of Indict v. P. S. Rajagopalan, [1964] 3 S.C.R.
140 and Kesoram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar, [1964] 2 S.C.R.
809, disting
Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court,
Madurai, [1961] 1 L. L. J. 729, Manicka Mudaliar (M) v.
Labour Court, Madras, [1961] I L. L. J. 592, Bachittar Singh
v. Central Labour Court, Jullunder, A.I.R. 1969 Punjab 187,
Management of Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bangalore, A.I.R. 1970 Mys.
225 and U.P. Electric Supply Co. Lod. v. Assistant Labour
commissioner, Allahabad, approved.
This judgment should not be considered as an expression of
opinion on the interpretation of ss. 20 read with s. 2(1) of
the Minimum Wages Act. 1948.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
February 18, 1970 of the Labour Court, Delhi in L.C.A. No.
709 of 1968.
O. P. Malhotra, N. S. Das Bahl, P. S. Mahindru and Sat
Pal, for the appellant.
L. D. A dlakha, Promod Swarup and S. S. Khanduja, for
respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J. Facts necessary for understanding the short but im-
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11
portant point arising for decision in this appeal by special
leave are these :
The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956 with its registered office in New Delhi. Its
entire share capital has been subscribed by the Central
Government. Pritam Singh Gill, respondent no. 1, in this
appeal was employed by the
1208Sup CI/72
42
appellant as Junior Engineer at its Bhopal office with
effect from the 9th November, 1962 at Rs. 280/- p.m. as
basic salary with other allowances. On October 5, 1964 he
was suspended and this order, of suspension remained in
force till September 18, 1967. He was dismissed from
service on September 19, 1967. During the period of
suspension, on October 7, 1965, the respondent was trans-
ferred to Delhi. On June 15, 1968 the respondent applied to
the Labour Court at Delhi under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for
computing the benefits and amount he was entitled to receive
alleging that the appellant had not paid to him such amounts
and benefits. The appellant contested the respondent’s
claim on various grounds. The, Labour Court framed the
following four issues :
1. Whether the application is not legally maintainable ?
2. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to entertain
this petition ?
3. Whether the petitioner has been dismissed with effect
from 19-9-1967, if so its effect ?
4. Whether the applicant is entitled to. any of the
benefits claimed ?"
and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was
held entitled to Rs. 5,195/- as balance of salary at the
rate of Rs. 1501p.m. for the period of suspension and also
other allowances, the total amount computed being Rs.
10,259.98.
Before us the appellant only questioned the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court to entertain the respondent’s application
under s. 33C(2) of the Act because, according to the
submission, the respondent, having already been dismissed,
had ceased to be a workman on the date of the application.
After his dismissal, argued Shri Malhotra learned counsel
for the appellant, the respondent ceased to be a workman
and had, therefore, no locus standi to approach the Labour
Court under s. 33C(2) and the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s application. The
date of the application under s. 33C(2) of the Act,
contended the counsel, is the crucial point of time, when-it
is to be seen whether or not the applicant is a workman.
The respondent on the other hand emphasised that if the
period, in respect of which the benefits and amount are
claimed under S. 33C(2) of the Act, was during the course of
his employment prior to his dismissal, then, the mere fact,
that he was dismissed by his employer before he could apply
to the Labour Court under s. 33C(2), would not deprive him
of his right to claim relief under that section. The sole
question we are thus called upon to decide is, whether s.
33C(2) can be invoked by a dismissed workman in respect of
benefits and salary due, to
43
him for the period prior to the date of his dismissal. It
may be stated that the appellant did not contend that a
workman under suspension is disentitled to seek relief under
s. 33C(2) and indeed, it was specifically conceded that a
suspended workman could invoke this section for relief
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11
because by suspension he does not cease to be a workman as
defined in the Act. The question posed is a pure question
of law depending on the construction of the relevant
statutory provisions.
The Act was brought on the statute book for making provision
for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes
and for certain other purposes. Section 2(s) defines
"workman’ to mean ,,any person (including in apprentice)
employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled
manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or
reward, whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this
Act in relation to an industrial dispute, include-; any such
person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or
whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that
dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force
Act, 1950 or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police, service or as an officer
or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or ad-
ministrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws
wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or
by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature."
It is noteworthy that s. 2 by its opening words expressly
includes the operation of this section in case of repugnancy
in the subject or context.- Section 33C provides for
recovery of money due from ail employer and sub-s. (2) of
this section reads as under:---
"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive
from the employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of
money and if any question arises as to the
amount of money due or as to the amount at
which such benefit should be computed, then
the question may, subject to any rules that
may be made under this Act, be decided by such
Labour Court as may be specified in this
behalf by the appropriate Government."
44
According to the appellants submission, under S. 33C(2) the
applicant cannot claim that his dismissal is unlawful and
that he should, therefore, be deemed to be in service and on
that basis entitled to receive salary or wages under the
pre-existing contract. Now, if challenge to his dismissal
is not open under this provision of law then the respondent
must be considered to be a dismissed workman, and..
therefore, outside the purview of "workman" as defined in
s.2(s). A dismissed workman, the argument proceeded, is to
be considered as a workman under this provision only for the
purposes of that proceeding under the Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, which has either arisen out of, or
resulted in or is connected with, his dismissal. In support
of this submission he relied on the Central Bank of India v.
P. S. Rajagopalan(1). At p. 156 of the report it was
observed there that
"If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it
is his case that the dismissal or demotion is
wrongful, it would not be open to him to make
a claim for the recovery of his salary or
wages under s. 33C(2). His demotion or
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11
dismissal may give rise to an industrial
dispute which may be appropriately tried, but
once it is shown that the employer has
dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the
dismissal or demotion is unlawful and,
therefore, the employee continues to be the
workman of the employer and is entitled to the
benefits due to him under a pre-existing
contract, cannot be made under s. 33C(2)"
Reference was also made on behalf of the appellants to
Messrs Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & ors. (2)
where it is observed at p. 823 :
"Ordinarily, the law is that a workman may be
suspended pending enquiry and disciplinary
action. If after the enquiry the misconduct
is proved the workman is dismissed and is not
entitled to any wages for the suspension
period; but if the inquiry results in the
reinstatement of the workman he is entitled to
full wages for the suspension period also
along with reinstatement unless the employer
instead of dismissing the employee can give
him a lesser punishment by way of withholding
of part of the wages for the suspension
period."
These observations were made in an entirely different
context and have nothing to do with the narrow point on
which alone the appellant based his challenge to the
judgment impugned in this appeal. The case cited has not
the remotest connection with s. 33C of the Act. The
decision in the Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140.
(2) [1694] 2 S.C.R. 809.
45
(supra) also in our opinion, does not assist us in deciding
the question requiring determination because the respondent
before us claims relief with respect to the period of
suspension prior to his dismissal and the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court is not questioned by the appellant on the
ground that the only relief available to the respondent is
to raise an industrial dispute with regard to his dismissal.
The respondent in the present case is not seeking relief
against his dismissal as indeed consistently with the order
of dismissal his claim is confined to the benefits and
amount which. he was entitled to receive for the period
prior to his dismissal. However, the decision in Central
Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (supra) does trace the
legislative history of Chapter VA and s. 33C of the Act and
after doing, so. the Court observed
"In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable
construction of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if
a workman’s right to receive the benefit is
dispute, that may have to be determined by the
Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute
the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court
inevitably has to deal with the question as to
whether the workman has a, right to receive
that benefit. If the said right is not
disputed, nothing more needs to be done and
the Labour Court can proceed to compute the
value of the benefit in terms of money; but if
the said right is disputed, the Labour Court
must deal with that question and decide
whether the workman has the right to receive
the benefit as alleged by him and it is only
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11
if the Labour Court answers this point in
favour of the workman that the next question
of making necessary computation can arise."
And again,
"Besides, it seems to us that if the
appellant’s construction is accepted, it would
necessarily mean that it would be at the
option of the employer to allow the work-man
to avail himself of the remedy provided by
sub-s.(2) because he has merely to raise an
objection on the ground that the right claimed
by the workman is not admitted to oust the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain
the workman’s application. The claim
unders.33C(2)clearly postulates that the
determination of the question about computing
the benefit in terms of money may, in some
cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into
the existence of the right and such an enquiry
must be held to be incidental to the main
determination which has been assigned to the
Labour Court by sub-s. (2)."
Section 33C of the Act has been the subject matter of
several judicial pronouncements. This Court has also dealt
with this section in several decisions. In Chief Mining
Engineer, East India
46
Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar & ors. (1) this Court deduced from
three of its earlier decisions the following propositions:--
"(1) The legislative history indicates that
the legislature, after providing broadly for
the investigation and settlement of disputes
on the basis of collective bargaining,
recognised the need of individual workmen of a
speedy remedy to enforce their existing
individual rights and therefore inserted s.
33A in 1950 and s. 33C in 1956. These two
sections illustrate cases in which individual
workmen can enforce their rights without
having to take recourse to s. 10(1) and
without having to depend on their union to
espouse their case.
(2) In view of this history two
considerations are relevant while construing
the scope of s. 33C. Where industrial
disputes arise between workmen acting collec-
tively and their employers such disputes must
be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed
by the Act, as for instance under s. 10(1).
But having regard to the legislative policy to
provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen
for enforcing their existing rights, it would
not be reasonable to exclude their existing
rights sought to be implemented by individual
workmen. Therefore though in determining the
scope of s. 33C care should be taken not to
exclude cases which legitimately fall within
its purview, cases which fall, for instance,
under s. 10(1), cannot be brought under s.
33C;
(3) Section 33C which is in terms similar to
those in s. 20 of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) ,Act, 1950 is a provision
in the nature of an executing provision;
(4) Section 33C(1) applies to cases where
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11
money is due to a workman under an award or
settlement or under Chapter VA of the Act
already calculated and ascertained and
therefore there is no dispute about its
computation. But sub-section 2 applies both
to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits.
In the case of monetary benefit it applies
where such benefit though due is not
calculated and there is a dispute about its
calculation;
(5) Section 33C(2) takes within its purview
cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to
which they ire entitled should be computed in
terms of money even though the right to the
benefit on which their claim is
(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140.
47
based is disputed by their employers. It is,
open to the Labour Court to interpret the
award or settlement on which the workmen’s
rights rests.
(6) The fact that the words of limitation
used in s. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 are omitted in
s. 33C(2) shows that the scope of s. 33C(2) is
wider than that of s. 33C(1). Therefore,
whereas sub-section I is confined to claims
arising under
an award or settlement or Chapter VA, claims
which can be entertained under subsection 2
are not so confined to those under an award,
settlement or Chapter VA.
(7) Though the court did not indicate which
cases other than those under sub-section 1
would fall under sub-section 2 it pointed out
illustrative cases which would not fall under
sub-section 2 viz. cases which would
appropriately be adjudicated under S. 10(1) or
claims which have already been the subject-
matter of settlement to which ss. 18 and 19
would apply.
(8) Since proceedings under s. 33C(2) are
analogous to execution proceedings and the
Labour Court called upon to compute in terms
of money the benefit claimed by a workman is
in such cases in the position of an executing
court, the Labour Court like, the executing
court in execution proceedings _governed by
the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent
under s. 33C(2) to interpret the award or
settlement where the benefit is claimed under
such award or settlement and it would be open
to it to consider the plea of nullity where
the award is made without jurisdiction.
In U.P. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla(1) this Court
approvingly referred to a passage from the judgment in Chief
Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. (supra), already
reproduced by us, in which, inter alia, it was emphasised
that Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain a claim in
respect of an existing right arising from the relationship
of an industrial workman and his employer. Again in R. B.
Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. The Labour Court,
Nagpur(2) this Court, after a review of its previous
decisions, upheld the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to
entertain application for lay-off compensation wider s. 33C
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11
observing that such jurisdiction could not be ousted by a
mere plea denying the workman’s claim to computation of the
benefit in terms of money, adding that the Labour Court had
to go into the question and determine whether on the facts
it had jurisdiction to make the computation.
(1) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 237. (2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451.
48
We now turn to some decisions of the High Courts which
directly deal with this point. In Tiruchi-Srirangam
Transport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai(1)
Ramachandra Ayyar J., repelled a similar contention as was
raised before us by Shri Malhotra on behalf of the
appellant. In the case. cited one Iswaran was employed as a
traffic supervisor in Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P)
Ltd. His services were terminated in December, 1956 under a
scheme of retrenchment. Later, disputes were raised between
the management and other workers regarding bonus for the
years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and a settlement was reached in
April, 1958 pursuant to which the management declared
additional bonus and one month’s wage for each of the two
years. Iswaran having not been paid anything by way of
bonus though he had worked during those two years applied to
the Labour Court for necessary relief under s. 33C(2) of the
Act. The Labour Court having granted the relief claimed.
the management approached the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution questioning the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court to entertain Iswaran’s claim. The High Court repelled
this challenge though on an other point relating to the
claimant’s right to benefit under the settlement, the case
was remitted back to the Labour Court for a fresh decision.
It was observed in that decision that while enacting s.
33C(2), the Legislature did not intend merely to provide a
remedy for the limited class of persons who are in actual
employment on the date of the application under that
section. The words "any workman" in s. 33C(2), according to
that decision, would mean a workman who would be entitled to
benefits conferred under the Act and would necessarily
include a discharged workman as well. In Manicka Mudaliar
(M) v. Labour Court, Madras(1) a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court, while hearing a writ appeal, from the
decision of a learned single Judge of that Court also upheld
the competency of a petition under s. 33C(2) of the Act for
arrears of salary and one month’s salary in lieu of notice,
although at the time of the application the applicant was no
longer in service of the employer. Following these Madras
decisions a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Bachittar Singh v. Central Labour Court,
Jullundur(3), a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in
The Management of Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court Bangalore(4) and the
Allahabad High Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v.
Assistant Labour Commissioner, Allahabad(5) took the same
view. In the Allahabad case, however, the provision which
directly came up for construction was s. 6H of the U.P.
Industrial
(1) [1961] 1 L.L.J. 729.
(3) A.I.R. 1969 Punjab 187.
(5) [1966] It I.L.J. 715.
(2) [1961] 1 L.L.J. 592.
(4) A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 225.
49
Disputes Act, the language of which was considered to be
identical with that of s. 33C of the Act. Incidentally it
may be pointed out that s. 6H of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act has been held to be identical with s. 33C of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11
the Act even by this Court.
Shri Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, contended
that all these decisions require reconsideration because
they ignore a vital point in construing s. 2(s) which
defines "workman". This definition has already been
reproduced. According to the appellant’s submission these
decisions have ignored the vital point that the definition
of "workman" specifically includes within its fold, only for
the purpose of a proceeding under the Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, persons who have, been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a
consequence of that, dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge
or retrenchment has led to that dispute. Since certain
categories of persons are also expressly stated not to be
included in this definition the Legislature must, according
to the argument, be considered to have intended to define
this word with exactitude and precision and its scope,
therefore, cannot be extended to the dismissed, discharged
or retrenched persons except strictly for the purposes of
the proceedings expressly mentioned in the inclusive clause.
The fact that the definition also specifically excludes from
its purview four categories of persons employed in an
industry who would have otherwise been within the periphery
of the definition shows that the legislature intended to be
meticulously precise leaving no scope for any intendment
extending the literal meaning of the language used to
dismissed employees for purposes of other proceedings not
specified in s. 33C(2) of the Act. The definition. said
Shri Malhotra, is exhaustive renderings, its extension
impermissible. The counsel also commented on the recent
decision of this Court in R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills
Co. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur (supra). According to
Shri Malhotra this decision does not touch the question
whether a dismissed employee can be considered as a workman
for the purpose of approaching the Labour Court under s.
33C(2) of the Act and he emphasised that this case should be
considered to be confined to its own facts. The further
contention pressed by Shri Malhotra was that the respon-
dent’s claim raises an industrial dispute and, therefore, it
would be more appropriate for him to claim a reference under
s. to, of the Act. This contention being based only on the
appellant’s denial of the claim cannot exclude the
applicability of S. 33C(2). He also made a reference to the
decision of this Court in Bennet Coleman & Co., (P) Ltd. v.
Punya Priya Das Gupta(1) which was concerned with the
Working Journalists (Conditions of Ser vice) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955 and contended that
in that decision the definitions in s. 2(c) and (f) of that
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 181.
50
Act took within their fold persons who were no longer in the
employment of their erstwhile employer against whom their
claim was made, provided the claim related to a period when
they were in his employment. Shri Malhotra pointed out that
in the reported case there was no clause in the statutory
definition including therein for limited purposes certain
persons otherwise not within the definition and excluding
therefrom certain other categories of persons who would
otherwise fall within the definition. This is how that case
was sought to be distinguished from the present. The
crucial point which requires consideration on the
appellant’s argument is thus confined to the precise scope
and meaning of the word "workman" used in s. 33C(2) in the
background of the definition of this word as contained in s.
2(s).
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11
Now, it is noteworthy that s. 2 of the Act, which is the de-
finition section begins, as is usual with most of the
definition sections, with the clause, "unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context". This clearly
indicates that it is always a matter for argument whether or
not this statutory definition is to apply to, the word
"workman" as used in the particular clause of the Act which
is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted
or expanded by its subject matter. The. context and the
subject matter in connection with which the word "workman"
is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing
on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus
construing the word "workman" is obvious because all parts
of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent.
Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object
of s. 33C of the Act. This section was enacted for the
purpose of enabling individual workmen to implement, enforce
or execute their existing individual rights against their
employers without being compelled to have recourse to s. 10
by raising disputes:and securing a reference which is obvi-
ously a lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act has
accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the
Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an
executing court so that the workman concerned receives
speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights.
The primary purpose of the section being to provide the
aggrieved workman with a form similar to the executing
courts, it calls for a broad and beneficial construction
consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should
serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief.
It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which
s. 33C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced
by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their
existing rights without having resort to s. 10 of the Act.
To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be
open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer
to terminate the services of his employee in order to
deprive him of the benefit conferred by s. 33C and compel
51
him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of
reference under s. 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very
purpose and object of enacting this provision This, in our
view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in
the opening part of s. 2 of the Act and such a position
could hardly have been contemplated by the legislature. In
order to remove this repugnancy s. 33C(2) must be so
construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was
employed during the period in respect of which he claims
relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of
the application. In other words the term "workman" as used
in s. 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring
computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an
existing right arising from his relationship as an
industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this
construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress
the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of
inserting s. 33C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to
agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we
approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in
cases where there is no dispute about the employee’s right
which is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit.
Whether or not the right of suit can be claimed by the
employee, we are not persuaded on the basis of this
argument, to accept the construction canvassed on behalf of
the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11
of speedy remedy under s. 33C(2) of the Act.
We are aware of a conflict of decisions in some High Courts,
on the interpretation of s. 20 read with s. 2(i) of the
Minimum Wage,-, Act, .12 of 1948. This aspect was not
canvassed before us and, therefore, we should not be deemed
to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of
either view. We are referring to this aspect only to make
it clear that our decision must be) confined to the
construction of the provisions of the Act and we must not be
understood to have expressed any opinion on the construction
of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two
single Judges have taken divergent views and tile Kerala
High Court agreed with the view that the employees under the
Minimum Wages Act need not be, in the employment at the time
of their applications under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act
whereas the Punjab High Court on the other hand agreed with
the contrary view of the Madras High Court. The language of
s. 20 of the Minimum Wages
52
Act is not completely identical with that of s. 33C(2)of the
Act and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in
the two statutes are also somewhat differently worded.
Without any further discussion on this aspect we are content
to observe that this judgment should not be considered as an
expression of opinion on the interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Minimum Wages Act.
As a result of the foregoing discussion, this appeal fails
and is dismissed with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
53