Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MOHAN BREWERIES & DISTILLERIES LTD. ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, MADRAS & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/09/1997
BENCH:
S.P. BHARUCHA, K.T. THOMAS, V.N. KHARE
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
THE 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1997
Present:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.P Bharucha
Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas
Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.N. Khare
G.L. Sanghi, Sr.Adv., A.T.M. Sampath, Adv. with him for the
appellants.
V.R. Reddy, Sr. Adv., V.Krishnamurthi and T. Harish Kumar,
Advs. with him for the Respondents.
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
WITH
(C.A. No. 5106/97, 5122/97, 5123/97, 5124/97, 5125/97,
5126/97, 5127-28/97, 5129/97, 5130/97, 5131-5133/97)
J U D G M E N T
S.P. BHARUCHA, J.
These are appeals against the judgments and orders of
Division Benches of the High Court at Madras in tax revision
cases that involve the same issue, name, whether the excise
duty on potable liquor manufactured by the appellants, paid
by the purchasers thereof, is includible in the taxable
turnover of the appellants for the purpose of levy of tax
under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
The appellants manufacture Indian Made Foreign Liquor
(IMFL) on the strength of licences issued to them under the
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Indian Made Foreign spirits
(Manufacture ) Rules, 1981. manufacture, supply and sale of
the IMFL is governed the Tamil Nadu prohibition Act, 1937
(now referred to as ’the Act’) , the Tamil Nadu Indian-Made
Foreign spirits Indian Made Foreign Spirit (Manufacture)
Rules, 1981 (now referred to as the ’wholesale Rules’ and
the ’Manufacture Rules’ respectively).
By reason of Section 17-C of the Act, (introduced by an
amendment in 1983), the Tamil Nadu state Marketing
Corporation Limited, a corporation wholly owned and
controlled by the Government of State of Tamil Nadu, had at
the relevant time the exclusive privilege of supplying by
wholesale IMFL for the whole of that State. Section 18-A
provides for excise duty on liquor. Sub-Section 91) therefor
reads thus:
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" (1) An excise duty or
countervailing duty of such amount
as the State Government may, by
notification in the Fort St George
Gazette specify from time to time
shall, if they so direct, be levied
on all liquors and intoxicating
drugs permitted to be imported,
exported, transported,
manufactured, issued from any
manufactory or institution or sold,
under the provisions of this Act or
any rule, notification, licence or
permit issued thereunder."
Section 18-B provides for excise duty on excisable
articles. It reads, so far as is relevant, thus:
" 18-B . Excise duty or
countervailing duty on excisable
articles-Notwithstanding anything
contained in Section 18-A, with
effect on an from the date of the
commencement of the Tamil Nadu
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1981,
an excise duty or countervailing
duty at such rate not exceeding
rupees thirty per proof liter as
the State Government may, from time
to time, by notification specify,
shall be levied only under this
Sectional] on all excisable
articles-
xxx xxx xxx
(d) manufactured under any licence
granted under this Act;
(e) manufactured at any distillery,
blending unit or brewery licensed
or established under this Act;
(f) issued from a distillery,
blending unit, brewery or warehouse
licensed or established under this
Act."
Section 18-C, so far as is relevant, reads thus :
"18-C, How duty may be imposed.
The excise duty or the
countervailing duty under section
18-B may be levied in one or more
of the following ways :-
(a) by duty of excise to be charged
in the case of spirits or beer
either on the quantity produced in,
or passed out of a distillery,
blending unit, brewery or
warehouse licensed or established
under this Act, or in accordance
with such scale of equivalents,
calculated on the quantity of
materials used or by the degree of
attenuation of the wash or wort, as
the case may be, as may be
prescribed.
Rule 22 of the manufacture Rules, as amended on 4th
October, 1982, reads thus :
"22. payment of excise duty and
vend fee -
(1) An excise duty, at such rate as
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the state Government may prescribe
from time to time, shall be paid by
the person who removes the goods
from a manufactory, on the stock of
Indian-made Foreign Spirits so
removed from the manufactory.
(2) A vend fee of rupees two per
bulk liter shall be paid by the
licensee on all stocks of Indian-
made Foreign Spirits issued from
the manufactory."
Rule 15 (1) of the Wholesale Rules, amended at the same
time, reads thus :
"15. Payment of excise duty and
vend fee.- (1) The licensee shall
pay the excise duty on the stock of
Indian-made Foreign Spirits removed
by him from a manufactory in the
State as required under sub-rule
(1) of rule 22 of the Tamil nadu
Indian-made Foreign Spirits
(manufacture) Rules, 1981 or the
countervailing duty on the stock of
countervailing duty on the stock of
Indian-made Foreign Spirits
imported from a manufactory outside
the State or the excise duty or
countervailing duty as the case may
be , on the stock of Indian-made
Foreign spirits removed by him from
a bonded warehouse licensed under
the Tamil Nadu Indian-made Foreign
Spires (Storage-in-Bond) Rules,
1981."
These amendments were given retrospective effect from
23rd May, 1981.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants in their
writ petitions before the High Court that the liability to
pay excise duty upon the basis of the aforesaid provisions
lay not upon them but upon the Tamil Nadu State Marketing
Corporation (TASMAC). TASMAC had submit an application for
its requirement of IMFL and thereupon the excise duty
thereon was assessed. TASMAC paid the amount thereof
directly. The appellants neither collected the excise duty
from the wholesaler nor had they the statutory or
contractual authority to realise the same from it. The
appellants were not, therefore, liable to pay sales tax on
excise duty which was neither part of the sale price nor
consideration for the Sale. In the principal judgment,
followed in the other cases, the High Court, primarily
basing itself upon the decision of this Court in Mc Dowell &
Company Limited vs. The Commercial Tax Officer, 1985 (3)
S.C.R. 791, rejected the contentions on behalf of the
appellants and dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these
appeals.
It is convenient at this stage to set out certain
provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959
(now referred to as "the Sales Tax Act") . Section 2(r), and
Explanation (1-A) thereto, read thus :
" Section 2(r) "turnover" means the
aggregate amount for which goods
are bought or sold, or delivered or
supplied or otherwise disposed of
in any of the ways referred to in
clause (n), by a dealer either
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directly or through another, on his
own account or on account of others
whether for cash or for deferred
payment or other valuable
consideration, provided that the
proceeds of the sale by a person of
agricultural or horticultural
produce, other than tea, and rubber
natural rubber latex and all
varieties and grades of raw rubber
grown within the State by himself
or on any land in which he has an
interest whether as owner,
usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or
otherwise, shall be excluded from
his turnover;
xxx xxxx xxxx
Explanation (1-A) - Any amount
charged by a dealer by way of tax
separately without including the
same in the price of the goods
bought or sold shall not be
included in the turnover.
Section 2(n) defines "sale" to mean "every transfer of
the property in goods (other than by way of a mortgage,
hypothecation, charge or pledge) by one person to another in
the course of business for cash, deferred payment or other
valuable consideration ...................... "
Section 3 provides for the levy of tax on sales or purchase
of goods.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that, by
virtue of the provisions of the Act and the Rules
aforementioned, particularly Rule 22 of the Manufacture
Rules, the manufacturer of the IMFL was not liable for the
payment of the excise duty thereon. The imposition of the
excise duty thereon. The imposition of the excise duty by
reason of Rule 22 was squarely on the party who removed the
IMFL from its manufacturory, namely, TASMAC. The
manufacturer could not, by reason of Rule 22, seek to
recover the excise duty from the party so removing the IMFL.
The element of the excise duty did not enter into the
turnover of the manufacturer and, accordingly, no sales tax
was payable on the element of excise duty. Learned counsel
cited the JUDGMENT of this Court in Union of India and
others vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. and others, 1984
(1) S.C.C. 467, and emphasised the reference to their
judgments of the Federal Court in The Central Provinces and
Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act and
Province of Madras vs. Boddu Paidanna and sons. In learned
counsel’s submission, the observations therein supported the
argument that the imposition of excise duty was upon the
party who removed the IMFL from the factory. Learned counsel
submitted that the ratio of the judgment in Mc Dowell &
Company Limited vs. The Commercial Tax officer, 1985 (3)
S.C.R. 791, (the second Mc Dowell case), upon which the High
Court had relied, was restricted to the Andhra Pradesh rules
therein mentioned and was inapposite to the provisions which
are before us. Learned counsel sought to draw assistance
from Explanation (1A) to Section 2(r) of the sales Tax Act.
Learned counsel submitted that Rule 22 itself was a
representation to the manufacturer and even the Sales Tax
authorities had been misled by it; in their submission, an
equitable estoppel arose against the respondent State which
prevented it from recovering sales tax from the manufacturer
on the element of excise duty.
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Excise duty is levied upon goods manufactured or
produced Entry 84 of List I and Entry 51 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution). Its incidence falls,
therefore, on the manufacturer or producer of the goods. The
collection of excise duty may be deferred to such later
stage as is, administratively or otherwise, most convenient.
In the case of Central Provinces and Berar Sales of
Motor Spirit an Lubricants Taxation Act, it was noted that
excise duty was a duty ordinarily levied on the manufacturer
or producer in respect of the manufacture or producer in
respect of the manufacture or production of the Commodity
tax. A distinction was made between the nature of the tax
and the point at which it was collected. It was subject to
the legislative competence of the taxing authority to impose
the duty at the stage which was most convenient and the most
lucrative, wherever it might be, but "that is a matter of
the machinery of collection, and does not affect the
essential nature of the tax". This was reiterated by the
Federal Court in Boddu Paidanna’s case. In the Bombay
Tyre’s case, this Court referred to the aformentioned two
authorities of the Federal Court and several authorities of
this Court to hold that excise duty was levied on
manufacture but it could be levied at any convenient stage
so long as the character of the impost, that is, that it was
a duty on the manufacture or production, was not lost. The
method of collection did not affect the essence of the duty
but only related to the machinery of collection of
administrative convenience. This Court said, "while the levy
in our country has the status of a constitutional concept,
the point of collection is located where the statute declare
it to be."
The liability to pay excise duty on the IMFL is,
therefore, that of the manufacturer thereof. Rule 22 only
provides a mode for collecting the excise duty, a mode which
is obviously convenient for it requires the party removing
the IMFL from the factory of its production to pay in
advance the excise duty thereon. That party might be the
manufacturer. That the Act provides in another section that
all IMFL should be supplied in the state of Tamil Nadu by
wholesale only through TASMAC does not, in out view, make
any difference to this position. It cannot be a reason for
holding that the primary obligation to pay excise duty is
that of TASMAC or that the manufacturer is absolved of the
obligation to pay excise duty.
We cannot agree with learned counsel for the appellants
that the second Mc Dowell case was based only upon the
provisions of the Andra Pradesh rules that were under
consideration. It is amply clear from the citation of the
authorities of this court in that judgement that it
elaborated upon the concepts of excise duty and concluded
that "the incidence of excise duty is directly relatable to
manufacture but its collection can be deferred to a later
stage as a measure of convenience of expediency". The Andra
Pradesh rules, it was held "did not detract from the
position that payment of excise duty is the primary and
exclusive obligation of the manufacturer and if payment be
made under a contract or arrangement by any other person it
would amount to meeting of the obligation of the
manufacturer and nothing more". Note was taken of the
argument that excise duty had never come into the hands of
the appellant and that the appellant and that the appellant
had no opportunity to turn it over his hands and, therefore,
the same could not be considered to be a part of its
turnover. It was held that the argument that "when the
excise duty does not go into the common till of the assesses
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and it does not become a part of the circulation capital, it
does not constitute turnover, is not the decisive test for
determining whether such duty would constitute turnover."
As we look at it, the primary obligation to pay excise
duty on the IMFL is of the manufacturer thereof. Rule 22
only provides for a convenient method for its collection.
When the excise duty is collected from a party removing the
IMFL from the factory from the factory of its production,
other than the manufacturer, the payment of excise duty that
party makes is in discharge of the obligation of the
manufacturer. That party does not, as it would ordinarily
do, pay the excise duty component along with the sale price
of the IMFL it purchases to the manufacturer; it pays the
sale price to the manufacturer and it pays the excise duty
into the Treasury for and on behalf of the manufacturer. In
effect, therefore, the element of excise duty does enter
into the turnover of the manufacturer just as much as it
would ordinarily do. The definition of "turnover" in
section 2(r) of the sales Tax Act, referring as it does to
"the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold"
and "whether for cash or..... other valuable consideration"
is wide enough to cover such excise duty. That the excise
duty does not physically enter the manufacturer’s till is,
as held in the second Mc. Dowell case, not the decisive test
for determining whether or not it would be a part of the
manufacture’s turnover.
The argument based on Explanation (1-A) of Section 2(r)
of the Sales Tax Act cannot be entertained because the
amount of excise duty was not charged by the appellants by
way of tax separately without including the same in the
price of the IMFL sold.
Insofar as the argument of equatable estoppel is
concerned, the short answer, in our view, is that,
admittedly, no representation had been made by any sales Tax
authority, and, given the construction that we have placed
upon it, Rule 22 itself cannot be said to be a
representation that could have misled the appellants.
In the premises, the appeals are dismissed, with costs.