Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)
RASHMI CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.598 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)
ANITA GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.599 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)
NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER
RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MEENAKSHI KOHLI
Date: 2019.10.03
14:50:53 IST
Reason:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
1
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)
AMIT CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.596 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)
KULDEEP GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)
RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
These appeals have been filed challenging the
judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by
2
which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed
by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint
and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015
have been dismissed.
2. All the appeals having been filed against the
same judgment, facts of the case are being taken from
Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra &
Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which
criminal appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder
affidavit have been filed. The background facts of
the case necessary to be noted for deciding these
appeals are:-
2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and
Rajesh Chopra got married with Vanshika
Bobal, daughter of respondent No.2,
Indrajeet Singh on 15.04.2012. All the
appellants are family members of Nayan
Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is mother, Rajesh
Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brother
and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of
3
Nayan Chopra, whereas Kuldeep Gandhi is
husband of Anita Gandhi. Nayan Chopra with
his mother, father and brother are resident
of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station –
Begumpet, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh).
Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi are
resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.
2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and
Vanshika, which was performed at Noida,
District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012,
Vanshika went alongwith her husband at
Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of
Vanshika. On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and
Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A. On or
about November, 2013, Vanshika and Nayan
Chopra separated. On 23.10.2014, an
application was filed by Nayan Chopra in
the Circuit Court for the County of
Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA,
seeking divorce.
4
2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by
respondent No.2 through registered post to
the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha
Nagar, Noida making allegations against
Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown
persons. An application under Section
156(3) was filed by respondent No.2. The
application of the respondent No.2 was sent
by the Magistrate to Mediation Centre
running under the District Legal Services
Authority for counselling. After failure
of counselling and mediation, an
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
was filed by respondent No.2 dated
10.05.2015 making allegations against all
the appellants under Section 498A and
Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been
made on the basis of incident dated
08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and his
associates. It was alleged that Rajesh
5
Chopra called the respondent No.2 near the
Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about
the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika
and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he
met Rajesh Chopra with two unknown persons.
Respondent No.2 further alleges that on his
request to accept his daughter, Rajesh
Chopra repeated his demand of one crore
rupees and used filthy words against
Vanshika, which was objected by respondent
No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and his
associates became annoyed and they abused
and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched
his gold chain from his neck and
Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The
allegations within the meaning of Sections
323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C. were made
on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In
the application, it was also stated that
Nayan Chopra has filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in America.
6
2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce
th
by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9 Court for
the County of Kalamazoo Family Division,
Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on
24.02.2016. The order of judgment of
divorce was passed after hearing both Nayan
Chopra and Vanshika Bobal, who were
represented through attorneys. The
judgment of divorce made provisions for
alimony, pension benefits and retirement
benefits, life insurance, property
settlement and provision in lieu of dower,
mutual release of claims and other
provisions.
2.6 The application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No.2 was
treated as a complaint and registered as
Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the
learned Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh
Nagar issued a summoning order on
17.01.2017 summoning the appellants under
7
Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.7 The appellants filed an application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court
praying for quashing the complaint and
proceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in
Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015. In the
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., High
Court passed an order referring the matter
to mediation centre of Allahabad High
Court. The mediation having failed between
the parties, application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the
appellants to quash the complaint and
proceedings have been refused. The
application was disposed of after directing
that the applicants may surrender in the
court below and make an application for
bail within a period of two months.
Aggrieved against the judgment of the High
Court, these appeals have been filed.
8
3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in
their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel
for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned
AOR appearing for the respondent No.2. We have also
heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
5.
Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint
proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse
of the process of the court. It is submitted that
Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal had already been
granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which
fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by
respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed.
It is submitted that a reading of the complaint does
not prima facie discloses any offence under Section
498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the
appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep
9
Gandhi separately reside and they have never met
Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The allegations
in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general.
The complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl
nor she got her statement recorded in support of the
complaint. In so far as incident alleged on
08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took
place and allegations are false and concocted to
somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy
Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by
competent person, hence ought not to have been
entertained.
6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing
for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in
summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by
order dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that
Magistrate is not required to record elaborate
reasons for summoning of an accused. The complaint
discloses several allegations pertaining to offence
under Section 498A and other offences mentioned
therein. Two courts having taken one particular view
10
of the matter, this Court may not exercise its
jurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is
further submitted that Section 498A does not indicate
that complaint on behalf of the women has to be filed
by the women herself. The complaint was fully
competent and no error has been committed by
Magistrate in taking cognizance of the complaint.
7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed
reliance on various judgments of this Court in
support of their submissions, which shall be referred
to while considering the submissions in detail.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint
by Magistrate has been brought on the record as
Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are
that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which
marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan
Chopra and his family members. It is alleged that
11
after the marriage, all family members were not
satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the
daughter of respondent No.2 by demanding further
dowry of one crore rupees. They further pressurised
to solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi
rites and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was
solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37,
Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies. Further
allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra
kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on
01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house
and since then Vanshika is residing with respondent
No.2. Another set of allegations are with regard to
incident dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken
place at 6.00 PM near the Gurudwara, Sector-18,
Noida. It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of
Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about
their problem on which date Rajesh Chopra again
repeated his demand of one crore rupees and used
filthy words against Vanshika to which respondent
No.2 objected, on which Rajesh Chopra and his
associates became annoyed and they abused and beat
12
the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from
his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The above
two sets of allegations have given rise to summoning
order. The summoning order passed by the Magistrate
on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-
“ORDER
The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh
Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep
Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the
offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506
of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The
complainant is directed to take steps as
per Rules within one week. Case is fixed
for 08.03.2017 for appearance.
Sd/- illegible
17.01.2017
(Vikas)
Civil Judge (Jr. Division)
J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”
10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that
Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds
for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving
any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports
13
Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139 , this
Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down
following:-
“9. In determining the question whether any
process is to be issued or not, what the
Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
and not whether there is sufficient ground
for conviction. Whether the evidence is
adequate for supporting the conviction, can
be determined only at the trial and not at
the stage of inquiry. At the stage of
issuing the process to the accused, the
Magistrate is not required to record
reasons. This question was considered
recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v.
Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and
after noticing the law laid down in Kanti
Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC
722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,
para 6)
The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain
situations such as dismissal of a
complaint without issuing process.
There is no such legal requirement
imposed on a Magistrate for passing
detailed order while issuing summons.
The process issued to accused cannot
be quashed merely on the ground that
the Magistrate had not passed a
speaking order.”
12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in
Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &
Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465 . There can be no dispute to
14
the above proposition as laid down by this Court that
while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate
is not required to pass a detailed order, however, in
a case when Magistrate issues process against a
person, who is not even charged with the offence for
which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the
summoning order cannot be assailed?
13. In the present case, there are two sets of
allegations, which are contained in the complaint,
which has also been repeated in the statements
recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses –
PW1 – Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 –
Deepa, wife of respondent No.2. One set of
allegations of offence under Section 498A and Section
3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are
allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504
and 506 of I.P.C.
14. We may first take up the allegations for offences
under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The
allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been
15
made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is
useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining
to incident dated 08.11.2014 from the complaint,
which are to the following effect:-
“…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m.
Nayan Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called
the Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector
18, Noida to talk about their problem.
When the Applicant reached there for talk
then he met there Rajesh Chopra alongwith
two unknown persons. When the Applicant
requested Rajesh Chopra to accept his
daughter the Rajesh Chopra again repeated
his demand of one core Rupees and said that
if he has arranged for one crore Rupees
then he can send his daughter at their
home, otherwise keep Vanshika at his house
and Rajesh Chopra used filthy words against
Vanshika, then the Applicant objected for
the same, on which Rajesh Chopra and his
associates became annoyed and they abused
and beat the Applicant and snatched his
gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/-
from his pocket. The wife of the Applicant
and a number of other people gathered at
the spot and saved the Applicant from them.
While leaving these persons threatened the
Applicant that after arranging for one
crore Rupees he can send his daughter at
their house, otherwise keep her at his
house and if he dare to inform the police
then they will kill the Applicant and his
daughter Vanshika…….”
16
15. In the statement made by the complainant in
support of his submission, complainant repeated the
same allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014
as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2,
Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the
incident dated 08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as
narrated in the complaint. A perusal of the
allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the
complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323,
504 and 506 has been made only against Rajesh Chopra
and two unknown persons. Neither in the complaint
nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses,
there is any allegation with regard to above offences
against any other appellants before us. There being
no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504
and 506 in the complaint or statement before the
Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the
other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504
and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allege
any offence against other appellants, we fail to see
that how the cognizance of the complaint can be taken
against other appellants with regard to offences
17
under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In above view of
the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order
are liable to be quashed against all the appellants
except Rajesh Chopra due to the above reasons in
above regard.
16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint
under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.
Learned counsel for the respondent in support of his
submission that power of the High Court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional
circumstances, has relied on judgment of this Court
in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2017)
16 SCC 772 . This Court in the above case has relied
on an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta
Vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 , in which
judgment, in paragraph No.8 following proposition was
laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-
“ 8 . … At the stage of cognizance and
summoning the Magistrate is required to
apply his judicial mind only with a view to
take cognizance of the offence … to find
out whether a prima facie case has been
made out for summoning the accused persons.
At this stage, the learned Magistrate is
not required to consider the defence
18
version or materials or arguments nor is he
required to evaluate the merits of the
materials or evidence of the complainant,
because the Magistrate must not undertake
the exercise to find out at this stage
whether the materials would lead to
conviction or not.”
17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra ’s case has also laid
down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can
exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima
facie case is not made out against the accused.
Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-
“5. The order passed by the trial court
taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-
9 is in conformity with the law laid down
in the above judgment. It is settled law
that the power under Section 482 CrPC is
exercised by the High Court only in
exceptional circumstances only when a prima
facie case is not made out against the
accused. The test applied by this Court for
interference at the initial stage of a
prosecution is whether the uncontroverted
allegations prima facie establish a case.”
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied
on various judgments of this Court in support of his
submissions. In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of
Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 , this Court laid down
following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-
19
“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the
supplementary charge-sheet discloses the
fact that the appellants are not the
immediate family members of the third
respondent/husband. They are the maternal
uncles of the third respondent. Except the
bald statement that they supported the
third respondent who was harassing the
second respondent for dowry and that they
conspired with the third respondent for
taking away his child to the U.S.A.,
nothing else indicating their involvement
in the crime was mentioned. The appellants
approached the High Court when the
investigation was pending. The charge-sheet
and the supplementary charge-sheet were
filed after disposal of the case by the
High Court.
6. Criminal proceedings are not normally
interdicted by us at the interlocutory
stage unless there is an abuse of the
process of a court. This Court, at the same
time, does not hesitate to interfere to
secure the ends of justice. See State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC
335 . The courts should be careful in
proceeding against the distant relatives in
crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes
and dowry deaths. The relatives of the
husband should not be roped in on the basis
of omnibus allegations unless specific
instances of their involvement in the crime
are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of
Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash
Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 551”
19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had
20
occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of
quashing of criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice
Ashok Bhushan) speaking for the Bench after examining
the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down
following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the
present case it is necessary to consider
the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court.
Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power
of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined
the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC and laid down
several principles which govern the
exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench
of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, held that the
High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
that allowing the proceeding to continue
would be an abuse of the process of the
court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In
para 7 of the judgment, the following has
been stated: (SCC p. 703)
“ 7 . … In the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it
21
comes to the conclusion that allowing
the proceeding to continue would be
an abuse of the process of the court
or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High
Court’s inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, is
designed to achieve a salutary public
purpose which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted
to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a
criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests
and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in
the interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made
by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose
of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court
to do justice, between the State and
its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours
of that salient jurisdiction.”
24. The judgment of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335, has elaborately considered the scope
and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in
the above case this Court was considering
the power of the High Court to quash the
entire criminal proceeding including the
FIR, the case arose out of an FIR
registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and
22
Section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947. This Court
elaborately considered the scope of Section
482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in
the context of quashing the proceedings in
criminal investigation. After noticing
various earlier pronouncements of this
Court, this Court enumerated certain
categories of cases by way of illustration
where power under Section 482 CrPC can be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process
of the Court or secure the ends of justice.
25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories
of cases where power can be exercised under
Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:
( Bhajan Lal case , SCC pp. 378-79)
“ 102 . In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
23
( 1 ) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case
against the accused.
( 2 ) Where the allegations in the
first information report and
other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
( 3 ) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
( 4 ) Where the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
( 5 ) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just
24
conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
( 6 ) Where there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in
the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
( 7 ) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
20. After referring to several other cases, this
Court concluded and made following observations in
Paragraph No. 41:-
“41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose
and object of advancement of justice. In
case solemn process of Court is sought to
be abused by a person with some oblique
motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt
at the very threshold. The Court cannot
permit a prosecution to go on if the case
falls in one of the categories as
illustratively enumerated by this Court in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal . Judicial
25
process is a solemn proceeding which cannot
be allowed to be converted into an
instrument of operation or harassment. When
there are materials to indicate that a
criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive, the High Court will not hesitate in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under
Category 7 as enumerated in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , which is to the
following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)
“ 102 . ( 7 ) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in
the facts of the present case. Although,
the High Court has noted the judgment of
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , but did not
advert to the relevant facts of the present
case, materials on which final report was
submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully
satisfied that the present is a fit case
where the High Court ought to have
exercised its jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC and quashed the criminal
proceedings.”
21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to
proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed.
This Court has observed that judicial process is a
26
solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be
converted into an instrument of oppression or
harassment. If High Court finds that proceedings
deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by
this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 , High court shall not hesitate in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to
quash the proceedings.
22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in
the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of
D.P. Act. Few facts have to be noticed before we
look into the allegations made in the complaint in
the above regard. The complaint has been filed by
the respondent No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh
Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition
for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on
23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of
Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan. It is on the
record that at the time of filing of the complaint
Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan
Chopra was living at U.S.A. Both were separately
27
living. It was pleaded in the application for
divorce that husband and wife had separated on or
around November, 2013. It is on the record that on
the day criminal complaint was filed on 10.05.2015 in
the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by respondent
No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in
India at the time when statements were recorded in
complaint of complainant as well as his two
witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it
has been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent
No.2. In the divorce application filed in the State
of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented by her
attorney. The divorce was granted with orders
relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement
benefits, life insurance, property settlement and
provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims
and other aspects on 24.02.2016.
23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that
orders of divorce between the parties was brought
into the notice of the Magistrate when he issued
process against the appellants. We, however, are in
28
agreement with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan
that decree of divorce between Nayan Chopra and
Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminal offence,
which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C.
or D.P. Act and the criminal offence committed in
jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the
divorce decree having been granted.
24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.
Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the
allegations against the appellants for offence under
Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general
and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details
of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.
The complaint having been filed after proceeding for
divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of
Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was
ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the
divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the
Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the
allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the
29
events and facts and circumstances of the case leads
us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A
and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as
counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State
of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any
one of the applicants except common general
allegation against everyone i.e. “they started
harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding
additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all
relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother,
brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s
sister have been roped in clearly indicate that
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed
with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior
to filing of the application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at any point of time
by the girl or her father making allegation of demand
of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both
Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately
since November, 2013, had there been any dowry demand
30
or harassment the girl would have given complaint to
Police or any other authority. Further, in the
divorce proceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have
agreed for dividing their properties including gifts
given at marriage but no complaint was made in those
proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or
his family members. The judgment of the divorce
contains following clauses regarding “Property
Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND “
PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER
1. Each party affirms that he or she
fully and accurately disclosed all the
assets owned by him or her in which he or
she has any interest. By affixing their
signatures on this Judgment, Plaintiff and
Defendant affirm that each has disclosed
all assets each owns or has any interest
in, whether held by him or her
individually, by both of them jointly or
with any other person or entity, or by
another person or entity for the benefit of
a party. The property division set forth in
this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be
a distribution and allocation of all the
property of the parties and also is
intended to declare the parties’ property
interests as of entry of this Judgment of
Divorce. If either party has failed, either
intentionally or unintentionally, to
disclose any of his or her assets, the
issue of property division may be reopened
on the motion of either party to determine
31
and resolve the distribution of any
previously undisclosed assets.
2. It appears to the court that the
parties have divided between them to their
mutual satisfaction all articles of
personal property, household furniture and
appliances, cash, savings and checking
accounts and vehicles except as provided
below. The personal property as so divided
shall be the sole and absolute property of
the party in whose possession or under
whose control each of the articles of
personal property are now found and each
shall defend and hold the other harmless
from liability thereon.
a.The parties agree to return all
jewelry to the other party that they
currently have in their possession,
which was acquired as a result of
their marriage. Plaintiff testified
that he only had one item of jewelry
and provided the only jewelry he had
in his possession to Defendant-a
single gold ring. Plaintiff testified
she does not have any jewelry in her
possession.
b.The parties agree that their
respective parents will return to the
other party’s parents, all jewelry
given as gifts to their parents and
are in their parent’s possession,
which was acquired by them as a result
of the parties’ marriage. The parents
agree to exchange at a mutually agreed
upon location and at a mutually agreed
upon time.
3. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall be liable for the debts
32
incurred by him or her after separation
(11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the
other harmless from all liability thereon.
4. Except as provide herein, each party
shall be liable for the debts in his or her
name and for the debts associated with
property awarded to him/her pursuant to the
Judgment of Divorce and shall defend and
hold the other harmless from all liability
therein.
5. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall retain all monies in their
respective names, including but not limited
to checking accounts, savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds,
IRAs or 401Ks.
6. There are no joint debts of the
parties except as provided herein.
7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall
receive the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear
from any claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA
BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees
to pay the liability thereon and to defend
and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
Defendant shall transfer title of such
vehicles to the Plaintiff if transferring
is needed.
8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall
receive the 2005 Toyota Camry free and
clear from any claim of the Defendant,
VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes
and agrees to pay the liability thereon and
to defend and hold the Defendant harmless
thereon.
9. The provisions for each party herein
made for the parties shall be in lieu of
the dower or spousal right in the lands of
the other and each shall hereafter hold
33
their remaining lands free, clear and
discharged from any such dower, spousal
right and claim and said provision shall be
in full satisfaction of all claims either
may have in any property which the other
owns, or may hereafter own, in which either
has or may hereafter have an interest.
10. The parties warrant that neither has
incurred any debt in the other party’s
name, or on which the other party may be
liable, which is not expressly disposed of
in this Judgment.
11. This Judgment of Divorce shall
constitute a termination of all rights of a
surviving spouse including, but not limited
to, homestead allowance, election, exempt
property, settlement and family allowance
by each party in the property of the other,
and a termination of all benefits which
would otherwise pass to one party from the
other by testate and intestate, succession
or by virtue of any provision of any will
executed prior to the entry of this
Judgment of Divorce.”
26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings
indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled
all issues between them including division of
properties at the time when divorce proceedings were
in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not
in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
had been filed making allegation under Section 498A
34
of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass
and put pressure on the applicants.
27. One observation also needs to be made with regard
to order passed by the High Court. High Court in its
impugned judgment has not referred to allegations
made in the complaint except noticing the summoning
order has been passed and noticing the principles of
law. This Court had occasion to consider a similar
order passed by the High Court rejecting the
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish
Prasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another, (2019) 2 SCC 184 . In the said case also
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the challenge
was made to summoning order as well as entire
proceedings of complaint case where allegations under
Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as Section 3/4 of
D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3, the facts
giving rise to filing the application under Section
482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been noted.
This Court made following observations in paragraph
Nos.6 to 9:-
35
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for
the parties and on perusal of the record of
the case we are inclined to set aside the
impugned order and remand the case to the
High Court for deciding the appellants’
application, out of which this appeal
arises, afresh on merits in accordance with
law.
7. On perusal of the impugned order, we
find that the Single Judge has quoted the
principles of law laid down by this Court
in several decisions relating to powers of
the High Court on the issue of interference
in cases filed under Section 482 of the
Code from para 2 to the concluding para but
has not referred to the facts of the case
to appreciate the controversy of the case.
We are, therefore, unable to know the
factual matrix of the case after reading
the impugned judgment except the legal
principles laid down by this Court in
several decisions.
8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to
have first set out the brief facts of the
case with a view to understand the factual
matrix and then examined the challenge made
to the proceedings in the light of the
principles of law laid down by this Court
with a view to record the findings on the
grounds urged by the appellants as to
whether any interference therein is called
for or not. We find that the aforementioned
exercise was not done by the High Court
while passing the impugned order.
9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to
concur with such disposal of the
application by the High Court and feel
inclined to set aside the impugned order
and remand the case to the High Court
(Single Judge) with a request to decide the
36
application afresh on merits in accordance
with law keeping in view the aforementioned
observations. Having formed an opinion to
remand the case in the light of our
reasoning mentioned above, we do not
consider it proper to go into the merits of
the case.”
28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7
and 8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in
the facts of the present case and the order of the
High Court deserves to be set aside on this ground
alone.
29. One of the submissions, which has been made by
the learned counsel for the appellant also needs to
be considered. Learned counsel for the appellant had
submitted that complaint has not been filed by a
competent person. It is submitted that complaint is
not made by Vanshika, but has been filed only by
father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The
above submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh
Krishnan. He submits that it is not necessary that a
complaint under Section 498A should be filed only by
the victim of offence. He submits that complaint
filed by father of the victim, respondent No.2 was
37
also fully maintainable. Section 498A provides as
follows:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty. — Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this
section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of
the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where
such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet
such demand.”
30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband
or the relative of the husband, subject her to
38
cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may
indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a
complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so
subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted
above, indicates that the provision does not
contemplate that complaint for offence under Section
498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected
to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are
of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2,
the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not
maintainable on this ground. We, thus, reject the
submission of the counsel for the appellant that
complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not
maintainable.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as
the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of
D.P. Act is concerned, we are of the view that
present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as
enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra)
and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, however,
39
observe that in so far as allegations against Rajesh
Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC
is concerned, there were specific allegations, which
were also supported by the complainant and his two
witnesses in the evidence, at this stage, this Court
cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as
alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or
alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as
alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra or not. We,
thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint
pertaining to offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506
I.P.C. against Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said
complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated
17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e.,
summoning of Rajesh Chopra under Sections 323, 504
and 506.
32. In result,
(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and
596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.
8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018)
40
are allowed. The complaint as well as
summoning order dated 17.01.2017 is set
aside insofar as the appellants in the
above-mentioned criminal appeals are
concerned.
(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out
of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh
Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr.) is partly allowed. The complaint as
well as summoning order is set aside
insofar as offence under Section 498A and
Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned,
however, complaint shall proceed insofar as
offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of
I.P.C. and summoning order to that extent
only is upheld.
......................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
April 30, 2019.
41