INDIAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION vs. UNION OF INDIA

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

RESERVED ON: 18.12.2013
% PRONOUNCED ON: 09.05.2014

+ W.P. (C) 2310/2012
CM APPL.4946 & 17545/2012

INDIAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sunil Gupta, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Rohit and Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, Advocates.

versus

UNION OF INDIA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Mohan Parasaran, SG, Mr. Rajeeve
Mehra, ASG, Mr. Jatan Singh, CGSC with
Mr. Devvrat, Mr. Kartikey Mahajan, Mr. Shoaib
Qureshi, Ms. Aarthi S. Anand and Mr. N.
Meyyapan, Advocates for UOI.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

MR. JUSTICE S.RAVINDRA BHAT

1. The Indian Olympic Association (hereafter IOA) seeks appropriate
directions that the National Sports Code, issued by the respondent Union
Government (hereafter “UOI”) is beyond its executive power (since
Parliament does not possess legislative power to enact a law in that regard)
and that its provisions are violative of its (IOA‟s) rights guaranteed under
Articles 14, 19(1) (c) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 1


2. IOA is registered under provisions of the Societies Registration Act
(“the Societies Act”). It is part of the Olympic movement, and the apex body
for all sports bodies and federations in India. It ensures that decisions of the
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) are observed; at the national level
it promotes and safeguards the Olympic movement in India in accordance
with the Olympic charter (“the Charter”). It also backs and encourages the
spread of sports ethics, and fights against doping (drugging) and other
obnoxious practices. Some of its objects contained in its Constitution are
relied upon; they are extracted below:
“9. To have full and complete jurisdiction over all matters
pertaining to the participation of India in the Olympic Games
and other Games under the patronage of the IOC as well as the
IOA.
10. To participate in the Games of the Olympiad by sending
athletes and to constitute, organize and lead its delegation at the
Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world multi-
sports competitions patronized by the IOC. It shall also ensure
that the members of the delegation shall conduct themselves in a
responsible and dignified manner at all such meets.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
11. To undertake with the assistance of National Sports
Federations the financing, management, transportation,
maintenance and welfare of teams from India taking part in the
Olympic Games and other Games under the patronage of the
I.O.C. as well as I.O.A.
12. To certify the eligibility of competitors from India for
such international competitions as require such certification.”
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 2


3. In terms of its objectives IOA acts as the channel of communication
between national Sports Federations and the Central Government for
financial or other assistance (Clause 14); it has to, in terms of Clause 21
collaborate and help national Sports Federations (NSFs), State Olympic
Associations and other sports bodies in the training of the sports
administrators for the effective sports information dissemination in India. It
is autonomous from the UOI or any State Government, in its functioning,
activities or governance. Its members elect its office bearers, in accordance
with its Constitution. It is answerable to its members in terms of its
Constitution, and to the extent it fosters the Olympic spirit, and involves the
athletes and other sports persons who participate in various Olympic games,
it is bound by the decisions – and the Charter of the IOC. The IOA
repeatedly underlines that it does not receive financial assistance, or any
direct financial support from the Government and any other NSFs
Federations. Most of the expenditure incurred by IOA is towards travel,
boarding and lodging of sports persons, directly or through its agencies like
Balmer Lawrie & Co., or the Sports Authority of India (“the Authority”). In
fact, the major expense is for the salary of the Officers of SAI. No money
given by the UOI for the day to day activities of the
Federations/Associations. The petitioners support themselves through
individual contribution, annual fee from members or sponsorship.
4. It is submitted that the world of international sports has a hierarchical
structure whereby participation of a country‟s team in any international
event is governed by the concerned International Federation and
participation in multi- disciplinary events is governed by the IOC. World
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 3


Level Association/Federation/Bodies exist in every sport, which are
affiliated to IOC. At the national level, there is IOA, corresponding to the
International Olympic Committee. Its affiliating organizations are NSFs,
one for every sport; these also affiliate to their respective World/
Association/Federation/Body, and are recognized by them. In the absence of
such affiliation or recognition, no player can compete in any international
tournament or competition.
5. The Charter requires the NSF to be autonomous bodies. Hence, any
mandate for interference with the autonomy is per se bad. The IOA and each
national sports association are independently registered under the Act and
are governed by their constitutions and bye-laws. They function in terms of
their Constitutions. The NSFs, under IOC‟s Charter are required to be
autonomous bodies and the Act assures that autonomy. This arrangement is
in keeping with the Charter, and necessary to safeguard the independence of
sports in India.
th
6. The petitioners refer to a letter of the UOI, dated 20 September, 1975
on the subject of “ Improvement of standard of sports and games in the
country—Conditions for financial and other assistance to National Sports
Federations/Associations, etc”. This letter had, for the first time, sought to
regulate and control certain aspects of the functioning of the IOA and the
NSFs. The regulations were particularly with respect to the tenure of office
bearers of such associations (IOA). The relevant extracts of that letter are as
follows:
“3. The Government of India have carefully considered the matter,
in consultation with the All India Council of Sports, and have
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 4


decided, in the interest of promotion of sports and games, that
Government's financial and other assistance shall be extended
only to those national organizations dealing with sports and games
which fulfill the following conditions:—
(i) An office bearer of a National Federation/Association may hold
office as such for one term of 4 years, and may be eligible for re-
election for a like term or period.
(ii) No such office bearer shall hold office consecutively for more
than two terms or 8 years:
Provided that in the event of election for the second term, an office
bearer who has completed one term shall only be deemed to have
been elected if he/she secures a majority of not less than two third
of the members of the national Federation/Association concerned.
In the event of failure to obtain such majority, the concerned office
bearer shall be deemed to have lost the election. The office would
thereafter be filled by election under the normal procedure from
amongst candidates other than the office bearer seeking re-
election.
Explanation 1: For the purpose of this clause, the expression
"office bearer" means:—
(a) the President,
(b) the Secretary/Secretary-General, or any corresponding office,
(c) the Treasurer.
Provided that the provisions of this clause shall not apply to the
post of Treasurer if, under the constitution of National
Federation/Association, the Treasurer does not possess the right to
vote in any of its meetings, and his duties and responsibilities shall
be confined only to the management of the finances of the
Federation/Association; however, he shall not be eligible to seek
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 5


election to the office of the President or Secretary/Secretary-
General or Vice President after having held the office of the
Treasurer consecutively for eight years, till the expiry of a period
of at least four years from the date on which he last vacated the
office of the Treasurer.
Explanation 2
(i) No person who has already held the office of the President or
Secretary/Secretary General or both in a National
Federation/Association consecutively for two terms or eight years
shall be eligible to seek re-election to any of the said offices or
Vice President or Treasurer till the expiry of a period of at least
four years from the date
on which he last vacated his office.
(ii) The National Federation/Association may, if they wish, apply
the provisions of clause 1 to the offices of Vice President,
Treasurer (not being an office bearer) and members of important
Organizations such as heir executive committee, selection
committee, etc. 65
(iii) No office bearer of a National Federation/Association shall
be eligible to be the office bearer, simultaneously, of any other
National Sports Federation/Association, excepting the Indian
Olympic Association.
(iv) That the annual accounts of the organization have been
properly maintained and regularly audited and that the various
business meetings as required under its constitution have been
duly held.
(v) That each national Sports Federation/Association, in its
particular field of specialization, has been appointing or would
appoint a National Coach who possesses a valid coaching
diploma. Prior approval of the All India Council of Sports would
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 6


be necessary if the person already appointed or proposed to be
appointed as National
Coach does not possess requisite coaching qualifications.
(vi) That the National Sports Federations/Associations, in their
respective fields of specialization, have been holding or would
hold, where feasible, not less than two competitions annually for
specified age groups at the Junior and Sub-junior levels; these
competitions should be organized through Inter-Block and Inter-
District competitions in each State, leading to the competition at
the National level.
(vii) That the membership of the National Sports
Federations/Associations, within their particular fields of
specialization, is confined to the corresponding State and other
special units affiliated to the National Sports
Federations/Associations, and that where any of the National
Sports Federations/Associations grants membership for individual
clubs or individual persons, such membership does not confer on
such members the right to vote in any of the
Federations/Associations meetings.
4. The guidelines, as enumerated above, have been finalized after
careful consideration of the points raised by the Indian Olympic
Association, National Sports Federations/ Associations,
consequent on issue of this Ministry's earlier letter No. F.11-4/74-
YS 1(2) dated 9th April, 1974, and on the basis of the advice of the
All India Council of Sports. The views expressed by these
organizations have been accommodated to the fullest extent
possible, consistent with the purpose for which the guidelines are
prescribed.
5. However, at the request of the IOA, Government have agreed,
as a special case to give time to the IOA and the concerned
National Sports Federations to change their respective
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 7


constitutions, finalize fresh elections where necessary and take all
other consequential action to fully and finally implement the
guidelines before the dates indicated below:
(i) National Sports Federations/Associations 1.12.1975
(ii) Indian Olympic Association 31.1.1976
6. The IOA/National Sports Federations/Associations are now
requested to confirm immediately, but not later than 15.10.1975,
that the guidelines as stipulated in this letter, are acceptable to
them, and that necessary action to implement the "Guidelines" has
been initiated. Details of the arrangements made with regard to
the amendment of the constitutions and holding of fresh elections
may also please be intimated.”
7. Having regard to the autonomy of the IOA and the NSFs, such
attempts at regulating their functioning and controlling tenure of their office
bearers affected their independence, violated the Charter in letter and spirit
and sought to interfere with the societies‟ functioning by imposing
provisions contrary to those contained in their Constitutions. It is argued that
there is no bar to tenure of office holding under the Act. Therefore, the UOI
could not impose such conditions by way of guidelines/office
directions/letter. It is further stated that further guidelines (hereafter “revised
guidelines” or “2001 guidelines”) were sought to be made in 14.8.2001.
These revised Guidelines were intimated to the petitioners as well as the
federations. The said Guidelines, particularly with regard to the term of the
office bearers had originally been formulated during the period of
Emergency in the year 1975; they were opposed by IOA and other
Federations. It is urged that in view of the strong sentiment against the
guidelines, a committee headed by Shri A.K. Pandaya, DG Sports Authority
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 8


of India to review the position was set up; its report submitted in 1992, the
Committee unanimously recommended the scrapping altogether, provisions
limiting terms of the office bearers. After hearing the views of the
Government, IOA and NSFs, the committee in its report submitted in 1995,
refrained from expressing any view, thus implying that it was not inclined to
the restrictions imposed during the Emergency. The IOA had also set up an
independent four member Committee to frame formal comments on the
alleged Guidelines. The said Committee in its report dated 16.7.1997, while
dealing with the tenure of the office bearers strongly expressed the view that
the said article in the Guidelines should be scrapped forthwith. It is
submitted that in the circumstances the revised guidelines too could not
regulate activities of IOA and the NSFs. It is argued that even if such
instructions are being followed, it cannot be said that these instructions are
being followed under any authority of law.
8. The petitioners question UOI‟s authority to frame the guidelines,
contending that „Sports‟ is covered under Entry 33 of the List II, in Schedule
VII; likewise the authority to register, incorporate and regulate
unincorporated corporations and societies is that of the State legislatures
exclusively, by virtue of Entry 32, List II (Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution of India. Neither Parliament has the authority to make laws in
that respect, nor does the Union Government have executive power over that
subject matter, as executive power is only co-extensive with legislative
authority. Consequently, the Union Government does not possess any power
to impose – through guidelines- restrictions on the functioning of
autonomous bodies (which are societies) such as IOA and NSFs. The
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 9


petition mentions a development which took place in October 2001, when
the IOA and NSFs were consulted; at that stage, on 11-10-2001, the UOI felt
that it could not issue such guidelines in the absence of Parliamentary
power. Then, the UOI had taken note of the earlier unsuccessful move to
give effect to the National Sports Policy of 1984, by amending the
Constitution. The petitioners refer to states‟ meeting and consultation, and
st
the Constitution (61 Amendment Bill) 1988 which was introduced in the
th
Rajya Sabha on 24 November, 1988. The Bill sought to move “sports” to
the Concurrent List, from the State List; however, the move was
unsuccessful. The petitioners then refer to the decision of the Union Minister
for sports dated 24-08-2002 directing that the 1975 Guidelines should be
scrapped. The petitioners also rely on an affidavit of the UOI filed in a
previous litigation ( Narender Batra v. Union of India , WP No.195/2010)
where its express stand was that sports is an exclusive State subject, because
of Entry 33, List II, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
9. The petitioners blame the media and the executive government for
adverse publicity about mis-utilization of funds, which they say is entirely
baseless. They point out that the UOI does not give sufficient funding and
upgrade infrastructure which is so necessary to encourage and promote sport
and that the issue is mired in red-tape. Contesting allegations of misuse of
funds, it is stated that the amounts given or disbursed are for specific heads
of expenditure such as travel and tour expenses etc, which are all accounted
for. Contrary to public perception, state the petitioners, the IOA and the
NSFs function in a completely transparent manner; the provisions of the
Right to Information Act are made applicable to the IOA as well as all sports
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 10


federations. The petitioners adversely comment on the general apathy to
sports in India, and state that the lack of infrastructure and the unwillingness
to upgrade it, or even make basic sports equipment available, kills initiative
and stifles talent. Infrastructure at grass root level is completely lacking and
the states are unwilling to give necessary budgetary allocation.
10. The Petitioners argue that the Sports Code of 2011 and the letter of
01-05-2010 are illegal and without authority of law, to the extent that they
impose cap on tenure of various office bearers of the IOA and the NSFs. It is
submitted that these bodies are registered under provisions of the Act which
nowhere speaks about cap on the tenure or on the number of re-elections of
the office bearers. The guidelines issued by the Government to this effect
are illegal as they are trying to override an Act passed by the Parliament. It
is submitted that these restrictions violate Article 19 (1) (c) as well as Article
14 of the Constitution of India, because there are many NGOs which receive
Government aid and grants but have no such caps on their tenures or re-
elections. It is urged that infliction of such terms is utterly unreasonable. In
any event, being non-statutory and mere guidelines, they cannot abridge or
affect fundamental rights. The revised 2001 guidelines, sought to be
imposed through the impugned letter and the National Sports Code, so far it
mandates a cap on tenure to the extent of two terms, and also mandates a
time limit for such tenure and similar restrictions, imposing a ban on
individuals holding office in more than one association or sports body, robs
these federations and independent societies of their right to exercise free
choice. When none of the members of these societies voiced any objection
to the existing rules in that regard, the UOI cannot, in the guise of
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 11


recognizing these bodies for the purpose of grants, impose something that is
neither a compulsion by law, nor mandated by individual constitutions.
11. The provisions of the Charter are self-explanatory and leave no doubt
that the autonomy of the IOA and its member units cannot be compromised
and has to be preserved at any cost so as to remain a member of the Olympic
family. The Charter specifically provides that no interference/compromise
with the autonomy shall be allowed and if attempts by the countries are
made to hamper the Olympic activities or their autonomy is compromised,
such National Olympic Committee or NSFs shall be suspended and its
recognition to participate in the Olympic Games shall also be withdrawn.
The effect of the interference in the functioning of the NOC‟s and making it
subservient to the dictates of the Government, bureaucrats would result in
non-participation of the Indian players in the Olympic Games. The same
result would ensue in the Asian Games, Common Wealth Games as well as
the games controlled, supervised and managed by various international
federations. Recognition as a National Sports Federation is by the
International Body and that is most essential. Further,
Federations/Associations have been granted recognition earlier and the same
cannot be withdrawn by imposing conditions subsequently.
12. It is submitted that merely because the UOI recognizes, gives
diplomatic clearances or rail concessions would not mean that it can control
the NSFs. It is submitted that if UOI is allowed to impose conditions by way
of executive orders in the running, functioning, management of the
federations as a condition for grant of recognition and assistance by the
Government, it would lead to Government interference and dictates in the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 12


affairs of the NSFs, which is impermissible. It is urged that while Rule
19.2.2 of the International Olympic Committee prescribes duration of term
of members of the IOC executive bearers as 4 years and a maximum of 2
successive terms, there is no such condition in the IOA nor has the IOC ever
asked the IOA to amend its Rules and bring in the term restriction. Even
otherwise the provisions of the Memorandum of one Society cannot be
imposed on another society. Permitting Government to control the affairs of
the NSFs would lead to chaos and the same would adversely affect the
international sporting activities of the petitioners. It also affects and severely
undermines the democratic process put in place by each individual society
through its members. In effect, it restricts the democratic choice of members
of each national federation as well as the individual federations in the IOA.
13. Elaborating on the pleas taken, Shri Sunil Gupta, learned senior
counsel submitted that executive power of the Union cannot extend to
framing policies in respect of sports. It was argued in this regard that Entry
33 of List II clearly enumerates sports as falling within the field of State
legislation. It was argued that India had participated in the Olympics before
1950 as well. The history of the entry “sports” clearly demonstrates that the
Constitution framers consciously placed the subject field in the State list. It
was submitted that under the Government of India Act, 1935 (“1935 Act”),
societies and associations, including those relating to sports were included in
the State list (List II, Entry 33). Theatre, dramatic performances, cinema, etc
were included in List II, Entry 35. This position continued in the Draft
Constitution (Entries 42 and 44, List II, draft Constitution). All the time,
sports as a subject matter was under the residuary head, falling within the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 13


exclusive domain of the Governor General – who could empower the federal
or the provincial legislature to enact laws on the subject, under Section 104
of the 1935 Act. In this background, the removal of sports from the residual
item and its placement in the State List (Entry 33, List II) by the Constituent
Assembly on 02.09.1949, which took final shape with the expressions
“ sports, entertainments and amusements ” signified that the Constitution
makers wished that this should be in the exclusive field of State legislative
power. Arguing next that the Constitution had specifically employed devices
to demarcate fields of overlapping legislative power, counsel submitted that
these included the use of expressions such as “but not including”, “subject
to”, “other than”, “not specified in List I” etc. Likewise, State power could
be made subject to Parliamentary declaration by law of the matter being of
national importance (List I, Entries 62, 63, 64 and 67); national highways or
waterways (list I, Entries 23, 24 and 30); or a matter being subject to
Parliamentary declaration by law that its control “is expedient in public
interest”. (List I, Entry 52, 54, 56 and Entry 33, List III). Learned counsel
relied on the decisions reported as State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley ,
AIR 1958 SC 560, Diamond Sugar v. State of UP, 1961 (3) SCR 242 and
Synthetics & Chemicals v. State of UP , 1990 (1) SCC 109 in support of the
argument that the widest import should be attached to each entry in the three
lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India since the framers
did not intend any term to be a surplus age. It was emphasized that one entry
or term cannot be narrowly construed to give effect to a wider import to
another term. Only when there is a direct conflict is perceived should the
court apply the “pith and substance” test. Likewise, each general word
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 14


should be held to comprehend allied, ancillary and subsidiary matters that
can be fairly and reasonably accommodated within it.
14. It was next argued that the UOI also does not possess the power to
regulate societies. Counsel relied upon Entry 32, List II and the decision
reported as Board of Trustees, Auyrveda Unani Tibbia College v. State of
Delhi , AIR 1962 SC 458 and submitted that societies constituted under the
Societies Act are not incorporated entities. Counsel emphasized that the IOA
and many NSFs existed as societies long before the Constitution was drawn
and that this has to be taken into consideration. He contrasted the terms used
in Entry 44 of the Union List, which reads “corporations, whether trading
or not, with objects not confined to one state”. Reliance was also placed on
the ruling in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India , 1983 (1) SCC 51 in this regard.
15. Mr. Gupta submitted that the UOI‟s position that the subject of sport
falls in Entries 10 and 13 of the Union List is untenable. He traced the
history of these entries to Entry 3 of the federal list under the 1935 Act
(„external affairs‟) and stated that the expression “external” and “foreign”
mean “belonging to or attached to another jurisdiction, made, done or
rendered in another state or jurisdiction” . For this, reliance was placed on
the Black‟s Law Dictionary (VI edn., at page 646). It was argued that these
entries (10 and 13) clearly relate to relation between India and foreign states.
But, the UOI is not part of IOC or any Olympic Games and any law which
seeks to regulate internal election matters of such societies cannot fall within
those legislative heads. Contending that the principle noscitur a sociis
applies to entries in the Lists of the seventh schedule to the Constitution,
counsel relied on Godfrey Philips India Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh , 2005
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 15


(2) SCC 515 and urged that Entry 13 “participation in international
conferences, associations and other bodies” has to be read contextually with
the preceding and succeeding entries. These clearly suggest that only state
participation was envisioned by the Constitution framers and not
participation by non-State actors in non-State events, such as IOC conclaves
and meetings. The implementation of decisions during such meetings cannot
be the subject matter of Union legislative concern; nor can it be embodied in
international treaties and covenants. Considering all these circumstances,
argued Shri Gupta, the UOI‟s argument that sports falls within the residuary
entry (Entry 97, List I read with Article 248 of the Constitution) cannot be
countenanced. The test for determining applicability of the residuary entry is
to see when lack of State competence under List II or List III is clearly
established. He relied on International Tourist Corporation v. State of
Haryana , 1981 (2) SCC 318, in this context.
16. It was next submitted that originally “education” was in the State list
nd
as Entry 11. However, through the 42 Constitutional Amendment, it was
placed in the Concurrent List (List III) as Entry 25. A similar attempt was
made by the UOI to place sports in the concurrent list (List III) through the
st
61 Amendment Bill in 1988. That move however did not succeed. The
Amendment was never carried. It is urged that this attempt strengthens the
petitioners‟ argument that the UOI has no legislative or executive power to
deal with sports or even societies. It was argued that the attempts of the
Union to regulate sports bodies and societies, including the IOA and its
federating organizations, through the Code, first indicated in 1975, later in
2001 and then in 2010 and subsequently through the impugned code,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 16


constitutes a fraud on the Constitution. Counsel relied on the decision in
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar , 1987 (1) SCC 378.
17. It was further urged that the question of Parliamentary competence to
enact law concerning sports or sports-based societies on the doctrine of
extra-territorial jurisdiction of the law – premised upon the view that State
laws are confined to the respective boundaries – is without foundation.
Learned counsel relied upon The State of Bombay v. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala , 1957 (1) SCR 874, The State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi ,
1959 Supp. 2 SCR 601 and The State of Bihar v. Bhabapritananda Ojha ,
1959 Supp. 2 SCR 624 to say that any event within the territories of the
State regardless of its inter-state, national or international character would
lie within the exclusive competence of the State.
18. Mr. Gupta argued that even if it is conceded that the UOI had the
power to fund sports of all nature and hues by virtue of Article 282 of the
Constitution, that would not by itself enable the Parliament or the UOI to
frame guidelines or policies that would impinge adversely on the autonomy
of the IOA or the sports federations. In this regard, it is urged that the receipt
of funds by sporting federations, or IOA, cited as „an excuse‟ for of
imposing restrictions to curtail the tenure of their office-bearers has no
correlation with the Parliamentary concern to audit the accounts and ensure
that funds are properly utilized. Highlighting that the Parliament has
exclusive power to make laws with respect to audit of accounts of the Union
and the State under Entry 76 of the First Schedule, learned counsel argued
that such power enables the UOI to put in an appropriate mechanism to
oversee the utilization of funds. In other words, submitted learned counsel,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 17


the need to ensure proper fund utilization has no correlation with the
imposition of tenure and other restrictions that directly impinge on the
autonomy of sports federations and the IOA.
19. Learned counsel emphasized that the UOI in fact under Article 282
has the obligation to provide such funds for social objects, having collected
it for the specific purpose from citizens. But that would not mean that
financial assistance for sports can be the excuse for wide-ranging and
intrusive restrictions that rob the citizens of their right to self-governance of
institutions created through their charters.
20. Learned counsel submitted that the impugned policy is not law and
cannot divest the citizens of their rights under Part III of the Constitution.
He further emphasized that the Right to Free Speech under Article 19(1)(c)
and the Right to Freedom of Association under Article 19(1)(c) can be
subject to lawful and reasonable restrictions on specific rights, such as
“public order”. The petitioners argue that imposing tenure restrictions can
never fall within the term “public order” as to justify the impugned policy in
that regard. Learned counsel relied upon the decision reported as Damyanti
Naranga v. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors. , 1971 (1) SCC 678, Bijoe
Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. , 1986 (3) SCC 615 and
Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Anr. v. District
Registrar Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Ors. , 2005 (5) SCC 632.
21. Learned counsel lastly argued that the impugned executive measures
are arbitrary and unreasonable. They violate Article 14 of the Constitution
by interference with internal affairs of the IOA and the NSFs. In this
context, it was submitted that the Directive Principles of achieving
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 18


international peace under Article 51-A of the Constitution has been
undermined through the impugned policy. Elaborating upon this, it was
submitted that the IOC is the supreme authority of the Olympic movement
and the policy strikes a discordant note with the Charter. The IOC Charter
had not imposed the nature and quality of restrictions, leaving it to the best
wisdom of individual National Olympic Federations and Sports Federations.
The imposition of impugned guidelines and policies has resulted in the
destruction of the autonomy guaranteed to the IOC by the Charter. This
resulted in the IOA‟s suspension and de-recognition by the IOC on
04.02.2012. This was consequent to the election held under supervision of a
Commission with the presence of a government observer pursuant to the
orders of this Court in C.M. 2218/2013. The impugned policy, it is
submitted, amounts to pressurizing and coercing the IOA and NSF‟s of their
original autonomy guaranteed by the IOC Charter. Therefore, it is arbitrary.
The decision in Bhim Singh v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. , 2010 (5) SCC
538 emphasized the UOI‟s duty to furnish grants for guaranteeing the
purposes of Directive Principles of State Policy. Learned counsel argued that
the impugned policy, to the extent it erodes the independence of IOA and
imposes the UOI‟s will in regard to choice of leadership and office-bearers,
is arbitrary.
22. The UOI in its counter-affidavit refutes the petitioner‟s contentions.
The learned Solicitor General highlighted that in a previous litigation, i.e.
Mr. Narinder Batra v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 7868/2005, a learned Single
Judge had located the source of legislative power of the UOI to Entries 10
and 13 of List I. It was further argued that in the said decision, the Court
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 19


emphasized that international sporting events are recognized as an essential
part of democratic relations between the nations and that political and
diplomatic clearances are required before teams participated in international
tournaments. The State Governments would be unable to exercise such
jurisdiction or undertake the task. The validity of the impugned guidelines,
submitted the Solicitor General, thus, was settled by the Court in Mr.
Narinder Batra (supra). It was also argued in addition that the UOI is also
competent to make a law or policy on the subject and issue executive
directions by invoking Entry 97 of the First List. In this regard, it was
submitted that the nature of the activity, i.e. inter-state and international
sports and the various facets applicable to it such as the need to secure
diplomatic clearances, realize significant Union funding and the general
necessity of fulfilling a common policy or approach to sports generally in
India cannot be catered to in by individual States. This would lead to
disharmony and chaos. The corollary, therefore, is that the power to frame
laws would be appropriately found in Entry 97 of the First List.
23. It was argued by the UOI that it neither seeks to interfere with the
autonomy nor working of the sports federation or IOA but it only seeks to
achieve transparency in their functioning. Learned counsel highlighted that
all guidelines issued by the UOI are in accordance with the provisions of
Olympic Charter and that the insistence on the impugned provisions would
not lead to the disqualification of the respective international federations. It
was emphasized that as many as 52 NSFs have given their consent and are
bound by the impugned guidelines and that the bogey of eroding of
autonomy has been raised only by the IOA. The UOI relied upon a list of
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 20


such federations that agreed to amend their respective bye-
laws/constitutions. Reliance was also placed on the order withdrawing
recognition of the IOA in respect of Archery Federation on 07.12.2012 on
account of its failure to amend the bye-laws.
24. The Solicitor General submitted that the materials on record would
show that roughly Rs. 435 crores was released to the sports federations
during the last four years. Apart from this, the sports federations received
indirect assistance, such as 100% Income Tax and Customs Duty exemption;
50% exemption in Income Tax for the donors, for those who donated money
to the IOA and recognized NSFs, which helps them secure such donations,
railway concession extended to sports personnel for participation in national
and state-level tournaments and infrastructure created by the Sports
Authority of India (SAI), given at considerable subsidized rates. It is stated
that these subsidies cannot be quantified easily as they are provided by
various field units of the UOI located at various places. Other than these,
stated learned counsel, the UOI also provides for basic playfields and block
panchayats under various programmes and schemes, aimed at achieving
sports development. Learned counsel also emphasized that the petitioner‟s
argument about the elections held through intervention of government being
the cause for de-recognition by the IOC is no longer correct. It was stated
that the Union Sports Minister met the IOC in a meeting at Lausanne when
various aspects were discussed and finally it was resolved that the
Government, even while respecting the IOCs (and IOA‟s) autonomy would
draw a Sports Bill in consultation with all concerned.
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 21


25. The Solicitor General also relied on the “aspect theory” mentioned
and applied by the Supreme Court in its decision reported as All India
Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India , 2007 (7) SCC 527 and
urged that one legislative entry may seemingly cover all facets of the subject
matter, but in reality one or more aspects may properly fall within the
domain of another legislative authority, under another field. It was therefore
urged that international sports, by its very nature was incapable of being
encompassed within the field of “sports” falling in the State List.
26. Sh. Rahul Mehra, who intervened and was heard during the
proceedings in public interest, argued that the Sports Code outlines
provisions for the good governance of the IOA and NSFs. It is submitted
that these bodies in fact perform public functions and possess monopoly to
regulate, manage and control their respective sports disciplines in India. This
is a kind of sponsorship given by the State through recognition. The
jurisdiction of such bodies extends over the whole of India. These State
bodies and the IOA control the sports disciplines in the country at all levels,
especially complete control over team selection and appointment of referees
and umpires of various events and coaching. Crucially, they have access to
extremely important resources, such as National Sports Coaches and
facilities provided, generated, developed and maintained by the UOI. The
UOI in fact facilitates the tasks of these sports bodies in hiring international
coaches and access to sports goods, equipments and materials in
international sporting events. Further, Mr. Mehra urged these federations
and office-bearers represent the entire country, and thus must maintain the
highest standards. The federations enjoy exemptions and subsidies in the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 22


form of income tax subsidies, Entertainment Tax, Excise and Customs
rebates etc.
27. The intervener argued that there can be no denial that the IOA and all
other Respondent NSF‟s are performing key public functions which are akin
to State functions and thus ought to be accountable, responsible and
transparent in their functioning. It is submitted that IOA and all NSFs, are
“State” under Article 12/226 of the Constitution of India as they perform
key public functions. For this, reliance is placed on Rahul Mehra & Anr. v.
UOI and Ors. , 114 (2004) DLT 323, Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. UOI and Ors. , JT
2005 (2) SC 8, Mr. Narinder Batra v. Union of India , ILR (2009) 4 Delhi
280, G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, 2003 (4)
SCC 225 and Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas , 2003 (10) SCC 733
28. The intervener argues that the Union of India possesses legislative
competence to frame laws for regulating sports at the inter-state, national
and international level in view of Article 245 and 246 of the Constitution of
India taking recourse to the doctrine of Pith and Substance. He urges that
supremacy of Parliament has been provided for by the non obstante clause
under Article 246(1) of the Constitution of India and the words „subject to‟
in Article 246 (2) and (3). Under Article 246 (1), if any of the entries in the
three lists overlap, the entry in List I will prevail. It is submitted that State
legislatures have no legislative competence to legislate with regard to any
subject outside the territorial boundary of the State be it subject of “Sports”.
In this context, it is urged that under Entry 33, it cannot be contended or held
that a State Government can regulate national teams; inter-state and
international sporting events, national level coaching or international events
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 23


or inter-state, national and international sporting relations. The State
Government also cannot issue guidelines on the manner in which the Central
Government is to dispense its largesse including financial assistance. It
cannot also regulate the manner in which the Central Government shall grant
recognition to a sports association or federation as a national level body. It
cannot also be argued that without such recognition, the association can
select a national team. When Entry 33 of List II is so read, it is clearly
evident that the general and residuary powers in all matters relating to sports
at the national level remain beyond the legislative competence of the State.
Sports are not exclusively mentioned as a subject in List I or III. Sporting
activity at the macro-level is beyond not only the boundaries of the State but
also beyond national boundaries. Several important issues of expertise and
diplomatic relations have come into play. The consideration of sports at the
narrow state level loses all significance when examined from these angles.
The intervener also relies on other entries in List I and List III, which state
as follows:
“25. Education, including technical education, medical education
and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66
of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.”
29. Mr. Mehra submits that sports has always been considered as an
integral part of education and human resources development and for this
reason there is a department under the Ministry of Human Resource
Development. Any educational programme would be incomplete without
sports as an essential part. Moreover, participation of the Indian team puts at
stake the national reputation involving matters of rules, regulations and
sporting policies. It is essential that national level bodies or their personnel
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 24


are involved in international level decision making. Mr. Mehra supports the
submission of the Solicitor General for the UOI that the subject matter of
international sports falls within Entries 10 and 13 of List I. He says that
international sporting events are an essential part of diplomatic relations of
the nations. Hostility in political relations, issues of defense, security
concerns of players, public policy concerns with regard to discriminatory
practices, apartheid and perceived human right violations have guided
nations in decisions to or not to participate in sporting events in different
countries. Political and diplomatic clearance is required by the Indian teams
before participation in the international tournaments and forums. No State
Government can undertake such exercise. This is clearly the province of the
Union Government. Furthermore, grant of visas for sportsmen and
administrators, provision of security to teams etc fall within the domain of
the Union. It is undisputed that the resources which are placed in the hands
of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports form a considerable part of the
budgetary allocation. There is extensive real estate in the form of stadia,
sports fields and facilities etc. which is also under its jurisdiction which is
put to the utilization of the encouragement and development of sports. Thus,
sports and attendant activities is one subject which, for different purposes
would be covered under different entries in different Lists in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India.
30. It is submitted that IOA and all sporting federations are substantially
funded by the UOI. Other assistance given includes national coach selection;
availability of facilities developed by UOI agencies such as Sports Authority
of India, financial assistance for acquisition of sports goods and materials;
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 25


organization of programs etc, all show exclusive Union participation. State
Governments do not have the legislative competence to enact laws with
regard to any subject at the national and international level. The power,
therefore, of the State legislature to frame laws regulating sports under Entry
33 of List II is restricted to matters relating to sports within their boundaries.
Such empowerment certainly cannot prohibit or denude the Parliament from
its legislative competence to regulate sports at the national and international
level.
31. Additionally, while conferring primacy on the Union, the
Constitutional provisions clearly delineate the jurisdiction of the State. The
residuary power, to legislate in regard to un-enumerated subjects, in the
Concurrent List or the State List has conferred upon Parliament by virtue of
Article 248. Entry 97 of List I gives effect to the power conferred on the
Union under Article 248. When sports becomes part of the national or
international level as at the level of selection of sportspersons for
representation of the country; appointment of national coaches, sports
activity and exchanges at the national and international level, etc., the
Central Government alone would have the power and competence to
regulate the same. The powers are clear and distinct. The entries in the Lists
when meaningfully and harmoniously construed, display no conflict of
jurisdiction or overlap.
32. Further, it is urged that the minority view in Zee Telefilms (supra)
considered the law/rule-making power of the National level sports body. It
was noticed that an NSF is entitled to represent the nation and regulate the
sport in the country. It would have duties to perform towards players,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 26


coaches, umpires, administrators and team officials. Aspects of ensuring
several rules for the sport to prevent physical injury to all concerned has to
be continuously reviewed. Health, sociability and play are important values
to be recognized in the human being. International sporting events promote
and aim at good relations in the comity of nations; promote peace and
prosperity for the people even at the domestic level. Development of sport at
the national level would include nomination of players for national awards,
such as the Arjuna Award, which are accepted by the Government. The
intervener also refers to the fact that now the Department of Sports falls
within the jurisdiction of the Union Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports; it
was earlier a part of the Ministry of Human Resource Development till its
nd
segregation in terms of Item 6 of the 2 Schedule of the Rules for
Allocation of Business framed in exercise of powers under Article 77. It is
vested with the power to recognize a federation or association as a national
federation and also to regulate interaction at the international level. It
performs the essential task of coordinating between the activities of different
states.
33. It is, therefore, submitted that till the time all the recognized NSF‟s,
including the IOA continue to perform the aforementioned public functions
which are akin to State functions such as selection of Team India, etc. and
till such time that these Federations/Associations continue to be
substantially funded, directly or indirectly, by the State and/or its
instrumentality they cannot seek absolute autonomy without any
accountability, responsibility and transparency and must conform to the
Sports Code notified by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports to ensure
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 27


adoption of good democratic principles and best international practices
essential for making India a sporting superpower.
Analysis and Conclusions
Issue 1 - Legislative competence :
34. The petitioners on the one hand urged that Parliament lacks legislative
competence over sports, as well as societies which are “unincorporated
corporations”, and that consequently the impugned National Sports Policy
framed under executive authority is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
Central Government. The position of the UOI and the intervener on the
other hand is that Olympic sports are international in nature and that
consequently the UOI is competent to frame policies, since Parliament is
entitled to enact laws under Entries 10, 13 & 97 of List I. The competing
entries in this regard are as follows:
“List II: 33. Theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas subject to
the provisions of entry 60 of List I; sports, entertainments and
amusements.”

“List I: Entry 10
10. Foreign affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation
with any foreign country.

XXX
List I:Entry 13
13. Participation in international conferences, associations and other
bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat.

XXX
List I: Entry 97
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 28


97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including
any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.”

35. For the sake of completeness it would also be essential at this stage to
notice the powers of the State to legislate upon societies and other such
bodies, which is found in Entry 32 of List II:
“ 32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other
than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated
trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and
associations; co-operative societies. ”

36. The competing entry enabling the Parliament to enact laws in regard
to unincorporated Corporations is Entry 44 of List I:
“ 44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations,
whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not
including universities. ”

Finally, Entry 43 of List I reads as follows: -

“ 43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading
corporations, including banking, insurance and financial
corporations but not including co-operative societies. ”

37. The petitioners had relied upon Tibia College (supra) to urge that
State Legislature possesses exclusive power to enact laws and State
Governments possess powers to frame policies in respect of societies. The
principal argument in support of applicability of that decision was that
societies are unincorporated entities and cannot be called „corporations‟. In
Tibia College , the precise question which arose for consideration was as to
the status of a society registered under the provisions of Societies
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 29


Registrations Act, the functions and management of which were transferred
to a Board created by State enactment. The Supreme Court rejected the
contention that a society is a corporation. The contention made in that regard
was as follows:

“ The point which the learned Advocate for the petitioners has
emphasized is that under Section 21 aforesaid the extent of the
legislative power of the Delhi State Legislator was limited to making
all laws in the whole or any part of Delhi State with respect to any
th
matter enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List of the 7
Schedule to the Constitution …

8. The argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the
old Board which was registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860 and is petitioner no.1 before us was a Corporation whose object
was not confined to State of Delhi, therefore, any Legislation with
regard to it would fall under Item 44 of List I and not under Item 32 of
List II. This argument consists of two parts - first is that the old
Board was the Corporation and secondly that its object was not
confined to one State. ”

38. The conclusions of the Supreme Court were as follows:
“19… It appears to us that the legal position is exactly the
same with regard to the provisions in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of
the Societies Registration Act, 1860. They do not show any
intention to incorporate, though they confer certain privileges
on a registered society, which would be wholly unnecessary if
the registered society were a corporation.
Sections 13 and 14 do not carry the matter any further in
favour of the petitioners. Section 13 provides for dissolution of
societies and adjustment of their affairs. It says in effect that on
dissolution of a society necessary steps shall be taken for the
disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims
and liabilities, according to the rules of the society; if there be
no rules, then as the governing body shall find it expedient
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 30


provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the said
governing body or the members of the said society, the
adjustment of the affairs shall be referred to the Court. Here
again the governing body is given a legal power somewhat
distinct from that of the society itself; because under s. 16 the
governing body shall be the governors, council, directors,
committee, trustees or other body to whom by the rules and
regulations of the society the management of its affairs is
entrusted.
20. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the
provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential
characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an
intention to incorporate the society … ”

39. It is thus clear that in Tibbia, the Supreme Court held that societies are
unincorporated associations and could therefore be regulated by valid laws
enacted by the State legislature under Entry 32 of List II. This however did
not determine completely what constitutes „regulation‟ of a corporation
under that Entry. This aspect was built upon, in part, in a later decision, S.P.
Mittal v. Union of India , AIR 1983 SC 1. The question that arose there was
whether Parliamentary was competent to enact a legislation enabling take-
over of management of the affairs of the petitioner society, incorporated
under a law governing societies in West Bengal. The Court held that
Parliament was competent. After referring to Tibbia , the Court held:
“The fact that the Society, which was registered under the West
Bengal Act, has been a channel of funds for the setting up of the
cultural township of Auroville and has been managing some aspects
of Auroville, does not bring Auroville under the domain of the West
Bengal Act. The right of management of property is itself a property
right.
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 31


The Solicitor General also tried to bring the subject matter of the
impugned legislation under various other entries of List I or List III of
the Seventh Schedule viz., entries 10, 20, 41 and 42 of List III and
entry 10 of List I. But it is not necessary for us to examine whether the
subject matter of the impugned legislation falls under any of the
entries of List I or List III if once we hold that the subject matter does
not fall within the ambit of any of the entries of List II. Even if the
subject matter of the impugned legislation is not covered by any
specific entry of List I or List III, it will be covered by the residuary
entry 97 of List I.
In our opinion the impugned Act even incidentally does not trench
upon the field covered by the West Bengal Act as it is in no way
related to constitution, regulation and winding up of the Society In
R.C. Cooper v. Union(1) it was laid down that a law relating to the
business of a corporation is not a law with respect to regulation of a
corporation.
Having heard the counsel for the parties, our considered opinion is
that the subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by entry 32
of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Even if the subject matter of the
impugned Act is not covered by any specific entry of List I or III of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution it would in any case be covered
by the residuary entry 97 of List I. The Parliament, therefore, had the
legislative competence to enact the impugned Act.” (emphasis
supplied)
The Sports Code in this case similarly concerns regulations relating to how
the IOA and NSFs are run (i.e. their business). Having regard to the above
decisions, this Court is of the opinion that the sports code cannot be said to
fall within Entry 32, as is sought to be contended by IOA.
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 32


Does the National sports code fall within Entry 33 (List II) or any
entry in the Union List
40. The respondents‟ claim is, and indeed, a first impression may be that the
content and import of the National Sports Code falls within, at least in part,
Entry 13 of List I of the VII Schedule, which reads: “ Participation in
international conferences, associations and other bodies and
implementation of decisions made thereat .” Such a reading, however, would
be erroneous and twist the core of Entry 13. This entry allows the Central
Government to manage the foreign affairs of the country, and to that end,
participate in international conferences, discussions at international
associations and other bodies. The reason for the inclusion of Entry 13 was
to ensure that in the international sphere the Central Government would not
have its hands tied behind its back in terms of its negotiating ability, if the
content of the discussion at the international forum relates to subject matter
found in List II. The focus, therefore, is on vesting power in the Central
Government to represent a unitary view of the sovereign Indian state at
international fora, rather than to provide a power to regulate private conduct
at an international level (i.e. in private conferences, associations and other
bodies). The fact that Entry 13 is focused on sovereign (i.e. state) conduct
abroad, rather than the relations of non-state actors internationally, is evident
not only from the entries surrounding Entry 13, i.e. foreign affairs (Entry
10), diplomatic, consular and trade representation (Entry 11), United
Nations Organization (Entry 12), entering into treaties and agreements with
foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions
with foreign countries (Entry 14), all of which relate to ensuring a breadth of
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 33


power to regulate sovereign conduct at the international level, but also by
the Constituent Assembly Debates surrounding this entry.
th
41. On 25 August, 1947, an amendment by way of a proviso to Entry 13
was proposed in the following terms: “ Provided that the Federation shall
not by reason only of this entry have power to implement such decisions for
a province or a Federated State except with the previous consent of the
Province or of the State. ” This amendment was ultimately rejected by the
drafters of the Constitution, but the consensus reached on certain aspects
during the debate in the Constituent Assembly is instructive in this case.
Some comments are extracted below in order to support the view that Entry
13 relates to empowering the Parliament to legislate, and the Central
government to act in its executive authority, in relation to matters at the
th
international level. For example, Mr. Munshi stated, on 25 August, 1947,
that Entry 13
“ does not refer to bilateral treaties, but refers to international
conferences. Now, as the House knows very well, in this age
international relations are not necessarily governed by treaties.
There are various conferences at which India sends out her
representatives and she will be sending them out in much
larger measure in the future. At these conferences decisions are
taken on the footing that the representatives of India have got
the power to implement those decisions; no representative of
India will be heard with any weight at all, if he has to keep a
reservation that he would come back to this country and ask his
35 unit Governments and if one of them disagrees he would not
be able to implement those decisions. In this present world it
would be impossible for India in such conditions to take part
effectively in any conference, except of course as in a debating
society without coming to any decision. Therefore it is highly
essential that the central legislature as well as the Central
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 34


Government should have ample power not only to participate in
these conferences but to implement the decisions arrived at
there. ”
Similarly, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru noted:

“ The National Government, before accepting any
responsibility, will naturally consider whether the
responsibility will be one which can be discharged by the units
with their own unaided resources, or only with the aid of the
National Government. It will not be in a hurry to enter into
agreements which will involve large expenditure, because it
will in that case be morally bound to help the Provinces to fulfil
the obligations accepted by it' Honourable Member may be
afraid that the acceptance of international conventions might
involve the units in expenditure which they would be unable to
bear. ”

42. Even for those who supported the amendment, for example Sardar
KM Panikkar, the idea that Entry 13 related to sovereign conduct abroad
was clear, and the disagreement related to whether the Centre should be
vested with such powers vis-à-vis the provinces (which, in fact, also
supports the view that the core of Entry 13 goes towards sovereign conduct
undertaken by the Centre abroad that affects the provinces locally):
“ Therefore, the issue that arises is if the Union goes not merely
to a recognized international conference as the U.N.O. or is a
party to the I.L.O. as India may be, but say to the Moral Re-
armament conference at Switzerland, are we in position to give
effect to the decisions? In order to do so, it is absolutely
necessary that it must be related to a substantial item in the
federal or concurrent legislative list and the federal or
concurrent legislative lists have been made in such a manner as
to include every possible thing which may be of common
interest. So, what is left to the Provinces or States are purely
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 35


matters of local administration, not of an all-India or of a
common character. That being so, to entrust wide powers such
as the enforcing of decisions by legislation, the implementing of
any agreement or arrangement reached at international
association-itself a very dangerous definition, what kind of
international association or conferences it is not mentioned-is
most dangerous which will, nullify every provincial and State
constitution, because it is not limited to the subjects in the
federal or concurrent legislative list. After all, Section 106 of
the Government of India Act, as it stands, specifically limits the
power of implementing such decisions. I am as anxious as any
other Member here that the Central Legislature should have
ample powers to give effect to treaties and agreements reached
with other countries. But in order to do so it must be related to
one or other subject in the concurrent or the federal legislative
lists …”

43. A perceptive response to this assertion is that the drafters did not foresee
a question such as the one this Court is faced with today – a world in which
private bodies such as the IOA, in their engagement with internationally
recognized, but again private, sports bodies such as the International
Olympic Committee, would acquire such a monopoly over entire fields of
public activity. Indeed, it is plausible to claim that the drafters did not
imagine a state of events where an Indian private entity would regulate
activities within its field of activity with a strong public character and as
pervasively as Government regulation. Indeed, that the IOA and other sports
associations have acquired a quasi-norm creating character, such that they
regulate activities between a host of private entities in the field of sports is
undeniable. Plausibly, the associations‟ connections with their international
counterparts, and realization of decisions reached by the latter locally, are of
grave importance, and are coloured by the same shade of „public‟ activity.
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 36


What may flow from this depiction is the argument that Entry 13 should
thus be read to include such activities which are private in form but public in
substance, so truly give effect to the import of Entry 13. In an insightful
work „ Lex Sportiva- What is Sports Law? ‟ (ed. Robert C. Siekmann &
Janwillem Soek, Springer Publishers), Franck Latty („Trannational Sports
Law‟) criticizes the theory that international sporting bodies do not make
law and that the rules they frame are not law:
“ However, it is these bodies which, even before the states,
organize sporting competition in its manifold aspects (rules of
play, technical rules, qualification of athletes, anti-doping
rules, in some cases, the status and contracts of athletes, etc.).
Taking the view that these standards cannot claim to have the
quality of legal rules amounts to having a highly restrictive
conception of the law, which is well out of step with the
realities on the ground. The “Sports and the Law” theory finds
its roots in state positivism that necessarily links the law to the
state, the sole entity capable of imposing compliance through
physical constraint. However, pluralist theories have shown
that neither power nor law in essence linked to the state… ”

Therefore, whilst the depiction (of content of Entry 13 being broad and not
confined to participation by state agencies or the state alone) is true, the
argument does not follow. The expansion of private activity means that
many activities traditionally, or at least previously, controlled by sovereign
States are now in fact, controlled by private entities. Nonetheless, the
distinction between public (sovereign) and private actions cannot be
ignored, or papered over, by this development. The two remain, and with
good reason, legally dissimilar. The scope of Entry 13 is to regulate
sovereign representations abroad, and to regulate the scope of power
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 37


possessed by the Centre as against the States, and not for the Centre to
assume control over private entities in their relations internationally (at
private meetings/conferences/associations, which is precisely what the IOA
engages in), no matter how pervasive they may be. Indeed, that the Centre
possesses the capacity to act in relation to such private activities may be true
otherwise, but for the present purpose, the exercise of that power cannot be
included under Entry 13, lest the clear and unambiguous import of the entry
be skewed. The other construction would lead to horrendous consequences,
whereby non-sovereign or non-state participation by bodies (or associations)
and decisions taken in such meetings would be the basis for a Central
legislation, which, on account of Article 253 might well claim primacy, and
override concerns of the multitude of states forming the Indian Union.
44. The Code is a comprehensive set of guidelines dealing with various
aspects of sporting activity, which are separable from each other, and not
all the provisions are subject to the above reasoning. The Code, broadly,
deals with three aspects: first , to define the areas of responsibility of the
various agencies involved in the promotion and development of sports.
Second, to identify NSFs eligible for coverage under the guidelines, set
priorities and to detail the procedures to be followed by the Federations,
for availing Government sponsorship and assistance. Third , to state
eligibility conditions for receipt of Government recognition and grant.
45. The Code is a repository of all relevant notifications and circulars,
issued by the Central Government concerning NSFs, and made “ with a
view to bringing together all orders/notifications/instructions/circulars
issued post 2001 guidelines … these are now amalgamated with necessary
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 38


modifications, into one Comprehensive Code … ” (Ref to Communication
st
No. F.23-2/2011-SP-I, dated 31 January, 2011, which introduced the
Code). Accordingly, various aspects are dealt with under the Code, though
they are in reality standalone matters that do not necessarily depend on the
other parts of the Code. Here, it is useful to identify one thread of
regulation, i.e. permission for sending sports teams/persons abroad, which
is covered under Annexure VI to the Code, and for inviting foreign
teams/sportspersons to India, covered under Annexure VIII to the Code
(and related communications issued in this regard which are included in
the Code, as for example, Communication No. F.9-68/2009-SP-I, dated
th
11 October, 2009, which concerns

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 39


foreign country. ” In such cases, the decision to field a team representing
the Indian Union abroad, or to invite a team from another nation, is one
that may critically involve an external affairs question that only the
Central Government is competent to decide upon. In fact, this very
question was discussed by this Court in Mr. Narinder Batra v. Union of
nd
India , WP(C) 7868/2005 (decided on 2 March, 2009), in the following
observations:
“ 86. There can be no argument that international sporting
events have been considered an essential part of diplomatic
relations of the nations. Nuances of hostility in political
relations, issues of defence, security concerns of players,
objections on account of policies of discrimination, apartheid
and perceived human right violations have guided nations in
decisions to or not to participate in sporting events in
different countries. Political and diplomatic clearance is
required by the Indian teams before participation in the
international tournaments and forums. No State Government
would have the competence or the jurisdiction to undertake
such exercise. This is clearly the province of the Union
Government .”

Thus, in relation to such parts of the Code, and such parts alone , it is clear
that the Central Government is competent to act in its execute power under
Entry 10, List I.
47. The next claim – this one by the petitioners – is that the National
Sports Code falls within Entry 33, List II (which includes sports), and is
thus exclusively within the domain of the State executive. The question
that concerns the Court is whether the National Sports Code pertains to
sport in the sense contemplated by Entry 33. Clearly, regulation of sports
does come within the state list. However, it would be more accurate to
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 40


note that states have exclusive competence over sport s within their
territory , i.e . in the state/province, any regulation of sport is to be
conducted by the state and not the centre. The question before the Court
today, however, is different, i.e. who regulates sporting activit y between
states (nationally) and as regards the Indian Union internationally. Or
more accurately put, though in principle the same question, the question is
who regulates the private bodies that regulate such activities.
48. At present, the Central Government regulates various national and
international sporting activities in India. An exhaustive list of these
activities, even if possible, would be vast, and the Court will only narrate a
few instances to provide context to the following discussion on the scope
of Entry 33 of List II. For example, the Centre organizes coaching camps
for national teams representing India (Code, paragraph 10.2), as well as
getting coaches (Code, paragraph 10.7), organizes for participation of
Indian teams in international competitions and training abroad (bearing
costs of the sportspersons, their boarding, travel etc., Code paragraph
10.4), acquires clearances for, and assists in financing and conducting,
international tournaments organized by the NSFs in India (Code,
paragraphs 10.9, 15(1)(b)), provides funds for meeting the expenses on
local hospitality of foreign teams visiting India under cultural exchange
programmes (Code, paragraph 11), oversees selection of national teams by
the NSFs based on principles of merit (Code, paragraph 13), overseeing
national (inter-state) tournaments within India (Code, paragraph 15(1)(c))
etc. Undeniably, various executive issues- without which national teams
cannot operate (and the organization of international tournaments,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 41


amongst other issues would not be possible) are also touched by the
Centre through various levels in the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.
th
For example, Communication No. F.63-3/07-SP.III (dated 20 February,
2008) concerns boarding and lodging facilities to the national campers
during transit national coaching camps at Delhi, Communication No. F.52-
th
12/2000-SP.III/SP.I (dated 5 November, 2007) concerns procurement of
sports and other equipment required for the training of national teams,
th
Letters F.8-2/2009-SP.III (dated 10 November, 2009) and F.8-4/2009-
rd
SP.III (dated 23 February, 2009) concern grant of out of pocket
expenditure to national teams going abroad and permissions for managers
to travel with their teams. Equally, various other activities involving a
foreign relations aspect, as noted above, are conducted by the Centre.
49. If the petitioner‟s argument were to be correct, regulation of sports
between states and internationally (i.e. inter alia the various activities
mentioned above) would fall within a legal vacuum. This is because the
states would lack the competence to legislate and to act beyond their
borders; even more importantly, there would be chaos and conflicting
regulatory regimes, within each State concerning inter-state sports. The
Union on the other hand, would be enjoined through its inability to locate
this power under List I or List III. These activities, though relating to
sports, would be left unregulated- worse, prey to potentially conflicting
regimes , reducing effective regulation of inter-State and International
sport to farcical proportions. Clearly, the intent of the drafters was not to
prevent regulation of sports at the national or international level, which is
the necessary conclusion of a reading of Entry 33, List II which makes the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 42

Although the ground of lack of constitutional competence was not taken
by the petitioners there, the Court in that case also noted the existence of
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, constituted
under the Central Government, to the IOA and other recognized Sports
Federations.
50. This question can seen from another angle. NSFs, definitionally,
deal only with sports bodies at the national level, and thus, only those
sports which have a national/international presence. This excludes
regulation of both local sports (i.e. sports that are played only within
certain states) and local/state level sports bodies that regulate intra state
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 43


sports, within a particular state/district, which squarely fall within a state‟s
competence under Entry 33. In fact, as the Code recognizes in its

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 44


discussion within the Assembly on the question of „sports‟. However, on
nd
2 September, 1949, Shri Shibban Lal Saxena proposed to transfer Entry
33 (or, as it was then, proposed entry 44) from List II to List III. While
this amendment was rejected, this does not imply an exclusion of control
by the Centre over any activity associated with sports. Rather, that
amendment was moved with, and the subsequent discussion related to, a
rather different aspect of the entry. This is apparent from the record of the
debates on that day, which are extracted below:

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 45

53. Accordingly, this case is suitable to categorize in that field of
activity which should fall within Entry 97. The drafters of the Constitution
recognized that certain fields of activity, or spheres of action, may develop
with the course of time. Given that these matters were not capable of
identification, debate and placement in either of the lists, Entry 97 was
inserted into List I to allow the Centre‟s legislative and executive power to
expand accordingly to regulate such matters. The breadth of Entry 97,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 46


moreover, was considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Shri
Harbhajan Singh Dhillon , (1971) 2 SCC 779, as follows:

54. It is also noteworthy that the Seventh Schedule does not confer the
power to legislate, but only demarcates the legislative field between the
Centre and the States (see, Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of
India , (1969) 2 SCC 166,), limiting the power to legislate based on a
restrictive reading of entries clearly runs counter to the plenary power to
legislate, and act. As neither Entry 13, List I, nor Entry 33 List II, cover
the field within which the National Sports Code operates, the plenary
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 47


power to legislate under Article 248, under the residuary field of Entry 97,
covers the National Sports Code in this case.
55. This issue is also to be viewed from another important angle. Whilst
the Code concerns the regulation of several societies, (and other entities)
which are properly governed under Entry 32, List II, the focus of the
regulation is not against societies per se , but rather societies in their
character as NSFs (hereafter “ NSFs ”). These NSFs are societies registered
under state laws, undoubtedly, but it is their characterization as NSFs that
triggers regulation by the Code. Essentially, their legal character as
societies is not the relevant factor, and they may continue being just
societies without any Central Government interference. However, in order
to lay claim to the character of an NSF, their regulation concerns the
possession of that characteristic, rather than being targeted at the
„societies‟. The scope of Entry 32 and regulation (legislative or executive)
that in pith and substance falls within the entry is on the regulation of
societies as distinct legal entities recognized under state law. That a
regulatory measure concerns a society, but is truly aimed at the regulation
of another characteristic of that body (and not to its being a society),
cannot be said to fall within Entry 32. The necessary characteristic sought
to be regulated by the Sports Code of the IOA is its tag of a NSF (National
Sports Federation). In other terms, absent a positive act of recognition by
the Central Government, IOA would not be an NSF entitled to conduct the
various activities that it does. Accordingly, since it recognized as such a
body, and vested with those powers, its regulation (insofar as it concerns
its functioning as an NSF, i.e. to promote betterment of sports at the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 48


national and international level) rests with the Centre. On the other hand,
regulation of societies regulating sports purely at a state level, i.e. state
level federations/associations by the Centre would be impermissible by
this standard, a conclusion that is not only internally coherent in terms of
how these various entries are read, but one that also recognizes the
placement of sports in Entry 33 of the List II, and gives that placement a
full and appropriate meaning to ensure that no sphere of activity lies in a
legal vacuum where neither the Centre nor the State can legislate.
56. It is important to recognize that being a NSF, the IOA is entitled to
a host of benefits, and its failure to comply with Central Government
guidelines result in adverse consequences. The Code itself recognizes this
aspect, with the following observation at paragraph 3.6:

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 49


goods, sports equipment, sports requisites as an NSF (as under
th
Notification No. 5/2010-Customs, dated 19 January, 2010, and
th
Notification No. 146/94-Customs, dated 13 July, 1994,
“ goods … imported into India by … (2) a National Sports
Federation for its own use or for the use of its State/District
Affiliate Associations, in a national or international
championship or competition, to be held in India or abroad
or for the purposes of training , under a certificate issued by
the Sports Authority of India ” are exempt from “ the whole of
the duty of customs leviable thereon which is specified in the
said First Schedule and from the whole of the additional
duty leviable thereon under section 3 (of the Customs Tariff
Act, 1975) … ”
58. It would also not be able to avail itself of special dispensation
available to NSFs to remit funds towards sponsorship, prize money etc. for
activities abroad (as under Row 9, Schedule II of the Foreign Exchange
Management (Current Transaction Rules), 2000,
“ [r]emittance of prize money/sponsorship of sports activity
abroad by a person other than International / National / State
Level sports bodies, if the amount involved exceeds USD
100,000 ”

requires approval of the Union Department of Youth Affairs and Sports of
the Ministry of Human Resources Development, but since NSFs qualify as
a “National” sports body given the Department‟s recognition, they may
remit such amounts automatically and without prior approval).
Significantly, these benefits, and the label „NSF‟, are available only
through, and because of, recognition by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 50


Sports. That is to say that the relationship between the NSF (here, the
IOA) and its regulatory powers is critically dependent on its recognition
and characterization as an NSF. Accordingly, the regulation of the IOA is,
in the relevant part, regulation of an NSF which is conducting tasks that it
could other have not without that characterization.
59. Significantly, the IOA admits that, as a matter of law, NSFs in
themselves are legal. It nevertheless argues that their regulation by the
Centre is beyond its competence. However, these two strands of argument
cannot proceed together. NSFs themselves are entities created by the
Government of India, in that a society/association is recognized as an NSF
by the Government of India (under Annexure II of the Code) through a
process of accreditation and affiliation. Without the positive action of the
Government of India, the IOA would not exist independently as an NSF.
The IOA does not argue that this process of recognizing sports bodies as
NSFs transgresses into the State‟s powers under Entry 33, List II.
Crucially, if this is the case, then, as a necessary implication, their
subsequent regulation by the Centre is justified on the same ground.
Having legally (and with the requisite competence) created NSFs, their
regulation is only consequential. Such regulation may be seen and do
constitute terms and conditions of affiliation/recognition. If any sports
body currently recognized as an NSF wishes to free itself from such
regulation by the Centre, it may choose to discontinue being an NSF.
However, it is unconvincing to claim that the Centre is acting with
competence in conferring benefits upon such sports bodies (by
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 51


recognizing them as NSFs and giving them consequential benefits), but
acting outside its competence in creating guidelines for them.
60. The Court at this stage notes that the various regulatory measures
under the Code concern elections within NSFs and the conditions of
tenure of the office-bearers (for example, Communications No. F. 11-
th st
4/74-SP.I, dated 20 September, 1975, and F.8-17/2009-SP.III dated 1
May, 2010). They have not gone unnoticed, but rather, are precisely the
sort of guidelines that are covered by this line of reasoning. It is irrelevant
whether the content of the regulation concerns elections to the NSFs or
terms of office-bearers, on one hand, or the conduct of national sports
meets on the other, in that both those extremes still concern regulation of
NSFs qua that characteristic (as discussed above), and not qua their legal
form as a society, which would fall within Entry 32, List II.
61. The Code therefore does not fall (subject to the limited exceptions
mentioned above) within any specific entry under any of the lists in the
Seventh Schedule. Fairly, the crux of the Code revolves around the
regulation of NSFs (which are sui generis entities recognized by the
Central Government), their terms of affiliation and in a broader sense,
sporting activity nationally and internationally. Accordingly, this Court is
of the opinion that the Code falls under Entry 97, List I.
62. To summarize the above discussion, it is held that though “sports” per
se falls within the legislative field of the state, international sports, and
Olympic sports, involving international and inter-state (“national”)
ramifications are covered under Entry 97 of List I. The impugned code
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 52


therefore cannot be held to be beyond the executive power of the Union,
under Article 73 (1) of the Constitution of India.
Is the impugned code not valid and binding as it is not “law” under
Article 13 of the Constitution of India and whether the provisions
impugned are unreasonable restrictions?
63. This Court proposes to deal with both aspects, since they are closely
inter-related. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1963 SC 1295
undoubtedly holds that executive orders and fiats cannot restrict
fundamental rights and that such measures would require enactment of a
valid law by the competent legislature. The Supreme Court held to the
same effect in Bijoe Emmaneul (supra). Likewise, the holding in
Damayanti (supra, relied on by IOA) establishes that any order, or
statutory measure, which has the effect of foisting, or imposing members
in a society, or dictating a management, as part of a state measure, would
not be considered a “reasonable” restriction. There is no gainsaying that
mere executive orders cannot regulate or restrict fundamental rights. Such
restrictions – through orders – would have to possess statutory flavor, i.e.
be subject to enacted law. However, what the IOA is seeking here is a
declaration that the Union is not possessed of any power to regulate how it
chooses to sanction sports grants. The petitioners‟ argument is premised
on its right to form associations and carry out activities for which it is
incorporated, by exercise of its rights under Article 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution of India. The reference to Damayanti is therefore in the
context of its assertion of autonomy to carry out its activities,
uninterrupted by state regulations. Now, the decision of the Supreme
Court in All India Bank Employees Association v. National Tribunal , AIR
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 53


1962 SC 171, is an authority for the proposition that the right to form an
association does not entitle the citizen or individual, or group, forming the
association a concomitant right to claim that the objects for which the
association is formed too is part of the (larger) fundamental right to form
association. In that case, the precise question before the Court was the
regulation of unions to go on strike. The petitioners had urged that such
regulations were impermissible, given the limited nature of restrictions
which could be imposed under Article 19(4). It was asserted that the right
to protest or strike was one such concomitant right, intrinsically protected
under Article 19 (1)(c). The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
rejected this contention, observing as follows:
“the argument of the learned Counsel, viz., that the right
guaranteed to form "an union" carries with it a concomitant
right that the achievement of the object for which the union is
formed shall not be restricted by legislation unless such
restriction were imposed in the interest of public order or
morality, that calls for critical examination. We shall be
referring a little later to the authorities on which learned
Counsel rested his arguments under this head, but before doing
so we consider it would be proper to discuss the matter on
principle and on the construction of the constitutional provision
and then examine how far the authorities support or contradict
the conclusion reached.
The point for discussion could be formulated thus: When
sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 guarantees the right to form
associations, is a guarantee also implied that the fulfilment of
every object of an association so formed is also a protected
right, with the result that there is a constitutional guarantee
that every association shall effectively achieve the purpose for
which it was formed without interference by law except on
grounds relevant to the preservation of public order or morality
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 54


set out in cl. (4) of Art. 19? Putting aside for the moment the
case of Labour Unions to which we shall refer later, if an
association were formed, let us say for carrying on a lawful
business such as a joint stock company or a partnership, does
the guarantee by sub-cl.(c) of the freedom. to form the
association, carry with it a further guaranteed right to the
company or the partnership to pursue its trade and achieve its
profit-making object and that the only limitations which the law
could impose on the activity of the association or in the way of
regulating its business activity would be those based on public
order and morality under cl. (4) of Art. 19? We are clearly of
the opinion that this has to be answered in the negative. An
affirmative answer would be contradictory of the scheme
underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental
rights which are guaranteed by Part III and particularly by the
scheme of the seven freedoms or groups of freedoms
guaranteed by sub- cls. (a) to (g) of el. (1) of Art. 19. The
acceptance of any such argument would mean that while in the
case of an individual citizen to whom a right to carry on a trade
or business or pursue an occupation is guaranteed by sub-cl.
(g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19, the validity of a law which imposes any
restriction on this guaranteed right would have to be tested by
the, criteria laid down by cl. (6) of Art. 19. if however he
associated with another and carried on the same activity-say as
a partnership, or as a company etc., he obtains larger rights of
a different content and with different characteristics which
include the right to have the validity of legislation restricting
his activities tested by different standards, viz., those laid down
in el. (4) of Art. 19. This would itself be sufficient to
demonstrate that the construction which the learned Counsel
for the appellant contends is incorrect, but this position is
rendered clearer by the fact that Art. 19-as contrasted with
certain other Articles like Arts. 26, 29 and 30-grants rights to
the citizen as such, and associations can lay claim to the
fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article solely on the
basis of their being an aggregation of citizens, i.e., in right of
the citizens composing the body. As the stream can rise no
higher than the source, associations of citizens cannot lay
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 55


claim to rights not open to citizens, or claim freedom from
restrictions to which the citizens: composing it are subject.
The resulting position way, be illustrated thus If an association
were formed' for' the purpose of carrying on business, the right
to form it would be Guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art.
19 subject to any law restricting that right conforming to cl. (4)
of Art. 19. As regards its business activities, however, and the
achievement of the objects for which it was brought into
existence, its rights would be those guaranteed by sub-cl. (g) of
cl. (1) of art. 19 subject to any relevant law on the matter
conforming to el. (6) of Art. 19 ; while the property which the
association acquires or possesses would be protected by sub-el.
(f) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 subject to legislation within the limits
laid down by cl. (5) of Art. 19.
We consider it unnecessary to multiply examples to
further illustrate the point. Applying what we have stated
earlier to the case of a labour union the position would be this :
while the right to form an union is guaranteed by sub-el. (c),
the right of the members of the association to meet would be
guaranteed by sub-el. (b), their right to move from place to
place within India by sub-cl.(d), their right to discuss their
problems and to propagate their views by sub- cl. (a), their
right to hold property would be that guaranteed by sub-cl. (f)
and so on each of these freedoms being subject to such
restrictions as might properly be imposed by cls. (2) to (6) of
Art. 19 as might be appropriate in the context. It is one thing to
interpret each of the freedoms guaranteed by the several
Articles in Part III a fair and liberal sense, it is quite another to
read which guaranteed right as involving or including
'Concomitant rights necessary to achieve the object which
might be supposed to under lie the grant of each of those rights,
for that construction would, by a series of ever expanding
concentric circles in the shape of rights concomitant to
concomitant rights and so on, lead to an almost grotesque
result.”
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 56


64. In the present case, what is in issue is whether the Union
Government, through the Code (primarily designed to act as guidelines for
its functioning, in admissibility of concessions and state privileges, such as
customs duty waivers, access to state owned property, stadia, grants for
training, coaching, travel expenditure and foreign travel clearances, etc. to
the associations, which can claim such privileges) is violating the right of
these associations under Article 19(1)(c). Specifically, the standards
impugned in this case are the tenure restrictions of office bearers of such
associations. The reliance on Damayanti, (supra), as shall be presently
seen, by the petitioners, is inapt. That was a case where through legislation
certain individuals were imposed onto the membership of existing
association, (i.e. the Sammelan). These new individuals were not part of
the association‟s membership. The Supreme Court held the imposition to
be unreasonable, but even while doing so it took note of the previous
ruling in All India Bank Association:
“It is true that it has been held by this Court that, after an
Association has been formed and the right under Art. 19 (1)
(c) has been exercised by the members forming it, they have
no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to
be carried on in- the manner they desire. Those cases are,
however, inapplicable to the present case. The Act does not
merely regulate the administration of the affairs of the
Society, what it does is to alter the composition of the Society
itself as we have indicated above. The result of this change in
composition is that the members, who voluntarily formed the
Association, are now compelled to act in that Association
with other members who have been imposed as members by
the Act and in whose admission to membership, they had no
say. Such alteration in the composition of the Association
itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 57

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 58


to decide whether the judgment of the Gujarat High Court holding that the
restriction imposed by the petitioner co-operative society was invalid as it
affected the right to property and more specifically, the right to deal with
such property. The petitioner co-operative society had resolved not to
permit the sale of properties by its members to non-Parsis. An individual
member approached the High Court, impugning this as an unreasonable
restraint. The challenge was upheld by the High Court. Invoking the
principle in Damayanti, the Supreme Court held that the conditions for
inducting members was within the legitimate power of the co-operative
society to formulate and that so long as the condition of non-alienation
existed, and did not fall foul of any statutory condition or restriction, the
Courts could not coin and impose their own notions of public interest.
Without in any manner seeking to undermine the apparently wide nature
of observations in the judgment, this Court holds that the ratio has to be
viewed in the narrow prism of what were the facts and the fair application
of Damayanti . The Court held that if the association were to be compelled
to admit new members, as would be the inevitable consequence of transfer
(of the properties by its members) the freedom of existing members to
choose who ought to be members of the co-operative society would be
affected and impaired.
66. The impugned provisions of the Code in this case do not impose
anyone as a member. Nor does any part of the Code mandate that an
unrelated individual or nominee of a government or state agency should be
part of the IOA or any of its NSFs. Nor are non-members directed to be
elected. All that the impugned provisions direct is that to qualify for the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 59


privileges and concessions, for which these associations, including NSFs
and IOA, apply frequently, their respective charters or constitutions should
impose tenure restrictions, disentitling individual members from
monopolizing positions of power and influence for definitely spelt out
period(s). These conditions are qualitatively different from the kind in
scrutiny before the Supreme Court in Damayanti (supra) and Zorastrian
Co-operative (supra). In the latter decision the Court also cautioned that
public policy can be an “ unruly horse ” which should be sparingly, if ever,
resorted to in matters of contract entered into voluntarily, as would be the
case, where parties agree to form an association. The Court held that in the
absence of a statutory interdict, Courts should not „read in‟ conditions that
are absent in such associations‟ constitutions, as doing so would
undermine the basis of their formation. In Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash v.
Union of India & Ors. , 1963 (2) SCR 547 it was held that if the statute
imposes conditions subject to which alone recognition could be accorded
or continued,

Are the impugned regulations to be held unenforceable as they
impose disproportionate or unreasonable conditions violating
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 60


Article 14 and expose the IOA or NSFs to the risk of disaffiliation or
de-recognition by IOC or other such international bodies.
68. There are norms within the country which insist that even in purely
private companies – in which the State or the Government has no
shareholding, the managing director (appointed under Section 26 of the
Companies Act, 1956) cannot function as managing director of more than
one company. This restriction can be relieved if the second company,
through its Board of Director, unanimously resolves to appoint one who is
already a managing Director of another public limited company (Section
316(2)). Such an individual cannot hold office as Managing Director of
more than two companies. This norm exists, even in cases of entirely
private commercial organizations, and is put in place in because of the
regulatory power of the state, despite the commercial concern not seeking
aid or finance from the State or UOI. Likewise, in the case of banking
companies under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Chairman of a
bank has to be a full time employee of the bank; he cannot be director in
some other company or companies, and has a tenure of five years, is
entitled to re-election or appointment (Section 10-B). His or her term can
be curtailed by removal, by the Reserve Bank of India; the provisions of
Section 10-B prevail, by virtue of Section 10-D. These apply whether or
not a banking company is a nationalized bank or a private bank.
69. The existence of norms such as the instances pointed out in the
preceding paragraph are manifestation of society‟s concern that companies
and banks should be regulated in a particular manner regardless of whether
they seek or are dependent on aid, or recognition for their activities. In the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 61


case of IOA and NSFs, the concerns are equally, if not greater; every
international event requires great degree of Union involvement – funding,
international clearance, co-ordination with other agencies, etc.
70. It is also relevant here that the IOA‟s argument that prescribing tenure
or other restrictions, as a condition for Central assistance or recognition,
undermines its autonomy, central to continued recognition by IOC, is not
correct. There are laws in several parts of the world- for instance in
Malaysia (through the Sports Development Act, 1997), in the United states
(through the Amateur Sports Act, 1978- also called the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act) that conditions of recognition of such
sporting bodies are regulated. The US enactment (36 US Code Chapter 2205
at 2205-22, „Eligibility requirements‟) inter alia provides that the body or
association seeking recognition :
“(11) provides for reasonable direct representation on its board of
directors or other governing board for any amateur sports
organization that—
(A) conducts a national program or regular national amateur
athletic competition in the applicable sport on a level of proficiency
appropriate for the selection of amateur athletes to represent the
United States in international amateur athletic competition; and
(B) ensures that the representation reflects the nature, scope,
quality, and strength of the programs and competitions of the
amateur sports organization in relation to all other programs and
competitions in the sport in the United States..”

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71. In fact both the enactments referred (Malaysia as well as the United
States) prescribe standards, including the standards concerning internal
governance etc. which sports bodies have to comply. The US statute
stipulates these conditions as applicable to the US National Olympic
federation, or sporting body. The New Zealand Sport and Recreation Act,
2002, likewise established a statutory agency whose functions are to
(m)facilitate co-ordination between national, regional, and local physical
recreation and sport organisations: and “ (n)represent the Government‟s
policy interests in physical recreation and sport internationally. ” So is the
Australian Sports Commission Act, 1989 premised on overriding state
interest in regulation of sports, especially international sports including the
funding and co-ordination of functioning of Olympic sports bodies. This is
achieved through a statutorily mandated company or corporation, known
as the Australian Sports Foundation. The argument of the petitioners
therefore that State regulation or stipulations tenure restrictions impinge
on the autonomy of IOA and NSFs falling foul of the Charter is
unappealing.
72. An added reason why the petitioners‟ argument has to fail is that
even otherwise, the laws of the land – as well as norms which are binding
upon citizens and entities such as the petitioners when they engage with
the state or seek its aid or assistance – must prevail in a uniform and non-
arbitrary manner. Surely, neither IOA nor any NSF can complain that the
operation of provisions of law, which affect their functioning, such as
grant of tax exemptions, state policies enabling them to claim access to
resources, labour and employment laws and a host of general laws
applicable to all others would apply. The argument of governance
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 63

73. State or social concern in regard to regulation of sports can be
achieved, inter alia, through the method of requiring certain definitive
policies to be followed by the NSFs and the IOA to ensure its
representative character, aimed at the larger common good in the world of
sport and to avoid development of cliques or cabals in sporting federations
or bodies. Such cabals beget not only concentration of power, but thrive in
opaqueness in all their dealings- functioning, finances and most
importantly selection of sportspersons to represent the country in the
concerned field of sport. The overriding concern of the Central
Government in ensuring that the decision making are by bodies which
such cabals operate, is sought to be achieved by such tenure restrictions.
So long as the Central Government has the authority to recognize the
national sporting federations and the IOA, even for the purpose of funding
and declaring which of them is entitled to use the national emblem or use
the term “India”, insistence on such regulations, is legitimate. The
important aspect here is that the Central Government, through the Code is
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 64


not saying that absent such compliance, there would be any deprivation of
an existing right; all that it suggests is that if recognition and funding for
various purposes is sought (towards travel, boarding and lodging,
coaching facilities, tax exemptions, etc) the NSF has to comply with these
guidelines. In other words, it is not as if the violation of such norms leads
to any adverse consequence, in the form of a penal sanction, or
blacklisting. The body simply cannot claim to select a team that represents
“India” or hold itself out as “Team India”. The Petitioners‟ argument that
Sports Code provisions are unenforceable, as they are not “law” therefore,
is without merit.

75. It has been held in several judgments that as a condition for
granting aid, the Government or state agency can direct that the recipient
institution should be managed in a particular manner. Thus, in TMA Pai
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*
52. The expression “public purpose” under Article 282 should be
widely construed and from the point of view of the Scheme, it is clear
that the same has been designed to promote the purpose underlying
the directive principles of State policy as enshrined in Part IV of the
Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the implementation of
the directive principles is a general responsibility of the Union and
the States. The right to life as enshrined in Article 21 in the context of
public health is fully within the ambit of State List Entry 6, List II of
the Seventh Schedule.
*
54. Even under the Government of India Act, 1935, a similar
provision was contained in Section 150(2) under the heading
“Miscellaneous Financial Provisions”. The Constitution-makers have
clarified the expression “purpose” by making it a “public purpose”
thereby clearly circumscribing the general object for which Article
282 may be resorted to, that is, for a “public purpose”. It was pointed
out before us that similar provisions are also found in the
Constitutions of other countries such as USA and Australia. Reference
was made to the first clause of Article I(8) of the Constitution of the
United States of America, which states that:
“8. The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States;”
*
56. The analysis of Article 282 coupled with other provisions of the
Constitution makes it clear that no restriction can be placed on the
scope and width of the article by reference to other articles or
provisions in the Constitution as the said article is not subject to any
other article in the Constitution. Further, this article empowers the
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 67


Union and the States to exercise their spending power to matters not
limited to the legislative powers conferred upon them and in the
matter of expenditure for a public purpose subject to fulfilment of
such other provisions as may be applicable to the Constitution their
powers are not restricted or circumscribed. Ever since the inception
of the Constitution several welfare schemes advancing the public
purpose/public interest by grants disbursed by the Union have been
PLAD
implemented. It is pointed out that M Scheme is one amongst the
several schemes which have been designed and implemented under
Article 282 . ”
76. State aid or recognition in matters such as sport can be premised on
fulfillment of certain pre-conditions. At this stage, it would be relevant to
analyze some of the important contents of the Sports Code. Annexure II
contains the Guidelines for Recognition of NSFs. This prescribed the
eligibility requirements to be registered as an NSF. Importantly, Clause 3.5
regulates the tenure of Office bearers in accordance with Government orders
(which are found in Annexures XI and XIII). Annexure XI is Order No. F.
th
11-4/74-SP.1, dated 20 September, 1975, and in Clause 3(i) and 3(ii)
regulates the term of an office bearer (i.e. President, Secretary and Treasurer
only), and the maximum period for which the office may be held (4 years,
and a period of 8 years consecutively maximum). Further, this order
prescribes that an office bearer in one NSF cannot hold office in another
NSF, except the IOA. Subsequently, Annexure XIII is a letter, F. No. 8-
st
17/2009-SP-III, dated 1 May 2010, making certain changes to the tenure
requirements “ after taking into account the facts and circumstances of the
case, and the views expressed by the Hon‟ble Courts and Parliament, and
the prevailing public opinion on the matter, and with a view to encouraging
professional management, good governance, transparency, accountability,
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 68


democratic elections etc. ” That letter introduces a maximum age limit to
hold office, i.e. 70 years, and further, indicates that the President may hold
the position for a maximum period of 12 years, and other office bearers
must, after two successive terms of 4 years, have a cooling off period of 4
years. Following up on this, Annexure XIV is a letter F. No. 8-17/2009-SP-
th
III, dated 17 May, 2010, asking the NSFs to comply with the government
guidelines on good governance, especially provisions relating to the tenure
and election of office bearers, as indicated above, in the context of the
Olympic Charter, the „Basic Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic
and Sports Movement‟ and the decision taken in the XIII Olympic Congress
indicating that essential nature of athletes‟ involvement in decision making,
with full voting rights and the establishment of a grievance redressal
mechanism for athletes. Similarly, Annexure XXXVII is the “ Model
Election Guidelines to be Followed by All National Sports Federations ”,
which ensures that the process of elections is fair and transparent, without
any issues of bias. (this also provides the form of the ballot papers, result of
counting of votes, declaration of results, list of contesting candidates, list of
the electoral college, manner of election, scrutiny of candidates and so on in
th
great detail). Annexure XXXII is a letter, F. 14-82/2009-SP.IV, dated 18
December, 2009, indicates that in terms of Rule 15(2) of the CCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1964, no Government servant can be an office bearer, or run for
elections to that post, in any NSF, unless otherwise permitted. This is
th
supplemented by Annexure XXXIII, No. 14-82/2009-SP.IV, dated 4
February, 2010, which reiterates this rule.
Financial Regulation
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77. Annexure IX (modified partially by Annexure LIII) is a letter F. No.
1-27/B6-D.I(SP) dated 2rd September, 1988, prescribing guidelines for
providing financial assistance NSFs for meeting the pay and allowances of
Joint Secretaries/Assistant Secretaries employed by them, and prescribing
the qualifications for appointment of such Joint Secretaries and Assistant
st
Secretaries, by a letter F. No. 1-28/88-SP-IV, dated 21 February, 1989.
th
Annexure XXXVI is a letter, No. 9-1/2008-SP.I, dated 18 February, 2009,
indicating the documents required by the Government for releasing the grant
in aid to the NSFS.
Suspension or Recognition of NSFs:
78. Annexure III indicates the grounds for which the NSF status can be
suspended. This includes, inter alia , suspension by the concerned
international or Asian federation, failure to hold elections as prescribed in
the Constitution of the NSF or in accordance with the government guidelines
or gross irregularities in election procedures, failure to submit an annual
audited account, non-compliance with the conditionalities prescribed by the
Government etc. Annexure XXXIX, No. 9-6/98-SP.II/SP.I (Vol. II), dated
TH
11 June, 2009, indicates the conditions to be fulfilled by that sport for the
Sport Associating regulating it to be recognized as an NSF (game should
have an all-India spread, should be recognized by the School Games
Federation of India etc.) in respect of sports which are not included in the
Olympic, Commonwealth or Asian Games,
79. Development/Regulation of Sporting Activity is dealt with in
Annexure X which contains guidelines for preparation of a 4 year
Development Plan (corresponding to the Asian Games cycle of 4 years) for
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the future development of sport, i.e. to develop sports infrastructure,
improve training, encourage competitions, improve the availability of
equipment to sportspersons etc. This document provides guidelines for the
headings that the Development Plan of each NSF Should consider, such as
athlete development, coaching, officiating, development of clubs,
participation in international tournaments etc. Similarly, Annexure XXI, F.
th
49-3/2008-SP-II, dated 18 September, 2008, provides guidelines to NSFs
on how to ensure efficient management of coaching camps, selection of
coaches and athletes to ensure quality is maintained in such processes.
th
Equally, Annexure XL, F. No. 63-3/07-SP.III, dated 20 February, 2008,
concerns the mechanism for providing board and lodging facilities to
sportspersons in National Camps during Transit National Coaching Camps
in Delhi.
80. Crucially, Annexure XLVIII is a letter, F. 13-27/2007-SP.III, dated
th
10 January, 2008, asking NSFs to prepare a data-base of performance of
individual players in national and international events, including the number
of times the player has had foreign exposure, his/her performance in the past
one year, the justification for being included in the proposed tour and the
comments of the Government Observer.
th
81. Annexure XVI, F. 32-18/2009-SP.III, dated 25 November, 2009, is a
letter indicating measures to be taken to curb age fraud in sports, and a
th
letter, F. No. 8-10/2010-SP-III, dated 12 August, 2010, ensuring
compliance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishakha on the
prevention of sexual harassment of women in sports. Annexure XX, F. 49-
th
3/2008-SP-II, dated 18 September, 2008, are guidelines for dope testing
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 71


procedures, indicating how the procedure should be unbiased and
transparent, and ensuring compliance with the World Anti-Doping Authority
Code. Importantly, Annexure XXXI is a letter, No. 94-11/2007-SP.I, dated
st th
31 August, 2010, read with a previous letter of 18 August, 2010, concerns
the management of para athletes and their training, especially as regards
such athletes‟ ability to take escorts along for assistance.
82. Some regulation concerns the acquisition of equipment – Annexure
th
XXIII (read with Annexure XXX) is a letter, F. 52-12/2000-SP-I, dated 4
February, 2010, and Notification No. 5/2010 and 146/94 of the Customs
Authorities indicating that sports equipment ordered by NSFs is exempt
from import duty. Similarly, Annexure XXV is Policy Circular No.
th
31/2009-2014, dated 26 April, 2010, (read with Notification No. 101/2010
of the Customs Authorities) facilitating the import of weapons by renowned
shooter, by rationalizing and liberalizing the procedure. Annexure XXVII
XXVIII and XXIX also operate in this field, prescribing the procedure by
which such shooting equipment can be procured, and Annexure XLI
concerns procurement of sporting equipment generally for training of
National Teams and in National Coaching Camps.
83. The Code contains various forms, for various purposes: Annexure IV,
is a form for application for financial assistance to the NSF for holding
coaching camps, Annexure VI, is an application form for obtaining approval
for sending sports teams/persons abroad; Annexure VII is an application
form for financial assistance to the sports federations/associations for
national championships; Annexure VIII is an application form for obtaining
approval of the Government of India for inviting foreign
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 72


teams/sportspersons to India; Annexure XII is an application form for
recognition of NSF; Annexure XLII is an application form for financial
assistance of purchase of equipment (supplemented by Annexure XLIII,
which prescribes the procedure for such purchases). Annexure XV is a letter,
F.9-69/2009-SP-II, concerning the management of records of NSFs, which
are to be forwarded to the Government. Annexure XVIII is a letter, F. 26-
2/2010-SP-II, declaring NSFS as public authorities under the Right to
th
Information Act. Annexure XIX is a letter, F. 9/68/2009-SP-I, dated 11
October 2009, indicating that NSFS must draw an advance calendar of
teams travelling abroad, and foreign teams coming to India, in order to
obtain clearance from the Ministry of External Affairs. This is supplemented
by Annexure L concerning the provision of security clearance for
teams/persons from certain countries, XLVII indicating when permission is
required to be taken, and XLVI, which deals with managers of teams also
th
going abroad. Annexure XXII is a letter, F. 45-5/2008-SP-I, dated 26
December, 2008, indicating that only Indian citizens can represent India
th
internationally. Annexure XLV, F. 8-2/2009-SP.III, dated 10 November,
2009, provides for an out of pocket allowance for sportspersons representing
India abroad.
84. The breadth of the above regulations – which go to the extent of
prescribing the staffing requirements and pay, salaries etc of NSFs and IOA,
and stating that irregularities in the manner of holding elections, or failure to
hold elections can result in loss of recognition – show that the Central
Government has placed measures which enable it to oversee the activities of
these bodies, for ensuring that the funds are properly utilized. It is necessary
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 73


to emphasize that aid given to these bodies and organizations is not in the
form of monetary grant alone; it enables sportswomen and sportsmen as well
as sports administrators to travel stay abroad, buy equipment, attend
international events, whenever necessary obtain coaching expertise, attend
administrative or international non-sporting meetings, etc. Besides, sports
and sports related equipment (specialized medical equipment geared for
sports) are imported, on payment of nominal or nil duty. Many organizations
might be obtaining sponsorships or international sponsorships or
endorsements, or be the canalizing bodies for such endorsements and
sponsorships on account of the conditions they impose on sportsmen and
administrators, and in the process earn considerable revenue, or facilitate it.
These are at least in many cases based on official recognition. That the
petitioners has not an issue with the manner the Central Government dictates
how funds are to be utilized, in all the verisimilitude of controls and
guidelines discussed above, is at once interesting and revealing. The
petitioners are not aggrieved by such degree of control – their objection is
only as to the tenure restrictions.
85. In the opinion of the Court, aid or recognition is not a one way street.
The Central Government‟s legitimate right to recognize these sporting
bodies, for the purpose of use of the expression “India” enabling national
sports teams sponsored by these NSFs and the IOA to in turn use that
appellation, carries with it, the right to insist that certain basic standards are
followed. With the right to grant or withhold such recognition is also the
right to spell out conditions, for the grant of aid- as such is undoubtedly the
case, because travel expenditure, and assistance for procurement of
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equipment would be aid (apart from use of state resources such as stadia,
customs duty waiver for importation of equipment, facilitation and co-
ordination during international events etc). The figure mentioned on behalf
of the Central Government towards positive grants for use these last four
years for travel purposes alone was Rs. 435 crores. Considering that the NSF
and IOA are free to use the national status conferred upon them by the
recognition and garner revenue, in the form of endorsement, sponsorships,
sale of event coverage rights to the media, etc, there cannot be two opinions
about existence of an overriding public or state concerns that such bodies do
not remain the preserve of the few, or worse, the moneyed and the powerful.
Conclusions
86. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the petitioners‟ contentions
are rejected. The Court reiterates its conclusions that international sports and
regulation of NSFs, and IOA, in respect of the matters which are the subject
of these proceedings, falls within Entry 97 of the First List to the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Central Government can insist
upon adherence to these provisions, without the aid of legislation. It is also
held that the Sports Code does not violate the freedom under Article
19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Neither are its provisions arbitrary. The tenure
restrictions impugned in this case can and are insisted upon as a part of the
public interest in efficient and fair administration of such NSFs. This Court
also specifically notes the letter/notice dated 20.09.1975, which forms part
of the Sports Code, as modified by the later letter of 01.05.2010, to the
following extent:
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“i. The President of any recognized National Sports Federation,
including the Indian Olympic Association can hold the office for a
maximum period of twelve years with or without break:
ii. The Secretary (or by whatever other designation such as Secretary
General or General Secretary by which he is referred to) and the
Treasurer of any recognized National Sports Federation, including
the Indian Olympic Association, may serve a maximum of two
successive terms of four years each after which a minimum 'Cooling
off period of four years will apply to seek fresh election to either post.
iii. The President, the Secretary and the Treasurer of any recognized
National Sports Federation, including the Indian Olympic
Association, shall cease to hold that post on attaining the age of 70
years.
iv. The other provisions in respect of the tenure limit as contained in
the letter of 1975 mentioned above shall remain as it is.
v. The above dispensation will come into operation with immediate
effect.”
This regulation (subject to any subsequent amendments) should, till
appropriate legislation is framed by Parliament, bind the parties and all
NSFs as a condition for recognition, aid and crucially, for the use of the term
“India” by any team in International Olympic sporting event.
87. Sports administration in this country appears to have reached depths
from where neither sporting bodies nor the State seem to care any longer for
the successive generations‟ sporting future. Reform is to be introduced
urgently by the State. Sports administration appears to be mired in power
play, where money, influence and chicanery play a dominant part and those
who had participated in competitive sports at some stage are given token
W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 76


representation at best, or mostly marginalized. As the cliché goes, the state
of sports is in a lockjaw where roughly 1.2 billion people have to rest
content with a harvest of medals so meager as to be surpassed by just one
individual like Micheal Phelps. The London Olympic saw India notch up a
tally of six medals. This averages to one medal for roughly every 207
million inhabitants. It is not without truth that the common perception that
Karnam Malleswari, Col Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Abhinav Bindra,
Sushil Kumar Tehlan and Vijender Singh were driven for individual
personal reasons to focus on competitive sports. Sport administration, the
way it is run in India, through coteries, cabals, manipulations and intrigues,
seems to discourage a vast majority of the population to devote itself to
athletics, shooting, judo, table tennis, gymnastics, soccer, boxing, fencing
and the like. Sports can be popularized and made successful, when those
who genuinely feel the need to inspire and attract talent, and are themselves
driven by inspiration, evolve policies that result in a range of sporting
activities becoming as or even somewhat as rewarding as cricket. As a
nation too, we should not be deadened to news that sportspersons sell their
proudly and hard earned medals to fight off penury (as in the case of Sita
Sahu, a mentally challenged teenager from Rewa who won two Bronze
Medals in the 2011 Olympic Games). Till the time that India, with her more
than a billion, continues to have a feeble sporting outlook, those who excel
will do so despite the state of NSFs and sports bodies controlling them.
88. In view of the above conclusions, the writ petition has to fail. It is

W.P.(C)2310/2012 Page 77


dismissed, but subject to directions contained in paragraph 86. There shall
be no order on costs.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT
(JUDGE)



NAJMI WAZIRI
(JUDGE)
MAY 09, 2014


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