Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 389
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 26487 of 2019)
PAWAN GARG & ORS. ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SOUTH DELHI MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal with special leave preferred by the
appellants interdicts the final judgment and order
th
dated 24 April, 2019 passed by the Division Bench
1
of the High Court of Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal
No.369 of 2016, wherein the Division Bench reversed
rd
the judgment and order dated 3 March, 2016
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.04.20
17:01:59 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Division Bench”.
1
2
of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.5382 of 2014, and, inter alia ,
upheld the decision of the Layout Scrutiny
3 th
Committee dated 19 May, 2014 and so also of the
th
Standing Committee dated 17 July, 2014.
I. BRIEF FACTS
4. The dispute centers around a parcel of land
4
admeasuring 1600 sq. yards , situated in the
erstwhile village Yusuf Sarai Jat, now falling within
the territory of Green Park Extension Colony, New
5
Delhi. The subject land forms part of a larger tract
of land which was originally under the ownership and
control of a coloniser, namely, Urban Improvement
6
Company Private Limited. It is stated that the
coloniser surrendered the land to the Municipal
7
Corporation of Delhi along with a layout plan for the
development of the colony. As per the original layout
rd
plan sanctioned on 3 September, 1958, the subject
plot of land was reserved for a High School, whereas
the adjoining areas were earmarked for primary
2
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Learned Single Judge”.
3
For short “LOSC”.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “subject land/subject plot”.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as the “colony”.
6
Hereinafter, referred to as the “coloniser”.
7
Predecessor of the present respondent; Hereinafter, referred to as the
“MCD”.
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school and park. Thereafter, the coloniser submitted
a revised layout plan, which was duly sanctioned by
th
the MCD on 30 May, 1969, whereby the reservation
of the land for a High School was deleted, while the
lands earmarked for the primary school and the park
were maintained. The principal reason for the
deletion of the High School from the layout plan was
that the area mandatorily required for establishing a
High School was approximately 4000 sq. meters
(roughly 4783.96 sq. yards), whereas the available
land area measured only 1600 sq. yards. The
decision of de-reservation was not questioned before
any forum and has long since attainted finality.
5. The coloniser sold the subject land bearing
8
Khasra Nos.5, 6 and 14 to five persons , namely, Mr.
Govind Ram (700 sq. yards), Mr. Vasudev (250 sq.
yards), Mr. Jagdish Lal Batra (250 sq. yards), Mr.
Prem Nath (150 sq. yards) and Mr. Pearey Ram (250
th
sq. yards), vide duly registered sale deeds dated 18
June, 1975.
6. Alleging that the MCD was trying to interfere
with possession and use of the subject land, the
8
Hereinafter, referred to as the “erstwhile owners”.
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erstwhile owners instituted five separate civil suits
before the competent civil Court, seeking perpetual
injunction against the MCD. All the said suits were
contested by MCD and were decreed vide separate
st
judgments dated 1 October, 1988, whereby the civil
Court directed that the MCD shall not interfere with
the possession of the plaintiffs over the subject land,
except in accordance with due process of law. The
9
relevant extracts from the said judgment are
reproduced below: -
“2. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that he is the
owner of property comprising one room, boundary
wall on a piece of land measuring 14 biswas falling
in Khasra No.6 in village Yusuf Sarai Jat, Green
Park Extension, New Dehi (hereinafter referred to
as the suit property) by virtue of sale deed dated
18.06.1975 which was executed by M/s Urban
Improvement Co. P. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
the Co.). The sale deed was registered with the Sub
Registrar on 19.6.1975.
3. The plaintiff is in possession of the aforesaid
property for the last 19 years. No Objection
Certificate was also obtained by the plaintiff from
A.D.M. (Revenue) dated 5.6.75 which shows that
the land is free from all encumbrances and
requirements/requisitions of the Government or
any local body.
4. The plaintiff is in use and occupation of the suit
property for more than 19 years and this fact is
duly endorsed in the sale deed of the plaintiff. All
rights, both possessory and ownership vest in the
plaintiff.
9
Suit No.444/78
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[……]
20. The onus to prove this issue was on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff appeared as PW2 and proved
the sale deed Ext.PW2/1. This sale deed was
executed in the presence of PW11 Shri Joginder Pal
Advocate. The site plan Ext.PW2/2 was also proved
by this witness. The sale deed was executed by the
Co. in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the ownership
of the suit property has been proved in favour of
the plaintiff without any iota of doubt. He has also
constructed a boundary wall as well as a room on
the property. It has come on the record that officials
of the deft. Corpn. came for the purpose of taking
possession, but could not take the same. No
evidence has been led by the deft. MCD on the
record that any notice has ever been served upon
the plaintiff because the ownership of 14 biswas of
land as per plan Ext.PW2/2 and the possession of
Gobind Ram has been undoubtedly proved on the
record. Merely stating that it was an encroachment
upon the municipal land is not sufficient. It has
also been proved on the record through the Local
Commissioner's report appointed by the court that
there is possession of the plaintiff. PW3 Chowkidar
has also proved the possession of the plaintiff. The
statement of PW1 and PW5 who were also plaintiffs
in similar suits and have their property adjacent to
the property of the plaintiff have proved on the
record that plaintiff was the owner of the suit
property and it was in possession of the plaintiff.
Thus, the attempt on the part of deft. MCD to
dispossess the plaintiff without any due process of
law, is illegal and without jurisdiction. This issue Is
decided in favour of the plaintiff as Khasra Nos.
have also not been shown in Ext. DW2/1. The
possession was also not taken in the presence of
DW2. Khasra Nos. have also not been shown in
Ext.DW3/2. He has also admitted that in
Ext.DW3/1, there is a portion on which possession
of MCD has not been shown. Thus, I am satisfied
that plaintiff who is in possession of the suit
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property by virtue of sale deed has a right to use
the same one cannot be dispossessed otherwise
than by compliance of statutory requirement.
21. U/s 477 of DMC Act, no suit can lie against the
MCD. The only limitation is that where the action
of MCD is against the provisions of DMC Act, then
the court has power to entertain the suit. In this
case, the suit was filed by the plaintiff because
there was an attempt on the part of deft. MCD to
take forcible possession of the property from the
plaintiff. Since this act of taking forcible possession
is against the provisions of DMC Act because no
notice has been served upon the plaintiff and he is
the owner and in possession of the suit property
through sale deed Ext.PW2/1 and site plan
Ext.PW2/2, the suit is not barred U/s 477 of DMC
Act.
23. In view of the above discussion, I am satisfied
that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit
property and also is the owner by virtue of sale deed
Ext. PW2/1. Any forcible dispossession without
compliance with the procedural requirements will
be against the law. The suit of the plaintiff is
accordingly decreed. The deft. MCD is hereby
restrained from taking forcible possession of the
property measuring 14 biswas forming part of
Khasra No.6, in Village Yusaf Sarai Jat, New Delhi.”
7. The MCD preferred separate appeals against the
judgments of the civil Court in all the civil suits, albeit
with significant delay. The learned appellate Court
i.e., Additional District Judge, Delhi, refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the aforesaid
st
appeal/s vide order dated 21 March, 1992 on the
ground of being time barred. Being aggrieved, the
MCD filed second appeal/s before the High Court of
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th
Delhi which also came to be dismissed on 4
November, 1992.
8. The erstwhile owners executed separate sale
10
deeds in favour of six persons namely, Dinesh
Kumar (400 sq. yards), Mr. Surinder Kumar (400 sq.
yards), Mrs. Surindra Kundra (150 sq. yards), Mr.
Harish Kundra (250 sq. yards), Mr. Roshan Lal (150
sq. yards) and appellant No. 1- Mr. Pawan Garg (250
th th
sq. yards) on 25 January, 1994 and 11 April,
1994.
9. In the meanwhile, the MCD again sought to
interfere with the possession over the subject land,
whereupon the subsequent purchasers preferred
contempt petitions before the Court of learned Civil
Judge, Delhi. In the said contempt proceedings, the
officials of the MCD tendered unconditional apology,
and accordingly, the contempt petitions were
th
dismissed as withdrawn on 28 September, 1995.
10. In August, 1996, the subsequent purchasers,
including appellant No.1, filed applications before the
11
MCD for incorporation of their plots in the layout
plan of “the colony”. The standing committee of the
10
Hereinafter, referred to as the “subsequent purchasers”.
11
The plots referred to herein form part of the subject land.
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th
MCD, vide Resolution bearing No.210 dated 19
August, 1998, rejected the said applications for
incorporation of the plots in the layout plan.
11. In the year 1999, appellant No.1 filed fresh
application seeking reconsideration of prayer for
incorporation of the subject land in the layout plan of
“the colony”. The LOSC of the MCD approved the said
th
application on 28 October, 2002 and recommended
incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the
colony, subject to obtaining proper clearance from
12
the Delhi Development Authority . However, it
appears that for number of years thereafter, no
further action was taken on the said prayer of
appellant No. 1.
12. In the year 2006, the subsequent purchasers
moved an application for sanctioning a building plan
for the construction of a nursery school. The said
th
application was dismissed on 30 November, 2006.
In the interregnum, i.e. , between the years 2006 and
2008, the subsequent purchasers executed two gift
deeds in favour of appellant Nos.1 & 2 respectively
12
For short “DDA”.
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and registered sale deeds in favour of appellant No.3,
in respect of the subject plots.
13. Upon receiving comments from the DDA and in
view of the report of the Land and Estate Department,
the LOSC gave a negative opinion on the applications
for incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the
th
colony vide order dated 19 May, 2014, observing
that there stood recorded an entry in the immovable
properties register of MCD indicating that the land
th
was entered in its name. Subsequently, on 17 July,
2014, the Standing Committee vide its Resolution
No.74 rejected the application of the appellants and
th
upheld the order dated 19 May, 2014 passed by the
LOSC.
14. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred a writ
13
petition in the High Court of Delhi. The learned
Single Judge, by a detailed well-reasoned order,
allowed the writ petition by setting aside the orders
th th
dated 19 May, 2014 and 17 July, 2014 and
directed the respondent-South Delhi Municipal
14
Corporation to objectively consider the application
for incorporation preferred by the appellants and
13
W.P. (C) No.5382 of 2014.
14
Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent-Corporation”.
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decide the same within a period of 60 days. The
relevant observations made and directions given in
rd
the order dated 3 March, 2016 are reproduced
hereinbelow: -
“45. Interestingly, the decision of the Lay Out
Scrutiny Committee dated 19th May, 2014 itself
shows that the ownership was verified in the name
of the applicants by concerned Tehsildar in 1997.
Mere entry in the I.P. Register does not entitle the
Corporation to become the owner of the land in
question. The own documentation of the
respondent Corporation itself frustrates the stand
taken by the MCD that the land is owned by them.
46. In my considered view, in light of the aforesaid
discussion, the decision taken by the Lay Out
Screening Committee can hardly be considered
rational. The result is that the petitioners cannot
utilise their land despite fighting for their rights
since 1975. Thus the decision of the Lay Out
Scrutiny Committee dated 19th May 2014 qua the
petitioners ‟ land is set aside. Consequently, the
decision of Standing Committee dated 17.7.2014
qua the petitioner’s land is also set aside. The
respondent, South Delhi Municipal Corporation is
directed to consider the petitioner’s plots in
question in the layout plan within a period of sixty
days from today in accordance with law.”
15. Aggrieved, by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge, the respondent-
15
Corporation preferred a Letters Patent Appeal ,
which stands allowed by the Division Bench vide
th
judgment dated 24 April, 2019, which is interdicted
15
Letters Patent Appeal No.369 of 2016.
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at the instance of the appellants in this appeal with
special leave.
II. SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED BY COUNSEL FOR
THE PARTIES
16. Shri Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,
vehemently and fervently contended that the findings
recorded by the civil Court in the suit for perpetual
injunction, instituted by the predecessors-in-interest
of the appellants, whereby a decree of permanent
injunction was granted, had attained finality. It was
submitted that the Division Bench without the issue
of title being subject matter of the proceedings before
the High Court, unjustly delved into the findings
recorded by the civil Court and proceeded to make
unwarranted observations with respect to the title of
the appellants over the subject plots of land. In this
regard, Shri Bhatnagar referred to the following
excerpts from the impugned judgment of the High
Court: -
“46. On an overall consideration of the findings of
the learned Single Judge, and having regard to the
submissions of the parties, the question which this
court has to decide are:
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(i) firstly, whether the findings of the five previous
suits are conclusive on the issue of title- alive to it
is the RV sale deeds executed by the coloniser in
favour of the writ petitioners’ predecessors in 1994;
(ii) Secondly, whether the communication by the
DDA that the Master Plan- and the consequential
Zonal Development Plan requirements no longer
stipulated that the land was needed for a secondary
school and, therefore, consequently, the SDMC
could change the purpose to residential. Alive to
this is the nature of the MCD’s obligation to carry
out the necessary correction in the layout plan.
(iii) The third would be the interpretation of
Sections 312 and 313 of the Act, having regard to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Pt. Chet Ram
Vashist (supra) etc. and whether the MCD is correct
in asserting that it has the right to manage the
property as its custodian.
(iv) Lastly, whether the issue of title- in the light of
the contentions of the parties has to be decided in
favour of the writ petitioners.”
17. It was urged that there was no occasion for the
High Court to have delved into or adjudicated upon
the issue of title, particularly when the title was never
under dispute and the writ petition had been filed by
the appellants for the limited purpose of seeking a
direction to the respondent-Corporation to
incorporate the plot in the layout plan of the colony.
18. He further submitted that the Division Bench
has recorded self-contradictory findings in the
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impugned judgment on the issue of title. It was, thus,
contended that the finding recorded by the Division
Bench that the appellants’ title over the land in
question was doubtful, is absolutely unjustified. It
was further submitted that the Division Bench
recorded adverse findings regarding the deletion of
the High School from the original layout plan without
taking into account the fact that the deletion took
place in the year 1969 and the very reservation of the
subject land for High School was impermissible
because the total available land area was only 1600
sq. yards, on which the High School could not be
built as the same required minimum land area of
nearly 4000 sq. meters (roughly 4783.96 sq. yards).
Thus, the land was de-reserved in the year 1969 and
reverted back to the original owners.
19. Shri Bhatnagar submitted that all that the
learned Single Judge had directed was that the
prayer of the appellants for incorporation of the
subject land in the colony be considered. Issue of title
was never a subject matter of the dispute before the
High Court. He thus, urged that the impugned
judgment is perverse and illegal on the face of the
record and, therefore, deserves to be set aside and
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the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing
the respondent-Corporation to consider the prayer of
the appellants for incorporation of the subject land in
“the colony” ought to be affirmed.
20. Per contra , Shri Ashwani Kumar, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation,
vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the counsel for the appellants. He contended
that the suits instituted by predecessors-in-interest
of the appellants, were confined to seeking perpetual
injunction, and no relief of declaration of title was
sought in respect of the plots in question. Thus, the
civil Court clearly exceeded the scope and ambit of
the suit while making observations on title, without
the same being an issue in the case.
21. It was further submitted that the original
coloniser had surrendered the larger chunk of land
for the development of a colony and, in the approved
layout plan, the land area in question was reserved
for the construction of a High School. However, owing
to insufficiency of area, the school could not be
constructed and consequently, the respondent-
Corporation passed a revised layout plan in which
the land was no longer shown as reserved for a High
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School. Notwithstanding the same, it was fervently
contended that even if the specific reservation for a
High School stood deleted, the nature of the de-
reserved land continued to be for public purposes
and thus, it could not have been subjected to any
private ownership.
On these grounds, learned counsel for the
respondent-Corporation implored the Court to
dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the
Division Bench.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for
the parties and have gone through the impugned
judgment and other material placed on record.
23. The proceedings before the civil Court, seeking
perpetual injunction, were contested by the MCD,
and upon adjudication, a decree of permanent
injunction was passed in favour of the predecessors-
in-interest of the appellants and other landowners,
restraining the MCD from interfering with their
possession, except in accordance with due process of
law.
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24. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed
by the civil Court, the MCD preferred a first appeal
albeit with a significant delay. The learned Additional
st
District Judge, Delhi, by order dated 21 March,
1992, dismissed the said appeals on the ground of
delay. The MCD thereafter preferred second appeals
before the High Court of Delhi, which also came to be
th
dismissed vide judgment dated 4 November, 1992.
The said decision was never challenged any further
and thus, the findings recorded by the civil Court
attained finality. There is no dispute that the
appellants and their predecessors have always been
in peaceful possession over the plots in question.
Except for a random entry in its property register, the
MCD never asserted title over the plots in question
before any forum. In such circumstances, the
Division Bench was not justified in rendering
observations so as to virtually unsettle the decree of
the civil Court passed way back in 1988 and thereby,
cause the title to be brought under dispute. In this
regard, reference may be made to the observations
contained in paragraph 55 of the impugned
judgment, which reads as below: -
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“55. In the light of the above discussion, it is held
that the impugned judgment to the extent it
assumes that question of ownership and title were
conclusively determined in the previous suit by the
Senior Sub judge and had been endorsed in appeal
and further on second appeal by this Court, is
clearly erroneous. It is also important to notice here
that the appeal preferred before the District Judge
appears to have been time barred. That was the
primary ground for rejection of the application for
condonation. The consequent refusal by this Court
to set aside the findings of the lower courts on the
ground that no substantial question of law arises
was in no manner conclusive on the issue of title
as well. For these reasons, it is held that the Single
Judge fell into error in accepting the writ
petitioners ‟ plea that the question of title had been
decided affirmatively in favour of their predecessors
in interest and that issue had the effect of
estopping SDMC from questioning their rights and
interest over the land, as subsequent transferees.”
25. In stark contradistinction to the aforesaid
findings, the Division Bench at Paras Nos. 67 and 72
of the impugned judgment recorded that the title and
interest in the land does not vest in the respondent-
Corporation. Notwithstanding the above finding, it
was observed that the respondent-Corporation acts
as a custodian of public interest of the said land for
the management and interest of the society in
general. The aforesaid paras are quoted hereinbelow:-
“67. It is clear from the above passage that the
title and interest in the land does not vest in
the public corporation (in this case, SDMC):
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however it has “a right as a custodian of public
interest to manage it in the interest of the
society in general. But the right to manage as
a local body is not the same thing as to claim
transfer of the property to itself .” This
enunciation is supported by the earlier observation
that this custodial nature of the right amounts to
“ creating an obligation in nature of trust and may
preclude the owner from transferring or selling his
interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court
that the interest which is left in the owner is a
residuary interest which may be nothing more than
a right to hold this land in trust for the specific
purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned
lay-out plan.” The facts in this case, no doubt are
different: it is that the layout plan continued to be
the same, i.e. the area was earmarked for a school.
The MCD in that case had compelled a transfer to
itself of the public spaces; in this case, it refused to
amend the layout plan.
[……]
72. Here, the land no doubt does not belong to
SDMC; the minimum area required for Sr.
Secondary School is 4000 sq. mts., which is
roughly 4783.96 sq. yds. and the land in
question is 1600 sq. yds . The stand of SDMC with
regard to the land being transferred to MCD in
1969 is correct. The layout plan of the area in
question was originally approved in the year 1958
by Resolution No. 7 dated 03.09.1958 of the SC.
Thereafter, the layout plan was modified in the year
1959. Thereafter, by Resolution No. 183 dated
30.05.1969, the demarcation plan of the area in
question was approved. The land in question,
which is the subject matter of the present petition,
was always shown as earmarked for school.
Possession of the land in question was also handed
over to the Municipal Corporation way back in the
years 1967 and 1968, as reflected from the record.
These facts, ipso facto, in the opinion of this Court,
did not compel the SDMC to permit residential use.
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SDMC undoubtedly cannot – like in Pt. Chet Ram
Vashist ’ s case compel transfer of the lands unto
itself. However, it has to formally accept the
proposal to convert the use. Here, the petitioners
are not on sound footing.” (Emphasis supplied)
26. Apparently, the discretion of the Division Bench
was heavily clouded by the fact that, in the original
layout plan, the subject land was originally
earmarked for a public purpose, namely, for a High
School, and once the land stood earmarked for a
public purpose, the same could not thereafter be
validly transferred to the appellants.
27. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid
finding was not only out of context but also
unsupported by any cogent or plausible material on
record. A mere entry in the list of properties
maintained by the MCD cannot, by itself, constitute
a valid proof of title over the subject land.
28. The competent authority had admittedly de-
reserved the land admeasuring 1600 sq. yards, which
was originally earmarked for a High School, way back
in the year 1958. There is no material on record to
show that notwithstanding such de-reservation, the
land would continue to retain the character of being
reserved for a public purpose. In this background,
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and having regard to the fact that based on registered
conveyances executed in respect of the land in
question, the land changed multiple hands over a
period of time and as issue of title was never agitated
by the respondent-Corporation before any forum, the
finding recorded by the Division Bench in the
impugned judgment, to the effect that the land was
required to be retained for a public purpose, is
unsustainable on the face of the record.
29. On a perusal of the order passed by the civil
st
Court dated 1 October, 1998, it is evident that no
contest was made by the MCD in the said civil suit
disputing the title of the predecessor-in-interest of
the appellants. In such circumstances, the
observations of the High Court that the respondent-
Corporation became the custodian of public interest
to manage the land, which was originally reserved as
a High School in the layout plan, are wholly perverse
and unsupported by tangible evidence. The issue of
title or public purpose having never been raised by
the respondent-Corporation before any forum, the
only issue that required adjudication by the Division
Bench was whether the direction given by the learned
Single Judge to the respondent-Corporation to
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consider the prayer of the appellant to incorporate
the land in question in the layout plan of “the colony”
was justified or not. The issue of title neither arose
for consideration before the learned Single Judge, nor
did the facts and circumstances of the case warrant
any such adjudication.
30. At this stage, we may record the submission of
the learned counsel for the appellants that the
possession over the subject land remains with the
appellants who have constructed residential
buildings thereupon. The attempts made by the
Corporation to interfere in the possession over the
plot always met a dead end.
31. The learned Single Judge, while reversing the
th
decision of the LOSC dated 19 May, 2014 and that
th
of the Standing Committee dated 17 July, 2014,
merely directed the respondent-Corporation to
consider the prayer of the appellants for
incorporating their plots in the layout plan within 60
days. For passing the said direction, the learned
Single Judge referred to the counter affidavit filed by
the MCD in W.P. (Civil) No. 4788 of 2000 wherein a
clear admission is recorded that the subject land is
owned by the other parties who had filed civil suits
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against the MCD and the civil Court had declared
them to be the owners. There may be some
incongruity in the language of the affidavit but the
long-standing possession of the appellants and their
predecessors over the plots comprising 1600 sq.
yards area is not in dispute.
32. In this background, there was neither any
occasion for the learned Division Bench to have gone
into the issue of title over the subject land nor was it
justified in non-suiting the appellants on the premise
that the subject land was earmarked for public
purpose. The scope and adjudication of the appeal/s
had to be confined to the direction given by the
learned Single Judge, namely, to consider the prayer
of the appellants for incorporation of the plot in the
layout plan of the colony, and nothing beyond that.
IV. CONCLUSION
33. In wake of the above discussion, we are of the
considered view that the direction issued by the
learned Single Judge, judgment and order dated
vide
rd
3 March, 2016, does not suffer from any infirmity
whatsoever. Consequently, the impugned judgment
th
and order dated 24 April, 2019 passed by the
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Division Bench upsetting the judgment of the learned
Single Judge is unsustainable in facts as well as in
law and hence, the same is hereby set aside.
34. The judgment rendered by the learned Single
Judge is restored. The respondent-Corporation shall
consider the application of the appellants for
incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the
colony within 60 days by passing a speaking order.
The disposition, as directed above, shall not be
influenced or prejudiced by any of the observations
made in the order passed by the Division Bench or in
this order.
35. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 20, 2026.
23
C.A.@ SLP(Civil) No(s). 26487 of 2019