Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6
PETITIONER:
SOMNATH RATH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BIKRAM K. ARUKH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/09/1999
BENCH:
S. RAJENDRA BABU, R.C. LAHOTI.
JUDGMENT:
Aggrieved by the dismissal of his election petition,
challenging the election of the returned
candidate-respondent No. 1, vide order of the High Court
dated 23rd of December, 1999, the appellant has filed this
appeal.
For the purpose of this appeal however only a few
facts are relevant and necessary to be noticed.
The last date for filing nominations in respect of the
Assembly Constituencies in the State of Orissa for the
elections held in the year 1995 was 17th of January, 1995.
Thirteen persons including the appellant and the respondents
filed their nomination papers for 66, Bhanjnagar Assembly
Constituency. At the time of scrutiny of the nomination
papers on 19th January, 1995, the Returning Officer rejected
the nomination papers of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. While
the nomination papers of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were
rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the
same
were found to be defective, the nomination papers of
respondent No. 7-Panchanan Das was rejected on the ground
that "Candidate is a PDS dealer of Bhanjnagar Ward No. 13.
Hence rejected."
After polling, results of the elections were declared
and respondent No. 1 was declared successful and elected by
a margin of 1567 votes.
An election petition was filed by the appellant on
26th of April, 1995 calling in question the election of
respondent No. 1, both on the ground of commission of
corrupt practices as also for improper rejection of the
nomination papers of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The
election petition was resisted and written statement was
filed by respondent No. 1. On the basis of pleadings of
the parties, certain issues came to be framed. However, for
the purpose of this appeal, the following issues only
require our consideration:
"(1) Whether the nomination of any one of the
candidates namely Shri Pratap Chandra Swain, Shri Rajendra
Kumar Sahu and Shri Panchanan Das has been improperly
rejected by the Returning Officer and as such the election
of Bikram Keshari Arukh, the returned candidate (respondent
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6
No. 1) for the66-Bhanjanagar Assembly Constituency is void?
(2) Whether the petition as laid 1s maintainable?"
Evidence was led by the parties in respect of these
issues.
We shall take up the question relating to. the
rejection of the nomination paper of Shri Panchanan Das-
respondent No, 7 only and do not find it necessary to
consider either the grounds of rejection or the effect
thereof insofar as Shri Pratap Chandra Swain or Shri
Rajendra Kumar Sahu- respondent Nos. 5 and 6 respectively
are concerned because the findings recorded by the High
Court in their case have not been seriously assailed before
us. findings regarding the rejection of nomination paper of
respondent No. 7 have, however, been vehamently assailed.
Insofar as respondent’ No. 7, Shri Panchanan Das is
concerned, the material averments regarding the improper
rejection of his nomination paper are contained in para, 10
of the election petition, which reads thus :
"10. That the nomination of Shri Panchanan Das S/o
Late Saita Das, At - Sanatota Sahi, Bhanjanagar, Dist.
Ganjam, Respondent No. 7 has been rejected on the ground
that the candidate is the P.D.S. Dealer of Ward No. 13.
The rejection Order is illegal and improper because P.D.S.
Dealership is not a disqualification for being chosen as a
member of the legislative Assembly. Besides, there was
evidence or material before the Returning Officer at the
time of scrutiny .to come to such a conclusion. In course
of his trade or business through P.D.S. Dealership of Ward
No. 13 under the Bhanjanagar, N.A.C., Sri Das had nothing
to do with the State Government and much less he was
interested in any subsisting contract with the State
Government which could have disqualified him under the
provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
He had not entered into any contract at all with the State
Government. His appointment as such was under the
recommendation of committee set up by the N.A.C. He was to
purchase commodities at prices fixed and on selling get a
commission which 1s also fixed. Therefore there is no scope
for any advantage being derived even if one becomes a member
of the Legislative Assembly. In the circumstances,
therefore, the nomination of Sri Panchanan Das having been
improperly rejected the election of the Respondent No.1 is
liable to be declared void. . . . . "
In the written statement filed by respondent No. 1,
the response to the averments contained in para 10 of the
election petition 1s as follows:
"15. That the averment made in paragraph 10 of the
election petition that the nomination paper of Sri Panchanan
Das, the Respondent No .7 has been improperly rejected 1s
false and denied and the petitioner is put to strict proof
thereof. The Returning Officer has acted legally and within
his power and authority in rejecting the nomination paper in
question as the same was violative of the relevant provision
of the Act and he has made an endorsement to that effect on
this nomination paper. Thus this averment is denied."
The learned Designated Judge of the High Court after
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6
considering the evidence on the record and taking note of
various judgments including the judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Cheekati Parasuram Naidu Vs.
Mariseria Venkatarami Na.1du and another AIR 1985 AP, 169
opined :
"The transactions between the State and respondent No.
7 do not constitute supply by the latter to the State.
Therefore, it cannot be said that respondent No. 7 was
disqualified in terms of Section 9A."
Thus, the learned Designated Judge found that the
ground on which the nomination paper had been rejected by
the Returning Officer was not valid.
The learned Designated Judge of the High Court, while
dismissing the election petition, inspite of the above
finding observed :-
"In. view of the legal position there can be no doubt
that improper rejection nullifies the election. But some of
the peculiar features as highlighted above need to be
carefully analysed. No doubt an election dispute can be
raised by a candidate or an electorate of the constituency,
because the election involves each of the electorates as
well as the contestants. Judged in that background, the
election petition has been he^d to be maintainable as
discussed above.
Improper rejection of a nomination affects the
election. But the person who 1s really affected is the
person whose nomination paper has been re.iected. In the
case at hand, he himself states that his presence in the
field of contest would have hardly made any difference and
would not have materially affected the election of the
electeed cand i date. He has stated with reference to his
past performance invarious elections that he would not have
polled more than 200 to 300 votes. A candidate is the best
person to say about his election prospects’ When the
candidate himself states that he would have got about ?00 to
300 votes had he contested, it would be not proper to accept
the version
of the election petitioner that his presence in the
election contest would have materially affected the result."
(Emphasis Ours)
The learned Designated Judge also opined
"Respondent No. 7 Panchanan Das, whose nomination has
been rejected, has stated that he did not think -it proper
to file election petition as he was satisfied that his
presence in the field of contest would not have made the
position different."
In our opinion, the above approach of the High Court
was wholly erroneous.
Section 100 (1) (c) of the Representation of the
People Act, 19.51 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’)
provides as under :-
"100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:- (1)
Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion-
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6
(a) .............
(b) .............
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected;
or ..."
The High Court having found and, in our opinion,
rightly that the ground on which the Returning Officer had
rejected the nomination paper of respondent No. 7,
viz., that he was a dealer under the Public
Distribution System did not disqualify him from contesting
the election, ought not to have proceeded any further
because it was essentially a case where the rejection of the
nomination paper by the Returning Officer, insofar as
respondent No. 7- Shri Panchanan Das is concerned, was
improper because respondent No. 7 was not disqualified in
terms of Section 9A of the Act. The improper rejection of a
nomination paper by itself and without anything more is a
ground under Section 100 (1)(c) of the Act to declare the
election void. No enquiry as to "material effect" on
account of the rejection of the nomination paper is required
to be made under Section 100 (1)(c) of the Act. The enquiry
whether the result of an election has been material1y
affected insofar as the Returned Candidate is concerned is
required in the cases covered by Section 100 (l)(d) of the
Act.
Learned counsel for the Returned Candidate, however,
asserted that the finding of the Returning Officer for
rejecting the nomination paper was correct and the High
Court’s finding in that behalf was not correct. Learned
counsel submitted that the case of respondent No. 7, a
dealer under the Public Distribution Scheme, was covered by
Section 9A of the Act. We are unable to accept this
submission.
Section 9A of the Act reads, thus :
"9A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc.
- A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as,
there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course
of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for
the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works
undertaken by, that Government.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, where
a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it
has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the
contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of
the fact that the Government has not performed its part of
the contract either wholly or in part."
Section 9A of the Act has come up for consideration of
this Court in Dewan Joynal Abedin Vs. Abdul Waged a I ias
Abdul Wazad Miah and Others. 1988 (Supp) SCC, 580 = 1987(2)
SCALE, 1447 and RanJeet Singh Vs. Harmohinder Singh
Pradhan. 1999 (3) SCALE, 630. Analysing Section 9A of the
Act, this Court has consistently taken the view that a
person would be disqualified under Section 9A of the Act, if
he has entered into a contract with the Appropriate
Government in the course of his trade or business which is
subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nominations and :
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6
(1) the contract is one for supply of goods to the
Appropriate Government; and
(11) the contract is for the execution of any works
undertaken by that Government .............
We find ourselves unable to accept the submission of
learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that in Section 9A of
the Act, the expression ’works’ would also include ’schemes’
of the type of Public Distribution System. The expression
’works’ as used in Section 9A was interpreted in Dewan
Joynal Abedin (supra) wherein this Court opined :
"..... The word ’works’ in the expression in
’execution of any works’ appearing in Section 9A of the Act
is used in the sense of ’projects’, ’schemes’, ’plants’,
such as building works, irrigation works, defence works etc.
Respondent 1 in this case had not undertaken to carry on any
such work. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary the
expression ’work’ means a structure or apparatus of some
kind; an architectural or engineering structure, a building
edifice. when it is used in plural, i.e., as ’works’ it
means ’architectural or engineering operations; a fortified
building; a defensive structure, fortifications; any of
the several parts of such structure". The words ’works’
used in entry 35 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India which reads as "works, lands and
buildings vested in or in the possession of
10
the State" is used in the same sense. The running of
boats across in land waterways 1s a topic which falls under
entry 32 of List III of the Seventh Schedule which reads
thus : "Shipping and navigation on inland waterways as
regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the rule of the
road on such waterways, and the carriage of passengers and
goods on inland waterways subject to the provisions of List
I with respect to national waterways". It is, therefore,
difficult to hold that when a person acquires the right to
collect toll at a public ferry under Section 8 of the
Ferries Act he is performing a contract of execution of
works undertaken by the government. It may have been
perhaps different if the words ’in performance of any
services’ which were present in Section 7(d) of the Act, as
it stood prior to its amendment in 1956 had been there in
Section 9-A of the Act."
The above observations are a complete answer to the
submission made by learned counsel for respondent No. 1.
From the pleadings of the parties and particularly
averments contained in para 10 of the election petition, it
is obvious that the respondent No. 7 - Shrl Panchanan Das
did not have any subsisting contract in the course of his
trade or business with the Appropriate Government either for
the supply of goods to the Government or for the execution
of any works undertaken by t?hat Government. He was a mere
licensee under the Public Distribution System. Such a
person does not suffer any disqualification for being chosen
as a Member of the Legislative Assembly under Section 9A of
the Act.
Since the only ground on which the Returning Officer
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6
rejected the nomination paper of Shri Panchanan Das,
respondent No. 7 was that "he was a dealer under the Public
Distribution System" and the High Court rightly found that
respondent No. 7 was not disqualified under Section 9A of
the Act, it ought to have been held that the nomination
paper of respondent No. 7 had been improperly rejected and
as a consequence Section 100 (1)(c) of the Act was attracted
to avoid the election.
The improper rejection of the nomination paper by
itself being sufficient to invalidate the election, the High
Court under the circumstances fell in error in dismissing
the emotion petition and not invalidating the ’election of
the Returned Candidate on the ground of improper rejection
of the nomination paper of respondent No. 7 - Shri
Panchanan Das.
As a result of the above discussion, this appeal
succeeds and is allowed. Consequently, the election
petition would stand allowed to the extent indicated above.
The election of the Returned
Candidate-respondent No. 1 is, hereby, set aside
under Section 100(1) (c) of the Act. We, however, leave the
parties to bear their own costs insofar as this appeal is
concerned.