Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 3229 of 2000
PETITIONER:
M.RAMALINGA THEVAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/04/2000
BENCH:
K.T. THOMAS & M.B. Shah
JUDGMENT:
Thomas J.
Leave granted.
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A Land Acquisition Collector passed award only after the
expiry of two years from the date of publication of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short the "Act’). The owner of the land wanted a
declaration that proceedings for acquisition covered by the
said publication stood lapsed on the expiry of the said
period of two years. But a Division Bench of the High Court
of Madras which the owner of the land approached for such a
relief, repelled his contentions. The High Court took into
account the time during which proceedings for taking
possession of the land were stayed by an order passed in a
writ petition. When that period was excluded from the time
fixed for passing the award the Division Bench held that the
award was passed within the permitted range of time. The
owner of the land challenges the said judgment in this
appeal.
After hearing learned counsel for the appellant we did
not find the necessity to issue notice to the respondent
State as the appeal can be disposed of without resorting to
such a course.
A notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was
published in the gazette on 27.2.1991. That notification
was challenged by the appellant in writ petition No.9715 of
1991 which he filed before the High Court of Allahabad on
16.7.1991. On the same day an order was passed by the High
Court staying dispossession of the appellant from the
property involved. Despite the pendency of the said writ
petition the Government published declaration under Section
6 of the Act on 10.4.1992. But the award was passed only on
16.9.1994. Thus, there is no doubt that the award was
passed only after the expiry of two years from the date of
declaration.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since
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there was no stay for passing an award the period of two
years should have been counted from 10.4.1992 which had
expired on 9.4.1994 and by such expiry the proceedings had
become lapsed. Section 11A and the Explanation thereto
(omitting the proviso which is not material in this case)
are extracted below:
"11A. Period within which an award shall be made. -
(1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11
within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration and if no award is made
within that period, the entire proceedings for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse.
Explanation.- In computing the period of two years
referred to in this section the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
excluded]."
As per the Explanation the period of exclusion from the
time is the period during which "any action or proceedings"
to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed.
We have no doubt that one of the actions contemplated
pursuant to the declaration is taking possession of the
land, though such action is a post-award step in normal
circumstances and in emergent circumstances it can as well
be a pre-award step. Nonetheless, taking possession is one
of the actions to be adopted as a follow- up measure
pursuant to the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of the
Act. The consequence mentioned in Section 11A is a
self-operating statutory process and, therefore, it can
operate only when the conditions specified therein conjoin
together. The consequence would step in only when there is
fusion of all the conditions stipulated therein. If there
is any stay regarding any of the actions to be taken
pursuant to the declaration then the consequence of lapse
would not happen. A three judge bench of this court had
considered the scope of the Explanation to Section 11A of
the Act in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya vs. State of
Gujarat[1991 (4) SCC 531]:
"The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms
and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the
action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to
actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award
under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as
held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is
covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an
award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid
expression in the Explanation should be given a different
meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by
Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to
us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a
landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration
under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation.
The benefit is that the award must be made within a period
of two years of the declaration, failing which the
acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would
revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of
the said provision what is required, is that the landholder
who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from
a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of
the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the
Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who
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do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or
prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the
land acquired."
In Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan vs. State of Karnataka
[1994 (4) SCC 145] the question considered was the scope of
Explanation 1 to the proviso of Section 6 of the Act which
also contained a similar restriction that no declaration
under the section shall be made after the expiry of three
years from the date of publication of the notification under
Section 4. The said Explanation states that in computing
the aforesaid period of three years "the period during which
any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the
notification issued under Section 4 (1) is stayed by an
order of a court shall be excluded." As there was only a
stay of dispossession from the land concerned the High Court
did not permit that period of stay to be excluded from the
three years’ period. But this Court reversed the said view
of the High Court and stated thus:
"Though there is no specific direction prohibiting the
publication of the declaration under Section 6, no useful
purpose would be served by publishing Section 6(1)
declaration pending adjudication of the legality of Section
4(1), notification. If any action is taken to preempt the
proceedings, it would be stigmatised either as ‘undue haste’
or action to ‘overreach the Court’s judicial process.’
Therefore, the period during which the order of
dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be
excluded in computation of the period of three years covered
by clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition
Act. When it is so computed, the declaration published on
the second occasion is perfectly valid. Under these
circumstances, we do not find any justification to quash the
notification published under Section 6, dated May 17, 1984.
The review petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs."
Both the above decisions were later followed by this
Court in Government of Tamil Nadu vs. Vasantha Bai {1995
Supple. (2) SCC 423}.
Thus, the position is now well settled that even when
dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during
which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time
fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would
render the acquisition proceedings lapsed. In the light of
the said interpretation it is now idle to contend that the
Government is debarred from proceeding with the acquisition.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.