DEVIDAS LOKA RATHOD vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL   NO.814 OF 2017 DEVIDAS LOKA RATHOD ....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The appellant assails his conviction under Section 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), rejecting his defence that he was of unsound mind. 2. In the  morning of 26.09.2006, the  appellant suddenly picked up a sickle from the shop floor of the iron smith and attempted to assault Gulab Pawar (P.W.11), but which injured Santosh Jadhav (P.W.5) on the jaw and  cheek  and gave a further   blow   on   his   shoulder.     The   same   day,   he   later Signature Not Verified assaulted Ulhas  Rathor (P.W.3) on his back and neck and Digitally signed by NEELAM GULATI Date: 2018.07.02 16:03:57 IST Reason: rained blows on the back and stomach of the deceased Harish 1 Chandra Chauhan, when the latter tried to intervene.   The appellant then tried to flee, throwing the sickle enroute, when he was apprehended by the villagers and handed over to the police. 3. The   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Akola   rejected   the defence   plea   for   unsoundness   of   mind,   citing   insufficient evidence   relying   on   the   evidence   of   Dr.   Sagar   Srikant Chiddalwar (C.W.1) that the appellant was not mentally sick and fit to face trial.  The subsequent conduct of the appellant while in custody, his demeanour during the trial, were further relied upon to conclude that the appellant was conscious of his   wrongful   acts   which   were   deliberate   in   nature,   evident from the repeated assaults and running away from the place of occurrence after throwing the sickle.  The High Court declined to interfere with the conviction. 4.  Ms.   Aparna   Jha   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant urged   that   in   absence   of   any   mens   rea,   conviction   under Section   302   I.P.C.   was   unsustainable,   relying   upon Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker vs. State of Gujarat, 2 1964 (7) SCR 361.  It was next contended that the evidence of Mankarna Chavan (D.W.1) and Gograbai Rathod (D.W.2), with regard to the unsoundness of mind of the appellant has not been properly appreciated and wrongly rejected as insufficient. The appellant belonged to a very poor family and they could not be expected to keep his medical records and prescriptions meticulously.   The   defence   witnesses   had   deposed   that   the appellant was  under  the treatment  of Dr. Kelkar  at Akola. There existed sufficient evidence for a plausible defence for unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code   read   with   Section   105   of   the   Evidence   Act   on   a preponderance of the probability.   The prosecution failed to lead any evidence in rebuttal, for which reliance was placed on Elavarasan vs. State represented by Inspector of Police , 2011 (7) SCC 110.   The conviction was, therefore, unjustified and the appellant was entitled to acquittal. 5. Learned   counsel   for   the   State,   Shri   Katneshwarkar, opposing the appeal, submitted that the appellant had failed to prima facie establish a case for unsoundness of mind on 3 probability.  The trial judge had taken adequate precautions in calling for medical reports from time to time and satisfying himself with regard to the ability of the appellant to defend himself quite apart from also noticing his demeanour in court. The  conduct  of  the  appellant in  making  repeated  assaults, running   away   from   the   place   of   occurrence,   throwing   the sickle   on   the   way,   were   all   sufficient   to   establish   the commission   of   the   offence   knowingly   by   him,   incompatible with the defence of unsoundness of mind.  6. We   have   considered   the   respective   submissions. Normally, this Court is reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings   of   facts   by   two   courts,   under   Article   136   of   the Constitution, as also observed in   Deepak Kumar vs. Ravi  2002 (2) SCC 737.  But this does not Virmani and another , preclude it in appropriate cases to reappraise evidence in the interest of justice, if it entertains any doubt about the nature of evidence and its appreciation or non­appreciation. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard, and much will 4 depend on the concept of justice in the facts of a case, coupled with the nature of acceptable evidence on record.  7. The   prosecution,   including   the   injured   witnesses, undoubtedly denied that the appellant was of unsound mind. But   the   evidence   of   police   Sub­Inspector   Chandusingh Mohansingh Chavan (P.W.14), coupled with the reference to the medical reports of the appellant, persuaded us to examine the original records of the trial court ourselves in order to satisfy   us   that   there   had   been   proper   and   complete appreciation of all evidence and that the findings were not perverse   or   obviated   by   non­consideration   of   relevant materials, so that justice may ultimately prevail. 8. That   the   appellant   was   a   very   poor   person   stands established by P.W. 14, and which consequently necessitated legal assistance to him for his defence by the District Legal Services Authority, Akola as also before the High Court and also before this court by the legal aid cell.  5 9. P.W.14,   in   his   examination­in­chief,   stated   that   the appellant was caught immediately after he made the assault on 26.09.2006 and brought to the police station.  The FIR was registered   the   same   day.   But   the   appellant   was   taken   in custody only on 28.09.2006 because he was not keeping well and had been admitted in the hospital.  The information of his arrest was not given to his sister or mother, but only to his friend Nagorao Baghe, who has not been examined. In view of the previous history of insanity of the appellant as revealed, it was the duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medical examination immediately and place the evidence before the court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused, as observed in  Bapu vs. State of , (2007)   8   SCC   66.     The   admitted   facts   in   the Rajasthan   present   case   strongly   persuades   us   to   believe   that   the prosecution has deliberately withheld relevant evidence with regard   to   the   nature   of   the   appellant’s   mental   illness,   his mental   condition   at   the   time   of   assault,   requiring 6 hospitalization immediately after the assault and hindering his arrest,   the   diagnosis   and   treatment,   the   evidence   of   the treating doctor, all of which necessarily casts a doubt on the credibility   of   the   prosecution   evidence   raising   more   than reasonable   doubts   about   the   mental   condition   of   the appellant.   Unfortunately, both the trial court and the High Court, have completely failed to consider and discuss this very important lacuna in the prosecution case, decisively crucial for determination or abjurement of the guilt of the appellant.  10. The   law   undoubtedly   presumes   that   every   person committing an offence is sane and liable for his acts, though in specified circumstances it may be rebuttable.  The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of  the plea of  insanity was stated as follows in   Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. (1964) 7 SCR 361 : State of Gujarat,  “( 1 ) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with   the   requisite   mens   rea,   and   the   burden   of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.  ( 2 )   There   is   a   rebuttable   presumption   that   the accused   was   not   insane,   when   he   committed   the 7 crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian   Penal   Code:   the   accused   may   rebut   it   by placing before the court all the relevant evidence oral, documentary   or   circumstantial,   but   the   burden   of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.  ( 3 )   Even   if   the   accused   was   not   able   to   establish conclusively   that   he   was   insane   at   the   time   he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a   reasonable   doubt   in   the   mind   of   the   court   as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.” 11.  Section 84 of the IPC carves out an exception, that an act will not be an offence, if done by a person, who at the time of doing   the   same,   by   reason   of   unsoundness   of   mind,   is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or what he is doing is   either   wrong   or   contrary   to   law.   But   this   onus   on   the accused,   under   Section   105   of   the   Evidence   Act   is   not  as stringent as on the prosecution to be established beyond all reasonable doubts.   The accused has  only to establish his defence   on   a   preponderance   of   probability,   as   observed   in   (2011) 11 SCC Surendra Mishra vs. State of Jharkhand, 8 495, after which the onus shall shift on the prosecution to establish the inapplicability of the exception.   But, it is not every and any plea of unsoundness of mind that will suffice. The standard of test to be applied shall be of legal insanity and not medical insanity, as observed in  State of Rajasthan vs. Shera Ram,  (2012) 1 SCC 602, as follows  : “19. ……..Once, a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder or mental deficiency, which takes within its ambit hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and self­control, at all relevant times by way of appropriate documentary and oral evidence, the   person   concerned   would   be   entitled   to   seek resort   to   the   general   exceptions   from   criminal liability.” 12. The crucial point of time for considering the defence plea of unsoundness of mind has to be with regard to the mental state of the accused at the time the offence was committed collated from evidence of conduct which preceded, attended and followed the crime as observed in  Ratan Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,  (1970) 3 SCC 533, as follows: “2. It is now well­settled that the crucial point of time   at   which   unsoundness   of   mind   should   be 9 established is the time when the crime is actually committed and the burden of proving this ties on the accused.  In D.G. Thakker v. State of Gujarat it was   laid   down   that   “there   is   a   rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused may  rebut  it by  placing  before  the   Court  all the relevant   evidence   –   oral,   documentary   or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that which rests upon a party to civil proceedings”.   13. If   from   the   materials   placed   on   record,   a   reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court with regard to the mental condition of the accused at the time of occurrence, he shall be entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt and consequent acquittal, as observed in  Vijayee Singh vs. State of U.P.,  (1990) 3 SCC 190.   14. We shall now consider the sufficiency of other medical and   defence   evidence   to   examine   if   a   reasonable   doubt   is created with regard to the mental state of the appellant at the time   of   commission   of   the   assault   on   a   preponderance   of probability, coupled with the complete lack of consideration of the evidence of P.W.14.   Merely because an injured witness, 10 who may legitimately be classified as an interested witness for obvious reasons,  may have stated that the appellant was not of   unsound   mind,   cannot   absolve   the   primary   duty   of   the prosecution to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt explaining why the plea for unsoundness of mind taken by the accused was untenable.  15. The   accused   was   taken   into   custody   on   28.09.2006. Charge­sheet was submitted on 29.12.2006 and commitment done on 16.02.2007.   The Trial Court records reflect several medical visits in prison, even weekly, 12 in number, between the period from 09.01.2007 to 07.04.2007, administering of antipsychotic   drugs   such   as   tablet   Haloperidol   and   tablet Olanzapine   and   tablet   Diazepam   to   the   appellant   with   the impression   recorded   by   the   Doctor   that   the   patient   is psychotic   and   needs   continuation   of   treatment.     The significance of use of the words “continuation” cannot be lost sight of, and has obviously been used with regard to a pre­ existing ailment and which includes the period prior to and from   26.09.2006   to   28.09.2006.   On   03.05.2007,   an 11 application   was   moved   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   under Chapter­XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was not fit to face trial.  A fresh medical report was called for on 14.06.2007 which opined on 19.06.2007 that the appellant was a chronic patient of psychotics who has been evaluated time and again by the Mental Hospital, Nagpur, the present doctor at Akola and also by the Psychiatrist.  On 13.07.2007, the Trial Court directed him to be sent to the Mental Hospital and called for a fresh report.  On 11.04.2008, fresh report was called for and the appellant was prescribed Trinicalm Forte tablet/Trinicalm Plus tablet amongst other medicines.   The treating   Doctor,  Dr.  Pramod   Thakare,   opined  in  writing on 20.05.2009 as follows: “1) Above   named   prisoner   is   suffering   from   mental illness (psychosis) since unknown duration.  He is being treated and examined by several psychiatrists attached to Govt. Medical College and Hospital, Akola since January 2008 during specialists visit to prison. 2) This prisoner showed suicidal tendency, aggressive behavior,   disturb   sleep,   poor   communication   and occasional erratic behavior. 3) He was treated with a various antipsychotic drugs since January 2008 till today. 12 …..At   present   he   is   under   control   with   antipsychotic drugs   and   is   still   maintained   on   drugs.     He   may   be referred   to   Mental   Hospital,   Nagpur   for   further investigations   and   expert   opinion,   for   further proceedings.” 16. The nature of illness of the appellant, and its correlation to the nature of treatment required may appropriately be set out as follows:

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17.  C.W.1 was also examined by the defence as D.W.3 and deposed that he had no materials with regard to the previous history of the appellant, that none of his relatives were present at the time of such examination, and he could not therefore say anything regarding any pre­existing mental disorder of the appellant.  18. D.W.1, the sister of the appellant, and his mother D.W.2, had stated that the appellant had to be tied up at times and was unable to take care of himself, including clothing on his person.   The prosecution did not deny the fact of a treating 14 Psychiatrist at Akola, by the name of Dr. Kelkar, mentioned by the witness. The appellant and his family were poor people and could hardly be expected to meticulously preserve medical papers   or   lead   expert   evidence   as   observed   in   Ratan   Lal (supra).  Merely because five years later in the witness box the witness may have stated that there was no complaint from the police with regard to the conduct of the appellant in custody, the trial judge manifestly erred in his conclusion with regard to the mental state of the appellant at the time of occurrence by testing it on the touchstone of the present demenaour in court   and   present   conduct   of   the   appellant,   without   any reference to the medication that was being provided to the appellant while in custody.   Naturally, if the appellant was being provided proper medical treatment during custody, his condition would certainly improve over time.   19. The   trial   judge   erred   in   proper   consideration   and appreciation of evidence, virtually abjuring all such evidence available   raising   doubts   about   the   mental   status   of   the appellant at the time of commission of the offence, so as to 15 leave his conviction as a foregone conclusion. The trial judge unfortunately   did   not   consider   it   necessary   to   put   further questions to P.W.14 with regard to the hospitalisation of the appellant   immediately   after   the   occurrence   and   why   the prosecution   had   not   placed   the   necessary   evidence   in   this regard before the court.  The truth therefore remained elusive, and justice thus became a casualty.  The Trial Judge therefore erred in his duty, as observed in  State of Rajasthan vs. Ani (1997) 6 SCC 162 as follows: alias Hanif and others,  “12. Reticence   may   be   good   in   many circumstances, but a Judge remaining mute during trial is not an ideal situation.  A taciturn Judge may be the model caricatured in public mind.  But there is nothing wrong in his becoming active or dynamic during trial so that criminal justice being the end could be achieved.   Criminal trial should not turn out to be a bout or combat between two rival sides with   the   Judge   performing   the   role   only   of   a spectator or even an umpire to pronounce finally who won the race.  A Judge is expected to actively participate   in   the   trial,   elicit   necessary   materials from witnesses in the appropriate context which he feels necessary for reaching the correct conclusion. There is nothing which inhibits his power to put questions   to   the   witnesses,   either   during   chief examination   or   cross­examination   or   even   during re­examination to elicit truth.  The corollary of it is that if a Judge felt that a witness has committed an 16 error or a slip it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain whether it was so, for, to err is human and the chances  of   erring  may   accelerate  under  stress   of nervousness   during   cross­examination.     Criminal justice is not to be founded on erroneous answers spelled out by witnesses during evidence­collecting process.   It is a useful exercise for trial Judge to remain   active   and   alert   so   that   errors   can   be minimized.” 20. The   Appellate   Court   also   had   a   duty   to   consider   the nature of the evidence led by P.W.14 and the other medical evidence   available   on   record   with   regard   to   the   appellant. Unfortunately, it appears that the Appellate Court also did not delve into the records in the manner required, as observed in Rama and others vs. State of Rajasthan,  (2002) 4 SCC 571 “(4) ……  It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is enjoined upon the appellate court to reappraise the evidence itself and it cannot proceed to dispose of the appeal upon appraisal of evidence by the trial court alone especially when the   appeal  has   been  already   admitted   and  placed  for  final hearing.     Upholding   such   a   procedure   would   amount   to negation   of   valuable   right   of   appeal   of   an   accused,   which cannot be permitted under law.” 21. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   opinion,   that   the appellant has been able to create sufficient doubt in our mind that he is entitled to the benefit of the exception under section 84   I.P.C.   because   of   the   preponderance   of   his   medical 17 condition   at   the   time   of   occurrence,   as   revealed   from   the materials and evidence on record.  The prosecution cannot be said to have established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal.  The appeal is allowed.  He is directed to be released from custody unless wanted in any other case. 22. In view of our conclusions and findings based on the medical evidence with regard to the appellant, it is considered necessary to give further directions under Section 335 or 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as the case may be, so that the appellant is not exposed to vagaries and receives proper care and support befitting his right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  A copy of this order be sent to the District Legal Services Authority, Akola for the needful. …………...................J. [A.M. KHANWILKAR] …………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA] NEW DELHI JULY 02, 2018. 18