Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MST. QAISAR JEHAN BEGUM AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
11/02/1963
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
SARKAR, A.K.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1963 AIR 1604 1964 SCR (1) 971
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1979 SC 404 (10)
ACT:
Limitation-Land Acquisition Act, (1 of 1894), s. 18.
HEADNOTE:
On October 25,1953, the Collector made an award in
respect of land belonging to the respondents, who were
evacuees, in the District of Gurgaon. The respondents were
not notified about the acquisition and they were not present
at the time of the award.
The respondents filed an application before the Collector
stating that they came to know of the contents of the Award
only on July 22, 1955 when they received the compensation
amount and that the amount of Rs. 96 pet acre as given in
the Award was too low and that the market value of the land
was about Rs. 600/- per acre. The Collector accepted the
application and referred the matter under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, to the Senior Subordinate judge, Gurgaon.
The Senior Subordinate judge held that the application for a
reference which was made on September 30, 1955, was filed
beyond the period of limitation prescribed by s. 18 and dis-
charged the reference. The matter was taken to the High
Court in revision by the respondents and the High Court
accepted the revision petition and directed the Subordinate
judge to deal with the reference on merits, on the view that
the civil court was preclued from going into questions other
than the matters specified in s. 18 of the Act. The High
Court did not go into the correctness of the decision on
merits on the question of limitation. On appeal by special
leave.
Held, assuming that the civil court could go into the
question of limitation, the respondents who were entitled to
notice under s. 12, sub-s. 2, of the Act had admittedly
received no notice nor were they present at the time when
the Award was made and therefore neither cl. (a) nor the
first part of cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18 applied.
The scheme of the Act requires that before applying for
reference under s. 18, the parties concerned must have know-
ledge of the essential contents of the award and in the
present
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case the petitioners though they had come to know of the
award earlier did not know the essential contents of the
award till July 22, 1955, therefore, the period of six
months contemplated in the second part of cl. (b) of s. 18
would commence from that date and the application for
reference was within time.
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer, [1962] 1 S. C. R. 676, relied on.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
November 16, 1959, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in
Civil Revision No. 268 of 1958.
R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the
appellant.
S. P. Sinha and Saukat Hussain, for respondent No. 2.
1963. February 11. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from
the judgment and order dated November 16, 1959 passed by the
Punjab High Court on an application in revision in respect
of an order dated December 17, 1957 by which the learned
Senior Subordinate judge of Gurgaon held that a reference by
the Collector of Gurgaon under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act (Act 1 of 1894) was incompetent by reason of the
circumstance that it was made on an application filed beyond
time. The appellant before us is the State of Punjab and
the respondents are two ladies being related as mother and
daughter. We shall presently state the relevant facts, but
before we do so it is necessary to say that the only point
on which the High Court disposed of the application in
revision before it made by the respondents herein, was
whether the civil court to which a reference is
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made by the Collector under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act on an application filed beyond time, can reject the
reference on the ground that the reference made is
incompetent. On this point there is a conflict of judicial
opinion. In disposing of the application in revision the
learned single judge who heard it proceeded on the basis
that he was bound by the Division Bench decision of the same
High Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu (1),
which held that- the jurisdiction of the civil court on a
reference under s. 18 was confined to considering and
pronouncing upon any of the four different objections to an
award under the Act which might have been raised in the
written application for the reference and the civil court
had no jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation.
Therefore, the learned single judge did not go into the
further question as to whether the application made for a
reference in the present case was filed beyond time or not
as prescribed by the proviso to s. 18 of the Act. That
question has however been agitated before us by reason of
the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy
Land Acquisition Officer (2) , a decision of this court
which was not available at the time when the learned single
judge of the Punjab High Court disposed of the application
in revision.
We proceed now to state the relevant facts. The
respondents who were evacuees were owners of 55 bighas and 7
biswas of land in two villages known as Salarpur and
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Nasirpur in the district of Gurgaon. Their lands in the
aforesaid two villages along with lands of other persons in
other villages were acquired by the appellant for use as a
field Firing and Bombing Range. The respondents were not
notified about the acquisition and were not present at the
time of the award. The respondents alleged, and this was
not denied, that the Collector treated the property as
evacuee property and none of the notices contemplated by the
Land Acquisition
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 490.
(2) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676.
974
Act, 1894 were issued to them. The Collector made an award
on October 25, 1953 by which he allowed compensation at the
rate of Rs. 96/- per acre in respect of the lands of the
respondents. On December 24, 1954 that is more than a year
after the award, the respondents made an application to the
Collector in which they said that certain agricultural lands
of villages Salarpur and Nasirpur were compulsorily acquired
by the Collector by an award dated October 30,1953 (October
30 was presumably a mistake for October 25), but they were
not given any notice of the acquisition proceedings. The
respondents further stated that the awerd had fixed the
compensation to be given to the land owners affected by the
acquisition, but the amount to be paid to each owner was not
apportioned therein. The respondents then referred to a
judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court dated November,
13, 1944 under which they were held to be the owners of the
lands in question. A prayer was made on behalf of the
respondents for payment of the compensation money at an
early date for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a
daughter’s marriage, but without prejudice to the claim of
the respondents for enhancement of the amount of
compensation. The amount of compensation appears to have
been paid on July 22, 1955 and on September 30, 1955 the
respondents made an application to the Collector for a
reference under s. 18 of the Act. In this application the
respondents stated that they knew about the award on July
22, 1955 when they received the compensation amount and
therefore the petition was within time. The principal
objection which they raised to the award was that the market
value of the land was not Rs. 96/- per acre as given in the
award, but about Rs. 600/- per acre. The Collector accepted
this application in a very short order which stated :
"Public Prosecutor has been heard. Mst.
Timur
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Jehan Begum has filed an affidavit to the
effect that she had no knowledge of the award
at the time it was made and that she only came
to know about it in July, 1955, when she
received the award money. Nothing has been
shown to me to the contrary to prove that the
award was made within the knowledge of the
petitioners. Under the circumstances it would
be only fair and equitable to refer the
petition under section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act to a civil court for
determining the compensation, which I hereby
do."
A reference was made accordingly to the civil court and the
Senior Subordinate judge of Gurgaon who heard it came to the
conclusion that the application made to the Collector for a
reference war barred by time, because the Collector’s award
was made on October 25, 1953 and the application for a
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reference was made on September 30, 1955. The learned
Subordinate judge expressed some doubt as to whether the
respondents were entitled to count the period of the
limitation from the date of knowledge but he held that even
if they were entitled to do so, their date of knowledge must
be taken to be December 24, 19-54 on which date they made an
application for interim payment and the application for
reference having been made more than six months from the
date of knowledge, the application was barred by time within
the meaning of the proviso to s. 18 of the Act. As to
whether it was open to the civil court to go into the
question of limitation the learned Subordinate-judge
referred to the conflict of .judicial opinion and said that
the preponderance of opinion was in favour of the view that
the. civil court could go into the question in order to find
out whether the reference was competent or not. In this
view of the matter, the learned Subordinate judge discharged
the reference on the ground that it was incompetent. It may
be mentioned here that the
976
Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Hari
Krishan Khosla’s case (1), was not available to the learned
Subordinate judge on the day he passed his orders. The
matter was then to the High Court on an application in
revision by the respondents and we have already stated that
the High Court dealt with it on the footing of the decision
in Hari Krishan Khosla’s case (1). The High Court accepted
the application in revision, set aside the order of the
learned Subordinate judge and directed him to deal with the
reference on merits. It is from this order of the High
Court that the appeal has come to us by special leave.
It is necessary at this stage to set out the
proviso to s. 1 8 of the Act
"............
Provided that every such application shall be
made,-
(a) if the person making it was present or
represented before the Collectorate at the
time when he made his award. within six weeks
from the date of the Collector’s award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector under
section 12, sub-section (2), or within six
months from the date of the Collector’s award,
whichever period shall first expire."
Assuming that the appellant can raise the ground of
limitation, the first question before us is whether the
application made on September 30, 1955 was within time
within the meaning of the aforesaid proviso. Clause (a) of
the proviso is clearly not applicable in the present case,
because admittedly the respondents were neither present nor
were
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 490.
977
represented before the Collector when the latter made his
award. The first part of cl. (b) is also not applicable,
because the respondents did not receive any notice from the
Collector under sub-S. (2) of S. 12 of the Act. That sub-
section requires the Collector to give immediate notice of
his award to such of the persons interested as are not
present personally or by their representatives when the
award is made. Clearly enough, the respondents herein were
entitled to a notice under sub-s. (2) of S. 12 but
admittedly no notice was issued to them.
As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true
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scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in
Raja Harish Chandra’s Case (1). It was there observed that
a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six
months from the date of the Collector’s award" occurring in
the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso would not be
appropriate an and "the knowledge of the party affected by
the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential
requirement of fair play and natural justice, the
expression...... used in the proviso must mean the date when
the award is either communicated to the party or is known by
him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award
was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the
question before us boils down to this. When did the
respondents know the award either actually or constructively
? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong
reliance on the petition which the respondents made for
interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He
has pointed out that the learned Subordinate judge relied on
this petition as showing the respondents’ date of knowledge
and there are no reasons why we should take a different
view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision
in Raja Harish Chandra’s case (1), is that the party
affected by the award must know it, actually or
constructively and the period of six months will
(1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676.
978
run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the
award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an
award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the
essential contents of the award. These contents may be
known either actually or constructively. If the award is
communicated to a party under s. 12 (2) of the Act, the
party -must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the
contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly
when a party is present in court either personally or
through his representative when the award is made by the
Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of
the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think
that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the
essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point
of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the
petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had
knowledge of the award. One of the respondents gave
evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said
"The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given
by me but the amount of compensation was not
known to me, nor did I know about acquisition
of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my
karinda had told me on the day I filed the
said application that the land had been
acquired by the Government."
This evidence was not seriously contradicted on behalf of
the appellant and the learned Subordinate judge did not
reject it. It is worthy of note that before the Collector
also the appellant did not seriously challenge the statement
of the respondents that they came to know of the award on
July 22, 1955 the date on which the compensation was paid.
In the reply which the appellant filed before the learned
Subordinate judge there was no contradiction of the averment
that the respondents had come to
979
know of the award on July 22, 1955. That being the position
we have come to the conclusion that the date of knowledge in
this case was July 22, 1955. The application for a
reference was clearly made within six months from that date
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and was not therefore barred by time within the meaning of
the second part of cl. (by of the proviso to s. 18 of the
Act.
In the view which we have taken on the question of
limitation, it is unnecessary for us to decide the other
question as to whether the civil court, on a reference under
s. 18 of the Act, can go into the question of limitation.
We have already stated that there is a conflict of judicial
opinion on that question. There is on one side a line of
decisions Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in
re. Land Acquisition Act (1), which have held that the
civil court is not debarred from satisfying itself that the
reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid
reference. There is, on the other side, a line of decisions
which say that the jurisdiction of the civil court is
confined to considering and pronouncing upon any one of the
four different objections to an award under the Act which
may have been raised in the written application for the
reference. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Secretary of State v. Bhagvan Prasad (1), is typical of this
line of decisions. There is thus a marked conflict of judi-
cial opinion on the question. This conflict, we think, must
be resolved in a more appropriate case on a future occasion.
In the case before us the question does not really arise and
is merely academic and we prefer not to decide the question
in the present case.
For the reasons given above, we would dismiss the appeal
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) (1905) I.L.R. 30 Bombay 275.
(2) (1929) I.L.R. 32 Allahabad 96.
980