MANOJ KUMAR KHOKHAR vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.4062 OF 2020) MANOJ KUMAR KHOKHAR            …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.           ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T NAGARATHNA J.  This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the th informant­appellant   assailing   Order   dated   7   May,   2020 passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   of   Rajasthan,   at Jaipur, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 3601/2020, whereby bail has been granted to the accused who   is   the   second   respondent   in   the   instant   appeal,   in connection with FIR No. 407/2019 Police Station Kalwar.  2.  According to the appellant, he is the son of the deceased, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2022.01.11 16:35:07 IST Reason: Ram Swaroop Khokhar and is the person who lodged the First th Information Report being FIR No. 407/2019 on 8  December, 1 2019 for the offence of murder of his father, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC” for the sake of brevity) against the second respondent­ accused herein viz. Ram Narayan Jat.   th 3. The said FIR dated 8  December, 2019 had been lodged by the appellant herein between 23:00 hrs and 23:30 hrs in the night stating that earlier on that day, at about 16:00 hrs, his father, aged about 55 years, was attacked by the respondent­ accused, at the Lalpura Pachar bus stand, with the intention of   killing   him.   That   the   respondent­accused   pinned   the deceased   to   the   ground,   sat   on   his   chest   and   forcefully strangled him, thereby causing his death. Some associates of the respondent­accused who were present at the spot of the incident, helped him in attacking and killing the deceased. The informant­appellant further stated in the FIR that there was a pre­existing rivalry between the respondent­accused, his brothers namely, Arjun, Satyanarayn and Okramal and the deceased. That the deceased had previously informed the appellant and certain family members about such rivalry and had communicated that he was apprehensive about his safety owing to the same. That even on the day of the incident, the respondent­accused along with one of his brothers, Okramal 2 had gone to the appellant’s house in the morning and had abused   the   deceased.   The   report   of   the   post­mortem th examination conducted on 9  December, 2019 has recorded that the deceased had died as a result of “asphyxia due to ante mortem strangulation.” 4.  The respondent­accused was arrested in connection with th the said FIR No. 407/2019 on 10  December, 2019 and was sent to judicial custody. The respondent­accused remained under judicial custody for a period of nearly one year and five months   till   he   was   granted   bail   by   the   High   Court   vide impugned order.   5.   A charge sheet was submitted by the police before the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur after conducting an investigation in relation to the aforesaid FIR. th The Additional Metropolitan Magistrate by Order dated 12 March, 2020 took cognizance of the offence and committed the   case   to   the   District   and   Sessions   Court   for   trial   and adjudication.   6.  The respondent­accused had earlier preferred applications seeking   bail,   under   Section   437   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “CrPC”) before the Court of 3 Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by rd th orders dated 23   January, 2020 and 6   March, 2020. The accused had also preferred a bail application under Section 439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional th Sessions Judge No.5, Jaipur Metropolitan by order dated 12 March,   2020   having   regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences alleged   against   the   accused.   The   respondent­accused preferred another bail application before the High Court and th by the impugned order dated 7  May, 2020, the High Court has enlarged him on bail. Being aggrieved by the grant of bail to   the   respondent­accused,   the   informant­appellant   has preferred the instant appeal before this Court.   7. We have heard Sri. Basant R., learned Senior Counsel for the   appellant   and   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned Counsel   for   respondent­accused   and   have   perused   the material on record.   8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the   deceased   had   been   elected   in   2015   as   the   Deputy Sarpanch   of   Mandha   Bhopawaspachar   village,   Jhotwara Tehsil, Jaipur, Rajasthan. That he was elected to such post 4 despite opposition from the accused and his family. That the family of the accused exercised significant influence in the village   and   were   trying   to   dissuade   the   deceased   from contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch, to be held in February   2020.   Owing   to   such   political   enmity,   the respondent­accused   along   with   his   brothers   Arjun, Satyanarayn and Okramal had gone to the appellant’s house th in   the   morning   on   8   December,   2019   and   abused   the deceased and later on the same day, the deceased was killed. According to the appellant, the deceased was suffering from 54% permanent physical impairment of both his legs and had therefore been overpowered by the respondent­accused who had pinned him to the ground, sat on his chest and throttled his neck, resulting in his death.   9.  Further it was urged that the High Court has not exercised its discretion judiciously in granting bail to the respondent­ accused.   That   the   High   Court   has   not   taken   into consideration the gravity of the offence alleged and the grave manner in which the offence was committed against a person incapable of defending himself owing to physical impairment. 5 10.   It   was   submitted   that   the   factum   of   previous   enmity between the family of the accused and the deceased has not been   taken   into   consideration   by   the   High   Court   in   the context of the allegations against the accused with regard to the grant of bail. That the possibility of respondent­accused, a person exercising high political influence in Bhopawaspachar village, absconding or threatening the witnesses or the family of   the   deceased,   thereby   having   a   bearing   on   the   trial,   if released on bail could not be ruled out. That the police were initially   reluctant   to   even   register   an   FIR   against   the respondent­accused. In fact, the accused was arrested by the th police on 10  December, 2019 only as a result of the protest (dharna) carried out by the family members of the deceased outside the police station. It was contended that the accused, being a very influential person in the village, could influence the course of trial by tampering with evidence and influencing the witnesses.  According   to   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the appellant, the High Court has not assigned reasons for grant of bail in the instant case wherein commission of a heinous crime has been alleged against the accused, for which, the accused, if convicted, could be sentenced to life imprisonment 6 or even death penalty. That the High Court in a very cryptic order,   de   hors   any   reasoning   has   granted   bail   to   the respondent­accused. It was urged that the grant of bail to the respondent­accused was contrary to the settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant, who is the son of the deceased, that this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned order.  11. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for the   appellant   placed   reliance   on   certain   decisions   of   this Court which shall be referred to later.   12.   Per   contra,   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned counsel for respondent­accused submitted that the impugned order   does   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity   warranting   any interference by this Court. That the informant­appellant has narrated   an   untrue   version   of   events   in   order   to   falsely implicate the accused. Existence of past enmity between the families   of   the   deceased   and   the   accused   has   been categorically denied. It has been stated that the two families maintained cordial relations, which fact is evidenced by the th findings in the charge sheet dated 7  February 2020, which records   that   the   deceased   and   the   respondent­accused 7 belonged to the same village and they used to play cards together   at   the   Lalpura   bus   stand   every   day   since   their retirement and there is no evidence which is suggestive of enmity between them. That the sudden scuffle between the th deceased and the accused on 8   December, 2019 was an isolated   incident   and   was   not   in   connection   with   or   in continuation of any pre­existing dispute between them.  It was further submitted that there was a considerable and unexplained delay by the informant­appellant in lodging the FIR which is proof of the fact that the same was lodged as an afterthought and therefore does not bring out the true narration of facts. In support of his submission as to the false nature   of   the   appellent’s   version   of   the   incident,   learned counsel   for   the   respondent­accused   has   relied   on   the statements of the eye­witnesses to the incident stating that there was a sudden scuffle between the deceased and the respondent­accused   on   the   date   of   the   incident   and   the accused   throttled   the   neck   of   the   deceased.   After   being separated, the deceased sat on a bench in the bus­stop but later became unconscious and was immediately taken to the hospital where he died. It has further been stated by an eye­ 8 witness, namely, Mangalchand that the brothers of accused were not present at the time of the incident.  Learned counsel for the respondent­accused referred to Niranjan Singh and Anr. vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote  to contend that a court deciding and Ors , [1980] 2 SCC 559 a bail application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits of the case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage is bound to prejudice fair trial.  Further, learned counsel for the respondent­accused submitted   that   the   investigation   in   relation   to   FIR   No. 407/2019 is complete in all respects and charge sheet has been   submitted.   Therefore,   there   arises   no   question   as   to influencing any witness or tampering with the evidence. That the accused has deep roots in society and will therefore not attempt   to   abscond.   Also,   the   accused   has   no   criminal antecedents and the incident in question occurred as a result of a sudden scuffle and therefore,  prima facie,  offence under section 300 of the IPC has not been made out against the accused.   Hence,   the   impugned   order   granting   bail   to   the respondent­accused   does   not   call   for   interference   by   this Court.   9 13. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Basant R., learned Senior Counsel for the informant­appellant that the impugned order granting bail to the respondent­accused is bereft of any reasoning   and   that   such   order   is   casual   and   cryptic,   we th extract the portion of the impugned order dated 7  May, 2020 passed by the High Court which is the “reasoning” of the Court for granting bail, as under:  “I   have   considered   the   submissions   and perused   the   challan   papers   and   the   post­ mortem   report,   but   without   expressing   any opinion on the merits and demerits of the case, I deem it appropriate to enlarge the accused­ petitioner on bail.   Therefore, this bail application is allowed and it is directed that accused­petitioner namely, Ram Narayan   Jat   S/o   Shri   Bhinva   Ram   shall   be released on bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in connection   with   aforesaid   FIR,   provided   he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/­ together with one surety in the like amount   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   concerned Magistrate   with   the   stipulation   that   he   shall comply with all the conditions laid down under Section 437 (3) Cr.P.C.” 14. Before  proceeding  further, it would be useful to refer to the judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an accused as under: a) In   Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­   (1978) 1 SCC 240 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content 10 of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail, which are extracted as under: “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction   is   confirmed,   also   bears   upon   the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. 9.   Thus   the   legal   principles   and   practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of   a   man   who   is   applying   for   bail   to   find whether he has a bad record – particularly a record   which   suggests   that   he   is   likely   to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict further   about   the   criminal   record   of   a defendant,   is   therefore   not   an   exercise   in irrelevance.” b) In   Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS   – (2001)   4   SCC   280   this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows:  11 “The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character, behavior, means and standing of the accused, circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words   "reasonable   grounds   for   believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” c) This   Court   in   Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan Singh –  (2002) 3 SCC 598,  speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: 

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d) In   Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav & Anr.   – (2004) 7 SCC 528 , this Court held   that   although   it   is   established   that   a   court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.  e) In     ­­ Prasanta Kumar   Sarkar   vs.   Ashis   Chaterjee   this Court observed that where a High (2010) 14 SCC 496  Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non­application of mind, rendering it illegal.   This   Court   held   as   under   with   regard   to   the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have 13 guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under:  “It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere   with   an   order   passed   by   the   High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court   to   exercise   its   discretion   judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic   principles   laid   down   in   a   plethora   of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or   reasonable   ground   to   believe   that   the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment   in   the   event   of   conviction;   (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released   on   bail;   (v)   character,   behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;   and   (viii)   danger,   of   course,   of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody. However,   as   noted   in   Ash   Mohammad   vs.   Shiv   Raj Singh @ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446 , the period of custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the   totality   of   the   circumstances   and   the   criminal antecedents   of   the   acused,   if   any.   Further,   the circumstances which may justify the grant of bail are to be 14 considered in the larger context of the societal concern involved   in   releasing   an   accused,   in   juxtaposition   to individual liberty of the accused seeking bail.  g) In  Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr.  – (2016) 15 SCC 422,  after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was) in paragraphs 15 and 18 as under:  “15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless sky that the High Court has totally ignored   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is   the   doctrine   of   parity.   A   history­sheeter involved in the nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the   crimes   are   of   heinous   nature   and   such crimes,  by   no  stretch   of  imagination,   can  be regarded   as   jejune.   Such   cases   do   create   a thunder   and   lightening   having   the   effect potentiality   of   torrential  rain  in  an  analytical mind. The law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.  x x x  18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with   profit   that   it   is   not   an   appeal   for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have 15 not   been   taken   into   consideration   which includes   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the accused and that  makes the  order  a  deviant one.   Therefore,   the   inevitable   result   is   the lancination of the impugned order.” h) In  Anil Kumar Yadav vs. State (NCT of Delhi)  – (2018) 12 SCC 129 , this Court, while considering an appeal from an order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this   Court   has   stated   that   while   it   is   not   possible   to prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of an order granting bail, is that it should result from   judicious   exercise   of   the   court’s   discretion.   The findings of this Court have been extracted as under:  “17.   While   granting   bail,   the   relevant considerations are: (i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the accused;   and   (iii)   likelihood   of   the   accused fleeing   from   justice;   (iv)   the   impact   that   his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of his   tampering.   No   doubt,   this   list   is   not exhaustive.   There   are   no   hard­and­fast   rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court.” 16 i) In   Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana Makwana (Koli) and Ors.,  (2021) 6 SCC 230 this   Court   after   referring   to   a   catena   of   judgments emphasized   on   the   need   and   importance   of   assigning reasons   for   the   grant   of   bail.   This   Court   categorically observed that a court granting bail could not obviate its duty to apply its judicial mind and indicate reasons as to why bail has been granted or refused. The observations of this Court have been extracted as under:  “ 35.   We   disapprove   of   the   observations   of   the High   Court   in   a   succession   of   orders   in   the present case recording that the Counsel for the parties   "do   not   press   for   a   further   reasoned order".   The   grant   of   bail   is   a   matter   which implicates the liberty of the Accused, the interest of   the   State   and   the   victims   of   crime   in   the proper administration of criminal justice. It is a well settled principle that in determining as to whether bail should be granted, the High Court, or for that matter, the Sessions Court deciding an application Under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal   Procedure   would   not   launch   upon   a detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a criminal   trial   is   still   to   take   place.   These observations while adjudicating upon bail would also not be binding on the outcome of the trial. But the Court granting bail cannot obviate its duty   to   apply   a   judicial   mind   and   to   record reasons, brief as they may be, for the purpose of deciding   whether   or   not   to   grant   bail.   The consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to indicate its reasons why it has either   granted   or   refused   bail.   This   is   for   the reason that the outcome of the application has a significant bearing on the liberty of the Accused on one hand as well as the public interest in the due enforcement of criminal justice on the other. The rights of the victims and their families are at 17 stake as well. These are not matters involving the private rights of two individual parties, as in a civil   proceeding.   The   proper   enforcement   of criminal law is a matter of public interest. We must,   therefore,   disapprove   of   the   manner   in which   a   succession   of   orders   in   the   present batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the "respective   parties   do   not   press   for   further reasoned order". If this is a euphemism for not recording   adequate   reasons,   this   kind   of   a formula   cannot   shield   the   order   from   judicial scrutiny.  36. Grant of bail Under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a matter involving the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in granting or refusing bail­as in the case of any other discretion which is vested in a court as a judicial institution­is not unstructured. The duty to   record   reasons   is   a   significant   safeguard which   ensures   that   the   discretion   which   is entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious manner. The recording of reasons in a judicial order   ensures   that   the   thought   process underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and that it meets objective standards of reason and justice.” j) Recently in   Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021),  this Court made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court  distinguished between setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts 18 requiring such cancellation. Quoting  Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar   ­   (2020)   2   SCC   118,   this   Court   observed   as under: “16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of  supervening   circumstances  or   violations  of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted.”  k) Learned   counsel   for   the   accused­respondent   has   relied upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Myakala Dharmarajam and Ors. vs. The State of Telangana  to contend that elaborate and Ors.  – (2020) 2 SCC 743 reasons need not be assigned for the grant of bail. What is of essence is that the record of the case ought to have been perused by the court granting bail. The facts of the said case are that a complaint was lodged against fifteen persons for offences under Sections 148, 120B, 302 read with   Section   149   of  the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860.   The accused therein moved an application seeking bail before the Principal Sessions Judge, who, after perusal of the 19 case diary, statements of witnesses and other connected records, released the accused on bail through an order which did not elaborately discuss the material on record. The High Court cancelled the bail bond on the ground that the   Principal   Sessions   Judge   had   not   discussed   the material on record in the order granting bail. In an appeal preferred   by   the   accused   before   this   Court,   the   order granting bail was restored and the following observations were made as to the duty of the court to record reasons and discuss the material on record before granting bail: “10. Having perused the law laid down by this Court on the scope of the power to be exercised in   the   matter   of   cancellation   of   bails,   it   is necessary to examine whether the order passed by the Sessions Court granting bail is perverse and suffers from infirmities which has resulted in   the   miscarriage   of   justice.   No   doubt,   the Sessions Court did not discuss the material on record in detail, but there is an indication from the orders by which bail was granted that the entire material was perused before grant of bail. It   is  not   the  case   of   either  the   complainant­ Respondent No. 2 or the State that irrelevant considerations have been taken into account by the Sessions Court while granting bail to the Appellants. The order of the Sessions Court by which the bail was granted to the Appellants cannot be termed as perverse as the Sessions Court   was   conscious   of   the   fact   that   the investigation was completed and there was no likelihood of the Appellant tampering with the evidence. 11. The petition filed for cancellation of bail is both on the grounds of illegality of the order passed by the Sessions Court and the conduct of the Appellants subsequent to their  release 20 after bail was granted. The complaint filed by one   Bojja   Ravinder   to   the   Commissioner   of Police,   Karimnagar   is   placed   on   record   by Respondent No. 2. It is stated in the complaint that the Appellants were roaming freely in the village   and   threatening   witnesses.   We   have perused   the   complaint   and   found   that   the allegations made therein are vague. There is no mention   about   which   Accused   out   of   the   15 indulged in acts of holding out threats to the witnesses or made an attempt to tamper with the evidence. 12. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties and examining the material on record, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not right in cancelling the bail of the Appellants. The orders passed by the Sessions Judge   granting   bail   cannot   be   termed   as perverse.   The   complaint   alleging   that   the Appellants were influencing witnesses is vague and   is   without   any   details   regarding   the involvement of the Appellants in threatening the witnesses. Therefore, the Appeals are allowed and   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   set aside.” However, we are of the view that the said decision is not   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   instant   case   for   the following reasons: Firstly, this Court in the aforecited decision restored the order granting bail to the accused on the ground that although no discussion was made by the Sessions Court as to the material on record, in the order granting bail, it was apparent in the order of the Sessions Court whereby bail was granted, that the decision to grant bail was arrived at after perusal of the entire material on record. While the 21 material   may   not   have   been   specifically   referred   to,   the order granting bail was indicative of the fact that it had been   arrived   at   after   thorough   consideration   thereof. However, in the instant case, no such indication can be observed in the impugned orders of the High Court which would be suggestive of the fact that the material on record was perused before deciding to grant bail. Secondly,   the   case   referred   to   by   the   accused concerned   an   offence   which   was   allegedly   committed   by fifteen   persons.   The   complainant   therein   had   not specifically assigned roles to each of such fifteen persons. It was thus found that the allegations being vague, no prima facie case could be made out, justifying the grant of bail to the accused therein. However, in the instant case, only one accused has been named by the appellant­informant and the role attributed to him is specific. Therefore, the facts of the case relied upon, being significantly different from the one before us, we find that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent­accused would be of no assistance to his case. l) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise 22 of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused   is   in   the   case   of   Brijmani   Devi   vs.   Pappu Kumar   and   Anr.   –   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1663/2021 th disposed   of   on   17   December,   2021,   wherein   a   three­ Judge   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   setting   aside   an unreasoned and casual order of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:  “While   we   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported   by   adequate   material   brought   on record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a prima   facie   conclusion.   While   considering   an application   for   grant   of   bail   a   prima   facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of   the   accused,   if   any,   and   the   nature   of punishment that would follow a conviction vis­ à­vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.” 15.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court   in   Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited   &   Anr.   vs.  – (2010) 9 SCC 496 , wherein Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. 23 after   referring   to   a   number   of   judgments   this   Court summarised   at   paragraph   47   the   law   on   the   point.   The relevant principles for the purpose of this case are extracted as under:  “(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to   serve   the   wider   principle   of   justice   that justice   must   not   only   be   done   it   must   also appear to be done as well. (b)  Recording   of   reasons   also   operates   as   a valid   restraint   on   any   possible   arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi­judicial or even administrative power. (c)  Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised   by   the   decision­maker   on   relevant grounds   and   by   disregarding   extraneous considerations. (d)   Reasons   have   virtually   become   as indispensable   a   component   of   a   decision­ making   process   as   observing   principles   of natural   justice   by   judicial,   quasi­judicial   and even by administrative bodies. (e)  The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed   to   rule   of   law   and   constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is   virtually   the lifeblood  of judicial decision­making  justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (f)  Judicial   or   even   quasi­judicial   opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities   who   deliver   them.   All   these decisions serve one common purpose which is to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (g)  Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. 24 (h)  If a judge or a quasi­judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision­making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (i)  Reasons   in  support   of   decisions   must   be cogent,   clear   and   succinct.   A   pretence   of reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision­making process. (j)  It cannot be doubted that transparency is the   sine   qua   non   of   restraint   on   abuse   of judicial   powers.   Transparency   in   decision­ making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and decision­makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David   Shapiro   in  Defence   of   Judicial Candor  [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731­ 37) (k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future.   Therefore,   for   development   of   law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. Though   the   aforesaid   judgment   was   rendered   in   the context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, reliance could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons while deciding a matter. 16. The Latin maxim “ cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex ” meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason 25 of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself”, is also apposite.  17. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned order   above.   At   the   outset,   we   observe   that   the   extracted portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of   the   High   court   while   granting   bail.   As   noted   from   the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences by  the   accused   would   not  have  been   crystalised  as   such. There   cannot   be   elaborate   details   recorded   to   give   an impression   that   the   case   is   one   that   would   result   in   a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of bail. However, the Court deciding   a   bail   application   cannot   completely   divorce   its decision   from   material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the allegations   made   against   the   accused;   severity   of   the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable doubt   and   would   result   in   a   conviction;   reasonable apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being   influenced   by   the accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a 26 prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge against the accused.  18.  Ultimately, the Court considering an application for bail has   to   exercise   discretion   in   a   judicious   manner   and   in accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to the crime alleged to be committed by the accused on the one hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other.  19. Thus,  while  elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail or an extensive discussion of the merits of the case may not be undertaken by the court considering a bail application,   an   order   de   hors   reasoning   or   bereft   of   the relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the order before a higher forum. As noted in  Gurcharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.)   ­ 1978 CriLJ 129,   when bail has been   granted   to   an   accused,   the   State   may,   if   new circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) of the CrPC. However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that 27 the   same   is   perverse   or   illegal   or   has   been   arrived   at   by ignoring material aspects which establish a prima­facie case against the accused.  20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider the   facts   of   the   present   case.   The   allegations   against respondent­accused as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of the same, the following aspects of the case would emerge:  a)   The  allegation   against   the  respondent­accused   is   under section 302 of the IPC with regard to the murder of the deceased  Ram   Swaroop   Khokhar,   the   father   of   the informant­appellant who was a disabled person. Thus, the offence   alleged   against   the   respondent­accused   is   of   a grave nature.  b) The accusation against the accused is that he overpowered the deceased who was suffering from impairment of both his   legs,   pinned   him   to   the   ground,   sat   on   him   and throttled his neck. As per the postmortem report, the cause of death was ante­mortem strangulation. c)   It is also the case of the appellant that the respondent­ accused   is   a   person   exercising   significant   political influence in the Bhopawaspachar village and that owing to 28 the same, the informant found it difficult to get an FIR registered against him. That the accused was arrested only following a protest outside a police station demanding his arrest.  Thus, the possibility of the accused threatening or otherwise influencing the witnesses, if on bail, cannot be ruled out.  d) That   the   respondent­accused   had   earlier   preferred applications seeking bail, under section 437 of the CrPC before the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by rd th orders dated 23  January, 2020 and 6  March, 2020. The accused had also preferred a bail application under section 439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional th Sessions   Judge,   Jaipur   Metropolis   by   order   dated   12 March, 2020 having regard to the gravity of the offences alleged against the accused. th e) The High Court in the impugned order dated 7  May, 2020 has not considered the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant of bail.   21. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that this case is a fit case for grant of bail to the respondent­ 29 accused, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against him. Strangely, the State of Rajasthan has not filed any appeal against the impugned order.  22. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material aspects of the case and has, by a very cryptic and casual order,   de   hors   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the accused.   We   find   that   the   High   Court   was   not   right   in allowing   the   application   for   bail   filed   by   the   respondent­ th accused. Hence the impugned order dated 7   May, 2020 is set aside. The appeal is allowed.  23. The respondent accused is on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled   and   he   is   directed   to   surrender   before   the concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from today.  ……………………………J  M.R. SHAH  ……………………….…..J B.V. NAGARATHNA NEW DELHI; th 11  JANUARY, 2022.  30