REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3382-3383 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos. 32285-32286 of 2018)
HAMMAD AHMED ........APPELLANT
Versus
ABDUL MAJEED & ORS. ........RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Hemant Gupta, J.
Leave granted.
2. The challenge in the present appeals is to an order passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi on 27.11.2018 whereby
an application filed by the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of
1
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was dismissed. The Division Bench has
set aside an order passed by the learned Single Bench on 25.10.2017.
3. The dispute between the parties at this stage is as to who
should discharge the duties of Chief Mutawalli of Hamdard
2
Laboratories (India) earlier known as Hamdard Dawakhana, after the
1 Code
2 Hamdard
1
death of previous undisputed Chief Mutawalli - Abdul Mueed on
19.03.2015.
4. The Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 211 of 2017 on 08.05.2017,
whereas Respondent No. 2 filed Civil Suit No. 162 of 2017 on
29.03.2017. The suit of the Appellant is for declaration, prohibitory
injunction and for other reliefs. The Appellant asserted that after
death of Abdul Mueed, Chief Mutawalli on 19.03.2015, the Appellant
being living senior most male direct successor of Wakif Mutawalli took
over the Office of Chief Mutawalli on 20.03.2015 when an office order
was issued to this effect by him. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are
the defendants in the suit filed by the Appellant. Such Respondents
are sons of former Chief Mutawalli late Shri Abdul Mueed, elder
brother of the Appellant. The Respondent No. 1 – Abdul Majeed also
issued an office order on 23.03.2015, appointing himself as Chief
Mutawalli. The Respondent No. 1 issued letters on the basis of such
declaration on 23.03.2015 to various authorities including Banks. It is
in this background; the Appellant has sought declaration that the
3
Respondent No. 1 is no longer Mutawalli under the Wakf Deed dated
28.08.1948 as amended from time to time on account of breach of his
obligations under the said Deed and to issue a decree in nature of
permanent injunction restraining Respondent No.1 to continue as
Mutawalli of Hamdard. The Appellant also claimed that all decisions,
orders issued by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 jointly or severally after
20.03.2015 are null and void and of no effect.
3 Deed
2
5. The Appellant filed an application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code
along with the suit claiming the following interim
directions:
“a) To release the salaries and other dues of all
the Mutawallis of HLI (including Defendant No. 4)
from September, 2016 till date.
b) Direct all the banks as stated in para no. 2
of the application, to allow the plaintiff to operate
accounts maintained by HLI as sole signatory in his
capacity as Chief Mutawalli.
c) An order directing the defendants no. 1 and
2 to handover the password of the domain name
www.hamdard.com , www.hamdard.in and
www.hamdardindia.com and its e-mail server
password to the plaintiff.
d) Direct defendants no. 1 and 2 to disclose
and handover the ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) Admin Control Password.
e) Pass any other or further relief(s) which this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case.”
6. On the other hand, Asad Mueed son of the previous Chief
Mutawalli Abdul Mueed, sought removal of Appellant- Hammad
Ahmed and his son Hamed Ahmed from the position of Mutawallis of
Hamdard in the suit (Civil Suit No.162/2017) filed by him. The
Defendant No. 4 in the said suit is Abdul Majeed, respondent No.1
herein, the elder son of the last undisputed Chief Mutawalli Abdul
Mueed who died on 19.03.2015. The removal of the Appellant and
Respondent No. 3 was sought inter alia on the ground of malfeasance
and misfeasance of the affairs of Hamdard.
3
7. The learned Single Judge decided the Interlocutory Applications
filed by the parties in their respective suits on 25.10.2017, whereby
IA No. 4331 of 2017 filed by Respondent No. 2 in suit filed by him was
dismissed, whereas, IA No. 5860 of 2017 filed by the Appellant was
allowed inter-alia observing as under: -
“28. At the time of disposal of interim
applications, only prima facie view of the matter is
to be taken. On perusal of the various clauses of
the Trust Deed, it can be inferred, at this stage,
that the senior-most male descendant in the line of
succession (of Wakif Mutawalli) is prima facie
entitled to be appointed as Chief Mutawalli. It is
not in dispute that presently the second defendant
is the senior most male descendant in the line of
succession of Wakif Mutawalli. It is fairly admitted
by the defendants that the second defendant
would remain Chief Mutawalli during his life time
and after that, it can devolve upon the plaintiff in
terms of the clauses of the Trust Deed. Clause 3 is
very specific and categorical in this regard. It
cannot be interpreted that the male descendant in
the line of succession would be that of the Chief
Mutawalli to be appointed as Chief Mutawalli. This
interpretation will lead to the conclusion that the
office of Chief Mutawalli would always remain in
the family of the plaintiff to the exclusion of the
second defendant and his family members for all
the time to come.
29. I find no substance in the arguments that
the succession to the office of Chief Mutawalli
must devolve by the rule of lineal
primogeniture….”
xxx xxx xxx
“47. In view of observations above, the
defendants No. 1 & 2 are directed to hand over the
password of the domain name www.hamdard.com ,
www.hamdard.in and www.hamdardindia.com and
its e-mail server password to the plaintiff. They
shall also disclose and handover the ERP
(Enterprise Resource Planning) Admin Control
Password.”
4
8. The learned Single Bench also did not find any merit in the
argument that the Appellant has incurred disability on account of
pending criminal cases against him in terms of Clause 6 of the 1973
4
Wakf Deed , as amended on 26.6.1973. The learned Single Bench
held that mere pendency of criminal proceedings cannot debar the
Appellant to be appointed as Chief Mutawalli as the disqualification as
per Clause 6 (2) of the Deed is conviction of an offence involving
moral turpitude alone for disqualification. The relevant clause reads
as under:-
“In spite of the fact that a person has a right to be
appointed as a Mutawalli under Clause Four herein,
the Majlis-e-Ayan shall have the authority by a
Special Resolution, to refuse to appoint such
person as a Mutawalli or in the event of such a
person having already been appointed as a
Mutawalli, to remove or suspend him from office,
if:
1. He is a minor or insane or by reason of lack
of education, experience or old age and weak
health is unable satisfactorily to perform his duties
as a Mutawalli;
2. He is dishonest, addicted to alcohol,
gambling or has been convicted of some crime
involving moral turpitude;….”
9. Two First Appeals were preferred by the present Respondent
Nos. 1 and 2. The learned Division Bench set aside the order passed
by the learned Single Judge prima-facie finding that though the rule of
primogeniture is not applicable as a rule of succession amongst
Muslims but that is not a ground to overrule its application if provided
in the testamentary or other document. The Division Bench relied
4 1973 Deed
5
upon para 3 of the 1973 Deed that after the death of First Chief
Mutawalli, the senior most male descendant in his line is to be
appointed as Chief Mutawalli. The Bench recorded the following
findings: -
“ 28. This court is of opinion that Faqruddin
(supra) is an authority that under Muslim personal
law, lineal primogeniture does not apply. However,
it nowhere states that lineal male primogeniture is
prohibited-either in its application in a
testamentary document, or in a trust. In fact in
Faqruddin (supra), the spiritual nature of the office
and the acceptance of the holder, by the
congregation were proved; they were not in
controversy. For these reasons, that primogeniture
is not applicable as a rule of succession amongst
Muslims, is not a ground to overrule its application
if a given deed (testamentary or otherwise) so
directs. Likewise, in Aruputham (supra), in fact the
court upheld the applicability of the relatively
simpler rule of succession through lineal male
primogeniture, rather than through a more
complicated generation by generation process of
discerning who amongst a collegial body, was
entitled to “ambulatory” lineal primogeniture
succession.
xxx xxx xxx
30. A complete reading of the provision
(relating to succession) therefore, leads one to
conclude that after the death of the first Chief
Mutawalli, the senior most male in his line- and
one who is also a Mutawalli, is entitled to succeed
to the office. The last condition is important,
because one might be the senior most male
member; yet existing membership as a Mutawalli
ensures that the wakf is spared the risk of
experimentation and vagaries of administration by
one alien to its governance. The last internal clue,
which has assumed some importance in this case,
is that during the tenure of a Chief Mutawalli (or
any Chief Mutawalli) he is the President of the
Majlis-e-Ayan “the descendant second in seniority
to the Chief Mutawalli will be its Nazir/Secretary”.
6
This condition is to be read along with the other
two preconditions, because it occurs as part of the
principle governing succession. The designation of
a Nazir or Secretary, has to be of the “descendant
second in seniority to the Chief Mutawalli”. In
other words, the successor to the office is also
revealed during the lifetime of the holder, Chief
Mutawalli, in the persona of the Nazir, who is
second in seniority to the Chief Mutawalli.”
10. Some facts leading to the present appeals are - Hakim Hafiz
Abdul Majid started the business of Hamdard as a sole proprietor in
the year 1906. He died on 22.06.1922 leaving behind his wife Mst.
Rabea Begum and two sons, Haji Hakim Abdul Hamid and Hakim
Mohd. Sayeed. These three executed a Deed on 28.08.1948 in order
to manage the affairs of Hamdard. The Deed inter alia when
translated in English recites as under:
“1. There shall be at least one or maximum two
Trustees (Mutwalli) and if there is one Trustee then
he will be given fees of Rs.1 anna from special
profit and if there are two Trustees then both will
get from the income Rs. 1.5 anna as commission
and this right will be beside the share of the family
income which according to the terms of the Trust
Deed will be obtained by the Trustee or Trustees
from his forefather, but till the time owner no. 1
and 2 will remain as the Trustee of the Trust they
will not be given any right under this section.
2. Till the time we owners from this Trust,
ownership No. 1 Haji Abdul Hameed and owner No.
2 Hakeem Hafiz Mohd. Sayeed is alive then we
both will be Trustee of this Trust and all the rights
regarding the management of the Trust will remain
jointly and severally with both of us and this right
will be received by both of us managers jointly.
That we can appoint someone else as Trustee
during our life time or we can include any other
person to share the benefit of the Trust with
compensation or without compensation and for
7
making arrangement after our death we can
appoint any person as a Trustee against the terms
of the Trust Deed and we both the Trustees will
have rights during our life time jointly and in the
case that only one Trustee is alive then he will
have this right alone to decide regarding that the
above mentioned condition and the arrangement
or way of distribution of the income and right of
inheritance in the above Trust Deed in proper
manner or to increase or decrees it. The Trustee or
Trustees we will appoint under this section for
doing our work through written agreement, after
us only that persons can be appointed as Trustee.
Right to remove the trustee which will be
nominated and appointed by us will be there to us
jointly or separately.
3. In case of death of anyone of the Trustee
then the deceased Trustee will be replaced by his
eldest son and in case of death of the other
trustee he will be replaced by his eldest son and if
out of us the trustees anyone son is minor or he is
not capable to fulfil the duties of the trustees then
till that son becomes major and capable to fulfil
the duties of trustees the sol trustee will manage
all the works of the Trust alone. After we both
trustees till the time whenever there will be two
trustees of the trust, their right will be distributed
by resolution by Majlis-e-Ayan, but the Majlis-e-
Ayan will not have right to decide the rights or
increase or decrease the right or to distribute
rights of both the Trustees together or separately
without any special reason or justification because
of which both the trustees or anyone of them
cannot perform his duties with full independence
or properly.
4. After us, and after the trustee or trustees
who will be appointed as Trustees, the trustee of
this Trust will be appointed from our sons who will
be the eldest in the age and after that from son of
our sons the eldest son will be appointed as
Trustee and in this manner the appointment of the
trustee of the trust will continue from our sons
generation by generation and if no son is there
from our children who is capable of managing and
taking care of this Trust then out of the sons of our
daughter, one will be appointed as the Trustee,
and if the sons of our daughter are not capable to
8
manage Trust, then from our children any such
lady will be appointed as Trustee who has
capability of trustee. God forbids out of our
children any male or female who is capable to be
appointed as trustee is not there then the Majlis-e-
Ayan will have a right through the resolution they
can appoint any non-family person as trustee who
is capable to manage and increase the trust.”
11. Mst. Rabea Begum died on 5.10.1948, whereas, the other
Trustee Hakim Mohd. Sayeed migrated to Pakistan in the year 1948.
His interest was declared evacuee property on 06.08.1948.
Subsequently, his share was purchased by Hamdard for the purpose
of Wakf Quami, that is for charity on 22.06.1950. Thus, Haji Hakim
Abdul Hamid became the sole surviving Wakif Mutawalli in terms of
the 1948 Deed.
12. The above said Wakif Mutawalli in the year 1964 appointed his
two sons Abdul Mueed (born in the year 1935) and Hammad Ahmed
(born in 1945) as Mutawallis. The Wakif Mutawalli has issued various
declarations from time to time in respect of working of Hamdard. On
the basis of all such declarations, a comprehensive declaration was
issued on 02.07.1973 amending the 1948 Deed substantially. The
amended Deed was countersigned by the Wakif Mutawalli on
26.6.1973. It may be stated herein that though the declaration and
the countersignatures are of different dates but both documents are
contemporaneous and almost containing similar recitals.
13. The Appellant relies upon the declarations in the nature of
amendments in the 1948 Deed carried on 02.07.1973 as to who
9
should manage the affairs of the Wakf after the Wakif Mutawalli. The
relevant extracts from the declaration issued by the Wakif Mutawalli
read as under:
“2. In exercise of the rights, powers and duties
vested in me by the Wakf-Deed I had made some
declarations for efficient and better management
of the Wakf and for clarifications and
interpretations and removal of doubts and
difficulties and the said declarations have been
enumerated as various appendices to the Wakf-
Deed and now they stand merged and
incorporated in the text of the relevant provisions
and appropriate contexts for the sake of
convenience. These declarations were made to
meet the exigencies of time and situation and
within the framework of the Wakf for the benefit of
charity and advancement of charitable objects and
compliance of the basic provisions of the Wakf.
3. In view of the vast expansion in the
activities of the charity for which the Wakifs
dedicated, complex problems of modern
management and for more efficient
administration, control and fulfilment of the object
of charity and to meet the requirements of the
changing tax and other laws it has become
necessary to make a further declaration for
clarification, explanation, elucidation, alteration,
removal of doubts and difficulties, if any, and for
further exposition of the provisions and meeting
the requirements of changing laws and
safeguarding the objects of charity and the
business of the Wakf which is for charity and for
advancement of the charitable objects.
Accordingly, I, in my capacity as sole Wakif-
Mutawalli, do hereby declare on solemn
affirmation regarding matters referred to above,
effective from 01.01.1973
:”
xxx xxx xxx
10
“Clause No. 1: This clause is substituted by
the following text;
“For the management of the Wakf there shall be at
least one and at the most five Mutawallis including
the Wakif-Mutawalli and the Chief Mutawalli.”
“The senior most among the male descendants of
the Wakif-Mutawalli who shall be holding an office
of Mutawalli will be the Chief Mutawalli. After the
Wakif-Mutawalli ceases to be Mutawalli, every
Chief Mutawalli shall have the same rights and
duties of administration of the Wakf and power of
making regulations therefore as are provided in
this Deed for the Wakif-Mutawalli and allocate
rights and duties among other Mutawallis. With
the exception of Wakif-Mutawalli, the remuneration
of the Chief Mutawalli and Mutawallis for services
rendered to the Wakf shall be such as may be
decided upon by the Wakif-Mutawalli and after he
ceases to be Mutawalli, by the Chief Mutawalli in
case of Mutawallis, and the Majlis-e-Ayan in case of
Chief Mutawallis. These remunerations will be
decided upon after taking into account the nature
of service rendered by each one of them and the
extent of the activities of the Wakf.”
“The above remuneration of a Mutawalli will be in
addition to the share of Khandani Income which
may be due to him under this Wakf-Deed, except
in the case of Wakif-Mutawalli Hakim Abdul
Hameed. During the life time of Wakif-Mutawalli
Hakim Abdul Hameed there will be no Khandani
Income. He will be paid for services rendered Rs.
72,000/- a year or 7/64 whichever is less.”
xxx xxx xxx
Clause 3: This clause is substituted by the
following text:
“The First Chief Mutawalli will be appointed by
Wakif-Mutawalli. And thereafter the senior most
male descendant in line of succession (of Wakif-
Mutawalli) and then holding an office of Mutawalli
will be the Chief Mutawalli. After the Wakif-
Mutawalli, the division of rights and duties among
the Mutawallis shall be made by the Chief
Mutawalli for efficient working of the Wakf and the
Majlis-e-Ayan shall have no right to disturb this
11
division or render it difficult for the Chief Mutawalli
or any of the Mutawallis to perform his or their
duties to manage the Wakf satisfactorily and with
proper freedom of action.”
“This Chief Mutawalli will be the Sadar
(President) of the Majlis-e-Ayan and the
descendant second in seniority to the Chief
Mutwalli will be its Nazir (Secretary).”
xxx xxx xxx
Clause 42 : This Clause is substituted by the
following text:
“42.: During the life time of Wakif Mutawallis
there will be no Khandani Income. He will be paid
for the services rendered Rs. 72,000/- a year or
7/64 of the net divisible profit whichever is less.
The Khandani Income will arise and become
payable only after the death of Wakif-Mutawalli as
per Shariat law.”
“42-A.: Mr. Abdul Mueed and Mr. Hammad Ahmad,
sons of Wakif-Mutawalli Hakim Abdul Hameed, are
nominated as his successors under the terms of
this Deed. They are the two other Mutawallis of
this Wakf appointed by the Wakif-Mutawalli. They
will act as Chief Mutawallis and Mutawallis
respectively. They will be paid salaries for services
rendered to the Wakf as fixed by the Wakif-
Mutawalli. This shall be charged to the profit and
loss account of the Wakf. The salaries of other
Mutawallis will be fixed by Wakif-Mutawalli/Chief
Mutawalli. The salary of subsequent Chief
Mutawalli will be fixed by Majlish-e-Ayan.””
14. The 1948 Deed as countersigned on 26.06.1973 after
incorporation of the amendments by Wakif Mutawalli has been
appended as Annexure P.1. The relevant extracts from such amended
document are as under:
“1. For the management of the Wakf there shall
be at least one and at the most five Mutawallis
including the Wakif Mutawalli and the Chief
Mutawallis.
12
The senior most among the male descendants of
the Wakif Mutawalli who shall be holding an office
of the Mutawalli will be the Chief Mutawalli. After
the Wakif Mutawalli ceases to be Mutawalli, every
Chief Mutawalli shall have the same rights and
duties of administration of the Wakf and power of
making regulations therefor as are provided in this
Deed for the Wakif Mutawalli and allocate rights
and duties among other Mutawallis. With the
exception of Wakif Mutawalli, the remuneration of
the Chief Mutawalli and Mutawallis for services
rendered to the Wakf shall be such as may be
decided upon by the Wakif Mutawalli and after he
ceases to be Mutawalli, by the Chief Mutawalli in
case of Mutawallis, and by Majlis-e-Ayan in case of
Chief Mutawalli. These remunerations will be
decided upon after taking into account the nature
of service rendered by each one of them and the
extent of the activities of the Wakf.
The above remuneration of a Mutawalli will be in
addition to the share of Khandani Income which
may be due to him under this Wakf-Deed except in
the case of Wakif Mutwalli Hakim Abdul Hameed.
During the life time of Wakif Mutawalli Hakim
Abdul Hameed there will be no Khandani Income.
He will be paid for services rendered Rs. 72,000/- a
year or 7/64 whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxxx
3. The First Chief Mutawalli will be appointed
by Wakif Mutwalli thereafter the senior most male
descendant in line of succession (of Wakif
Mutawalli) and then holding an office of Mutawalli
will be the Chief Mutawalli. After the Wakif-
Mutawalli, the division of rights and duties among
with Mutwallis shall be made by the Chief
Mutawalli for efficient working of the Wakf and the
Majlis-e-Ayan shall have no right to disturb this
division or render it difficult for the Chief Mutawalli
or any of the Mutawallis to perform his or their
duties to manage the Wakf satisfactorily and with
proper freedom of action.
The Chief Mutwalli will be the Sadar
(President) of the Majlis-e-Ayan and the
descendant second in seniority to the Chief
Mutawalli will be its Nazir (Secretary).
13
xxx xxx xxx
6. In spite of the fact that a person has a right
to be appointed as a Mutwalli under Clause Four
herein, the Majlis-e-Ayan shall have the authority
by a Special Resolution, to refuse to appoint such
person as a Mutawalli or in the event of such a
person having already been appointed as a
Mutawalli, to remove or suspend him from office,
if:
(1) He is a minor or insane or by reason of lack
of education, experience or old age and weak
health is unable satisfactorily to perform his duties
as a Mutawalli;
(2) He is dishonest, addicted to alcohol,
gambling or has been convicted of some crime
involving moral turpitude;….
xxx xxx xxx
8. In the event of Wakif Mutawalli ceasing to
be the Mutawalli of this Wakf, the general
superintendence of the Wakf shall vest, subject to
the terms of this Deed, in a Majlis called Majlis-e-
Ayan. However, the Majlis-e-Ayan shall not
interfere in the day to day administration of the
Wakf. The rights and powers that have been
reserved for exercise by the Majlis-e-Ayan shall be
exercised by the said Majlis-e-Ayan only after the
death of Wakif Mutawalli or when he ceases to be
Mutawalli. This Majlis shall have a maximum of
nine members nominated by Wakif Mutawalli
including all the Mutawallis in office. The future
vacancies will also be filled in by nomination by
Wakif-Mutawalli in his life time and after his death
by the members of the Majlis-e-Ayan from out of
his heirs, legal representatives and all persons
male or female who are entitled to a share in
Khandani Income either in their own right or as
rightful guardian of the minor beneficiaries. The
Wakif Mutawalli after his ceasing to be Mutawalli
and all the Mutwallis in office shall be ex-officio
members of the Majlis-e-Ayan. They shall have all
the rights and duties of the members of Majlis-e-
Ayan including the right to vote.
9. An ordinary meeting of the Majlis-e-Ayan
shall, subject to the rules and bye-laws framed by
14
it, be held at least twice a year. (Whenever)
Whatever resolutions are passed by a majority of
votes of members present at such meetings, the
same shall be called ‘ORDINARY RESOLUTIONS’.
The Chairman of the Meeting shall have the
casting vote.
xxx xxx xxx
42-A. Mr. Abdul Mueed and Mr. Hammad Ahmed,
sons of Wakif Mutawalli Hakim Abdul Hameed, are
nominated as his successors under the terms of
this Deed. They are the two other Mutawallis of
this Wakf appointed by the Wakif Mutawalli. They
will act as Chief Mutawalli and Mutawalli
respectively. They will be paid salaries for services
rendered to the Wakf as fixed by the Wakif
Mutawalli. This shall be charged to the profit and
loss account of the Wakf. The salaries of other
Mutawallis will be fixed by Wakif Mutawalli/Chief
Mutawalli. The salary of subsequent Chief
Mutawalli will be fixed by Majlis-e-Ayan.”
15. The Wakif Mutawalli appointed his grandsons Abdul Majeed
(eldest son of Abdul Mueed born on 23.12.1969) and Hamed Ahmed
(eldest son of Hammad Ahmed born on 25.3.1977) as Mutawallis on
30.05.1995 as fourth and fifth Mutawalli. Haji Hakim Abdul Hamid, the
Wakif Mutawalli died on 22.07.1999 that is after the amendments in
the deed of Wakf.
16. On 04.07.1995 the Wakif Mutawalli constituted Board of
Mutawallis. Abdul Mueed was declared to be the Vice Chairman and
his son Abdul Majeed as Secretary of the Board of Mutawallis. Such
declaration reads as under:
“HAMDARD
Dated 04/07/1995
CONSTITUTION OF THE BOARD OF MUTAWALLIS
15
Presently, Wakif Mutawali, Chief Mutawali and
Mutawali are consulting and discussing the affairs
of the Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) both formerly
and informally. Now two more Mutawallis, viz. Mr.
Abdul Majeed & Mr. Hamid Ahmed eldest sons of
Mr. Abdul Mueed and Mr. Hammad Ahmed
respectively, are appointed as Mutawallis of the
Wakf. They will be working from the day they
assume their offices.
It is felt that the Board of Mutawallis should be
constituted in the life of Wakif Mutawalli, which can
be converted later into “Majlis-e-Ayan” after Wakif
Mutawali ceases of hold his office.
As per clause 8 of the Wakf Deed of Hamdard
Dawakhana, “Majlis-e-Ayan” will be constituted in
the event of Wakif Mutawalli ceasing to be
Mutawalli of Wakf for the general superintendence
of the Wakf.
With this order, I hereby constitute the board of
Mutawallis for the Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) as
under:-
1. Hakeem Abdul Hameed
(Wakif Mutawalli) : Chairman
2. Mr. Abdul Mueed : Vice Chairman
3. Mr. Hammad Ahmed : Senior Mutawalli
4. Mr. Abdul Majeed : Mutawalli
5. Mr. Hamid Ahmed- can attend the meetings as
an observer till he assumes office of Mutawalli.
Mr. Abdul Majeed will be the Secretary of the Board
of Mutawallis and he will issue the agenda and will
record the minutes.
In the absence of Wakif Mutawalli, Vice Chairman
will preside over the meetings.
16
The meeting will be held initially fortnightly i.e. for
about a year and subsequently the frequency will
be reviewed.
The Board of Mutawallis will supervise, monitor
and review the functions of Hamdard Dawakhana
(Wakf). The Board of Mutawallis will finalise and
approve the budgets, working plans, projects and
major policies which are not of routine in nature.
The Board of Mutawallis will also review the
reports, budgets and plans of the Aid Receiving
Institutions from Hamdard Dawakhana(Wakf).
This Board will start functioning from today.
Sd/-
(Hakeem Abdul Hameed)
Wakif Mutawalli”
17. After the death of Wakif Mutawalli, Abdul Mueed as the Chief
Mutawalli appointed Asad Mueed, his younger son born on 1.9.1973,
as the fifth Mutawalli on 17.04.2000. It is said Asad Mueed, who is
Plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 162 of 2017. Abdul Mueed died on 19.3.2015,
leading to disputes between the parties.
18. Sajid Ahmed son of Hammad Ahmed (born on 5.6.1978) was
appointed as fifth Mutawalli on 14.4.2015 by Hammad Ahmed
claiming himself to be Chief Mutawalli after the death of Abdul
Mueed, the first and last undisputed Chief Mutawalli.
19. In this background, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant
argued that the rule of primogeniture is not contemplated by the
Deed as amended in the year 1973 by the Wakif Mutawalli. Learned
Senior Counsel for the Appellant refers to the various clauses of the
17
1948 Deed, which contemplate that the Wakif, his sons and grand-
children would not get anything as income but could receive
remuneration only for consideration of services rendered to the Wakf.
The Wakif Mutawallis and their successors would have no right of
ownership or power of disposition in the capital, the assets, the
corpus and the properties of the Wakf or any appreciation in value
thereof.
20. Earlier four suits including one by Hamdard bearing Suit No.
117 of 1972 were decided by the learned Single Bench of High Court
of Delhi on 23.12.2011. The challenge in the suit was to a notification
dated 12.12.1970 declaring Hamdard as Wakf under the Wakf Act,
1995. The said notification was alleged to be illegal and void. It was
held therein that the Hamdard is not a Wakf within the meaning of the
Wakf Act. The relevant extracts from the judgment of the learned
Single Judge read as under:
“74. In view of the above discussion, it is held
that the Dawakhana Wakf is not a Wakf within the
meaning of the term, under the Wakf Act, despite
the use of the term “wakf” (which appears to be
misleading). It is settled law that nomenclature of
a document or deed is not conclusive of what it
seeks to achieve; the court has to consider all
parts of it, and arrive at a finding in regard to its
true effect….
xxx xxx xxx
77. In this case, as held earlier, the Dawakhana
Wakf is not a wakf, on an application of all the
relevant tests. Therefore, the question of the
Nursing Home, the Institute of History of Medicines
and Medical Research, Hamdard National
Foundation, Indian Institute of Islamic Studies
being wakfs just because their properties were
purchased out of the income of the Dawakhan
18
Wakf, would not arise. Some of them, are in fact
independent juristic entities, being societies,
capable of, and in fact holding properties. In the
case of registered societies, by virtue of Section 5
of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 the
property, movable and immovable, belonging to it,
if not vested in trustees, would be deemed to be
vested in its governing body. This is completely
contrary to a wakf, where the mutawalli is a mere
manager; the property is perpetually and
irrevocably dedicated to God Almighty.
Furthermore, each of the said bodies and entities is
autonomous, and the Dawakhana Wakf is not the
exclusive donor; it is one of the sources of grant.
They can itself seek donations and grants from
other institutions in furtherance of its objectives.
Lastly, there is nothing in the deeds or instruments
creating them, either in the Memorandum or
Articles of Association, indicative of perpetual
dedication, or its being in favour of the Lord
Almighty, to obtain divine pleasure. In other
words, the controlling instruments, or documents
which have created these institutions, are
singularly silent about the essential elements
which signify a wakf. The court therefore, holds
that the said institutions are not wakf, even though
some of them are beneficiaries of the Dawakhana
Wakf. The issues are answered against the
Defendants, and in favour of the plaintiff.”
Such judgment and decree was affirmed in the appeal.
21. The argument is that the entire reading of the Deed particularly
Clauses 1, 3 and 42-A would show that the senior most surviving male
successor is contemplated to be the Chief Mutawalli, whereas, the
four other male successors/descendants are contemplated to be the
Mutawallis. The Deed also contemplates that in the event, if there is
no male descendant in the direct line of succession who is fit person
to assume charge as a Mutawalli of the Wakf, then anyone from the
male descendant of the female issue being rightful claimant to
succession shall be appointed as Mutawalli. If there is no male
descendant of the female issue, who is fit enough to become a
19
Mutawalli then any female issue of descendants who shall be fit to
become Mutawalli shall be so appointed. It is only in the event, when
there is no male or female left from the male and female
descendants, Majlis-e-Ayan shall have the right to appoint by an
extra-ordinary resolution, someone from outside the family who has
the ability to act as a Mutawalli and to administer the Wakf property.
22. In terms of Clause 1 of the 1973 Deed, there shall be minimum
of one and maximum of five Mutawallis including the Wakif Mutawalli
and the Chief Mutawalli. The senior most amongst the male
descendants of the Wakif Mutawalli who shall hold the office of the
Mutawalli, will be Chief Mutawalli. On the basis of such clause, it is
argued that for a Chief Mutawalli, the condition is that the person
should be Mutawalli and the senior most amongst the male
descendants of the Wakif Mutawalli shall be the Chief Mutawalli. After
the death of Wakif Mutawalli, the senior most male descendant, Abdul
Mueed came to discharge the duties of Chief Mutawalli. Therefore,
after his death, the Appellant being senior most male descendant of
the Wakif Mutawalli, is to act as Chief Mutawalli. Abdul Majeed, the
elder son of First Chief Mutawalli cannot be the Chief Mutawalli as is
made out from the nature of the bequest and the cumulative reading
of the Wakf documents.
23. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant refers to Clause 3 of
the Deed amended in the year 1973 to argue that the First Chief
Mutawalli is to be appointed by Wakif Mutawalli. Thereafter, the
senior most male descendant in line of succession and then holding
20
an office of Mutawalli will be the Chief Mutawalli. It is further stated
that the Chief Mutawalli would be called President of the Majlis-e-Ayan
and the descendant, who is second in seniority to the Chief Mutawalli
will be its Nazir (Secretary).
24. Referring to Clause 42-A of the 1973 Deed, it was pointed out
that Abdul Mueed was appointed as Chief Mutawalli and the Appellant
as Mutawalli by the Wakif Mutawalli. Therefore, a reading of the entire
document would show that the object of the Deed is to appoint the
senior most male descendant as the Chief Mutawalli. Since the
Appellant is the senior most male descendant, he has rightly issued
an order on 20.03.2015 to take over the responsibilities as a Chief
Mutawalli.
25. Mr. Vasdev, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant argued
that Asad Mueed has not pleaded in the suit that Abdul Majeed is
entitled to be Chief Mutawalli in view of rule of primogeniture or that
Abdul Majeed is Chief Mutawalli, but it was only in replication the
plea of applicability of rule of primogeniture was raised. It was
5
submitted relying upon the judgment in Faqruddin v. Tajuddin
that rule of primogeniture has no application amongst Muslims.
26. The reliance is placed upon an earlier order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, in FAO(OS) 208/2017,
directed against an order of the learned Single Bench of 26.5.2017,
wherein learned counsel for the parties stated that issue relating to
Chief Mutawalli is of considerable importance as it affects the
5 (2008) 8 SCC 12
21
functioning of the aforesaid institutions/ organisations. The appeals
were decided in view of the fact that the matter was listed before the
learned Single Judge on 30.8.2017. The relevant extract from the
said order reads as under:
“3. Learned counsel for the parties state that
the issue relating to Chief Mutawalli is of
considerable importance as it affects the
functioning of the aforesaid
institutions/organisations. Counsel for the parties
state that they will make a request for early
adjudication of the said issue. We hope and trust
the matter would be decided expeditiously. We
also record that the matter is already listed before
th
the single Judge on 30 August, 2017.”
27. It was argued that there is no impediment or bar on the
judgment of a Court to grant an injunction, even at the interim stage
if there is illegality for the reason that the Appellant is the senior most
male descendant in the line of Wakif Mutawalli, therefore, the
Appellant is entitled to control of domain names as Chief Mutawalli.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgment reported as Dorab
6
Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others . It was
also argued that in an Appeal against an order of injunction, a Court
of Appeal interferes not when the judgment under attack is not right,
but only when it is shown to be wrong, placing reliance upon Dollar
7
Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras . The reliance is also
placed upon a judgment reported as Wander Ltd and Another v.
6 (1990) 2 SCC 117
7 (1975) 2 SCC 730
22
8
Antox India P. Ltd. that the Appellate Court will not reassess the
material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the court below, if the one reached by the court below
was reasonably possible on the material. The reliance was also
placed upon the judgment reported in Mohd. Mehtab Khan and
9
Others v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan and Others that the
Appellate Court should not have substituted its view on the matter
merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a
different conclusion.
28. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant argued that the
10
judgment reported as A. Aruputham v. A.V. Yagappa has been
wrongly applied to hold that the principle of lineal primogeniture
applies in the present case. The said judgment arises out of a case
where the parties are governed by the Hindu Law of Succession
wherein testator has specified that his estate to come to his son and
sons by the rule of primogeniture. In the present case, in the case of
Hanafi Muslims, the Deed governing the succession to manage the
affairs of a Wakf specifies a line of succession as different and distinct
from the said judgment. The succession to the office of Mutawalli is
governed by the terms of Deed. Therefore, the question that who will
succeed as a Chief Mutawalli is to be arrived at only from the entire
reading of the Deed.
8 (1990) Suppl. SCC 727
9 (2013) 9 SCC 221
10 (1971) 3 SCC 808
23
29. It is also argued that on 28.04.2015, a resolution was passed by
all the Mutawallis that the banking operations shall be carried out by
Abdul Majeed and Hammad Ahmed. In pursuance of such resolution,
more than Rs. 900 crores have been disbursed to various parties in
the last 2 years. Since there is no rule of primogeniture and the Deed
as amended in the year 1973 has not changed the basic concept of
Wakf Management in the hands of two sons of Wakif Mutawalli and
their successors with the condition that the senior most male
descendant will be the Chief Mutawalli, therefore, Abdul Mueed, the
senior most male descendant, after the death of Wakif Mutawalli was
rightly designated as Chief Mutawalli and after his death, by virtue of
the Deed, the Appellant has rightly declared himself to be the Chief
Mutawalli.
30. Mr. Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents argued
that order of the Division Bench passed on 04.08.2007 relates to
issues pertaining to Chief Mutawalli, the issue that is to be framed in
a suit and not for the purpose of deciding an interim injunction
application. Since the issues in the suit have not been framed,
therefore, the question that who will be the Chief Mutawalli is not an
issue to be decided at the time of consideration of application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code.
31. It is also argued that in an application under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 of the Code, the Court will not grant interim mandatory relief
resulting in creation of entirely new state of affairs which hitherto
never existed. The reliance is placed upon Samir Narain Bhojwani
24
11
v. Arora Properties and Investments and Another . It is
contended that the declaration of the Appellant to be Chief Mutawalli,
disputed immediately by Respondent No. 1, does not mean the
existence of status at the time of filing of the suit which can be
protected in an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the
Code. Since the Appellant has sought passwords of domain names,
server and Enterprise Resources Planning System, it shows that the
Appellant was not in control of the management of Hamdard,
therefore, injunction to hand over of the passwords and thus
management of Hamdard cannot be granted being an injunction in
the mandatory form.
32. It is also argued that Respondent No. 1 being in actual control
of Hamdard was not required to file a substantive suit for control of
the Organisation as he was already in control of the Organisation and
all Heads of the Departments of Hamdard report to him. He is the
occupier of all factories and the holder of all licences allotted to
Hamdard.
33. It is submitted that the language of the Deed as amended had
to be different if the contention of the Appellant is to be accepted.
Though 1948 Deed sets out the “line of succession” of the said Wakif
Mutawalli but the amended deed does not contain any such or similar
clause.
34. In pursuance of such Deed, Abdul Majeed was declared to be
Nazir by the Wakif Mutawalli on 04.07.1995 during his life time. Such
11 2018 (10) Scale 33
25
declaration will negate the argument that the Appellant was not the
second in the line of succession competent to be appointed as Nazir
in terms of Clause 3 of 1973 Deed. The parties have understood that
position since 1995 when Abdul Majeed was declared as Nazir. The
Appellant has not disputed such arrangement for more than 20 years;
therefore, the Appellant cannot assert himself to be the Chief
Mutawalli. It is also argued that Abdul Mueed died on 19.03.2015 but
the suit has been filed only on 16.05.2017, asserting himself to be
Chief Mutawalli. Such assertion also suffers from delay and laches. It
is argued that the words “in line of succession” would be rendered
otiose and meaningless if the contentions raised by the Appellant is
to be accepted.
35. Relying upon the judgment reported as The Secretary of
State for India in Council v. Syed Ahmad Badsha Sahib
12
Bahadur , it is argued that in the case of single indivisible
hereditary office, the succession should be governed by the principle
of lineal primogeniture in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary.
36. Further, the Division Bench has remitted the matter back to the
learned Single Bench to frame a neutral administrative oversee
mechanism for the management of Hamdard to balance the interests
of the parties. Therefore, the order passed by the Division Bench
does not require any interference.
12 ( 1921) LW Mad.188 (DB)
26
37. We find that the order of Division Bench cannot be sustained. In
an earlier suit, the challenge was to notification dated 12.12.1970
declaring Hamdard as Wakf under the Wakf Act, 1995. The Delhi High
Court examined 1948 Deed and also the amendments made in the
year 1973, to arrive at a finding in regard to true nature of Wakf. It
was held as under:-
| “ | 74. In view of the above discussion, it is held that | | | | |
|---|
| the Dawakhana Wakf is not a wakf within the | | | | | |
| meaning of the term, under the | | | | Wakf Act | , despite |
| the use of the term "wakf" (which appears to be | | | | | |
| misleading). It is settled law that nomenclature of | | | | | |
| a document or deed is not conclusive of what it | | | | | |
| seeks to achieve; the court has to consider all | | | | | |
| parts of it, and arrive at a fni ding in regard to its | | | | | |
| true efef ct….. | | | | | |
*
| 77. | | | In this case, as held earlier, the Dawakhana | | |
|---|
| Wakf is not a wakf, on an application of all the | | | | | |
| relevant tests. Therefore, the question of the | | | | | |
| Nursing Home, the Institute of History of Medicines | | | | | |
| and Medical Research, Hamdard National | | | | | |
| Foundation, Indian Institute of Islamic Studies | | | | | |
| being wakfs just because their properties were | | | | | |
| purchased out of the income of the Dawakhana | | | | | |
| Wakf, would not arise. Some of them, are in fact | | | | | |
| independent juristic entities, being societies, | | | | | |
| capable of, and in fact holding properties. In the | | | | | |
| case of registered societies, by virtue of | | | | | Section |
| 5 | | of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 the | | | |
| property, movable and immovable, belonging to it, | | | | | |
| if not vested in trustees, would be deemed to be | | | | | |
| vested in its governing body. This is completely | | | | | |
| contrary to a wakf, where the mutuwalli is a mere | | | | | |
| manager; the property is perpetually and | | | | | |
| irrevocably dedicated to God Almighty. | | | | | |
| Furthermore, each of the said bodies and entities | | | | | |
| is autonomous, and the Dawakhana Wakf is not | | | | | |
| the exclusive donor; it is one of the sources of | | | | | |
| grant. They can itself seek donations and grants | | | | | |
| from other institutions in furtherance of its | | | | | |
27
| objectives. Lastly, there is nothing in the deeds or | |
|---|
| instruments creating them, either in the | |
| Memorandum or Articles of Association, indicative | |
| of perpetual dedication, or its being in favour of | |
| the Lord Almighty, to obtain divine pleasure. In | |
| other words, the controlling instruments, or | |
| documents which have created these institutions, | |
| are singularly silent about the essentials elements | |
| which signify a wakf. The court therefore, holds | |
| that the said institutions are not wakfs, even | |
| though some of them are benefci iaries of the | |
| Dawakhana Wakf. The issues are answered against | |
| the Defendants, and in favour of the plaintiff. | ” |
38. Thus, the nature of Hamdard was settled that it is not Wakf as is
defined in the Wakf Act,1995 and that the property, movable and
immovable, belonging to it would be deemed to be vested in its
governing body.
39. We do not find any merit in the argument that the consent of
the parties in an appeal against an interim order passed on an
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code related to
issues which are required to be framed after completion of the
pleadings in a suit. The appeal was directed against interim
injunction, therefore, the expression “issue” used in para 3 of the
consent order is not the issues in the suit, but the questions which
arise for consideration at the ad-interim stage. The parties have
agreed that the question of considerable importance relates to the
appointment of Chief Mutawalli at the time of consideration of an
interim application. Both the courts have examined the Deeds to
consider as to whether the Appellant can be said to be Chief
Mutawalli.
28
40. The learned Single Judge held that the Appellant is a Chief
Mutawalli by interpreting the Wakf Deed, whereas, the Division Bench
has taken a different view. In fact, the Division Bench relied upon A.
Aruputham case (supra) which was in respect of a construction of
a Will relating to vesting of the estate of the testator-a Hindu Male.
The said judgment is not applicable in respect of appointment of a
Chief Mutawalli which is not a case of succession of the property of
the deceased governed by Muslim personal law but appointment of
successor under a deed executed by Wakif Mutawalli for the
management of Hamdard. The question relates to construction of the
Wakf Deed as amended in the year 1973 for the management of Wakf
as to who shall have the right to manage the affairs of Hamdard and
not the succession of an estate of the deceased. Therefore, we find
that the Division Bench has wrongly relied upon A. Aruputham case
(supra) .
41. The learned Division Bench referred to Faqruddin’s case
(supra) that under Personal Law the rule of lineal primogeniture is
not applicable as a rule of succession amongst Muslims, is not a
ground to overrule its application if a deed (testamentary or
otherwise) so directs. It is thereafter, the Division Bench has
interpreted the amended deed of wakf and also the resolution of
04.07.1995 to hold that lineal male primogeniture is the rule of
succession applied to the office of Chief Mutawalli rather than an
uncertain collegial ambulatory lineal succession.
29
42. The rule of primogeniture is not a rule applicable to the Muslims
as per the Personal Law as held in Faqruddin’s case (supra) .
Therefore, the primary question between the parties relating to
appointment of Chief Mutawalli has to be decided on the basis of
construction of 1948 Deed and the amendments made in the year
1973 by the Wakif Mutawalli. The 1948 Deed is unambiguous that two
brothers Haji Hakim Abdul Hamid and Hakim Mohd. Sayeed shall be
Trustees and that in case of death of any one of the Trustee then the
deceased Trustee will be replaced by his elder son and in case of
death of other Trustee he will be replaced by his elder son (Clause 3
as reproduced above). Similarly, Clause 4 of the Deed is that the
Trustees of the Trust will be appointed from their sons who will be
eldest in age and after that from the sons of their sons, the elder son
will be appointed as Trustee.
43. The 1973 Deed is not a new document but includes
amendments in the 1948 Deed based upon the declarations made by
the Wakif Mutawalli from time to time compiled on 02.07.1973. Last
page of document Annexure “P-1” would show that it is not a new
document but the document incorporating amendments which were
counter signed by Wakif Mutawalli on 26.06.1973. Clause 3 of the
declaration as also the amended Deed of Wakf and Deed in the year
1973, referred to by the parties, read as under:
| Deed as amended in the year 1973 | Declaration |
|---|
| 3. The First Chief Mutawalli will<br>be appointed by Wakif Mutwalli<br>thereafter the senior most male | Clause 3: This clause is<br>substituted by the following text: |
30
| descendant in line of succession (of<br>Wakif Mutawalli) and then holding<br>an office of Mutawalli will be the<br>Chief Mutawalli. | “The First Chief Mutawalli will be<br>appointed by Wakif-Mutawalli.<br>And thereafter the senior most<br>male descendant in line of<br>succession (of Wakif-Mutawalli)<br>and then holding an ofcfi e of<br>Mutawalli will be the Chief<br>Mutawalli.” |
|---|
44. We find that in the declaration dated 02.07.1973, in the first
line there is a full stop after the word “mutawalli” and thereafter, new
line starts. But in the 1973 Deed (Annexure P-1), the full stop is
missing. It appears to be an inadvertent omission as the Deed as
amended in the year 1973 in the absence of full stop is not coherent
and appears to be incomplete.
45. The well-known principle of interpretation of document is that
one line cannot be taken out of context. It is a cumulative reading of
entire document which would lead to one conclusion or the other.
Some of the judgments relevant for determining as to the principle of
interpretation of documents are delineated hereinafter. One of the
judgments relating to the interpretation of documents is Delhi
| that | | t | he meaning of the document or of a particular part of it is to be |
|---|
sought for in the document itself. The Court held as under:-
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| “19. | | Both sides have relied upon certain | | | | | | | | | |
| passages in | | | | | | Odgers | ' | | “ | Construction of Deeds and | |
| Statutes” | | | | (5th ed. 1967). There (at pages 28-29), | | | | | | | |
| the First General Rule of Interpretation formulated | | | | | | | | | | | |
31
| is: “The meaning of the document or of a<br>particular part of it is therefore to be sought for in<br>the document itself”. That is, undoubtedly, the<br>primary rule of construction to which Sections 90<br>to 94 of the Indian Evidence Act give statutory<br>recognition and effect, with certain exceptions<br>contained in Sections 95 to 98 of the Act. Of<br>course, “the document” means “the document”<br>read as a whole and not piecemeal.<br>20. The rule stated above follows logically from the<br>Literal Rule of Construction which, unless its<br>application produces absurd results, must be<br>resorted to fri st. This is clear from the following<br>passages cited in Odgers' short book under the<br>First Rule of Interpretation set out above:<br>Lord Wensleydale, in Monypenny v.<br>Monypenny14 said:<br>“the question is not what the parties<br>to a deed may have intended to do by<br>entering into that deed, but what is the<br>meaning of the words used in that<br>deed: a most important distinction in<br>all cases of construction and the<br>disregard of which often leads to<br>erroneous conclusions.”<br>Brett, L.J., in Re Meredith, ex. p. Chick15 observed:<br>“I am disposed to follow the rule of<br>construction which was laid down by Lord<br>Denman and Baron Parke…………….They said<br>that in construing instruments you must have<br>regard, not to the presumed intention of the<br>parties, but to the meaning of the words which<br>they have used.”<br>21. Another rule which seems to us to be<br>applicable here was thus stated by this Court<br>in Radha Sunder Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim<br>and Others16 :<br>“Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation<br>that if there be admissible two constructions of<br>a document, one of which will give effect to all<br>the clauses therein while the other will render | is: “The meaning of the document or of a | | |
|---|
| particular part of it is therefore to be sought for in | | |
| the document itself”. That is, undoubtedly, the | | |
| primary rule of construction to which Sections 90 | | |
| to 94 of the Indian Evidence Act give statutory | | |
| recognition and effect, with certain exceptions | | |
| contained in Sections 95 to 98 of the Act. Of | | |
| course, “the document” means “the document” | | |
| read as a whole and not piecemeal. | | |
| | | |
| 20. The rule stated above follows logically from the<br>Literal Rule of Construction which, unless its<br>application produces absurd results, must be<br>resorted to fri st. This is clear from the following<br>passages cited in Odgers' short book under the<br>First Rule of Interpretation set out above: | | |
| Lord Wensleydale, in Monypenny v.<br>Monypenny14 said: | | |
| “the question is not what the parties<br>to a deed may have intended to do by<br>entering into that deed, but what is the<br>meaning of the words used in that<br>deed: a most important distinction in<br>all cases of construction and the<br>disregard of which often leads to<br>erroneous conclusions.” | | |
| | | |
| Brett, L.J., in Re Meredith, ex. p. Chick15 observed: | | |
| | “I am disposed to follow the rule of<br>construction which was laid down by Lord<br>Denman and Baron Parke…………….They said<br>that in construing instruments you must have<br>regard, not to the presumed intention of the<br>parties, but to the meaning of the words which<br>they have used.” | |
| | | |
| 21. Another rule which seems to us to be<br>applicable here was thus stated by this Court<br>in Radha Sunder Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim<br>and Others16 : | | |
| | “Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation<br>that if there be admissible two constructions of<br>a document, one of which will give effect to all<br>the clauses therein while the other will render | |
14 (1861) 9 HLC 114, 146
15 (1879) 11 Ch D 731, 739
16 AIR 1959 SC 24, 29
32
one or more of them nugatory, it is the former
that should be adopted on the principle
expressed in the maxim ‘ut res magis valeat
quam pereat’.”
46. Therefore, the entire 1948 Deed as amended in the year 1973
has to be read together to find out the process of appointment of
Chief Mutawalli.
47. The argument that the rule of primogeniture is explicit in the
amended clauses of the 1948 Wakf Deed, as the eldest son and after
his death his son has been given the preferential treatment than the
other male descendants, is not tenable. The question is not
succession in the matter of immovable property but line of succession
for the management of Wakf.
48. The Clause 1 of 1973 Deed is that the senior most among the
male descendants of the Wakif-Mutawalli holding an office of
Mutawalli will be the Chief Mutawalli. The Clause 3 of the same deed
is that the First Chief Mutawalli will be appointed by Wakif Mutawalli
thereafter the senior most male descendant in line of succession (of
Wakif Mutawalli) and then holding an office of Mutawalli will be the
Chief Mutawalli. Thus, at least two provisions of the 1973 Deed are
that the senior most male descendant in the line of succession of
Wakif Mutawalli shall be Chief Mutawalli.
49. The argument that the constitution of the Board of Mutawallis
on 04.07.1995 negates the argument raised by the Appellant that the
senior most male descendant has to be the Chief Mutawalli and
33
second in line as Nazir (Secretary). No doubt in the constitution of
the Board on 04.07.1995, the second senior most male descendant
was not nominated as Nazir (Secretary) but such fact alone will not
negate the various provisions of the document which support the
contention raised by the Appellant that it is the senior most male
descendant who shall be the Chief Mutawalli. May be, Abdul Majeed
was nominated as Secretary of the Board keeping in view his age and
educational qualifications but such action will not negate cumulative
reading of the 1973 Deed.
50. The action of the Wakif Mutawalli in nominating the senior most
male descendant Abdul Mueed and his younger son-the Appellant as
Mutawallis in terms of 1948 Deed shows that his both lines of
successors were treated equally. After the composition of the Board of
Management was increased to five after amendment in the year
1973, the Wakif Mutawalli appointed Abdul Majeed eldest son of the
Abdul Mueed (born on 23.12.1969) and Hamed Ahmed eldest son of
the Appellant (born on 25.03.1977) on 30.05.1995 as Mutawallis. On
that day, Asad Mueed (born on 1.09.1973) younger son of Abdul
Mueed but older in age than the Hamed Ahmed was not made
Mutawalli. It was only on 17.04.2000 i.e. after the death of Wakif
Mutawalli, he was made the fifth Mutawalli. If the line of management
has to be in the hands of senior most male descendant of Abdul
Hamid, the Wakif Mutawalli should have appointed Asad Mueed
instead of Hamed Ahmed in the year 1995.
34
51. 1973 Deed is not a new document but the amended 1948 Deed
by Wakif Mutawalli from time to time. Since, the Board of Trustees
was contemplated to be five Mutawallis including Wakif Mutawalli or
Chief Mutawalli, therefore, the induction of grandsons was not in
order of date of birth but keeping in view the representations to both
sons of the Wakif Mutawalli. Therefore, the 1948 Deed as amended
does not show the applicability of principal of rule of primogeniture
but equal representation to the heirs of both sons of Wakif Mutawalli.
52. The judgment of Division Bench of Madras High Court in
Secretary of State for India (supra) is consequent to the
judgment of Full Bench reported as The Secretary of State for
17
India in Council vs. Syed Ahmad Badsha Sahib Bahadur . The
Full Bench was examining the applicability of principle of res judicata
in view of findings recorded in an earlier suit. It was held by the Full
Bench that decision in the previous suit is not conclusive but is only
evidence and it is open to the plaintiff to establish his title as against
the Government. Consequent to the opinion of the Full Bench, the
appeal was taken up for hearing on 09.05.1921. It was consequent to
the opinion of the Full Bench; the appeal was taken up for hearing on
09.05.1921.
53. The Division Bench held that plaintiff has proved that he is
lawful successor by heredity right as the office cannot be enjoyed by
several heirs in common, therefore, succession must be by lineal
primogeniture. The said order does not support the argument raised
17 (1921) 14 L.W. 128 (F.B.)
35
by the respondent as it is not a single heir who is holder of the office.
In fact, the Wakif Mutawalli has constituted a Board of five Mutawallis.
Therefore, it is a body of Mutawallis which has been vested with the
right of management of Hamdard and senior most male descendant
amongst them contemplated to be Chief Mutawalli.
54. The argument that there is delay and laches on the part of the
Appellant to dispute the existing mechanism of the management is
again not tenable. The entire argument is based upon the constitution
of the Board on 04.07.1995. Mere failure to dispute the constitution of
Board would not mean that the 1948 Deed or 1973 Deed is rendered
otiose. The constitution of the Board by the Wakif Mutawalli is in
relation to the requirements of the Hamdard to carry out the functions
of the Board but that does not rewrite the Rule of Succession
contemplated after amendments in 1948 Deed in the year 1973.
55. The argument that the Appellant is involved in criminal cases is
again not relevant at this stage. 1973 Deed provided for
disqualification of conviction in criminal case involving moral
turpitude. None of the criminal prosecution launched against the
Appellant have ended up in conviction, therefore, there is no
disqualification attached to the Appellant at this stage.
56. The grant of mandatory injunction is not prohibited even in
Samir Narain Bhojwani case (supra) . It has held that unless clear
and prima facie material justifies a finding that status quo has been
36
altered by one of the parties the order in mandatory injunction can be
given.
57. The ad interim mandatory injunction, is to be granted not at the
asking but on strong circumstance so that to protect the rights and
interest of the parties so as not to frustrate their rights regarding
mandatory injunction. In Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra and
18
Others , this Court held that Court would grant such an interim relief
only if it is satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience
of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in
injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end
the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of
| justice. | Therefore, in appropriate case, ad-interim injunction in |
|---|
mandatory form can be granted. The Court held as under:-
| “12. | | Situations emerge where the granting of an |
|---|
| interim relief would tantamount to granting the | | |
| fni al relief itself. And then there may be converse | | |
| cases where withholding of an interim relief would | | |
| tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; | | |
| for, by the time the main matter comes up for | | |
| hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed | | |
| as relief to the petitioner though all the fni dings | | |
| may be in his favour. In such cases the availability | | |
| of a very strong prima facie case — of a standard | | |
| much higher than just prima facie case, the | | |
| considerations of balance of convenience and | | |
| irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of | | |
| the case totally in favour of the applicant may | | |
| persuade the court to grant an interim relief | | |
| though it amounts to granting the fni al relief itself. | | |
| Of course, such would be rare and exceptional | | |
| cases. The court would grant such an interim relief | | |
| only if satisfei d that withholding of it would prick | | |
| the conscience of the court and do violence to the | | |
| sense of justice, resulting in injustice being | | |
18 (2004) 4 SCC 697
37
| perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the | |
|---|
| end the court would not be able to vindicate the | |
| cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare | |
| cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, | |
| where the injury complained of is immediate and | |
| pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The | |
| conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen | |
| and the court may put the parties on such terms | |
| as may be prudent.” | |
58. The argument that under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the
Code, the Court has the jurisdiction to maintain the status of the
parties on the date of filing of the suit or on the date of passing of the
order but cannot direct the parties to do something which was not in
existence at the time of filing of the suit, is not a general rule of
universal application. The nature of the orders claimed by the
Appellant are not passed ordinarily in a routine manner as the Plaintiff
is required to have a case which should be of higher standard than
mere prima facie case. But in view of the agreement between the
parties, as recorded by the Division Bench in an earlier round of
litigation the primary question was agreed to be that who is to act as
Chief Mutawalli. Both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench has
examined such question only. Even, before this Court, the parties
have argued primarily on the question as to who shall be Chief
Mutawalli. Therefore, a prima-facie opinion would lead to
consequential order in respect of management of the affairs of the
Hamdard.
59. Thus, in view of above the appeal is allowed. The order passed
by learned Division Bench on 27.11.2018 is set aside and that of the
38
order of learned Single Bench on 25.10.2017 is restored. The parties
will additionally continue with the arrangements arrived at in respect
of the management of the Hamdard in terms of the resolution dated
28.04.2015.
60. It is needless to say that decisions of the suits shall be on the
basis of evidence to be led by the parties as the present order is in
the context of deciding ad interim injunction application only.
61. Keeping in view the nature of disputes and the evidence to be
led, we further order that an endeavour shall be made to decide the
suit expeditiously by granting maximum period of three months to
each of two sets of parties to conclude their respective evidence so
that an early decision is arrived at to finally conclude the first stage of
disputes between the parties.
……..….………………………………J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
….………..…………………………..J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
New Delhi
April 3, 2019.
39