Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10
PETITIONER:
SRI SRI KALIMATA THAKURANI & SRI SRI RAGHUNATH JEW & ORS.ETC
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/02/1981
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
CITATION:
1981 AIR 1030 1981 SCR (2) 950
1981 SCC (2) 283 1981 SCALE (1)391
CITATOR INFO :
O 1984 SC 374 (5,11,12,14,16,23)
ACT:
West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, S. 2(8) Proviso and
Explanation, S. 20B(3), (4) and (5); West Bengal Land
Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 & West Bengal Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1977-Constitutional validity of.
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14, 19(1)(e), (g)
and Ninth Schedule Entry Nos. 60 and 81-Violation of
Fundamental Rights complaint of court to determine whether
restrictions contain quality of reasonableness.
HEADNOTE:
The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 permitted a
tenant (land-holder) to get the land cultivated by a
bargadar, on the basis that the bargadar would share tho
produce, and the Act contained provisions for enforcement of
the right of the tenant to get such share. Section 17
permitted the tenant to terminate the cultivation of the
land by a bargadar and resume possession for his own
cultivation on certain contingencies, one of them being that
he requires it bona fide for personal cultivation.
The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972
provided for the reduction in the ceiling area of the
tenant, and incorporated sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of
section 20B of the 1955 Act, which provided that where the
bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the
cultivation of the land, the facility of cultivating the
land personally by the tenant should be denied to him.
The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1977
inserted a Proviso and an Explanation to clause (8) of
section 2 of the 1955 Act, which provided that a person or
member of his family should reside in the greater part of
the year in the locality where the land is situated and the
principal source of his in come is derived from the land and
that ’family’ shall have the same meaning as in clause (c)
of section 14.
The petitioners in their writ petitions to this Court
assailed: (1) The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as also
amendments made to the said Act upto 1977, contending that
the 1955 Act was constitutionally invalid and that the
Amendment Act of 1972 was in the nature of a Ceiling Act
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10
prescribing a particular ceiling for the area of the land
which should be retained by the tenant and that sub-sections
(3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act were violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, as being discriminatory and
arbitrary Once the tenant was given the right of personal
cultivation and was permitted to get the land cultivated by
a bargadar on the basis that the bargadar would share the
produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to
resume the land where a bargadar had voluntarily surrendered
or abandoned the land and to deny the right of cultivating
the land personally by the tenant, and (2) the Proviso
951
and the Explanation to section 2 of the 1955 Act deprive the
petitioners of their rights guaranteed under Article
19(1)(e) and (g) of the constitution in as much as it
prevents them from either going to or residing in any other
place in India and places a serious curb on their right to
carry on an occupation other than agriculture.
On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the
rigour of sub-sections (3) and (4) can be softened if clause
(d) of section 17 is read down and interpreted in a way as
to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause (d) of
section 17 if the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or
abandons the land.
Dismissing the writ petitions:
^
HELD: 1 (i). The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955
including the Amendment Act of 1972 and the proviso
introduced by the Amendment Act of 1977 are constitutionally
valid. [961 G]
In the instant case the 1955 Act and the Amendment Act
of 1972 having been added to the Ninth Schedule as Entry
Nos. 60 and 81 prior to April 24, 1973, are immune from
challenge as being violative of Part III of the
Constitution. [954 A]
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1981 SC
271, referred to.
(ii) Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of
section 17 of the 1955 Act are the only grounds on which a
tenant can get the land back for his personal cultivation.
The contingency where the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or
abandons the land is neither mentioned, nor directly or
indirectly contemplated by them. The contention of the
respondent cannot be accepted for it would introduce
something into section 17 which is not there and this is
diametrically opposed to the well-known canons of
interpretation. [956 D-E]
(iii) There is no logical justification for the
provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20B. When
once the cultivator chooses to bring a bargadar on the land
the interest of the bargadar is protected and has been made
heritable. But when the bargadar on his own volition
surrenders or abandons the land, there is no reason why the
tenant should not be allowed to resume cultivation and
instead be compelled to get the land cultivated by some
other person nominated by the authority concerned under
section 49 of the 1955 Act. This provision, therefore,
appears to be extremely harsh and works serious injustice to
the rights of the tenants particularly after the ceiling
area of the tenant has been considerably reduced by the
Amendment Act of 1972. [956 E-G]
(iv) Though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and
(5) of section 20B a perilously border on arbitrariness and
amount to serious curbs on the fundamental right of the
cultivator to pursue his occupation, they cannot be struck
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10
down because they are contained in the Amendment Act of 1972
which has been placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to April
24, 1973. It will, however, be for the legislature which is
the best judge of the needs of its people to give, a
suitable relief to the tenant and soften the rigours of
these harsh provisions. [957 C-D]
(2) The object of the proviso is to safeguard the
interest of the tenant himself so that he may give
wholehearted attention to the personal cultivation of
952
the land. The proviso does not debar him from following any
other occupation but once a tenant wants to have the land to
himself for personal cultivation he must elect whether to
pursue the profession of cultivation or some other
occupation. Thus, even though there is some amount of
restriction both on the right of the petitioners to reside
or follow any other occupation, such a restriction cannot be
said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [958 C, E-F]
In the instant case the restriction does not amount to
complete deprivation of the right of the tenant to reside
elsewhere because the words for the greater part of the
year’ leave sufficient scope to the tenant to reside
elsewhere for a part of the year if he so desires. It is not
necessary that the tenant should himself reside in the
village for the greater part of the year. It is sufficient
if any member of the family which includes his wife,
unmarried adult, married adult, minor son and so on remains
in the village. This would amount to substantial compliance
of the conditions of the proviso. The restriction,
therefore, is partial and in public interest. [958 G, 959 D]
(3) Whenever a complaint of violation of fundamental
rights is made the court has to determine whether or not the
restrictions imposed contain the quality of reasonableness.
In assessing these factors a doctrinaire approach should not
be made but the essential facts and realities of life have
to be duly considered. Our Constitution aims at building up
a socialist state and the establishment of an egalitarian
society and if reasonable restrictions are placed on the
fundamental rights in public interest, they can be fully
justified in law. [959 F-G]
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597, referred
to.
(4) As the proviso operates equally to all the tenants
governed by it no question of discrimination arises. [961 F]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1345,
1635/79, 458, 935. 1418 and 1692/80.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Sukumar Ghosh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1345/79.
S.N. Kacker, Govinda Mukhoty and Rathin Das for the
Respondent in WP No. 1345/79.
P. Keshva Pillai for the Petitioner in WP No. 1635/79.
Rathin Das for Respondent No. 2 and Ors. In WP No.
1635/79.
Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A.K. Sen Gupta
for the Petitioner in WP No. 458/80.
S.N. Kacker and Rathin Das for Respondent No. 2 and
Ors. in WP No. 458/80.
S.C. Majumdar, Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and
A.K. Sen for the Petitioner in WP No. 935/80.
953
Sripal Singh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1418 of 1980
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10
and 1692/80.
Rathin Das for Respondent Nos. 2 and Ors. in WP Nos.
935 1418 & 1692/80.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J These petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires
of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter
referred to as the ’1955 Act’) as also various amendments
made to the said Act upto 1977. The first plank of argument
related to the constitutional validity of the 1955 Act. The
second plank of argument was confined to the validity of the
West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as the ’Amendment Act of 1972’) which was in the
nature of a ceiling Act prescribing a particular ceiling of
the area of land which could be retained by the tenant. So
far as the Ceiling Act, viz., the Amendment Act of 1972 is
concerned, it is conceded by the counsel for the petitioners
that the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Act is
clearly concluded by a recent decision of this Court in
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. where a
Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various
grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of
various ceiling Acts passed by the States concerned. In view
of this decision the learned counsel for the petitioners was
fair enough to state that he does not want to press his
contention regarding the constitutional validity of the
Ceiling Act. Similarly, the learned counsel for the
petitioners fairly conceded that as the 1955 Act, alongwith
its amendments upto 1972, has been placed in the Ninth
Schedule of the Constitution, it was immune from challenge
and was saved by the protective umbrella contained in Art.
31B of the Constitution. In this connection, this position
was made absolutely clear in Waman Rao’s case (supra) where
this Court observed as follows :
"Thus, in so far as the validity of Article 31B
read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that
all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule
prior to April 24, 1973 will receive the full
protection of Article 31B. Those laws and regulations
will not be open to challenge on the ground that they
are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of
the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part
III of the Constitution."
954
In the instant case, it is clear that the 1955 Act as
also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the Ninth
Schedule, being entry Nos. 60 and 81, prior to April 24,
1973. In these circumstances, it is manifest that the
aforesaid Acts ale completely immune from challenge on the
ground that they are violative of any of the rights
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The learned
counsel for the petitioners, therefore, was fully justified
in making the concession before us.
The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners
in W.P. No. 1345 of 1979, which has been adopted by the
counsel for the petitioners appearing in other petitions,
centres round the validity of-(1) The West Bengal Land
Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977 (published in the Gazette
Extraordinary on 3-2-1978), and (2) Section 20B, sub-
sections (3), (4) and (5), of the 1955 Act. So far as the
challenge to the constitutional validity of this section was
concerned, it was confined only on the ground that the said
sub-sections were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution
of India as being discriminatory and arbitrary.
It was contended that once the land holder, viz., the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10
tenant was given the right of personal cultivation and was
permitted to get the land cultivated by a Bargadar on the
basis that the bargadar would share half the produce, there
was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the
land where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or
abandoned the land. In order to consider this argument, it
may be necessary to examine the status of the bargadar under
the 1955 Act. Section 2(2) defines bargadar thus
" ’Bargadar’ means a person who under the system
generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the
land of another person on condition of delivering a
share of the produce of such land to that person and
includes person who under the system generally known as
kisani cultivates the land of another person on
condition of receiving a share of the produce of such
land from that person."
Section 16 of the 1955 Act provides that where the
tenant brings in a bargadar on the land, the produce of the
land may be shared in the proportion of 50: 50 or 75; 25.
There are also provisions in the 1955 Act for enforcement of
the right of the tenant to get his share of the produce from
the bargadar which have not been challenged before us. It
would be seen that s. 17 permits the cultivator to terminate
the cultivation of the land by a bargadar and resume
possession under his own cultivation if the conditions
mentioned in clauses
955
(a), (b) and (d) of sub-section (1) of s. 17 are satisfied.
Clause (d) may be extracted thus:-
"That the person owning the land requires it bona-
fide for bringing it under personal cultivation."
Thus, the cultivator has a right to get back the land
for personal cultivation if he requires it for his bona fide
use and proves the same to the satisfaction of the authority
appointed under s. 17(1).
It was argued by the counsel for the petitioners that
on a parity of reasoning contained in s. 17, there was no
reason why-where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or
abandoned the land-the facility of cultivating the land
personally by the tenant should be denied to him. Sub-
sections (3), (4) and (5) of s 20B of the 1955 Act run thus:
"(3) If such officer or authority determines that
the bargadar had not voluntarily surrendered or
abandoned the cultivation of the land which was being
cultivated by him as such and what he had been
compelled by force or otherwise to surrender or abandon
the cultivation of such land, such officer or authority
shall restore the bargadar to the cultivation of the
land, or where the bargadar is not available or is not
willing to be restored to the cultivation of such land,
the person whose land was so cultivated shall not
resume personal cultivation of the land but he may,
with the permission of such officer or authority, get
the land cultivated by any person, referred to in
section 49, who is willing to cultivate the land as a
bargadar.
(4) If such officer or authority determines that
the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned
the cultivation of the land which was cultivated by him
as such, the person whose land was being so cultivated
shall not resume personal cultivation of such land but
he may, with the permission of such officer or
authority, have the land cultivated by any person,
referred to in section 49, who is willing to cultivate
the land as a bargadar.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10
(5) Any contravention of the provisions of sub-
section (3) or sub-section (4) shall be an offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees, or with both."
Sub-sections (3) and (4) prescribe the procedure which
is to be adopted where a bargadar voluntarily surrenders or
abandons the
956
cultivation of the land. Under these provisions, the tenant
is not allowed to resume personal cultivation but has to get
the land cultivated by some other person with the permission
of the officer or authority concerned.
Realising the force of the argument, Mr. S. N. Kacker,
appearing for the State of West Bengal, with his usual
persuasiveness submitted that sub-sections (3) and (4) are
extremely harsh but the rigours of these sub-sections can be
softened if we read down s. 17(d) and interpret it in such a
way as to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause
(d) of s. 17 if the Bargadar voluntarily surrenders or
abandons the land. We are, however, unable to agree with
this argument because it will amount not only to distorting
and misinterpreting clause (d) but also to causing serious
violence to its plain language, which cannot be done
It would appear that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-
section (1) of s. 17 of the 1955 Act are the only grounds
given on which a tenant can get the land back for his
personal cultivation. The contingency where the bargadar
voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land is neither
mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) nor is directly or
indirectly contemplated by them. In these circumstances. if
we accept the contention of Mr. Kacker it would amount to
introducing something into s. 17 which is not there and this
is diametrically opposed to the well-known canons of
interpretation
We are, however, constrained to observe that there does
not appear to be any logical justification for the
provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of s. 20B.
It is understandable that when once the cultivator
chooses to bring a bargadar on the land, the interest of the
bargadar should be duly protected and has been made
heritable. So far, there can be no objection and such a
course is in consonance with the object of the statute. But
when the Bargadar on his own volition surrenders or abandons
the land, there is no reason why the tenant should not be
allowed to resume cultivation and instead be compelled to
get the land cultivated by some other person nominated by
the authority concerned under s. 49 of the 1955 Act. This
provision therefore appears to us to be extremely harsh and
works serious injustice to the rights of the tenants
particularly after the ceiling area of the tenant has been
considerably reduced by the Amendment Act of 1972. Thus, the
tenant having a small area guaranteed to him for his unit,
he should have at least fuller and
957
more effective rights to get that area cultivated by him or
even by a bargadar of his choice subject to resuming the
same, if the bargadar surrenders or abandons the land. The
amendment doubtless recognises the right of the ownership of
the tenant within the ceiling area and yet to deny him the
right of resuming cultivation of the land from the bargadar
inducted by him after the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or
abandons the same and forcing or imposing someone else to
cultivate the land on behalf of the tenant appears to be
contrary to the very tenor and spirit which sections 17 and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10
20B of the 1955 Act seem to subserve Unfortunately, however,
though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) [and (5) of
s. 20B, which is only a penal section] perilously border on
arbitrariness and amounts to serious curbs on the
fundamental right of the cultivator to pursue his
occupation, we cannot however strike down these provisions
because they are contained in the Amendment Act of 1972
which has been placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to April
24, 1973, and therefore fall within the protective umbrella
and are immune from challenge. It will, however, be for the
legislature which is the best judge of the needs of its
people to give a suitable relief to the tenant and soften
the rigours of the harsh provisions of sub-sections (3), (4)
and (5) of s. 20B on the lines indicated by us. With these
observations, the arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioners on this ground are overruled.
We now come to the second plank of the argument which
comprises the challenge to the proviso and the Explanation
to s. 2 of the 1955 Act. This provision having been brought
into force after the 24th of April, 1973, falls beyond the
ambit of Art. 31B and is not covered by the protective
umbrella of that Article. In these circumstances, the
challenge to the constitutionality of this provision could
be entertained by us. Mr. Kacker did not controvert this
position. The impugned proviso and the Explanation which
were added to clause (8) of s. 2 by the West Bengal Land
Reforms (Amendment Act, 1977, may be extracted thus:-
"Provided that such person or member of his family
resides for the greater part of the year in the
locality where the land is situated and the principal
source of his income is produced from such land.
Explanation-The term "family" shall have the same
meaning as in clause (c) of section 14K"
It was submitted that the proviso insists that the
cultivator or member of his family must reside in the
locality where the land is
958
situate for the greater part of the year and thus deprives
the petitioners of their right guaranteed to them under Art
19(1) (e) and (g) of the Constitution inasmuch as it compels
the petitioner to reside in the village and prevents them
from either going to or residing in any other place in
India. The second ground of challenge to the
constitutionality of the proviso was that it places a
serious curb on the right of the petitioners to carry on
their occupation other than agriculture.
As regards the first argument, we are unable to agree
with the learned counsel because the object of the proviso
is to safeguard the interest of the tenant himself so that
he may give whole-hearted attention to the personal
cultivation of the land which has been secured for him by
virtue of a valuable piece of agrarian reform. If the tenant
is allowed to go out of the village and reside at other
places then the benefit conferred by the 1955 Act cannot be
fully utilised by the tenant and would frustrate the very
purpose for which agrarian reforms are meant. Moreover, the
land is given to the tenant as the tiller of the soil
fundamentally for the reason that cultivation is his main
source of sustenance as is mentioned in the proviso itself.
If, therefore, the principal source of sustenance of the
tenant is agriculture it would be futile for the tenant to
say that he should be permitted to follow other avocations
or occupations in the main which will defeat the very
purpose for which the proviso has been enacted. The proviso
does not debar him from following any other occupation but
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10
once a tenant wants to have the land to himself for personal
cultivation he must elect whether to pursue the profession
of cultivation or some other occupation. Thus, even though
there is some amount of restriction both on the right of the
petitioners to reside or follow any other occupation, such a
restriction cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
It is well settled that where a restriction is imposed by
the legislature in public interest in order to advance a
particular purpose or carry out the dominant object. such a
restriction is undoubtedly a reasonable one within the
meaning of clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 19 of the
Constitution. Moreover, in the instant cast, the restriction
does not amount to complete deprivation of the right of the
tenant to reside elsewhere because the words ’for the
greater part of the year’ leave sufficient scope to the
tenant to reside elsewhere for a part of the year if he so
desires. Furthermore, the Explanation adopts the definition
of "family" which is the same as defined in s. 14K of the
1955 Act which runs thus:
"(i) himself and his wife, minor sons, unmarried
daughters, if any,
959
(ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not
hold any land as a raiyat,
(iii) his married adult son, if any, where neither
such adult son nor the wife nor any minor son or
unmarried daughter of such adult son holds any land as
a raiyat,
(iv) widow of his predeceased son, if any, where
neither such widow, nor any minor son or unmarried
daughter of such widow holds any land as a raiyat,
(v) minor son or unmarried daughter, if any of his
pre deceased son, where the widow of such predeceased
son is dead any minor son or unmarried daughter of such
predeceased son does not hold any land as a raiyat,
but shall not include any other person."
Thus, it is not necessary that the tenant should
himself reside in the village for the greater part of the
year and it is sufficient if any member of the family which
includes his wife, unmarried adult, married adult, minor son
and so on, remains in the village and this would amount to
substantial compliance of the conditions of the proviso. The
restriction, therefore, is partial and in public interest
and bears a close nexus with the object of the 1955 Act,
viz, to achieve agrarian reforms.
The fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 19 of the
Constitution are not absolute and unqualified but are
subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed
under sub-clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 19. Whenever a
complaint of violation of fundamental rights is made the
Court has to determine whether or not the restrictions
imposed contain the quality of reasonableness. In assessing
these factors a doctrinaire approach should not be made but
the essential facts and realities of life have to be duly
considered. Our Constitution aims at building up a socialist
state and the establishment of an egalitarian society and if
reasonable restrictions are placed on the fundamental rights
in public interest, they can be fully justified in law. The
principles laying down the various tests of reasonableness
have been very aptly enunciated in the case of State of
Madras v. V.G. Row which is almost the locus classicus on
the subject in question. In that case Shastri, C.J, speaking
for the Court observed as follows :-
"It is important in this context to bear in mind that
the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10
be
960
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no
abstract standard, or general pattern, of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all
cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to
be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time,
should all enter into the judicial verdict."
The case has been consistently followed by later
decisions of this Court right uptodate
Another important factor to consider the reasonableness
of restrictions is if the restrictions imposed are excessive
or dispreportionate to the needs of a particular situation.
Further, if the restrictions are in implementation of the
directive principles of the Constitution the same would be
upheld as being in public interest because the individual
interest must yield to the interest of the community at
large for only then a welfare state can flourish.
Applying these tests to the facts of the present case
we are satisfied that the restrictions contained in the
impugned proviso cannot be said to be unreasonable for the
following reasons:
The dominant object of the proviso is to abolish the
age-old institutions of absentee land-holders by
insisting that the cultivator to whom land is allotted
must give full and complete attention to the soil and
as a result of which there will be a maximum
utilisation of the agricultural resources which would
increase production. Under the Amendment Act of 1972 an
adult unmarried person is entitled to hold an area up
to 2.50 hectares which is equal to 6.72 acres, a tenant
with a family of two or more is entitled to hold 12.36
hectares and a tenant having a family of five or more
is entitled to hold 7 hectares which is equal to 12.23
acres being the maximum area permissible. Thus, the
area left to the tenant is quite vast and appreciable
and if the tenant wants to bring this area under
cultivation in right earnest it would hardly leave him
time to quit the village and pursue other avocations of
life. It is obvious that the tenant has to remain in
the village for the purpose of cultivating the lands,
sowing the seeds, growing it and harvesting it. These
processes would doubt less require the presence of the
tenant for a greater part of the year which is what the
proviso predicates. If the
961
tenant is permitted to leave the village for more than
half the year then the very purpose of giving such a
vast area for cultivation to a tenant will be foiled.
Moreover, the proviso merely insists that the tenant
should remain in the village or its periphery for
"greater part of the year" which appears to be not only
reasonable but absolutely essential if the land has to
be cultivated in a scientific manner in order to yield
the maximum possible production, which would result in
better and equitable distribution of agricultural
products for the use of the people of the country.
Another aspect of the proviso is that the land is given
to the tenant only if his main source of sustenance is from
agriculture so that the land may be reserved only for the
tiller of the soil and none else. Hence, the restrictions
imposed, therefore, by the proviso are undoubtedly in public
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10
interest and in consonance with the concept of promoting and
accelerating agrarian reforms which is the prime need of the
hour.
For these reasons, therefore, the challenge that the
proviso violates Art. 19 (1) (e) and (g) must fail.
The last contention put forward by the petitioners was
that the proviso is also violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as it
is extremely arbitrary and discriminatory. We are unable to
uphold the challenge on the ground that the proviso violates
Art. 14 because we do not find any element of arbitrariness
in the proviso. If the statute insists that the tiller of
the soil must remain in the village for a greater part of
the year in order to cultivate the land which has been given
to him and thereby increase the produce. Of the land, no
serious prejudice is caused to the tenant because that is
the purpose for which he has himself secured the land.
Secondly, as the proviso operates equally to all the tenants
governed by it no question of discrimination at all arises.
Thus, this argument also is wholly untenable and must fail.
For the reasons given above, we hold that both the Act
of 1955, including the Amendment Act of 1972, and the
proviso introduced a by the Amendment Act of 1977 are
constitutionally valid. As we have made certain observations
regarding the harshness of the provisions of sub-sections
(3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act, let a copy of
this judgment be sent to the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West
Bengal. The petitions are dismissed without any order as to
costs.
N.V.K. Petitions dismissed,
962