Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SRIMATI ASHALATA DEBI AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SRI JADU NATH ROY AND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/04/1954
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
CITATION:
1954 AIR 409 1955 SCR 150
ACT:
Indian Independence, (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947,
para. 4 (2)-New decree passed in proceedings under section
36 of Bengal Money. Lenders Act, 1940, pending in the Court
of Subordinate Judge, Alipore, on the 15th August, 1947-Bulk
of properties in respect of the new decree situated in East
Pakistan -Appeal filed after 15th August, 1947-Whether
competent to Calcutta High Court Bengal Money Lenders Act,
1940 (Act X of 1940), section 36(2)-New decree-Default made
by judgment-debtor-Application by decree-holder for re-
restoration of properties-An application for execution
-Orders on such application-Appealable.
HEADNOTE:
Para. 4(2) of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings)
Order,-1947, runs as under:-
" 4. Notwithstanding the creation of certain new Provinces
and the transfer of certain territories from the Province of
Assam to the Province of East Bengal by the Indian
Independence Act, 1947...............
(2)Any appeal or application for revision in respect of any
proceedings so pending in any such Court shall lie in the
Court which would have appellate, or as the case may be,
revisional jurisdiction over. that Court if the proceedings
were instituted in that Court after the appointed
day...............
An application by the decree-holder for re-restoration of
properties by reason of the default made by the judgment-
debtor after a new decree had been passed under section 36
of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940, was pending in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipore, on 15th August,
1947, when the bulk of the properties, which were the
subject-matter of the new decree, went to East Pakistan as
being situated there. The application was saved by the
provisions of para. 4(1) which provided for the continuance
in the same Court of these proceedings as if the said Act
(Indian Independence Act) had not been passed. It was con-
tended that the appeal to the High Court filed by the
decreebolder was not saved by para. 4(2) as it was filed
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after 15th August, 1947, as the words "if the proceedings
were instituted in this Court" in the said para. should mean
"if the proceedings could have been instituted in that
Court."
Held, that the appeal from the Court of the Subordinate
Judge was competent to the Calcutta. High Court because the
only construction that could be put upon this provision was
that the Court having appellate or revisional jurisdiction
over that Court would
151
have such jurisdiction as if the proceedings had been
instituted in that Court after the 15th August, 1947.
An application by the decree-holder was in substance an
application for the execution of the new decree which had
been passed under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders
Act, 1940. Orders passed on such applications for execution
would be clearly appealable.
The reasoning of the High Court that such an application was
an application in the suit for a special remedy given under
a special law and that the rules of Civil Procedure Code
applied and an appeal lay against such orders because they
were deerees within the definition of section 2(2) of the
Civil Procedure Code was not sustainable and could not be
accepted.
Tirlok Nath v. Moti Ram and Others (A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab
149) referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 69 of
1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 27th April,
1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Sen &
Chunder JJ.) in Appeal from Original Decree No. 19 of 1948
arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 27th
September, 1947, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge,
Third Court of Zillah, 24Parganas at Alipore in
Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 31 of 1947.
Sukumar Ghose for the appellants.
Bankim Chandra Banerji and R. R. Biswas for respondents Nos.
1, 2, 8 & 9.
1954. April 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BAAGWATI J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and
decree of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta reversing
the order of the Third Subordinate Judge, Alipore,
dismissing the respondents applications for re-restoration
of certain immovable properties.
One Romesh Chandra Acharji Choudhury (deceased) predecessor-
in-interest of the appellants borrowed on the 16th August,
1918, Rs. 1,60,000 and Rs, 73,000 from the predecessors-in-
interest of the respondents under two deeds of mortgage.
There being default in payment of the mortgage amounts a
suit to realise the mortgage securities was filed on the
10th March, 1926,
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in the Third Subordinate Judge’s Court, Alipore. A
preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. 4,21,851.1-6 was passed
on the 4th April, 1929, and a decree absolute for sale was
passed on the 13th September, 1929. The mortgaged
properties were put up for sale in execution proceedings in
1930 and the decree-holders purchased the properties at
auction sales on the 29th February, 1932, and the 23rd
April, 1935, for an aggregate amount of Rs. 2,35,200. These
sales were duly confirmed and the auction-purchasers took
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delivery of possession of different items of property on
different dates between the 25th June, 1933, and the 9th
March, 1936. The aecree-holders obtained on the 13th
December, 1937, a personal decree under Order XXXIV, rule 6,
of the Civil Procedure Code for the balance due to them,
viz., Rs, 3,30,903. This personal decree was also executed
and some properties of the mortgagors were purchased by the
decree-holders on the 8th August, 1939, for Rs. 3,899 and
delivery of possession of these properties was duly given to
them on the 6th July, 1940.
Kshitish Chandra Acharji Choudhury, since deceased, the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellants Nos. 1 to 3 and
Jyotish Chandra Acharya Choudhury, the appellant No. 4, sons
of the mortgagor filed on the 9th December, 1940, a petition
under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act (Act X of
1940) for reopening the mortgage decree and the personal
decree. By an order dated the 25th August, 1941, the
learned Subordinate Judge reopened the decrees and on the
10th May, 1943, passed a new decree for a sum of Rs.
3,76,324-12-4. The said sum was directed to be paid by the
judgment-debtors to the decree-holders in fifteen equal
annual instalments. He also directed the restoration of the
properties purchased by the decree-holders.
The present respondents preferred, on the 19th June, 1943,
an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta and
cross-objections were filed by the said Kshitish Chandra
Acharji Choudhury and appellant No. 4. By their judgment and
decree dated the 29th June, 1944, the High Court affirmed
the decree of the Court below with some substantial
variations and
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passed a new decree in favour of the mortgagors. The
mortgagees were ordered to put the mortgagors in possession
of all the properties they had purchased in’ execution of
the reopened decrees and render to them an account of the
mesne profits of those properties from the 15th September,
1941, till they restored or relinquished possession to the
mortgagors of the collection papers of those properties.
The sum of Rs. 3,76,324-12-6 was declared to be due by the
mortgagors to the mortgagees and the mortgagors were to pay
the same in twenty equal annual instalments the first of
such instalments to be paid on or before the first
anniversary of the date on which the mortgagees restored or
relinquished possession of all the properties purchased by
them in execution to the mortgagors or of the date on which
they delivered to the mortgagors the collection papers as
therein mentioned, whichever date was later. The mortgagors
were to pay to the mortgagees the successive annual
instalments on or before the same date of the succeeding
years on which the first instalment became payable and they
were also to pay the annual revenue of the aforesaid
properties that would become payable after they were
restored to possession kist by kist, as they fell due, at
least three days before the kist dates and file the challans
in the Court below in proof of payment within ten days of
the payments. The road, public works and education cesses
and rent due to the superior landlords were also to be paid
similarly by the mortgagors and in default of payment of any
one instalment or cesses or rent within the time prescribed,
the mortgagors were entitled to get back possession of the
said properties from the mortgagors and in that event the
sum of Rs. 2,39,099 at which the mortgagees had purchased
those properties would be balanced against the amount then
due to them under the decree. If thereafter any amount
still remained due to the mortgagees under the decree they
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were entitled to apply in the Court below for a decree for
the balance under Order XXXIV, rule 6, of the Civil
Procedure Code. An enquiry was ordered into the mesne
profits for the period between the 15th September, 1941,
till the restoration of possession to the mortgagors and
20
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the mortgagors were at liberty to set off the amount that
might be decreed in their favour for mesne profits towards
the instalment that fell due in the year in which the amount
was declared by the Court below and the next succeeding
years till the said amount was wiped off.
Possession was delivered to the mortgagors on the 5th
October, 1944. The delivery of the collection papers was
however given on the 28th March, 1945. The mortgagors were
alleged to have committed default in the payment of the
second instalment which was due in any event on the 28th
March, 1947, and also in the payment of the revenue kist and
the cesses which were due on or about that date. The
mortgagees therefore made applications in the Court of the
Third Subordinate Judge at Alipore on the 6th September,
1946, and the 18th April, 1947, asking for re-restoration of
the properties. Several defaults were alleged but only two
defaults were pressed, one in regard to the payment of the
second instalment which was due on the 28th March, 1947, and
the other in regard to the payment of the revenue and the
cesses of the Noakhali properties due also on the same date.
The learned Subordinate Judge rejected these applications by
his order dated the 27th September, 1947, holding that there
was no default in the payment of revenue and cess and that
the default in payment of the second instalment though it
had accrued was due to the wrongful acts of the decree-
holders themselves and that the, decree-holders were not
entitled to take advantage of their own wrong. An appeal
was preferred to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta.
The appeal was allowed on the 27th April, 1950. The High
Court held that a default had been committed by the
mortgagors and ordered rerestoration of the properties.
This appeal has been filed against that order of the High
Court with certificate under article 133(1)(a) of the
Constitution.
Shri S. Ghosh appearing for the appellants before us urged
that the bulk of the properties which were the subject-
matter of the new decree had gone to Pakistan after the 26th
January, 1950, being situated in East Pakistan and the High
Court at Calcutta had
155
after the 26th January., 1950, no jurisdiction and power to
determine the appeal and to pass an order relating to the
immovable properties situated in foreign territories. He
further urged that the order of rerestoration of the
properties was not appealable and that in any event no
default had been committed by the mortgagors.
In support of his first contention reliance was placed on
paragraph 4(2) of the Indian Independence (Legal
Proceedings) Order, 1947, which ran as under:---
"4. Notwithstanding the creation of certain new Provinces
and the transfer of certain territories from the Province of
Assam to the Province of East Bengal by the Indian
Independence Act, 1947...................
(2) Any appeal or application for revision in respect of
any proceedings so pending in any such Court shall lie in
the Court which would have appellate, or as the case may be
revisional jurisdiction over that Court
if the proceedings were instituted in that Court after the
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appointed day;......... "
The applications for re-restoration of the properties were
pending before the Third Subordinate Judge at Alipore on the
15th August., 1947, and they were saved by the provisions of
paragraph 4(1) which provided for the continuance in the
same Court of these proceedings as if the said Act that is,
Indian Independence Act, 1947, had not been passed. But he
contended that paragraph 4(2) did not save the appeal which
had been filed by the mortgagees after the 15th August,
1947. We cannot accept this contention of the appellant.
Paragraph 4(2) provided for appeals or applications for
revision in respect of proceedings which were pending in the
Courts after the 15th August, 1947, and laid down that these
proceedings by way of appeal or applications for revision
could lie in -the Courts which would have appellate or
revisional jurisdiction over that Court if the proceedings
were instituted in that Court after the 15th August, 1947.
It was contended that for the purpose of this provision the
words "if the proceedings were instituted in that Court"
should be read as meaning "if the proceedings could have
been
156
instituted in that Court." This certainly could not be the
meaning, because by reason of the transfer of the
territories no proceedings in respect of the properties
which had gone to Pakistan’ could ever have been maintained
after the 15th August, 1947, in the Courts concerned. The
only construction which could be put upon this provision was
that the Court having appellate or revisional jurisdiction
over that Court would have such jurisdiction as if the
proceedings had been instituted in that Court after the 15th
August, 1947. For the purpose of the appellate or the
revisional jurisdiction that Court had to be treated as the
Court in which the proceedings could and should have been
instituted and it goes without saying that if the pro-
ceedings could be treated as -having been properly
instituted in that Court the only Court to which the appeal
or the application for revision could lie was the Court
which then had appellate or revisional jurisdiction over
that Court. In the case before us no proceedings could have
been instituted in the Third Subordinate Judge’s Court at
Alipore in respect of the properties which had gone to East
Pakistan after the 15th August, 1947. But by reason of the
fact that these proceedings were pending in that Court on
the 15th August, 1947, the High Court of Calcutta which had
appellate or revisional jurisdiction over that Court was
prescribed to be the Court in which the appeal or the
application for revision in respect of such procedings would
lie, because that Court, that is the Third Subordinate
Judge’s Court at Alipore, was treated as the Court in which
such proceedings could and should have been instituted after
the 15th August, 1947.
Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to
the case of Tirlok Nath v. Moti Ram and Others(1). In that
case a suit for possession of land at place X was filed in
Court at B in 1943. On the 15th August, 1947, the suit was
pending before the Court at B which dismissed the suit in
1948. An appeal from the decision was filed in the East
Punjab High Court as the place B was included in the East
Punjab. On
(1) A.I.R. 1050 East Punjab I49.
157
objection regarding jurisdiction of the High Court being
taken on the -around that the land in suit was at A, now
included in Pakistan, the High,Court held that the suit
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being pending at place B on 15th August, 1947, appeal from
the decision of that Court lay to the East Punjab High Court
and not to Lahore High Court under paragraph 4(2) of the
Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947. This
decision is on all fours with the case before us and we are
of the opinion that the contention urged on behalf of the
appellants is untenable.
The next contention of the appellants is equally untenable.
The Calcutta High Court considered these applications as
applications in the suit for a special remedy given under a
special law and held that the rules of the Code of Civil
Procedure applied and an appeal lay against the orders
because they were decrees within the definition of section
2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We cannot accept this
reasoning. These applications were in truth and in
substance applications for execution of the new decrees
which had been passed in favour of the mortgagors by the
High, Court on the 29th June, 1944. The only thing
competent to the mortgagees under the terms of the new
decree was to apply for execution of the decrees on default
committed by the mortgagors and the applications made by the
mortgagees in the Court of the Third Subordinate Judge at
Alipore were really applications for execution of the decree
though not couched in the proper form and could be treated
as such. If they were treated as such it is clear that the
orders passed on such applications for execution were
appealable and no objection could be sustained on the ground
that no appeals law against these orders. Treating these
applications therefore as applications for execution we see
no substance in this contention of the appellants.
if the matter is approached in this way no objection could
be urged by the appellants against the decision of the High
Court. The executing Court could not go behind the decree
and it is clear on the facts that default was committed by
the mortgagors both in
158
regard to the payment of the revenue and the cess as also
the second instalment under the new decree.
The contention which was therefore urged on behalf of the
appellants that there was no default committed by the
mortgagors also could not be sustained.
The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta was therefore
rightly seized of the appeal and it had jurisdiction to
decide whether the mortgagors had committed default in
carrying out the terms of the new decree. The appeal being
a mere rehearing the appellate Court was entitled to review
the judgment of the trial Judge and declare that it was
wrong and that the decree-holder was entitled to re-
restoration. The question whether he would be able to
obtain possession of the immovable properties in fact was
foreign to such an enquiry. By appropriate proceedings in
another jurisdiction he may be able to do so; but this
difficulty could not be a deterrent to the High Court
passing the necessary orders for re-restoration of the
properties.
The appeal therefore fails and must stand dismissed.. There
will be no order as to costs.