Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME- TAX, BOMBAY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. INDIRA BALKRISHNA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
14/04/1960
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
KAPUR, J.L.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
CITATION:
1960 AIR 1172 1960 SCR (3) 513
CITATOR INFO :
R 1961 SC1043 (6,7,8)
RF 1961 SC1261 (6)
RF 1965 SC1752 (8)
R 1968 SC 317 (22)
RF 1970 SC1707 (8)
R 1973 SC2369 (7,10)
RF 1977 SC 394 (5,6)
ACT:
Income-tax-Association of Persons-Meaning of-Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), s. 3.
HEADNOTE:
A Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law died
leaving three widows as his legal heirs. The widows took
the estate as joint tenants and did not exercise their right
to separate possession and enjoyment. The main income was
from dividends and from immovable property. The latter was
held under s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act not to be
assessable as income
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of an association of persons. The question was whether the
three widows could be assessed as an association of persons
in respect of the rest of the income:
Held, that the three widows did not have the status of an
association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Income-tax Act. An association of persons is one in which
two or more persons join in a common purpose or common
action and, for purposes of the income-tax law, one of its
objects must be to produce income, profits or gains. It
must be a combination of persons formed for the promotion of
a joint enterprise for producing income. In the present
case except for receiving the dividends and interest jointly
the widows had done no act which helped to produce the
income.
In Ye : B. N. Elias, [1935] 3 I.T.R. 408, Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937] 5 I.T.R. 484
and Re. Dwayakanath Harishchandra, [1937] 5 I.T.R. 716,
approved.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 249 & 250
of 1958.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March 7, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in I.T.R. Nos. 52
and 53 of 1955.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant (in
both the appeals).
N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for
the respondent (in both the appeals).
1960. April 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. K. DAS, J.-These two appeals with special leave have
been heard together. They arise out of similar facts and
the question of law arising therefrom is the
same.
The short facts are these. One Balkrishna Purushottam
Purani died on November 11, 1947. He left behind him three
widows and two daughters. The three widows were named
Indira, Ramluxmi and Prabhuluxmi. These widows as legal
heirs inherited the estate of the deceased, which consisted
of immovable properties situate in Ahmedabad, shares in
Joint Stock Companies, money lying in deposit, and share in
a registered firm. For the two assessment years 1950-51 and
1951-52 (the corresponding account years being the Sambat
years 2005 and 2006) the Incometax Officer issued notices to
the legal heirs of Balkrishna Purushottam Purani. Pursuant
to those notices, returns were filed under the heading, "
Legal heirs of Balkrishhna Purushottam Purani ", in one case
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and in the name of the ’estate of Balkrishna in the other;
the status was shown as " individual " in one case and "
association of persons " in -the other. They were signed by
Indira, one of the three widows. For the assessment year
1950-51 the total income was shown as under-
Rs.
Property.. 11,011
Share from registered
firm. 4,071
Dividends. 51,796
Interest.. 22,343
Ground rent.... 125
Total..... 69,346
For the assessment year 1951-52, the total income was shown
as-
Rs.
Property-. 10,879
Share from registered
firm. 460
Dividends. 80,426
Interest on deposits..... 536
Ground rent.... 125
Total..... 92,426
For both years the Income-tax Officer took the status of the
assessee as an " association of persons " and on that
footing made two assessment orders. There was an appear to
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and two of the points
taken before him were(a) that the three widows ought to have
been assessed separately and not as an " association of
persons ", and (b) that in any event, the income from
property ought to have been assessed separately in the hands
of the three widows by reason of the provisions in s. 9(3)
of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Appellate Assistant
Commissioner rejected point (a) but accepted point (b).
Then, there was a further appeal to the
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516
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. The Tribunal held
that the entire estate of deceased Balkrishna Purushottam
Purani was inherited and possessed by the three widows as
joint tenants and its income was liable to be assessed in
their hands in the status of an association of persons. The
Tribunal further held that the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner was wrong in holding that the shares of the
three widows were definite and determinable and s. 9(3) was
applicable. The assessee then moved the Tribunal to refer
certain questions of law which arose out of its orders to
the High Court of Bombay. The Tribunal referred four such
questions, but we are now concerned with only one of them,
viz., question No. 3 which was in the
following terms:
" (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessment
made on the three widows of Balkrishna Purushottam Purani in
the status of an association of persons is legal and valid
in law ? "
Two references were made to the High Court in respect of the
orders passed for two assessment years and they gave rise to
Income-tax References Nos. 52 and 53 of 1955. The leading
judgment was given in T. T. It. 52 of 1955. The High Court
held that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the
conclusion that the three widows could be assessed in the
status of an association of persons with regard to the
income which they earned as heirs of their deceased husband.
Therefore, it answered question No. 3 in the negative. The
department represented by the Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay, then applied to this Court and obtained special
leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of the High
Court of Bombay in the two References. These two appeals
have been filed in pursuance of the special leave granted by
this Court. The appellant is the Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bombay, and the assessee is the respondent.
The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the High
Court was in error when it said that " what is required
before an association of persons can be liable to tax is not
that they should receive income but that
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they should earn or help to earn income by reason of their
association, and if the case of the Department stops short
at mere receipt of income, then the Department must fail in
bringing home the liability to tax of individuals as an
association of persons." It is submitted that the High Court
did not, in the statement quoted above, lay down the correct
test for determining what is an " association of persons "
for the purposes of the Income-tax Act.
Before we go on to discuss the argument presented on behalf
of the appellant, it is necessary to clear the ground by
stating what is the position of co-widows in Mitakshara
succession and what are the findings arrived at by the
Tribunal. The position of co-widows is well-settled. They
succeed as co-heirs to the estate of their deceased husband
and take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and
equal beneficial enjoyment ; they are entitled as between
themselves to an equal share of the income. Though they
take as joint tenants, no one of them has a right to enforce
an absolute partition of the estate against the others so as
to destroy their right of survivorship. But they are
entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the
property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the
income accruing therefrom. The Tribunal found that the
widows in this case did not exercise their right to separate
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possession and enjoyment and " they chose to manage the
property jointly, each acting for herself and the others and
receiving the income of the property which they were
entitled to enjoy in equal shares." Learned counsel for the
appellant has emphasised before us the aforesaid finding of
the Tribunal and has contended that on the finding of joint
management, the widows fulfilled even the test laid down by
the High Court and constituted an an "association of
persons" for taxing purposes. The High Court, however,
rightly pointed out that the only property which the widows
could have managed jointly was the immovable property which
fetched an income of about Rs. 11,000, and as to that
property, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had held that
s. 9 (3) applied. There was no appeal by the Department
against that finding and it was not 68
518
open to the Tribunal to go behind it. Even on merits the
Tribunal was wrong in thinking that the respective shares of
the widows were not definite and ascertainable. They had an
equal share in the income, viz., one-third each, and the
provisions of s. 9 (3) clearly applied in respect of the
immovable property.
With regard to the shares, dividends and interest on
deposits there was no finding of any act of joint
management. Indeed, the main item consists of the dividends
and it is difficult to understand what act of management the
widows performed in respect thereof which produced or helped
to produce income. On the contrary, the statement of the
case shows that the assessee filed lists of shares, copies
whereof are marked annexure C and form part of the case,
which showed that the shares stood separately in the name of
each one of the three widows and this was not denied by
the Department.
We now come to the main question in this appeal. What
constitutes an " association of persons " within the meaning
of the Income-tax Act ? It has been repeatedly pointed out
that the Act does not define what constitutes an association
of persons, which under s. 3 of the Act is an entity or unit
of assessment. Previous to the year 1924, the words of s. 3
were " individual, company, firm and Hindu undivided
family." By the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act of 1924 (Act
XI of 1924) the words " individual, Hindu undivided family,
company, firm and other association of individuals " were
substituted for the former words. By the Income-tax
Amendment Act of 1939 (Act VII of 1939) the section was
again amended and it then said:
" Where any Act of the Central Legislature enacts that
income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or
rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for
that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions
of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous
year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company
and local authority, and of every firm and other association
of persons or the partners of the firm or members of the
association individually."
519
By the same Amending Act (Act VII of 1939) sub-s. (3) of s.
9 was also added.
Now, s. 3 imposes a tax " in respect of the total
income...................... of every individual, Hindu un-
divided family, company and local authority, and of every
firm and other association of persons or the partners of the
firm or members of the association individually." In the
absence of any definition as to what constitutes an
association of persons, we must construe the words in their
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plain ordinary meaning and we must also bear in mind that
the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on the
total income of each one of the units of assessment
mentioned therein including an association of persons. The
meaning to be assigned to the words must take colour from
the context in which they occur. A number of decisions have
been cited at the bar bearing on the question, and our
attention has been drawn to the controversy as to whether
the words " association of individuals " which occurred
previously in the section should be read ejusdem generis
with the word immediately preceding, viz., firm or with all
the other groups of persons mentioned in the section. Into
that controversy it is unnecessary to enter in the present
case. Nor do we pause to consider the widely differing
characteristics of the three other associations mentioned in
the section, viz., Hindu undivided family, a company and a
firm, and whether in view of the amendments made in 1939 the
words in question can be read ejusdem generis with Hindu
undivided family or company.
It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In
re: B. N. Elias and Others (1); Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another("); and In re:
Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another(3); In In re:
B. N. Elias and Others (1) Derbyshire, C. J., rightly
pointed out that the word " associate " means, according to
the Oxford dictionary, " to join in common purpose, or to
join in an action." Therefore, an association of persons
must be OD e in which two or more persons join in a common
purpose or common action, and as the words occur in
(1) [1935] I.T.R. 408. (2) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 484.
(3) [1937] 5, I.T.R. 716.
520
a section which imposes a tax on income, the association
must be one the object of which is to produce income,
profits or gains. This was the view expressed by Beaumont,
C. J., in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas
Devidas and Another (1) at page 589 and also in Re:
Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another (2). In re: B.
N. Elias (3 ) Costello, J., put the test in more force full
language. He said "It may well be that the intention of the
legislature was to hit combinations of individuals who were
engaged together in some joint enterprise but did not in law
constitute partnership When we find that there is a
combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint
enterprise then I think no difficulty arises in the way of
saying that these persons did constitute an association
We think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the
crucial test for determining what is an association of
persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Income-tax Act,
and they have been accepted and followed in a number of
later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it
is unnecessary to call attention. It is, however, necessary
to add some words of caution here. There is no formula of
universal application as to what facts, how many of them and
of what nature, are necessary to come to a conclusion that
there is an association of persons within the meaning of s.
3; it must depend on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or
not.
Learned counsel for the appellant has suggested that having
regard to ss. 3 and 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, the real
test is the existence of a common source of income in which
two or more persons are interested as owner or otherwise and
it is immaterial whether their shares are specific and
definite or whether there is any scheme of management or
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not. He has submitted that if the persons so interested
come to an arrangement, express or tacit, by which they
divide the income at a point of time before it emanates from
the source, then the association ceases; otherwise it
continues to be an association.
(1) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 484. (2) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 716.
(3) [1935] 3 I.T,R. 408.
521
We have indicated above what is the crucial test in
determining an association of persons within the meaning of
s. 3, and we are of the view that the test suggested by
learned counsel for the appellant are neither conclusive nor
determinative of the question before us.
Coming back to the facts found by the Tribunal, there is no
finding that the three widows have combined in a joint
enterprise to produce income. The only finding is that they
have not exercised their right to separate enjoyment, and
except for receiving the dividends and interest jointly, it
has been found that they have done no act which has helped
to produce income in respect of the shares and deposits. On
these findings it cannot be held that the three widows had
the status of an association of persons within the meaning
of s. 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act.
The High Court correctly answered question No. 3 in the
negative. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee in the two
appeals.
Appeals dismissed.