Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 437
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7786 of 2026)
PAWAN KHERA Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM Respondent
O R D E R
1) Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior counsel,
appearing on behalf of the Appellant, and Mr. Tushar Mehta,
learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Respondent-
State, are ad idem that the matter may be heard on merits;
therefore, it would be appropriate to finally dispose of this appeal.
2) Leave granted.
3) Assailing order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the High Court
of Assam, Gauhati (hereinafter, ‘Gauhati High Court’ ) in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2026.05.01
11:06:02 IST
Reason:
Anticipatory Bail No. 804/2026, whereby the Gauhati High Court
refused to grant anticipatory bail, the present Appeal has been
1
filed.
4) The Appellant has been made an accused in connection with
FIR No. 04/2026 dated 06.04.2026 registered by the Crime Branch
Police Station, Guwahati under Sections 175, 3(5), 3(6), 318,
336(4), 337, 338, 340, 341(1), 351(1), 352, 353, 356, and 61(2) of
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNS’ ) .
5) In the FIR, it is alleged that the Appellant, who is an office
bearer of a national political party, addressed two press
conferences on 05.04.2026, one at All India Congress Committee
headquarters, New Delhi, and other at Hotel Lily, Gauhati. In the
press conferences, the Appellant displayed certain documents on
the stage with a large screen in the background, inter alia , stating
that the complainant is the wife of the present Chief Minister of
Assam and she holds three passports of (i) Egypt; (ii) United Arab
Emirates; (iii) Antigua and Barbuda. He further stated that the
documents shown on the screen exist as on date and have not
expired. Showing some other documents in similar manner, it was
also stated that the complainant has a company registered at
Wyoming, USA with an investment of more than Rs. 50,000/-
crores. She also owns and possesses certain assets and properties
in Dubai and these facts have not been disclosed in the election
2
affidavit filed by the husband of the complainant.
6) The complainant while lodging FIR denied the veracity of all
these documents and stated that they were fabricated using forged
seals and QR codes. On the basis of these averments appropriate
criminal action for the offences as indicated hereinabove has been
sought. The press conferences allegedly was held on 05.04.2026 at
about 6 p.m. in the evening and the FIR was registered at 12.49
a.m. in the intervening night of 05.04.2026 and 06.04.2026. After
giving such statements the Appellant travelled to Delhi and later to
Hyderabad.
7) On the next date, i.e., 07.04.2026, search and seizure
proceedings were undertaken by the State through the police
authorities at the residence of the Appellant in Delhi.
Simultaneously, an application was also filed before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M) seeking issuance of non-bailable
warrant of arrest against the Appellant which was rejected on the
same date, inter alia observing that the grounds urged were based
on presumptions and conjectures without being supported by any
material on record. It was also observed that the offences as alleged
were cognizable and non-bailable, therefore, the IO has the
authority to arrest the Appellant under Section 35 of the BNSS.
3
With these observations and in view of the guidelines laid down by
this Court, the application seeking issuance of the non-bailable
warrant was rejected.
8) In the interregnum , Appellant sought transit anticipatory bail
before the Telangana High Court which was granted vide order
dated 10.04.2026 in CRLP No. 5285 of 2026. Challenging the same,
the State filed Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 6818 of 2026
before this Court, wherein initially vide order dated 15.04.2026,
the operation of the order of the Telangana High Court was stayed.
Subsequently, the Appellant filed I.A. No. 116724 of 2026 seeking
vacation of the stay and the SLP (Crl.) as well as the I.A. were
disposed of vide order dated 17.04.2026 granting liberty to the
Appellant to file an application seeking anticipatory bail before the
competent Court in Assam. It was also observed that upon filing
such application it be decided uninfluenced by the observations
made by the Telangana High Court in the order dated 10.04.2026
or by this Court while staying the said order. On filing the
application seeking anticipatory bail before the Gauhati High
Court, it was rejected vide impugned order dated 24.04.2026,
giving rise to this Appeal.
9) Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior counsel
4
appearing for the Appellant submits that the press conferences
were attended by him wherein in the background of the stage, on
the screen, the alleged passports were exhibited by him with
certain other documents. However, merely attending such press
conferences and exhibition of the documents, as contended, would
not prima facie make out a case under Sections 337 and 338 of the
BNS. He further submits that the offences under Sections 175,
318, 336(4), 356, 340, 341(1), 351(1), 352 and 339 of BNS are
bailable. It is only offences under Sections 337, 338 and 353 of
BNS that are cognizable and non-bailable. So far as the offences
under Section 3(5), 3(6) and 61(2) of BNS are concerned, they have
to be read with the offences alongwith which these are invoked.
Therefore, most of the offences as attracted in the present case are
bailable. It is further urged that on the basis of the contents of the
FIR, prima facie , offences under Sections 337, 338 and 339 of BNS
cannot be made out. It is further contended that Section 353 of
BNS deals with the statements conducing to public mischief,
however, any statement made purely against an individual would
not fall within the purview of such provision. It is not a case in
which the Appellant has himself prepared false and fabricated
documents. It is a case where the Appellant while addressing the
5
press conferences exhibited some documents and from the
transcripts of the press conferences, it is quite clear that those
documents were received from someone else. Therefore, prima facie
offences are not made out. Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior counsel,
also contends that those statements can, at best, be said to have
been uttered for the purpose of gaining political edge having no
intention or mens rea for commission of offence as allegedly
projected. The Appellant is a resident of India and represents the
Indian National Congress Party. He is a resident of Delhi and
Hyderabad, so there cannot be any apprehension of flight risk or
fleeing away or to influence or tamper with any documentary
evidence which have already been exhibited and he is ready to co-
operate in the investigation.
10) In addition, for canvassing apprehension of arrest, he has
referred to various press notes and conferences held by the
husband of the complainant on 06.04.2026, 07.04.2026 (three
conferences), 08.04.2026, 09.04.2026, 11.04.2026 and
15.04.2026 which are available on digital and social media
platforms. From perusal of those statements, it is apparent that in
case the Appellant is not given protection, his personal liberty
would be in jeopardy. Learned Senior counsel placing reliance on
6
the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Shri Gurbaksh
1
Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab and a recent
judgment in Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and
2
Another submits that when an offence is based on documentary
evidence, insistence for custodial interrogation does not appear to
be necessary and as flight risk of the accused is not there, the
Court may grant the anticipatory bail.
11) Per Contra , learned Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta,
vehemently opposing the prayer, submits that, with respect to
allegations as raised in the FIR, investigation has already begun
and the documents which were exhibited by the Appellant in the
press conferences have been found to be forged. Therefore, prima
facie offences under Sections 337 and 338 of BNS are made out. It
is also urged that during the time when the press conferences were
being organized, legislative assembly elections were ensuing in the
State of Assam. Viewed in this context, giving such statements
would amount to public mischief and cannot be said to be confined
to a certain individual i.e., complainant. He further contends that
the FIR was registered on 06.04.2026 and since then the Appellant
1
(1980) 2 SCC 565
2
2025 SCC OnLine 457
7
is not traceable. In fact, he is occasionally giving press releases on
social media stating that he is not absconding, which is not enough
to establish his co-operation with the investigation. In case if the
appellant really intended to co-operate in the investigation, then
rather giving social media press notes, he would have appeared
before the police station as and when required and co-operated.
Therefore, he urges that this is not a case wherein the benefit of
anticipatory bail may be granted. In support of his contention,
compilation of some judgments has been supplied to us across the
Bar, however reliance has been mainly placed on judgment of this
3
Court in Maruti Nivrutti Navale v. State of Maharashtra to
contend that where the documents have been fabricated and where
custodial interrogation is necessary in such cases, the grant of
anticipatory bail is not justified. In addition, while referring to
Section 2(31) of the BNS, he further contends that passport falls
within the definition of valuable security; and if the act of the
Appellant is considered where he has exhibited forged passport of
the complainant in the press conference, it is a serious offence.
Therefore, in connection with the passport, it would be essential to
find out as to how and in what manner this passport has been
3
(2012) 9 SCC 235
8
received by him, which essentially has been found to be forged
during investigation. It is a matter of investigation and custodial
interrogation, to unearth all those who are involved in the forgery
of passport or from whom such passport could have been received
by the Appellant is necessary. Hence, for all these purposes, the
custodial interrogation in the matter may be essential. In view of
the said submission, it is urged that the order passed by the High
Court refusing to grant anticipatory bail does not warrant any
interference.
12) Having considered the submissions as advanced and after
perusal of the order under challenge, it is clear that the High Court
has mainly based its decision on the fact that the alleged
documents in question as exhibited by the Appellant have been
found forged by the police and it is not the case of Appellant that
the claim of the prosecution is fabricated or he has been falsely
implicated. Although the offence under Section 339 of the BNS is
not mentioned in the FIR, however, on the statement of the learned
Advocate General, impugned order records that the case of the
Appellant may fall under Section 339 of BNS. It was further
observed that the complainant is not in politics, but her husband
is in politics who is the Chief Minister of Assam. In case the
9
Appellant had made accusations against the husband of the
complainant who is the Chief Minister of the State, such an act
could have been said to be politically motivated. However, in the
present case, the Appellant has raised allegations with respect to
the complainant, which cannot be said to be politically driven.
13) It is further observed in the impugned order that the
Appellant has not proved beyond doubt that the complainant has
passports of three countries and she owns companies as alleged in
the press conference. In the said conspectus, the Court opined that
it is not merely a case of simpliciter defamation but prima facie an
offence under Section 339 of BNS, for which custodial interrogation
may be required.
14) Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties and the
findings as recorded by the Gauhati High Court, it is imperative to
refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case
of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), wherein this Court observed
as thus:
“ 31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed
accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering
the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object
being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him
arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail
in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the
other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents
10
of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of
anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order
would not be made. But the converse of these propositions
is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down
as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be
granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be
actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail
must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will
abscond. There are several other considerations, too
numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must
weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory
bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges,
the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the
charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence
not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension
that witnesses will be tampered with and “the larger
interests of the public or the State” are some of the
considerations which the court has to keep in mind while
deciding an application for anticipatory bail. The relevance
of these considerations was pointed out in State v. Captain
Jagjit Singh [AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 3 SCR 622 : (1962)
1 Cri LJ 216] , which, though, was a case under the old
Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439
of the Code. It is of paramount consideration to remember
that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the
survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the
individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free
man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing
to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of
conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in
consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be
enlarged on bail.”
15) From the above, it is clear that in case accusations as alleged
do not reflect any motive to secure ends of justice, but reflect an
ulterior motive and object to cause injury or to humiliate the
applicant, which is discernable, the direction to release in the event
of arrest has to be ordered usually. On the contrary, if the Court
11
finds that on the basis of the antecedents and with an intent to
take advantage of the order of the anticipatory bail, the accused
wishes to evade from the clutches of law, the said order would not
be made. Conversely, this Court observed that it cannot be laid
down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted
unless proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides.
Equally, the absence of any likelihood of the applicant absconding
does not, by itself, mandate the grant of anticipatory bail. The
Court emphasized that several other relevant considerations must
guide the exercise of judicial discretion while deciding whether to
grant or refuse anticipatory bail. The nature of the seriousness of
the proposed charges, context of the events, the possibility of
tampering and influencing witnesses and evidence, the larger
interest of the public or the State are some of the considerations
which the Court has to keep in mind while deciding such
application.
16) In the recent judgment in the case of Pradip N. Sharma
(supra), this Court in para 18 has observed as under:
“18. However, considering the nature of the allegations and
the fact that the matter is to be investigated primarily based
on documentary evidence, the Court is inclined to grant the
relief of anticipatory bail to the appellant. The offences
alleged pertain to the exercise of administrative discretion
12
in the passing of an order rather than direct physical
involvement in any overt criminal act requiring custodial
interrogation. The prosecution has not demonstrated any
necessity for the custodial interrogation of the appellant
beyond scrutiny of official records, which can be done
without placing him in detention. Additionally, the appellant
has expressed his willingness to cooperate with the
investigation, and no material has been placed before this
Court to suggest that he has evaded or obstructed the
investigation in any manner. Furthermore, it is well-
settled that anticipatory bail can be granted where
custodial interrogation is not essential, particularly
in cases where the allegations hinge on official
records and the presence of the accused can be
secured without pre-trial detention. The Court also
takes note of the fact that the FIR in question is part
of a series of similar allegations against the
appellant, and in the absence of any concrete
material indicating a likelihood of tampering with
evidence or influencing witnesses, the grant of
anticipatory bail is justified. Accordingly, while the
appellant shall cooperate with the investigation as
and when required, he shall not be taken into
custody, subject to conditions imposed hereinafter to
ensure his participation in the inquiry process.
(emphasis supplied)
17) Learned Solicitor General has placed reliance on the case of
Maruti Nivrutti Navale (supra), in particular para 16, 17 and 18.
For ready reference, it is also reproduced as under:
“16. As observed above, all the three counsel appearing for
the parties took us through MoUs, lease deed and other
correspondence/communications with the educational
authorities as well as the report of the Deputy Collector,
Pune, to the Senior Police Inspector, Bundgarden Police
Station, Pune. It is also relevant to point out that all these
materials were scrutinised/analysed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Pune and the High Court while considering
the application for anticipatory bail. It is true that the parties
13
have also approached the civil court for various reliefs. At
the same time, as pointed out by the counsel for the State
and the second respondent complainant, considering the
seriousness relating to corrections/additions/alterations
made in various documents, information furnished to the
educational authorities which, according to them, are
incorrect, we are of the view that in order to bring out all the
material information and documents, custodial interrogation
is required, more particularly, to ascertain in respect of the
documents which were alleged to have been forged and
fabricated. In the said documents and other materials
which are in the possession of the appellant and the
allegation against him that he has made false
representation before the public authority on the basis of
those documents for obtaining necessary permission, as
pointed out by the State, in order to secure possession of
those documents, custodial interrogation is necessary. For
this reason, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High
Court rejected the claim for anticipatory bail.
*
18. In the light of the above discussion and in view of the
mandate prescribed in Section 438 of the Code, we fully
agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Additional
Sessions Judge and the High Court in rejecting the relief of
anticipatory bail. Consequently, the appeal fails and the
same is dismissed.”
18) In the said case, the dispute was between Pawan Gandhi
Charity Trust and Sinhgad Technical Education Society. After an
interim 35-month lease expired in 2011, the Trust issued a notice
for the Society to vacate the premises. The Society refused,
prompting the Trust to file a criminal complaint alleging that the
appellant forged an 87-year lease deed, altered original notarized
documents, and submitted false information to the Education
Department to unlawfully retain control of the property. Given the
14
severity of these forgery allegations and the need to recover the
fabricated documents, the courts, including this Court, denied the
appellant's request for anticipatory bail, ruling that custodial
interrogation was absolutely necessary.
19) In the wake of the observations of the Constitution Bench in
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), in the matter of grant of
anticipatory bail and in the facts of the present case, it is required
to be examined whether the discretion of grant of anticipatory bail
ought to be exercised by this Court and whether the High Court
was justified in refusing to grant anticipatory bail.
20) In the facts of this case, it cannot be disputed that in the State
of Assam the assembly elections were in progress and the polling
of votes was scheduled for 09.04.2026. The incident as alleged in
the FIR occurred on 06.04.2026 which is prior to the conclusion of
the election campaign. The Appellant being the representative of a
national political party organized a press conference making some
allegations against the complainant, who is the wife of the Chief
Minister of the State. While doing so, three passports were
displayed by the Appellant alleging that the complainant is having
passports of three countries, out of which, two are of Muslim
countries, however, complainant’s husband’s politics is based on
15
hatred against the Muslim community in the State. In addition, it
was further stated by the Appellant that in the election affidavit
furnished by the husband of the complainant, the details of the
companies and properties owned by his wife has not been
disclosed.
21) It is the case of the prosecution that upon investigation it has
been found that the passports purported to be belonging to the
complainant are fake and has been displayed by the Appellant to
defame the wife of the Chief Minister, intentionally causing harm
to their reputation and for this purpose, the press conference was
organized. At the same time, it is true that the documents which
have been exhibited by the Appellant are in custody of prosecution
and they have made some preliminary investigation thereon.
However, it primarily appears that merely to gain some political
momentum in favour of his party, this statement has been made
by the Appellant. Albeit , we cannot lose sight of the fact that the
Chief Minister of the State, who is also husband of the
complainant, has made certain unparliamentary remarks against
the Appellant in various press statements which have been filed
before this Court vide annexure P/5.
22) To cite a few, complainant’s husband on 07.04.2026 stated:
16
“….This election will certainly proceed as planned, but I am
going to take further action-which I will reveal later-
to turn Pawan Khera into “Pawan Peda”, wait for a
few days. ”
He has further stated on 07.04.2026 that:
“He has fled now, hasn’t he? He ran away from Guwahati
as early as 6 AM yesterday morning. I just learned from our
contacts in Delhi-via newspaper reports-that when the
police went to Delhi, he had already fled all the way to
Hyderabad.”
On being put a question:
“Ques: You had used certain words regarding him”
He answered:
“Ans: Well, that is just election rhetoric.”
On the same date, he gave another statement:
“ Who is this Pawan Khera? Even if he hides in the
hell, I will drag him out. ”
He further stated on 08.04.2026 that:
“ No, well-first I’ll go after Khera and knock him out
(Khera ko pelunga); then, if other names comes up
during the investigation, I’ll make the others pay the
price (Baaki ko peda banaunga). ”
Then on 11.04.2026, it was stated:
“Regarding the police-the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is
currently in force. Had I been exercising the full
authority of the Chief Minister’s office-whereas today,
in a sense, I am under the jurisdiction of the ECI-and
had I been free to act without restrictions, I wouldn’t
17
have sent just the Assam Police; I would have
deployed the CRPF as well. But since I am not free to
act unilaterally today, only the regular police were
sent . As of today, I cannot exert any personal influence; the
MCC is in effect. Had the MCC not been in force, Pawan
Khera would never have been able to travel from Delhi to
Hyderabad; I would have had him deplaned and brought
back midway through his journey.
Reporter: He was actually saying, “I am sitting right here in
Guwahati; stop me if you can-I challenge you.”
*
CM – It is the police’s responsibility to conduct
investigations. However, if the BJP forms the government,
then Pawan Khera will spend the very last days of his life
in an Assam jail.”
Notably, the verbal exchange did not end there and on 15.04.2026
while giving interview to one of the prominent Hindi news channels,
following was stated:
“ Himanta Biswa Sarma : We didn’t communicate. We
didn’t update. But if I could do it, I would make Assam
police accountable that how did this person go from
Guwahati to Delhi? And how did he go from Delhi to
Hyderabad? How did he go?
*
Himanta Biswa Sarma : If on 4th May, if our government
comes, then on 5th May, Commissioner of Police will be in
my firing line.
*
Himanta Biswa Sarma : At 12 o’ clock, I submitted an FIR.
If you had to question prima facie, if you were convinced
that FIR is genuine, at 12 o’ clock, the case was registered.
At 6 o’ clock in the morning, Pawan Khera left Guwahati.
That means Assam police let him go.
*
18
Himanta Biswa Sarma : I can’t say anything. So I am more
angry with the Assam police than Pawan Khera that how
did this person go from Guwahati.
Interviewer : So if you come back as Chief Minister on 4th
May, on 5th May, Commissioner of Police will be released.
Himanta Biswa Sarma : Then Commissioner police has to
give me that explanation. When FIR was registered at 12
o’clock, at 6 o’clock in the morning, Pawan Khera left
Guwahati. He landed at 9 o’clock. Even if he had gone, you
should have caught him at Delhi airport. Then he went
home. In the evening, he left for Hyderabad. How did he get
such a gap?”
23) After perusal of the aforesaid statements, we are of the view
that the allegations and counter allegations have been made by the
Appellant as well as by the husband of the complainant. Learned
Solicitor General has not defended any of such statements during
the course of hearing, nor is the veracity of the same questioned.
24) At this stage, we are cognizant of the fact that personal liberty
of an individual enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India cannot be put to jeopardy lightly. But at the same time, we
are also of the view that for any offences as alleged in the FIR, the
investigation should be completed with integrity and in full swing
with co-operation of the Appellant.
25) Having regard to the aforesaid considerations, we are of the
opinion that while adjudicating an application for anticipatory bail,
a careful balance must be struck between the State’s interest in
19
ensuring a fair investigation and the individual’s fundamental right
to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in
light of the principles enunciated in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia
(supra). In this context, the criminal process must be applied with
objectivity and circumspection so as to ensure that individual
liberty is not imperiled by proceedings that may be coloured by
political rivalry. We are further of the opinion that the allegations
and counter-allegations, as apparent in the present case, prima
facie, appear to be politically motivated and seemingly influenced
by such rivalry, rather than disclosing a situation warranting
custodial interrogation, and the veracity of the allegations can be
tested at trial. The right to personal liberty is a cherished
fundamental right, and any deprivation thereof must be justified
on a higher threshold, particularly where the surrounding
circumstances may indicate the presence of political overtones.
26) Considering all these aspects as discussed above and in
conspectus of the present case, we are of the view that the tests as
enumerated for grant of anticipatory bail in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia (supra) finds favour with the Appellant.
27) In our view, the observations as made by the High Court in
the order impugned is not based on correct appreciation of all the
20
material which has been placed on record and appears to be
erroneous, in particular shifting the burden on the accused. In
addition, without alleging any offence under Section 339 of BNS
and merely on the basis of statement made by the learned Advocate
General, observations made regarding Section 339 of BNS do not
appear to be correct. Accordingly, the present appeal stands
allowed with following directions –
a) The Appellant is directed to be released on anticipatory bail
in the event of his arrest in Crime Branch P.S. Case No.
04/2026 and on such reasonable terms and conditions which
may be put by the Investigating Officer as deemed fit;
b) The Appellant is directed to co-operate in the investigation
and to appear before the police station as and when required
and intimated;
c) The Appellant shall not influence or tamper with any of the
evidence during pendency of the investigation or trial;
d) Further, he shall not leave India without prior leave of the
competent Court;
e) We further direct that if the trial Court deems it fit to impose
some other conditions, it has the discretion to do the needful
21
and put those conditions during trial.
28) We further make it clear that the reference of the documents
and the material made hereinabove is only for the purpose of
consideration of grant of anticipatory bail and it has nothing to do
with the merits of the criminal case. Therefore, the competent
Court shall not be influenced by those observations and shall
proceed in the matter in accordance with law.
29) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..……………………., J.
[J.K. MAHESHWARI]
..…………………………., J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
New Delhi;
April 30, 2026.
22