The State Of Telangana vs. Mir Jaffar Ali Khan (Dead) Thr. Lrs.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1465
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9996 OF 2025

THE STATE OF TELANGANA
REPRESENTED BY FOREST DIVISIONAL OFFICER … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MIR JAFFAR ALI KHAN (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS . … RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.
1. An extent of 102 Acres in Survey No. 201/1 Gurramguda Forest Block,
Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, State of Telangana, is the Subject
Matter of the Civil Appeal.
1.1 The Civil Appeal examines the legality of the order dated 15.10.2014 of
the Forest Settlement Officer (“FSO”) made under Sections 4 and 6, read with
1
Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act, 1967 (“Telangana Forest Act”). The
consideration of the issues would require examination of the scheme of the
2
Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358F (“the Abolition
Regulation”), Telangana Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 (“Atiyat Enquiry Act”),
Telangana Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (“Abolition of Inams Act”).
1.2 On 30.11.2005, Mir Jaffar Ali/Respondent no. 1 (“Claimant”) filed a
claim petition before the FSO claiming a succession right through Salar Jung-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2025.12.18
18:29:10 IST
Reason:

1
Previously, A.P. Act No. 1 of 1967.
2
Corresponding to ~1949 AD.
1



III to the Subject Matter of the Civil Appeal. The FSO, at the first instance,
vide order dated 03.09.2010, rejected the claim for exclusion from the
proposed notification as a reserved forest, and held that the Subject Matter is
Government land. The Claimants filed an appeal before the Appellate
th
Authority, IX Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District. The Appellate
Authority, by order dated 14.03.2012, set aside the order dated 03.09.2010
of the FSO and remanded the matter to the FSO for fresh enquiry.

1.3 On remand, the FSO, by order dated 15.10.2014, accepted the claim of
the Claimants for Subject Matter as Arazi-Makta of Salar Jung-III and
requested the Divisional Forest Officer to exclude the subject matter of appeal
from the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Telangana Forest
Act from Gurramguda Forest Block and send a revised map for Turkayamjal
and Gurramguda villages for final proposals under Section 15 of the
Telangana Forest Act to the Government. The Forest Department, aggrieved
by the exclusion of subject matter from the reserve forest notification, filed
CMA No. 5 of 2015 before the Appellate Authority, the Principal District
Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at L B Nagar (“Principal District Judge”). On
23.09.2016, CMA No. 5 of 2015 was dismissed. The State, represented by the
Forest Department, filed CRP No. 417 of 2017 in the High Court of the State
of Telangana, and, by the order impugned, the release of the subject matter
from the reserve forest notification was upheld. Hence, the appeal at the
instance of the State represented by the Forest Department.
2



I. T HE L EGAL J OURNEY
2. The above brief narrative leads us to the cause for the commencement
of the present litigation, wherein the Claimants claim to be the successors-in-
interest of Salar Jung-III of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad. Stated further,
on 13.09.1948, the Indian Army commenced Operation Polo, resulting in the
surrender of the Sovereign of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The State of Hyderabad
became part of the Union of India. In 1949, the Abolition Regulation was
promulgated, resulting in the abolition of all the Jagirs in the erstwhile Nizam
State. Government Order 9 dated 27.10.1949 was issued to reorganise the
survey and settlement department, resulting in the revision surveys of land
in the erstwhile State of Nizam. On 14.03.1952, the Atiyat Enquiry Act was
promulgated and published. On 20.07.1955, the Abolition of Inams Act was
promulgated and notified in the Official Gazette. These enactments, with a
few legislative amendments over the years, have been in operation in the
administration and regularisation of land tenures, grant of pattas, etc., in the
3
State of Telangana. In Claim Petition No. 1 of 2005 in File No. 786 of 2005,
filed for exclusion of subject matter from the reserved forest, the Claimants
presented their case as follows:
a. That Late Saheb Begum Saheba, wife of Ali Zaman Khan Muneer-
ul-Mulk, purchased the Arazi-Makta of Sahab Nagar through a
registered sale deed bearing D.C. No. 1243, dated 05.03.1248H.
The property devolved from Saheb Begum Saheba to her
son Alam Ali Khan (Sirajul Mulk), then to her grandson Turab Ali

3
See , State of AP (now State of Telangana) v. AP State Waqf Board and Others (2022 2 SCC
383) for a comprehensive assimilation of the march of legislation in the State of Telangana.
3



Khan (Salar Jung I), then to Laiq Ali Khan (Salar Jung II), and
finally to Yousuf Ali Khan (Salar Jung III). Salar Jung III was a
one-month-old minor when his father died. The estate was taken
over by the Nizam’s Government, through the Court of Wards,
and was returned to Salar Jung III upon his attaining majority,
via a Farman in 1330F.
b. Claimant Nos. 2 and 3 before the FSO were the surviving sons
of Late Abdullah, the maternal uncle of Salar Jung III. Claimant
1 (Mir Jaffer Ali Khan) was the surviving nominee appointed by
the Court in Application No. 84/71 in C.S. No. 13 of 1958 dated
20.08.1971 to deal with cases relating to the properties of Late
Salar Jung III. The claimants relied on the judgment in C.S. No.
13 of 1958, dated 05.03.1959, of the High Court, which is said to
have allotted shares among successors-in-interest of Salar Jung-
III. Further, the judgment in O.S. No. 156 of 1980 dated
12.10.2004, of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, declares the
Claimants to be the successors of Salar Jung-III.
c. The Nazim Atiyat/Revenue Department declared that Late
Yousuf Ali Khan (Salar Jung-III) was in possession and enjoyment
of Maktas comprised of Jagirs, Seri and Inam lands. This was
published in the Hyderabad Government Gazette No. 1 dated
29.03.1956. According to this notification, Saheb Nagar village is
explicitly mentioned under the item “self-acquired purchased
lands” at Serial No. D. The name of Salar Jung-III was mutated
4



in the Revenue Records as Pattedar/Owner of the land in Survey
No. 201 of Saheb Nagar village.
d. The Claimants relied on a letter of the Jagir Administrator (No.
808/CH, dated 24.04.1954) addressed to District Collectors of
Hyderabad, Mahaboobnagar, and Nalgonda, which stated that
the Jagir Administrator had released Arazi-Makta through an
order dated 09.02.1954 to the estate of Salar Jung III. The list
annexed to the letter included the Arazi-Maktas of Saheb Nagar
village.
3. The Forest Department, represented by the Divisional Forest Officer,
resisted the Claim Petition No. 1 of 2005 filed for exclusion from the reserved
forest, and the gist is noted as follows:
a. The Board of Revenue, through a letter dated 23.07.1953, had
already transferred 570 acres out of the total 770.27 acres in Sy.
No. 201 of Saheb Nagar Kalan village to the Forest Department
for the establishment of a soil conservation research centre. Out
of the transferred extent, 102 acres in Sy. No. 201/1 was included
in the “Gurramguda Forest Block.”
b. This land was officially notified under Section 4 of the Telangana
Forest Act, via G.O.Ms. No. 772 dated 18.06.1971, and published
in the Gazette. A proclamation under Section 6 of the Telangana
Forest Act was subsequently issued on 05.01.1972.
c. The Claimants filed their petition after a 53-year lapse. Due to
this significant delay, the Claimants have no right to the land.
5



The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, had already
approved proposals under Section 15 of the Telangana Forest Act
vide a letter dated 02.03.2008, thereby negating the rights of the
Claimants.
d. While the letter No. 808/CH dated 24.04.1954 released certain
lands to the Salar Jung Estate, it did not specify survey numbers.
This lack of specificity made it difficult to identify the land on the
ground. Furthermore, the claim over Sy. No. 201/1 was illegal
and baseless because that specific land had already been
transferred to the Forest Department in 1953.
e. As per the High Court judgment in CCCA No. 84/1982, Jagirs
were inalienable and non-heritable, restricted only to usufruct for
life. Therefore, the land in question is “neither patta nor inam,
and it is a Government land”. Hence, the application of the Inams
Abolition Act by any authority does not arise.
f. A joint inspection conducted by the Mandal Revenue Inspector
and Surveyor revealed that the 102 acres in Sy. No. 201/1 was
physically vacant (covered with eucalyptus and bushy trees) and
was under the absolute occupation of the Forest Department.

g. There was no clarity in the judgment of O.S. No. 156/1980
regarding the declaration of Mir Jaffar Ali Khan as the legal
successor of Salar Jung-III.
4. While considering the same set of circumstances and documents, the
FSO reached contradictory conclusions. To appreciate the consideration by
6



the FSO in the order dated 15.10.2014, we find it apposite to present the
comparative table of the orders dated 03.09.2010 and 15.10.2014.

7

5. On appeal, in CMA No. 5 of 2015, the learned Principal District Judge
framed five points for consideration, and the summary of the findings is as
follows:

8

6. The High Court, through the impugned judgment in CRP No. 417 of
2017, exercising the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, refused to examine the record, which goes to the root of
the claim of right and title to the subject matter through succession to the
estate of Salar Jung III. At the same time, the High Court expanded the
consideration of a few facts in issue and recorded findings. The above
approach would warrant independent scrutiny by this Court. The summary
of the High Court’s findings is as follows:
a. High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is
supervisory and limited to correcting patent errors, perversity, or
grave injustice. The FSO and the Principal District Judge had
recorded concurrent findings of fact based on evidence. Unless
there is an error apparent on the face of the record, the High
Court cannot interfere with such concurrent findings.

b. It concurred with the findings of the authorities below that the
land in Sy. No. 201/1 of Saheb Nagar Kalan village is the private,
self-acquired property (“Arazi-Makta”) of the late Salar Jung-III
and not Government land.
9



c. The title was established through a Persian sale deed
dated 05.03.1243F (approximately 1833 AD), purchased by the
great-grandmother (Begum Saheba) of Salar Jung III. This proved
the land was self-acquired private property.
d. The letter No. 808/CH dated 24.04.1954 from the Jagir
Administrator, declared Saheb Nagar Kalan as “Arazi-Makta”
(purchased/private land) and ordered its release from integration
in favour of the Salar Jung Estate, confirming it did not fall under
the Abolition Regulation.
e. The Hyderabad Government Gazette dated 29.03.1956, listed
Saheb Nagar Kalan under “List D” as “purchased land” rather
than Inam land.
f. Nazim Atiyat Order (File No. 2/56) dated 26.06.1968 held that
Arazi-Makta villages (including the subject village) were released
in 1954 as they did not fall under the Abolition Regulation.
g. Revenue records (pahanies) from 1974-75 to 1982-83 recorded
the land as “Salar Jung Sarkari” in the pattadar column,
supporting the private title. The Government failed to produce
any revenue records or documents to substantiate that the land
in Sy. No. 201/1 was Government land.
h. Since the land was determined to be private patta/purchased
land, the definition of Arazi-Makta under Section 2(c) of the
Abolition of Inams Act does not apply. Consequently, the
10



claimants were not required to seek remedies before the Inams
Abolition Court.
i. High Court judgment in CCCA No. 84 of 1982, to claim the land
was Government property, was not binding on Claimants
because they were not parties to that appeal or O.S. No. 906 of
1977.
4
j. A previous judgment by a Special Court held that similar lands
in Lingojiguda (part of the same Salar Jung estate release) were
private lands, not Government property.
k. While a notification under Section 4 was issued in 1971, the final
notification under Section 15 of the Telangana Forest Act had not
yet been issued. Therefore, the Claimants’ rights were not
extinguished.
l. The FSO was authorised under Section 16 of the Telangana
Forest Act to condone the delay in filing claims if sufficient cause
is shown. Hence, the FSO had validly condoned the delay and
admitted the claim filed in 2005.
m. The prior approval of the Central Government (under the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980) is required only for using forest land for
non-forest purposes. Since this case involved the exclusion of
private patta land that had been wrongly included in the forest
block, such permission was not required.

4
LGA No. 31 of 1997.
11



II. A RGUMENTS
7. We have heard Learned ASG Aishwarya Bhati, Learned Senior Counsel
C.S. Vaidhyanathan and Challa Kodandaram for the Appellant. Learned
Senior Counsel Basava Prabhu Patil for the Claimants, and Vipin Sanghi and
A Sirrajuddin for the impleaded Respondents in the Civil Appeal.
8. The learned counsel have argued the matter in great detail and have
objectively assisted the Court without repetition on the core issues. Therefore,
it is convenient to set out the arguments as follows.
A. Arguments from the Appellant’s side
9. After the abolition of Jagirs under the Abolition Regulation, the land
vested solely with the State. Consequently, Jagirdars were entitled to a
commutation amount in lieu of cash payments. The subject land comprises
102 acres in Survey No. 201/1, Saheb Nagar, Hyderabad, which formed part
of the Saheb Nagar Kalan village. The allotment by the Board of Revenue and
the de-reservation by the State demonstrate that the right, title, and interest
in Saheb Nagar Kalan vest with the government.
10. The revenue term, Arazi-Makta, is by no means a self-acquired land. In
5
Mohd. Shaukat Hussain Khan v. State of AP , this Court construed Arazi-
Makta as a minor Inam. Furthermore, the definitions in Section 2 of the
Abolition of Inams Act include Arazi-Makta within the definition of ‘Inam’.
Even the glossary denotes that Arazi-Makta is not self-acquired land. The
claimants filed the claim 33 years after the State Government released the
Section 6 notification, and the FSO has entertained such claims despite a

5
(1974) SCC 2 376.
12



statutory embargo under Section 6 of the Telangana Forest Act, which, in
effect, prescribes a period of 6 months to 1 year from the date of such
publication.
11. The impugned judgment failed to note that, post the enactment of the
Forest Conservation Act, 1980, the FSO cannot exclude or eliminate any land
forming part of a forest block without prior approval of the Central
Government. The FSO lacks jurisdiction to decide the claim, and it also does
not explain how it issued differing orders despite the same set of facts. Once
steps are initiated for reserving a forest, the State government’s actions
should not have been interfered with by the orders impugned.
12. The Claimants have produced forged documents in a calculated attempt
to manufacture a fictitious historical lineage, and thereby assert illegal claims
over the subject land. The Jagirs, on abolition, stood vested in the
Government from 15.08.1949. 570 acres in Survey No. 201 of Saheb Nagar
Kalan village, including the disputed land, were transferred to the Forest
Department by order dated 23.07.1953. Undisputedly, they have been in the
possession of the Forest Department ever since. Anyone seeking to assert title
or ownership over the suit property should have resorted to appropriate
proceedings within a period of 12 years from 15.08.1949 or, at any rate, from
23.07.1953. Reliance is placed on Sections 3 read with 2(j) and Article 65 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
13. Sections 4, 5 and 10 of the Telangana Forest Act cannot be construed
as empowering the FSO to adjudicate on ownership and title to any land
proposed to be constituted as a Reserve Forest. Assuming the FSO had
13



jurisdiction to entertain the present claim, it does not have the discretion to
condone the delay of 33 years. Moreover, the authenticity of the document of
sale has not been proved and cannot be considered in the summary
proceedings by the FSO.
14. The counsel also laid emphasis on the Atiyat Courts’ inability to pass
determinative orders with respect to the subject matter’s title. The Inams
Abolition Act includes Arazi-Makta within the definition of ‘Inam’; therefore,
an Arazi-Makta is not private land. The arguments also delved into Sections
9 and 10 of the Telangana Forest Act, wherein the counsel noted that the
power of the FSO is to admit claims wholly or in part, and to follow the
required procedure for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
B. Arguments from the Respondent’s side
15. The State’s appeal is unsustainable because it seeks to disturb the
concurrent factual findings of the FSO, the Principal District Judge, and the
High Court. He further emphasises that the final notification under Section
15 of the Telangana Forest Act has not been issued, and the bar under Section
5 continued to operate. As a result, the FSO had exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate the dispute. They contend that the State cannot rely on earlier Civil
Court and High Court decisions to defeat their claim.

16. On the title, the Respondents trace the ownership to a purchase in
1249H by Saheb Begum Saheba, the great-grandmother of Salar Jung-III of
Makta lands, which later formed Saheb Nagar Kalan. They also show that
these lands have consistently appeared in revenue records as Arazi-Makta
belonging to the Salar Jung Estate, with separate village records and
continuous reflection of private ownership at least until the mid-80s. They
14



point to the takeover of the estate by the Nizam’s Court of Wards after the
death of Salar Jung II, the restoration of estate to Salar Jung III by a Farman
in 1912, subsequent estate and Jagir legislation, and Jagir Administrator’s
order dated 24.04.1954 and the 1956 Gazette notification which released 12
Arazi-Makta villages from integration and clarified that these were not Inam
lands.
17. The counsel would submit that the claim petition filed under Section 6
of the Telangana Forest Act was within time, as the notification under Section
15 had not yet been issued.
18. We have taken note of the arguments for and against the impugned
orders, and have perused the documents in support of the Claimants’
contention that the subject matter should not be declared a reserved forest.
Before we consider the documents on merits and jurisdictional errors, if any,
before the Principal District Judge and the High Court, the binding precedents
on Jagir Administration, Atiyat Enquiry Act, and Abolition of Inams are
prefaced.
18.1 The Division bench in the High Court of Hyderabad at Andhra Pradesh
in Writ Appeal No. 887 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 26.10.2007,
has elucidated the powers and scope of the Nazim Atiyat Court. It was thereby
concluded that under the Atiyat Enquiry Act, the Atiyat Court was limited to
making enquiries into rights, title, or interest in Atiyat grants and related
succession claims. Further, it found that in the case of erstwhile Jagir lands,
the Atiyat Courts only had jurisdiction to issue cash grants (such as
commutation sums) and had no jurisdiction to confer property rights over the
15



immovable Jagir lands. However, the decisions in Writ Petition No. 14439 of
2006 and Writ Appeal No. 887 of 2006 were set aside by this Court in Special
Leave Petition (Civil) No(s). 23392 of 2007 on 13.12.2007 and allowed K.S.B.
Ali (petitioner in the said SLP) to avail an appropriate remedy. The extract of
this Court’s Order is hereunder:
“1. Heard petitioner's counsel and learned counsel/ASG for
contesting respondents HUDA, State of A.P. and other
contesting respondents.
2. The petitioner herein has sought permission to withdraw the
W.P. No. 14439/2006 filed before the High Court of A.P. from
which Writ Appeal No. 887/2006 has arisen. The contesting
respondents have no objection for withdrawal of the writ
petition filed by the petitioner with liberty to take appropriate
remedy. Permission sought is granted. The impugned
judgment as well as the judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge are set aside. The Writ Petition No. 14439/2006
is dismissed as withdrawn. The issues raised are left open.
3. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.”
18.2 The Journey did not stop there because K.S.B Ali filed another Writ
Petition in the High Court. The decision in the Writ Petition was the subject
6
matter of Writ Appeal No. 1159 of 2009, decided on 18.07.2012. The Court,
in passing the said judgment, relied on the findings in Writ Appeal No. 887 of
7
2006. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“30. At this stage of the analysis, the points framed for
determination and the conclusions recorded by the Division

6
(2012) SCC OnLine AP 858.
7
(2008) 1 ALD 548 (DB).
16



Bench of this Court (judgment dated 26.10.2007) in W.A No.
887 of 2006 [reported in 2008 (1) ALD 548 (DB)] may be noticed
(notwithstanding the plenary eclipse of that judgment, in view
of the order of the Supreme Court dated 13.12.2007 in SLP
(Civil) No. 23397 [23392] of 2007).
The issues framed (in WA No. 887 of 2006):
(1) What were the powers and jurisdiction of the Nazim Atiyat
under the provisions of the 1952 Act?
(2) What is the scope and purport of the order dated 15.2.1954
of the Nazim Atiyat Court?
(3) What is the true purport of the order dated 24.12.1954 of
the Honourable Revenue Minister and whether the said order
falls within the scope of the 1960 Act and gets validated under
the provisions of the said Act even if the Honourable Revenue
Minister had no jurisdiction to pass the said order?
(4) Whether Muntakhab No. 57 of 1955 dated 12.5.1955 is in
conformity with the order dated 15.2.1954 of the Nazim Atiyat
Court, and if not, whether the same is enforceable in law?
(5) What is the scope of the order dated 1.4.1963 in Writ
Petition No. 227 of 1960 of this Court and whether this order
operates as constructive res judicata against the appellant?
(6) Whether the Royal Firman has a bearing on the relief
claimed by the appellant in the present proceedings?
(7) What is the effect of the judgment dated 13.6.1976 in OS
No. 512 of 1973 on the file of the IV-Additional Judge, City
Civil Court, Hyderabad?
The conclusions recorded (in WA No. 887 of 2006):
(a) On Issue No. 1 — that the Atiyat Courts (under me 1952
Act) whether pre-amendment or post the 1956 amendment
thereto had no power to make a grant regarding Jagir lands;
17



had power to make only cash grants except in case of Inam
lands, by whatever name the cash grants are called; and in
any event in case of erstwhile Jagir lands, Atiyat Courts could
only make cash grants and had no jurisdiction to confer
property rights … ”
(Emphasis supplied)
18.3 The decision dated 18.07.2012 rendered by the Division Bench of the
8
High Court, was affirmed by this Court in K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P . This Court
reiterates the conclusions of the Division Bench in the earlier round. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“33. After answering the questions in the manner stated
above, the High Court has summarised' the position as under:
(Malik Sultana case SCC On Line AP paras 98-99) "Summary
of our Conclusions: (a) Neither the State nor any officer of the
State, including the Principal Secretary or the Special Chief
Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department is conferred
judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction, power or authority, either
as Court, a Tribunal or a persona designate, to adjudicate
disputed questions of title to immovable property, even where
one of the competing claimants to such title is the State…”
18.4 The principles laid down in KSB Ali’s case (supra) are referred to for
appreciating the consistent view of the precedents on the jurisdiction of the
Atiyat court.
18.5 One of the issues in State of Andhra Pradesh (Now State of Telangana)
9
v. Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board and others , is whether the Atiyat Court’s

8
(2018) 11 SCC 277.
9
(2022) 20 SCC 383.
18



order is relevant to determine the nature of the grant. The dispute traces back
to the erstwhile Hyderabad State’s system of Jagirs and Inams and the
subsequent commutation framework introduced by pre-Constitution
regulations. The judgment notes that after Jagir grants were abolished under
the Abolition Regulation, the Atiyat Courts’ jurisdiction was held to survive
mainly for succession-type determinations, i.e., adjudicating entitlement
among Claimants to receive commutation sums treated as “Atiyat grants”
under the scheme of the Atiyat Enquiry Act. This Court explicitly stated that,
in this post-abolition setting, the Atiyat Court had no jurisdiction to decide
the nature and extent of wakf property, and hence its findings on whether
land was wakf could not be used as a lawful basis to conclude title/character
of the land. It was held that on the date of that order, the Nazim Atiyat’s
jurisdiction was essentially confined to distribution/succession of
commutation. Therefore, any finding in that order determining title to an
immovable property or the land being in the nature of Mashrut-ul-
Khidmat/Madad-e-Maash etc. was beyond its jurisdictional scope. The
relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are excerpted hereunder:
“ 179. Atiyat grants have been defined to mean in the case of
jagirs abolished under the Abolition Regulation, the
commutation sums payable under the Commutation
Regulation. The Atiyat grant exclude inams under the Inams
Abolition Act but contemplates the payment of compensation
within the ambit of Atiyat grants. The inquiry is to be held by
Atiyat Courts in accordance with the provisions of the Act
including inquiries into claims to succession arising in respect
of such grants. An appeal lies to the Board of Revenue against
the order of the Nazim Atiyat in terms of Section 11 of the Act.
19



The decision of the Civil Court is to prevail on questions of
succession, legitimacy etc. in terms of Section 12 of the Act.
Section 13 gives finality to the decision of the Atiyat Court.”
xxx
182 . It is to be noted that the Enquiries Act is applicable in
respect of Atiyat grants alone. Atiyat grants after the
commencement of Jagir Abolition Regulation mean only the
commutation sum payable under the Commutation Regulation
or the compensation payable under the Inams Abolition Act or
cash grants etc.
xxx
183 . … Therefore, after the Atiyat grants stood abolished in
terms of Abolition Regulation, the Atiyat Courts would have
jurisdiction to decide issues relating to succession of the
commutation amount payable to the heirs.”

18.6 The findings in paragraphs 146, 179, 180, 182 and 183 in AP Wakf
Board (Supra) can be summarised and stated as a ratio of the judgment as
follows. The Government Pleader’s presence before the Nazim Atiyat was only
to facilitate implementation or payment of grants, and the State was not a
party. Hence, the State was not estopped or bound on merits merely due to
that appearance (Emphasis supplied). Under the Atiyat Enquiry Act’s scheme,
“Atiyat grants” (in jagirs abolished under the Abolition Regulation) effectively
refer to commutation sums payable under the Commutation Regulation.
Further, the Atiyat Court’s enquiry is aimed at entitlement or succession to
such grants, with civil court primacy on succession/legitimacy issues.
20



10
18.7 In Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, to which one of us (Justice
Pankaj Mithal) was a party to the bench, is also relevant to the present
discussion. This case involves a dispute originating from a 1958 partition suit
(C.S. No. 14 of 1958) regarding the Paigah estates in Hyderabad. One of the
issues addressed by this Court was whether a preliminary decree in a
partition suit could be used by assignees of the decree to dispossess third
parties (claimants therein) who asserted independent title to the land (Sy No.
172 of Hydernagar). It was held that a partition suit determines rights inter-
se between family members. Hence, the finding in the preliminary decree
dated 28.06.1963 that the land was “Mathruka” was only incidental to
adjudicate claims of legal heirs and is not determinative of title against third
parties like claim petitioners or the State (paragraph 120 of the said judgment) .
Further, the Schedule in the partition suit did not even mention survey
numbers or boundaries for Hydernagar, yet the receiver and assignees
arbitrarily identified specific lands (Survey No. 172) to execute the decree.
18.8 Another issue the said judgment dealt with was whether the State has
a legitimate claim after a series of setbacks in prior decisions. This Court held
that though the High Court decided that pattas were granted prior to 1948
and that land did not vest in the State, the State of Telangana was not a party
before the Division Bench. Therefore, such findings are not binding on the
State. Further, non-filing of the appeal did not prejudice the State’s claims or
amount to acquiescence. Hence, the declaration in para 414(d) of the
impugned order in the said judgment must be understood only qua the

10
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 738.
21



appellants and claimants therein and cannot operate against the State
(paragraphs 172-174 of the said judgment) .
18.9 The Subject Matter consists of large tracts of land. No individual officer,
who is not a juristic person of the Government under the scheme of the
Constitution nor under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) can file a
suit or initiate any proceeding in the name and the post he is holding. The
11
State is a juridical person, and this Court in Conservator of Forest v. Collector
12
and Collector v. Bagathi Krishna Rao laid down the need for the State being
represented by the Secretary to the Government or the District Collector. In
these decisions, this Court had drawn an analogy from Sections 79 (which
directs that the State shall be the authority to be named as the plaintiff or the
defendant in a suit by or against the Government), 80 (directs notice to the
Secretary of that State or the Collector of the district before the institution of
the suit) and Rule 1 of Order XXVII of the CPC (lays down as to who should
sign the pleadings), to conclude that the procedural designation creates a
presumption that the Collector is the complete representative of the State’s
interests in the District, being the custodian of the record of rights and
revenue records.
13
18.10 In R. Hanumaiah v. State of Karnataka , this Court held that suits for
declaration of title against the Government require a significantly higher
standard of proof specifically establishing possession for over 30 years
because all unoccupied land is presumed to belong to the State. This higher
threshold is required to protect public assets. Since government properties

11
(2003) 3 SCC 472.
12
(2010) 6 SCC 427.
13
(2010) 5 SCC 203.
22



are vast and difficult to monitor, they are uniquely vulnerable to
encroachment, which is often facilitated by the negligence or collusion of the
very officers entrusted to protect them. Recognising that any loss of
government land is ultimately a loss to the community, it was held that the
courts must be vigilant to ensure public property is not converted into private
hands by unscrupulous elements. It was further emphasised that a plaintiff
cannot succeed merely due to a weakness of the Government’s defence or
absence of contest but it must independently prove its own title.
14
18.11 In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab , this Court has held that a suit
seeking relief against the State, or the Union of India is not maintainable
unless the Government is formally impleaded as a party. Relying on Section
79 read with Order I of the CPC and Article 300 of the Constitution of India,
this Court held that the State is a necessary party in such disputes. Merely
suing subordinate officers or independent agencies is a fatal defect; if the
State is not formally joined, the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of a
necessary party, and any decree passed is unenforceable against the
Government.
19. The prior judgments and orders vis-à-vis the Subject Matter of the
present Civil Appeal are discussed below.

19.1 In CCCA No. 84 of 1982 dated 16.08.1985, the Bench, speaking
through Justice Seetharam Reddy, dealt with the subject matter. The suit
schedule in that case consisted of new Sy Nos. 152/1, 152/2 (old survey
number 106) in Kutubullahapur Village, and new Sy Nos. 200, 201, 70/1 to
70/3 (old survey numbers 166, 166/1, 20/1 to 20/3) in Saheb Nagar Kalan

14
(2014) 15 SCC 715.
23



Village. Points 1, 3 and 4 determined in CCC Appeal No. 84 of 1982 are
relevant and reproduced below:
“(1) What is the nature of right, which the Jagirdar had in the
Jagir granted to him by the Nizam? Whether he had only a
right of usufruct, or whether he had a right to assign any patta
in favour of others?
xxx
(3) Whether the claim of the respondent is barred by limitation?
(4) Whether the Government has perfected the title in respect
of the suit land by adverse possession? ...”
19.2 The High Court opined that there was no authority placed before it to
depict the powers vested in Jagirdar to issue pattas in favour of the plaintiff.
Ultimately, the High Court held that the very scope of the grant in favour of
the Jagirdar was limited and restricted to the expansion in favour of a third
party. The High Court examined the Farman and held that it was not a direct
conveyance of title to the property but an administrative order directing the
Revenue Department to grant a patta . It required execution by subordinate
authorities, and there was no implementation of this order. No survey was
conducted, no subdivision was made to separate the 570 acres from the larger
Sy No. 201, and no boundaries were fixed. The High Court noted that the title
cannot pass by mere mental disposition. Since the specific administrative
steps (like issuing a patta certificate) were never completed, the plaintiff never
acquired a valid title to the land. It notes that it is incomprehensible as to how
the Jagirdar, whose grant was limited for life, had assigned suit lands in
favour of the respondent. It also notes that the Government had expressed its
24



intention to make over the Subject Matter to the Forest Department, which
was not in dispute.
19.3 Thus, the High Court held that the defendant-appellant (the State
represented by the Secretaries to the Forest Department and Revenue
Department) had perfected their title.
19.4 The Judgment passed in CCCA No. 84 of 1982 was challenged before
this Court in Civil Appeal No. 3354 of 1988. This Court observed that the High
Court had examined the history, origin, and method of jagir grants in the
State of Hyderabad. After perusing a plethora of documents, the High Court
concluded that the powers of the Jagirdar were merely usufructuary in
nature, and he lacked the authority to grant patta to third parties. This Court
further noted that the High Court had correctly re-appreciated the evidence
to establish that the respondent-State was in possession of the land, thereby
fortifying its title by adverse possession. Consequently, the claim set up
against the Government by an alleged assignee of Salar Jung III in O.S. No.
906 of 1977 has attained finality.
19.5 The second claim for the present subject matter was considered by the
Division Bench of the High Court in OSA No. 47 of 2013. The Division bench
considered Survey No. 201 of Saheb Nagar Kalan village; thus, the subject
matter of the Original Side Appeal is the subject matter of the present dispute.
The Court held that the appellant (Defendant No. 111) and Respondents 18
and 19 (Defendants 4 and 5) were necessary parties to Application No. 1054
of 2010, which sought to record a compromise and pass a final decree in the
partition suit (C.S. No. 13 of 1958). It was further reiterated that unless a final
decree is passed, no party can claim absolute right over the property. The
25



Court found that the applicants did not derive any valid rights to the land in
question based on the sale deeds executed by Defendant No. 2. The Court
referred to the order dated 22.03.1962, which directed the division of the right
to collect Nuzul (rent) from Nuzuldars, not the division of the Nuzul lands
themselves (Sy. No. 201). Therefore, the Court held that it was not proper to
pass a final decree in view of a compromise between the parties. Lastly, the
High Court found that for effective adjudication of the dispute, it is necessary
to implead the State of Andhra Pradesh, through its Secretary, Revenue
Department and through its Secretary, Environment and Forests Department
as party-defendants.
19.6 It is apposite to note that the judgment was delivered by the Division
Bench in OSA No. 47 of 2013 on 29.04.2014, and the FSO passed a
contradictory order with respect to the same Subject Matter on 15.10.2014.
20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court could go into the question of facts or
look into the evidence if justice so requires it if there is any misdirection in
15
law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. The
High Court also should not interfere with a finding rendered within the
jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings are a perverse
misreading of documents and not based on any material evidence, or it results
in manifest injustice. The High Court, in the supervisory jurisdiction of
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, distinguishes between
overseeing the functioning of courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction and
the overreaching of its jurisdiction. Through the “jurisdiction” defined in the

15
1977 (2) SCC 437.
26



Articles, the High Court refrains from overreaching into the discretion
conferred on the courts and tribunals subordinate to it. However, the High
Court, as part of its jurisdictional obligation, is expected to intervene when
the subordinate court or tribunal has acted with a patent lack of jurisdiction,
has exceeded its authority or has failed to exercises a jurisdiction legally
vested in it.
20.1 Similarly, the supervisory jurisdiction confers power on the High Court
to set aside orders where the finding of fact is so manifestly perverse or
irrational that no reasonable judicial mind could have arrived at it; often
described as a perversity apparent to the face of the record. Ancillary and
incidental to the above two illustrations, the High Court corrects orders
passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law or justice by the court or tribunal subordinate to it. The
limitation is that the High Court, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, ought
not enter into a factual dispute, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own
16
view for the finding of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal.
We conclude by noting that the High Court can and should interfere with
findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate court, if they are not based on
17
evidence or based on a manifest misreading of evidence.
21. We keep in our perspective, the scope and inquiry before the FSO under
Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act, and the supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

16
(2022) 15 SCC 190.
17
(1997) 5 SCC 76.
27



while dismissing the Revision filed against the orders of the Principle District
Judge and the FSO.
III. A NALYSIS
A. Array of Parties in the Claim Petition No. 1 of 2005
22. Through the orders impugned in the Civil Appeal, a twin effect is sought
to be achieved; viz. , exclusion of the Subject Matter from the notifications
issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Telangana Forest Act from the
Gurramguda Forest Block. Incidentally, the said deletion results in taking
away the vesting of land in the Government as per the extant procedure under
the Abolition Regulation.
23. The Division Bench decided OSA No. 47 of 2013 on 29.04.2014. The
judgment in the OSA deals with the publication of notification of the Subject
Matter for inclusion as a reserved forest under Sections 4 and 6 of the
Telangana Forest Act, and the pendency of the Claim Petition of the present
Claimants before the statutory authorities. The FSO decided the claim on
15.10.2014. The array of parties through the cause title of Claim Petition No.
1 of 2005 in File No. 786 of 2005 is reproduced hereunder:
“1. Mir Jaffer Ali Khan, S/o Late Mir Mehdi Ali Khan, Shia
Muslim, Aged about 70 years. Occupation: Business, R/o.
H.No. 10-1-123/B, Masab Tank, Saifabad, Hyderabad- 500
028, A.P.
2. Nawab Syed Abdul Wahab, S/o Late Nawab Syed
Abdullah, Muslim, aged __ years, Resident of H.No.6-2-977,
Khairatabad, Hyderabad.
3. Nawab Syed Abdul Hameed, S/o. Late Nawab Syed
Abdullah, Muslim, aged ___ years. Resident of H.No.6-2-977,
Khairatabad, Hyderabad. [Claimants]

28



AND

State of Government of A.P. Forest Dept' Represented by
Divisional Forest Officer, Hyderabad/FSO Hyderabad.
[Respondent] ”
24. It may be noted that the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, firstly,
is not represented by the District Collector, who is the custodian of
Government rights and interest in lands which stood vested in the
Government. Independent of the above omission, as has been noted in OSA
No. 47 of 2013, the State has to be represented by the Secretary, Revenue
Department and the State of A.P., through its Secretary, E&F Department.
The Cause Title, as read above, shows Respondent as the State of A.P. Forest
Department, represented by the Divisional Forest Officer/FSO Hyderabad.
The subject matter of the appeal is stated to have been transferred by the
Government in favour of the Forest Department by an order of the Board of
Revenue on 23.07.1953. The Board of Revenue claims vesting of the subject
matter in the Government pursuant to the Abolition Regulation. The inclusion
or exclusion as a reserved forest is an incidental consequence, but the primary
consideration could be the right and title to the Subject Matter of the Civil
Appeal.

24.1 The State of Andhra Pradesh (now, the State of Telangana) must have
been represented by the aforementioned authorities. After the directions were
issued in OSA No. 47 of 2013, the Forest Department failed to bring to the
notice of the primary authority the misdescription of the Respondent in Claim
Petition No. 1 of 2005. The above omission is not treated as a deliberate
omission by a party to the lis , but is noticed by this Court as complete
complacency on the part of the official respondents in getting proper and
29



necessary parties arrayed as respondents to the lis , and subsequently inviting
orders from the court or statutory authority. The Board of Revenue and the
District Collectors are the custodians of the records of abolition of Jagirs,
determination of commutation amount, and disbursement of commutation to
the heirs of Jagirdars.
24.2 We are conscious that the direction issued by the Division Bench in
OSA No. 47 of 2013 at best could be limited to the array of parties in C.S. No.
13 of 1958. The Forest Department is complacent in not taking the right
objections at the right time. The learned counsel appearing for the parties,
having noticed the misdescription or incomplete description of proper and
necessary parties, alternatively argued that the matter could be remanded to
the High Court or primary authority, amend the cause title as required by
law, hear such party, and decide the matter.
24.3 The suggestion is noted, and for the view we are proposing to take, this
argument is not accepted favourably inasmuch as the documents on which
the Claimants are relying would be the core issue for consideration either by
this Court or by the Tribunal. We make it clear that the incorrect array of
parties is not being treated as the decisive factor in deciding the Civil Appeal.
B. The scope and jurisdiction of FSO under the Telangana Forest
Act
25. A summary inquiry conducted by a statutory authority such as the FSO
under Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act is fundamentally distinct from
a civil trial conducted by a competent civil court under the CPC. The
jurisdiction exercised by such authorities is creature of statute, limited both
in scope and depth, and intended to serve administrative or regulatory
30



objectives, rather than to finally adjudicate complex civil rights or title
disputes. The CPC itself recognises this distinction. Proceedings before
Revenue Courts, Small Causes Courts, and other special tribunals are
expressly exempted from the application of the CPC, except specifically
provided. Accordingly, an FSO conducts a fact-finding or claim-verification
exercise, often based on limited material, without the trappings of a regular
trial. Any attempt by statutory authority to finally pronounce upon title would
amount to jurisdictional overreach attracting the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. When the dispute over question
of title surfaces, the administrative machinery must halt, and the parties
must be directed to the competent Civil Court, which is the sole repository of
the power to declare ownership.
25.1 The Telangana Forest Act was enacted primarily to consolidate and
amend the law relating to the protection and management of forests in the
State of Telangana. Section 3 empowers government to constitute any land as
a reserved forest, but in the manner provided under the Telangana Forest Act.
Section 4 of the said Act provides for issuing a notification to constitute any
land as a reserved forest by publishing a notification in the Gazette of the
State and the district concerned. Section 5 bars suits related to the lands
notified under Section 4 for constituting as reserved forests between the
intermittent stage of notifications under Sections 4 and 15 of the said Act.
Under Section 6 of the Telangana Forest Act, the FSO is empowered to issue
a proclamation setting out the details of the proposed integration of land as a
reserved forest. Section 10 deals with claims to certain rights. For the present
purpose, the relevant portion of Section 10 is excerpted below:
31



“ 10. Claims to certain rights - (1) where the claim relates to a
right in or over any land other than the following rights:-
(a) a right of way;
(b) a right to water-course, or to use of water;
(c) a right of pasture; or
(d) a right to forest produce; the Forest Settlement Officer shall,
after considering the particulars of such claim, and the
objections of the forest officer, if any, pass, an order, admitting
or rejecting the same wholly or in part after recording the
reasons therefor.
(2)(a) If any claim is admitted wholly or in part under sub-
section (1), the Forest Settlement Officers may-
(i) accept the voluntary surrender of the right by the claimant
or determine the amount of compensation payable for the
surrender of the right of the claimant, as the case may be; or
(ii) direct the exclusion of the land from the limits of the
proposed forest; or
(iii) acquire such land in the manner provided by the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter in this sub- section referred
to as the said Act.) (…)”
25.2 A plain reading of Section 10(1) discloses that when the claim relates to
a right in or over any land, other than right of way, water course, use of water,
pasture or to forest produce; the FSO, considering the particulars of such
claim, i.e., the claim relating to a right in or over any land and the objections
of the Forest Officer, passes an order admitting or rejecting the claim wholly
or in part, and requirement is that the FSO records reasons. Assuming a case
where it falls under Section 10(2)(a)(i), the FSO is authorised to accept
voluntary surrender or determine the compensation payable for the surrender
32



of the right of the Claimant. Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 10 typically deals
with a situation where the claim to a right in or over any land is partly or
wholly admitted by the FSO. The second clause deals with directing the
exclusion of the lands from the limit of the proposed forest. The third option
is to acquire such land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
FSO becomes the Land Acquisition Officer for this purpose. Section 10
enables an FSO to decide the claim to a right in or over any land and
conditions on the acceptance and extent of inquiry before the FSO. The
determining words in the provision are a claim that relates to a right in or
over any land. To wit, the scope and jurisdiction of the inquiry relate to the
claim to a right and the admission or rejection of the said claim in or over any
land. The FSO, in his jurisdiction, can admit a claim to a right in or over any
land, but in the summary procedure, cannot assume the jurisdiction of
deciding the very existence of the right in an inquiry under Section 10 of the
Telangana Forest Act. The right so claimed before the FSO is a right
recognised in law. Extending the scope of inquiry over and above the explicit
words of Section 10 would be violative of the very language of the provision.
After perusing the scheme of the Act, we are of the view that the inquiry under
Section 10 is summary in nature because, upon considering the claim and
objection, the FSO does not decide rival claim but merely admits or rejects
the claim to a right in or over any land.
C. The nature and origin of the Claimant’s case.
26. The Claimants state that Salar Jung-III was the last surviving owner of
the Subject Matter. Salar Jung-III has come into possession and
33



18
administration of the estate through a Farman in 1330F (after attaining
majority). On 02.03.1949, Salar Jung-III died issueless. C.S. No. 13 of 1958
was filed by the successors of late Salar Jung-III for partition and separate
possession of the properties of Salar Jung-III. In OSA No. 47 of 2013, the High
Court considered, in a dispute between inter-se successors, the right and title
to the Subject Matter. The High Court, in paragraph 21 of the judgment dated
29.04.2014, excerpted the prayers in the plaint in C.S. 13 of 1958 and also
the schedule of properties of Salar Jung-III for which a preliminary decree was
prayed for.
26.1 A perusal of the judgment, between the alleged successors of Salar
Jung-III, discloses that Sy No. 201/1, admeasuring 102 Acres at Saheb Nagar
Kalan, is not mentioned in the schedule or does not fall within item 18 to the
schedule appended to the plaint. The said finding goes to the very root of the
claim of the alleged successors-in-interest of Salar Jung-III, including the
Claimants herein. We take note of the array of parties in the OSA and the
present claim; and the finding in OSA is not put against the claimant to
disallow the claim, but the reported judgments are looked at to bring home
the lukewarm approach of the Forest Department in presenting proper and
available objections on the alleged right of the claimants.
26.2 The verification of the list of properties of Salar Jung-III as to whether
the subject matter is one of the personal properties, and what the pre and
post-survey record notes on this behalf have missed the attention. The
findings of the FSO, the Principal District Judge and the High Court in the

18
Corresponding to 1920-21 AD.
34



impugned judgments hold that the property is one of the items of Salar Jung-
III, and make reference to C.S. No. 13 of 1958. The consequence of these
findings is that the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
declares that Survey No. 201 is not part of the estate of Salar Jung-III. The
finding is between the successors-in-interest of Salar Jung-III. In a summary
procedure, the FSO holds that the claim is traceable through C.S. No. 13 of
1958 to the sale deed dated 05.03.1248H. The finding recorded by the High
Court in OSA No. 47 of 2013 could not have been either ignored or explained
away as not binding on the Claimants herein. The said approach is definitely
beyond the authorities, including the learned Single Judge, as held in the
impugned judgment. The infirmity which goes to the root of the matter is
merely appreciated in understanding the conspectus of the claim accepted by
the impugned orders/judgments.
27. On 01.10.1948, the Abolition Regulation was promulgated. The
regulation abolishes Jagirs and vests the Jagirs in the State. On 15.08.1949,
the Abolition Regulation came into force. Through notifications dated
07.09.1949 and 20.09.1949, the Jagirs of Salar Jung-III were transferred for
administration under the Abolition Regulation. The Claimants admit that, at
the first instance, the subject land vested in the Government under the
Abolition Regulation. To claim divestment from the Government and revest in
the estate of Salar Jung-III, the Claimants rely on a copy of the letter no.
808/CH dated 24.04.1954 said to have been received from the Jagir
Administrator, Hyderabad, Deccan addressed to the District Collectors of (1)
Hyderabad, (2) Mahabubnagar, and (3) Nalgonda. Copy of letter dated
24.04.1954 is signed by Assistant Jagir Administrator (Cases). The purport of
35



the letter is that vide decision dated 09.02.1954, the Jagir Administrator
released Arazi-Maktas of Salar Jung-III from the purview of the Jagir
Administrator. The letter further reads that the lands be released from
integration as Arazi-Maktas. It is further stated that, in terms thereof, the
lands treated as Arazi-Maktas have been excluded from integration and
continue to be the estate of Salar Jung-III. The claimants refer to, and rely
upon, the Gazette Notification dated 29.03.1956 published by Nazim Atiyat
for Inam Enquiry and judgment dated 26.06.1958 in File No. 2/56 of 1956.
These three documents are relied upon, firstly, admitting the movement of all
Jagirs from the Salar Jung estate to Jagir Administration, thereby divesting
from the Government and revesting with the successors-in-interest of Salar
Jung-III.
28. On the contrary, the Forest Department claims that the Board of
Revenue, through a letter dated 23.07.1953, allotted 570 acres in Sy No. 201
to the Forest Department for establishing a soil conservation centre. On
15.04.1967, the Telangana Forest Act came into force and on 26.07.1971, a
notification under Section 4 of the Telangana Forest Act was issued, initiating
the process to declare an extent of 102 acres in Sy No. 201/1 as a reserved
forest. This was followed by a proclamation dated 15.12.1971 under Section
6 of the Telangana Forest Act, and publication of the proclamation under
Section 6 in District Gazette No. 1. On 08.06.1976, an extent of 367 acres of
this Forest Block was de-reserved and made over to Hyderabad Urban
Development Authority. Stated in a nutshell, the subject land under Jagir
Administration is vested in the Government. The Government allotted the
land to the Forest Department, steps for recording the land as a reserved
36



forest were initiated, a portion of the land was de-reserved, and the balance
of the land continued to stay with the Forest Department. It is very pertinent
to refer to the judgment of the High Court in CCCA No. 84 of 1982 on adverse
possession and continuous enjoyment of the Government from the date of
vesting till 1977, when the suit was filed. These findings are referred to in the
paragraphs above and are not repeated for brevity. The important aspect is
that in a suit instituted by the District Collector, as shown as defendant, a
finding is recorded that by operation of adverse possession, the title stood
prescribed in favour of the Government. O.S. No. 906 of 1977 was filed by
claiming as assignee of a patta from Salar Jung-III to a vast extent of land in
Saheb Nagar Kalan, including the Subject Matter. The distinction to the
present claimants is that they are successors-in-interest to Salar Jung-III.
When the claim of a patta for the Subject Matter initiated in 1977 was rejected
19
by the High Court and this Court, beyond the jurisdiction of FSO, a claim
presented in a summary inquiry under Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act
is allowed. These findings are contrary to the findings recorded by the Division
Bench and this Court concerning the Subject Matter. To explain away the
legal effect of vesting of the land in the State Government, the Principal
District Judge and the High Court, through the impugned judgments,
observed that the present claimants are not parties to the lis in CCCA No. 84
of 1982. The observation is made in the absence of proper and correct array
of parties, much less, relevant documentary evidence, as considered in CCCA
No. 84 of 1982.

19
Civil Appeal No. 3354 of 1988.
37



D. Claimants’ case
29. The case of Claimants can be compartmentalised into (a) Pre Jagir
Abolition Record, i.e., sale deed dated 05.03.1248H in favour of Saheb Begum
Saheba, (b) Post Jagir Abolition and (c) decisions on the Subject Matter. The
schedule of property as stated in the translated typed copy of the said sale
deed is excerpted hereunder for immediate reference:
“Boundaries of the said Maqtas are as per the link documents
and purchase document of Late Mir Muzaffar Ali Khan named
above written on the 2nd of Safar 1229H are as follows:
Limits of Maqta No.I mentioned above, behind Qazi tank, with
a Pun of Rs.20/- per annum:
East: Adjacent to Chintal Bowli and old trench up to Chalka
with trees as limit.
Boundaries of land in between the said area, with a pun of
Rs.5/- per annum:
East: Adjacent to the boundary stones as limit
West: Annexing Inam land of Benkat Bhatimit.
South: Adjacent with Sorakunta water channel as limit.
Boundaries of 2nd Maqta inside Qazi Tank with annual Pun of
Rs.8/-:
East: Adjacent to the mouth of Tank as limit
West: Annexing the houses of Balaguda as limit
North: Abetting the public road as limit
South: Annexing Inam land of Kishna Rao landlord and some
land of tank as limit. Boundaries of land in between the said
area, with a pun of Rs.5/- per annum:
East: Adjacent to the boundary stones as limit
West: Annexing Inam land of Benkat Bhat as limit
North: Abetting water channel as limit
38



South: Annexing land of the said village and its stones and
trees as limit.
Written on 5th Rabi al-Awal 1249AH corresponding to 1243F.
Issued to the Receiver-cum-Commissioner, Estate of Salar
Jung, on his application dated: 4th May 1966.
Sd/- Director, State Archives 13/9 3.9.1966
- Sd/- Assistant Director Archivist State Archives, 02.9.1966
Hyderabad”
a. Pre Jagir Abolition

b. Post Jagir Abolition/Atiyat Enquiry Act:
39

40

c. Decisions on the Subject Matter

41

30. The claim for title is firmed up through the order of Nizamat Atiyat dated
26.06.1968, the orders impugned as already noted in the paragraphs above,
accepted (a) alleged release of land from integration and (b) in an enquiry by
Nizamat Atiyat, a few villages are held as Arazi-Makta. Therefore, the Subject
Matter is liable to be excluded from a final notification under Section 15 of
the Telangana Forest Act. As discussed above, this Court has authoritatively
declared the outer limit of the jurisdiction of the Atiyat Court, and held that
20
Nazim Atiyat’s jurisdiction is confined to the distribution of commutation.
By applying the said ratio, we note that the order of Nazim Atiyat Court is not
determinative of the subject matter’s status; and consequently, the findings
in the impugned order are contrary to the findings by this Court. Moreover,
independent of the view taken by the FSO on the determinative character of
the Nazim Atiyat Court’s orders, the impugned orders failed to appreciate the
inconclusiveness in the order of the Atiyat Court, when it redirected the
matter to be settled as per the Inams Act.
31. The impugned judgments/orders clearly lay down conclusions which
are explicitly contrary to the view taken by the High Court and this Court in
previous decisions. The foundation of the claim is based on the sale deed
dated 05.03.1248H, release orders, and orders of Nazim Atiyat. This

20
AP Waqf Board (supra).
42



foundation does not make out a case, and the judgment and decree of the civil
court relied on by the FSO and the alleged entry in revenue records pale into
insignificance. If the argument of the Claimants is accepted, the same can be
utilised for a vast extent of property, for which all the rights have been settled
under one enactment or another.
32. The intrinsic examination of the documents relied on by the Claimants
does not establish that the Subject Matter is a self-acquired property of Salar
Jung-III. It is admitted that with the abolition of Jagirs, the land stood vested
in the Government. Having admitted that at the first instance, the estate of
Salar Jung-III was divested of its entitlement and possession through a valid
regulation, accepting such scanty records/copies of letters for retransfer in
favour of the estate of Salar Jung-III is highly improbable, and acceptance of
such a claim is nothing short of a perverse recording of a finding. The decree
and judgment in O.S. No. 156 of 1980, by any measure of interpretation,
cannot be extended to affect the process initiated in 1949, continued till
12.10.2004. The claim of an alleged assignee of Salar Jung-III was found to
be untenable on the ground that the Jagirdar, except for having a life interest,
does not have the right of alienation or assignment. The revenue records have
been found to be tampered with and fudged with incorrect entries. The
possession of the Government was held adverse to the assignee claimant, and
the acquisition of title by adverse possession by the Government was upheld.
The commonality in both cases is that the plaintiff in O.S. No. 906 of 1977
claims as assignee, and the present claimants claim as successors to the
estate of Salar Jung-III. A regularly instituted suit in 1977 was found to be
beyond the period of limitation, and curiously, in a summary enquiry under
43



Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act, it is held that the claim is not barred
by limitation. The orders impugned fell into a serious error of law in
appreciating the difference between a claim barred by limitation and
consideration of condonation of delay under Section 16 of the Telangana
Forest Act. Even if the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing a
claim, the same does not have the effect of upsetting the title acquired through
prescription. The impugned orders, either as ancillary or incidental to
accepting the claim, hold title in favour of the Claimants. The fundamental
error of law is that the Forest Department is a transferee of the then
Government of Andhra Pradesh. A claim on title is always between the
Government and the rival claimant. The proceedings under the Telangana
Forest Act cannot go thus far to unsettle the proceedings initiated under Jagir
Abolition Regulation, Jagir Abolition Commutation, and the Abolition of
Inams Act.
33. In fine, we hold that the claim of right through the sale deed dated
05.03.1248H, release order from Jagir Administration, adjudication by Nizam
Atiyat Court of the Claimants has been accepted either through non-
consideration of the documents filed by the Claimants, its legal effect vis-à-
vis the government, and/or by exceeding the jurisdiction of inquiry under
Section 10 of the Telangana Forest Act. The limitation for filing objections is
liberally applied by holding that there is power to condone the delay. The
District Court and the High Court fell into error of law in affirming the view
taken by the FSO through the order dated 15.10.2014. The claim for the
Subject Matter of the Claimants in Claim Petition No. 1 of 2005 for the
appreciation and examination of the very case of the Claimants fails, and the
44



claim is thus rejected. It is held that the Subject Matter has been Government
land and the proposals for final notification under Section 15 of the Telangana
Forest Act have been validly instituted. The impugned judgments, for the
above reasons, are unsustainable, warrant interference, and accordingly, the
order of FSO dated 15.10.2014, as confirmed by the Principal District Judge
and the High Court, is set aside.
34. The Appellant has kept the proposal for final declaration under Section
15 of the Telangana Forest Act pending from 1971 till 20.12.2004. It is a
matter of common knowledge that lung spaces are shrinking in all cities, and
the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad are no exceptions. Hence, the
Chief Secretary, State of Telangana, is directed to ensure completion of
pending proposals under Section 15 of the Telangana Forest Act for including
the Subject Matter as a reserved forest within 8 weeks, and file the compliance
status report before the Registry of this Court.
35. The Civil Appeal allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Pending
applications, if any, stand disposed of.


……….…………………J
[PANKAJ MITHAL]




..…………………………J
[S.V.N. BHATTI]
New Delhi;
December 18, 2025
45



NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9997 OF 2025

SRI AGA SYED NAIMATH ULLAH SHUSTRI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF TELANGANA
REPRESENTED BY
DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER
AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.
1. The Civil Appeal assails the judgment and final order dated 20.01.2023
in CRP No. 417 of 2017. The Civil Appeal is entertained by granting leave to
the Appellant to assail the order dated 20.01.2023. The Appellant is not a
party to the proceedings initiated before the Forest Settlement Officer in Claim
Petition No. 1 of 2005 and the consequential cases filed before the Principal
District Judge and the High Court in CMA No. 5 of 2015 and CRP No. 417 of
2017. The Civil Appeal has been tagged with Civil Appeal No. 9996 of 2025
filed by the State of Telangana, aggrieved by the very same judgment dated
20.01.2023.
2. The Appellant herein claims an independent right and title in the
instant Civil Appeal by upsetting the claim of Mir Jaffar Ali (Respondent No.
1) in Civil Appeal No. 9996 of 2025, and also the right of the State of Telangana
as having vested in the State in terms of Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs)
Regulation, 1358F (Corresponding to ~1949 AD). There are two conjunctive
1



parts to the challenge; one assails the order dated 20.01.2023, while the other
seeks to establish rights of the Appellant to the common Subject Matter of the
tagged Civil Appeals. The substantive Civil Appeal No. 9996 of 2025 filed
challenging the order dated 20.01.2023 vide a Judgment of even date has
held that the claim of Mir Jaffar Ali and others vis-à-vis State Government is
untenable. Consequently, the impugned order dated 20.01.2023 in CRP No.
417 of 2017 has been tagged, heard along with, and set aside. We hasten to
add that this Court is not to be treated as a court of first instance. The claim
of the Appellant, we are of the view, need not independently for the first time
be considered by this Court in examining whether the claim is tenable
through Syed Aga (through Nawab Mir Alam Bahadur). The Civil Appeal
stands disposed of in terms of the Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 9996 of 2025.
3. In view of the above, the present Civil Appeal is dismissed. No order as
to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.


……….…………………J
[PANKAJ MITHAL]




..…………………………J
[S.V.N. BHATTI]
New Delhi;
December 18, 2025
2