Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PARMANAND AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GANPATRAO AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
12/09/1962
BENCH:
ACT:
Revenue Sale--Validity of--C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1947 (C.P.
2 of 1917), s. 149.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants are Lambardars of Mahal No.2 of Mouza
Gujarkhedi, and they held therein an undivided share of As.
-/II /- and as they were found in arrears of land revenue to
the extent of Rs. 730/13/-, the property was sold for Rs.
600/-but the sale proclamation recited the amount of arrears
due as Rs. 1345-9-0 and that the properties were being sold
for
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recovering that amount. It was contended by the appellants,
that it was open to them to have the sale set aside in the
Civil Court on the ground that the arrear for which the
property was sold was not due. The trial court dismissed
the suit on the ground that the suit did not lie and the
High Court affirmed the decision.
Held, that s. 149 (2) of the Act was plain and unambiguous
and that if the arrear in respect of which the sale was held
was not due it gave a right to the owner of the property to
have the sale set aside in a Civil Court. The fact that
subsequent to the sale proclamation but on the date of the
sale further amounts towards land revenue had become due was
not material, the scheme of the Act being that in respect of
each specific arrear separate proceedings had to be taken.
Held, further, that mistakes and irregularities contemplated
by the Act which would not furnish grounds for invalidating
and setting aside the sale were of a different kind and from
the scheme of the Act it is clear that a sale for an arrear
that was not due was put in a separate category.
Rewa Mahten v. Ram Kishan Singh (1886) L.R. 13 I.A. 106 and
Ram Prosad Choudhury v. Ram Jadu Lahiri, (1936) 40 C.W.N.
1054, distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 110 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
April 13, 1956, of the former Nagpur High Court in F.A. No.
99 of 1947.
Naunit lal, for the appellants.
B. A. Masodkar, B. D. Najbile and Ganpat Rai, for the
respondents.
1962. September 12. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave raises a
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short question about the construction of section 149 (2) of
the C. P.-Land Revenue Act, 1917 (No II of 1917)
(hereinafter called the Act). The validity of a revenue
sale of their properties held on February 27, 1941 under
section 128(f) of the Act was challenged by the appellants
by their suit
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filed in the Court of the Additional judge, Nagpur on
November 12, 1946. Ganpatrao Vishwanathji Deshmukh who had
purchased the properties at the said auction sale was
impleaded as defendant No. 1 to the said suit. During the
pendency of the litigation, the said Ganpatrao has died and
his heirs have been brought on the record. They will be
referred to as respondent No. 1 in the course of this
judgment. The appellants challenged the impugned sale on
five different grounds. They alleged that the sale was
without jurisdiction; that as the final bid was not accepted
by the Dy. Commissioner, it was invalid; that as the sale
was brought about fraudulently by respondent No. 1 in
collusion with the Revenue Clerk, it was invalid; that as
the Commissioner was not competent to confirm the sale on
November 13 1945, it was invalid; and that the sale could
not be held validly for the recovery of Rs. 1,354/9/- which
was shown in the proclamation of sale as the arrear for
which the property was put to sale. The trial court
rejected all the contentions raised by the appellants in
impeaching the validity of the sale and so, the relief
claimed by the appellants against respondent No. 1 by way of
injunction restraining him from recovering possession of the
property and disturbing the appellants’ possession thereof
was rejected.
The appellants then preferred an appeal in the Nagpur High
Court. The High Court has confirmed the findings of the
trial court and accordingly, the appeal has been dismissed.
It is against this decree that the appellants have come to
this Court by special leave; and the only point which has
been raised on their behalf by Mr. Naunit Lal is that the
view taken by the courts below that the impugned sale could
not be effectively challenged by the appellants under s.149
(2) is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction
of the said provisions.
The material facts leading to this point are very few, and
they are not in dispute. The appellants are Lambardars of
Mahal No. 2 of Mouza Gujarkhedi,
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Tehsil Saoner, District Nagpur, and they held therein an
undivided interest of As. /11/- . On or about October 4,
1940, they were found to be in arrears of land revenue to
the extent of Rs. 730/13/-in respect of the suspended Rabi
kist of 1938-39 and the Rabi kist of 1939-40. The Tehsildar
of Saoner .made a report on October 4, 1940 to the Dy.
Commissioner that the said arrears were due from the
appellants and asked for sanction to sell by auction the
property in suit. ’Along with this report, a draft of the
sale proclamation containing the relevant details was also
submitted for the signature of the S.D.O. in case the Dy.
Commissioner sanctioned the sale. The S.D.O. forwarded the
said report to the Dy. Commissioner who accorded sanction to
the proposal of the Tehsildar on December 17, 1940.
Thereafter, on December 23, 1940. the S.D.O. signed the said
proclamation and on getting the said documents back, the
Tehsildar ordered on January 7, 1941 that the sale
proclamation should be published and that the sale should be
held on February 26, 1941. On that date, the sale was
adjourned to February 27, 1941 for want of adequate bids.
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On the next day the sale was held and the property was sold
to respondent No. 1 for Rs. 600/-. Ultimately, the said
sale was confirmed. It is common ground that though at the
relevant time, arrears due from the appellants amounted only
to Rs. 730/13/-, in the Parchanama the said amount was shown
as Rs. 1,354/9/- and the property in fact was sold to
recover the said amount of arrears under s. 128(f) of the
Act. The appellants’ contention is that the arrear, Rs.
1,354/9/-, for which his property has been sold under s.
128(f) was not due; what was due was the lesser amount of,
Rs. 730/13/- and so, the sale in question is invalid under
s. 149 (2) of the Act.
In dealing with this point, it is necessary to refer to the
relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter X of the Act deals
with the collection of land revenue, and it consists of
sections 122 to 160. Section 124
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confers power on the State Government to regulate payment of
sums payable under the Act and provides for the number and
amount of the instalments, and the time, place and manner of
payment of any sum payable under a settlement or sub-
settlement, or otherwise under an assessment made under this
Act. Sub-section (2) of s. 124 requires that unless the
State Government otherwise directs, all such payments shall
be made as prescribed under sub-s. (1). A notice of demand
can be issued by Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar under s. 127
and it may be served on any defaulter before the issue of
any process under s. 128 for the recovery of an arrear.
Section 128 provides for the process for recovery of an
arrear and it prescribes that an arrear payable to
Government may be recovered, inter alia,...(f) by selling
such estate, mahal or land, or the share or land of any co-
sharer who has not paid the portion of the land revenue
which, as between him and the other co-sharers, is payable
by him. Section 131 prescribes the procedure for attachment
and sale of movables and attachment of immovable property..
Then s. 132 provides for holding enquiry into claims of
third persons in respect of property attached or proceeded
against. Section 138 (1) provides that the purchaser of any
estate, mahal, share or land sold for arrears of land
revenue due in respect thereof shall acquire it free of all
encumbrances imposed on it, and all grants and contracts.
made in respect of it, by any person other than the
purchaser. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) make other
provisions, but it is unnecessary to refer to them. Section
143 lays down that if the arrear in respect of which the
property is to be sold is paid at any time before the lot is
knocked down, the sale shall be stayed. Section 145
provides for application to set aside sale on deposit of
arrear, and s. 146 provides for application to set aside
sale for irregularity. Under s. 148 it is provided that on
the expiry of 30 days from the date of sale if no
application has been made under section 145 or 146 or no
claim has been made under s. 151, or if
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such application or claim has been made. and rejected, the
Dy. Commissioner shall pass an order confirming the sale.
Section 151 refers to claims of pre-emptions.
That takes us to section 149. Section reads as follows :
"(1) if no application under section 146 is
made within the time allowed therefor, all
claims on the grounds of irregularity or
mistake shall be barred.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall bar the
institution of a suit in the Civil Court to
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set aside a sale on the ground of fraud or on
the ground that the arrear for which the
property is sold is not due."
It would thus be seen that the scheme of the relevant
provisions of the Act in relation to revenue sales appears
to be self-contained. The revenue process for recovering
arrears begins with the report as to the arrears and ends
with the confirmation of sale. Provision is made for the
examination of claims of third parties as well as for
setting aside sales on account of deposit or on account of
irregularities committed in conducting the sales., It is in
the light of this self-contained scheme that s. 149 (1)
provides that if no application under s. 146 is made within
the time prescribed, all claims on the grounds of
irregularity or mistake shall be barred. In other. words’.
the effect of this provision is that if a party aggrieved by
a revenue sale of his property wants to challenge the
validity of the said sale on grounds of irregularity or
mistake, the Act has provided a remedy for him by s.146 and
it he fails to avail himself of that remedy, it would not
be open to him to challenge the impugned sale on the said
grounds by a separate suit. The grounds of irregularity or
mistake must be urged by an application made under s. 146
and if no such application is made, then the party is
precluded from taking the said grounds otherwise. Thus far
there is no difficulty or dispute.
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Sub-section (2) of s. 149 provides an exception to ss. (1),
and it says that the institution of a suit would not be
barred in a Civil Court to set aside ’a sale on two grounds;
if the sale is challenged on the ground of fraud, a suit
will lie; similarly, if a sale is challenged on the ground
that the arrear for which the property is sold is not due, a
suit will lie. The effect of this provision is that if
fraud is proved in regard to a revenue sale, a suit will lie
and the sale will be set aside; similarly, if it is shown
that the arrear for which the property is sold was not due,
a suit will lie and the sale will be set aside. There is no
difficulty or dispute about this position also.
The question on which the parties are at issue before us is
in regard to the interpretation of the clause "the arrear
for which the property is sold." It has been held by the
High Court that what this clause requires is not that the
arrear for which the property is sold should be stated with
meticulous accuracy, if a mistake is made in showing the
actual amount of arrear due from the defaulter for which the
property is sold, that mistake would not render the sale
invalid; it would be a mistake within the meaning of ss.(1)
and so, to cases of that kind sub-section (2) will not
apply. On the other hand, Mr. Naunit Lal contends that the
clause "the arrear for which the property is sold" is plain
and unambiguous. In considering the question as to whether
this clause is attracted or not, one has to look at the
proclamation of sale and enquire whether the amount shown as
arrears due from the defaulter was in fact due or not. If
the said amount was not due, the clause will apply
notwithstanding the fact that a lesser amount may have been
due from the said defaulter.
In construing s. 149(2) it is relevant to remember that the
provision in question is made in relation to revenue sales
and there is no doubt that the revenue sales are authorised
to be held under the summary procedure prescribed by the
relevant sections of the
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Act, and so, it would not be unreasonable to construe these
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provisions strictly. That is why we are not inclined to
accept the view that in interpreting the relevant clause, we
should assume that the Legislature did not expect the
authorities to specify the arrear for which the property is
sold with meticulous care. If the defaulter’s property is
being sold under revenue sale and the object of issuing the
proclamation is to show for what arrear it is being sold, it
is, we think, fair to assume that the said arrear must be
stated with absolute accuracy. It would not be enough to
say that some arrear was due and so, the sale should be
upheld though it was purported to be held for recovery of a
much larger arrear.
Nor is this consideration purely academic. As we have seen,
s. 143 provides that if the arrear in respect of which the
property is to be sold is paid before the lot is knocked
down, the sale shall be stayed. In the present case, if the
arrear had been properly shown at Rs. 730113/-, it is
theoretically possible that the appellants may have been in
a position to deposit this amount before the lot was knocked
down and the sale would have been stayed. Since the arrear
was shown to be much larger, it is theoretically possible
that the appellants could not make a successful attempt to
deposit the said amount. Now, in working out the provisions
of s. 143, there should be no difficulty in determining the
amount which the defaulter has to deposit to avoid the
revenue sale. The arrear in question must be correctly
stated in the proclamation so that everybody concerned knows
the exact amount for which the revenue sale is held. That
is another consideration which supports the construction for
which the appellants contend.
Mr. Masodkar for respondent No. 1 argued that the
construction for which the appellants contend is mechanical
and it may lead to anomalies. In support of this argument,
he took the illustration of a case where the amount of
arrears is accurately shown in the proclamation, but after
the proclamation is
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issued, a part of it is paid by the defaulter;-(as in fact
Rs. 291/- were deposited by the appellants in the present
case) the contention is that in such a case, if the original
amount ,of arrears continues to be shown in the
proclamation, the sale would be invalid on the construction
suggested by the appellants. We are not impressed by this
argument. Our attention has not been drawn to any specific
provision of the Act under which a partial payment of the
arrear due is allowed +lo be made by the defaulter. If such
a payment is made, it may, at best be treated as deposited
on account, and no deduction would be made from the arrear
notified to be due from him in the proclamation at that
stage. The only provision which has been cited before us in
that behalf is s. 143 and s. 143 expressly provides for the
payment of the whole of the arrear due and lays down that on
such payment before the lot is knocked down, the sale shall
be stayed. Therefore, the complication sought to be
introduced by Mr. Masodkar by taking a hypothetical case of
a part payment of the arrears due from the defaulter, does
not affect the construction of s. 149(2).
It is then argued that the impugned sale cannot be said to
be irregular in the present case, because on the date when
it was, actually held, the amount of Rs. 1,354 /9/- was in
fact due from the appellants as arrears. It is common
ground that after the proclamation was issued, a further
amount of arrears became due from the appellants and on the
date of the sale, the total amount came to be Rs. 1,354/9/-.
In our opinion, arrears accumulating. after an order for
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sale has been passed and the proclamation in that behalf has
been issued, cannot come into the calculation while
construing s.149 (2). Every arrear for which the sale is
ordered must be specifically dealt with as provided by the
Act. It is not open to the authorities to deal with a
specific arrear as prescribed by the Act and to pass an
order for sale of the defaulter’s property on the
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basis of that arrear and then add to it subsequently
accruing arrears without following the procedure prescribed
in that behalf. Once the amount of arrear is determined and
sale is ordered by reference to it, it is that amount which
must be shown in the proclamation and it is for that amount
of arrear for which the property must be sold. That, in our
opinion, is clearly the effect of the relevant clause in s.
149 (2). We must, therefore, hold that the High Court was
in error in coming to the conclusion that the sale of the
appellants’ property on the 27th February, 1941 was valid.
We are satisfied that the arrear for which the appellants’
property was sold was not due within the meaning of s.149
(2), and so, the sale must be set aside.
In support of his argument that the impugned sale cannot be
held to be invalid, Mr. Masodkar relied on a decision of the
Privy Council in Rewa Mahton v. Ram Kishen Singh(1). In
that case, the Privy Council was dealing with a question
which had reference to the true construction of s. 246 of
the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 (Act X of 1877). The said
section had provided that if cross decrees between the same
parties and for the payment of money be produced in the
Court, execution shall be taken out only by the party who
holds the decree for the larger sum, and for so much only as
remains after deducting the smaller sum. It appears that
contrary to the provisions of this section, an auction sale
was held and when the title of the auction-purchaser was
challenged, it became necessary to consider that the effect
of noncompliance with the provisions of s. 246 would be on
the title of the auction-purchaser. The Privy Council held
that a purchaser under a sale in execution is not bound to
inquire whether the judgment debtor had a cross judgment of
a higher amount such as would have rendered the order for
execution incorrect. If the Court has jurisdiction, such
purchaser is no more bound to inquire into the correctness
of an
(1) (1886) L. R. 13 I. A. 106.
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order for execution than he is as to the correctness of the
judgment upon which execution issues. In other words, the
effect of this decision is that if in contravention of the
provisions of s. 246 an executing Court orders a sale to be
held, the auction-purchaser gets a good title
notwithstanding non-compliance with s. 246. We do not see
how this case can assist Mr. Masodkar in the present appeal.
The decision turned upon the construction of s. 246. But
the present dispute has to be decided on a construction of
s. 149 (2). It is wellknown that execution sales held under
the Code of Civil Procedure can be challenged only in the
manner prescribed and for the reasons specified, say, for
instance, by O. XXI r. 89, 90 and 91. The fact that certain
irregularities committed during the conduct of execution
sales would not render the sales invalid, flows from the
relevant provisions of the Code and so, it would not be
reasonable to invoke the assistance of the decisions dealing
with irregularities committed in execution sales in support
of the argument that a revenue sale held under s. 128 (f)
should be judged by the same principles. The question as to
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whether the revenue sale is valid or not must obviously be
determined in the light of the relevant provisions of the
Act and that again takes us to the construction of s. 149
(2).
Mr. Masodkar had also relied on the decision of the Calcutta
High Court in Ram Prosad Choudhury v. Ram Jadu Lahiri (1)in
support of his argument that a revenue sale held under s.
128 (f) of the Act would not be rendered invalid merely
because the amount of arrears shown in the proclamation is
not accurate. In the case of Ram Prosad Choudhury, the sale
had been held under the provisions of the Bengal Land
Revenue Sales Act (Act XI of 1859). Under s. 5 of the said
Act, notice had to be issued before the sale could be held.
In the notice. issued prior to the sale had been shown a sum
which had then not become due as an arrear along with other
sums
(1) (1936) 40 C.W.N. 1054.
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which had become arrears, and the subsequent sale was held
on the footing of the total amount thus shown being the
arrears due. It was urged that the sale was invalid because
of the irregularity committed in the issue of the notice
under s. 5. This argument was rejected and it was held that
despite the said irregularity, the sale was valid. Now, in
appreciating the effect of this decision’ it is necessary to
refer to the provisions of s. 33 of the said Act under which
the sale was challenged. We have already referred to the
fact that s. 5 required a notice to be issued prior to the
sale. The notice provided for by this section had to
specify the nature and amount of arrear or demand, and the
latest date on which payment thereof shall be received.
Section 33 provides that no sale for arrears of revenue
shall be annulled, except upon the ground of its having been
made contrary to the provisions of this Act, and then only
on proof that the plaintiff has sustained substantial injury
by reason of the irregularity complained of’; with the rest
of the section we are not concerned. The argument which was
urged in the case of Ram Prosad Choudhury was that the
notice under s. 5 having been irregularly issued, the sale
should be deemed to have been held contrary to the
provisions of the said Act, and this argument was not
accepted. It would be noticed that s. 33 justifies a claim
for annulling the sale only if two conditions are satisfied;
that the sale should have been made contrary to the
provisions of the Act and that the plaintiff must show that
he has sustained substantial injury by reason of the
irregularity complained of. It is in the context of these
requirements that the Calcutta High Court held that the
inclusion of an amount in the notice which had not become an
arrear on the date of the notice did not render the impugned
sale invalid. We do not think that this decision can assist
us in interpreting s. 149 (2) with which we are concerned.
The scope and effect of the relevant provisions of s. 149(2)
are not at all similar to the scope and effect of
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s.33 of the Bengal Act. Therefore, we are not inclined to
accept Mr. Masodkar’s argument that the defect in the sale
on which the appellants rely would not render the sale
invalid.
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by
the High Court is set aside and the appellants’ suit
decreed, There would be no order as to cost throughout.
Appeal allowed.
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