Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 483
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 1276 OF 2026
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 536 OF 2026
FAKIR MAMAD SULEMAN SAMEJA AND ORS.
…APPLICANT(S)
VERSUS
ADANI PORTS AND SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES LTD. AND ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. The instant miscellaneous application has been filed by the
Respondent No. 7 to 10 and 12 to 17 in a disposed of civil appeal.
It has been captioned as an ‘application seeking clarification in
respect of the order dictated on dated 27.01.2026 in open Court
and the one uploaded on 12.02.2026 and for necessary correction’.
The prayer made in the application is as follows:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2026.05.12
18:03:58 IST
Reason:
“ In the above circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed
that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to:
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a) Allow the present application clarifying that the Order as
it was dictated in the open Court on 27.01.2026 is final and
binding and the one uploaded on 12.02.2026, does not have
any force of law and cannot be acted upon and an order be
corrected accordingly;
b) Pass such order or further order (s) as this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case in favour of the Petitioner. ’
2. The Civil Appeal No. 536 of 2026 arose out of Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 14440 of 2024 challenging the interim order
dated 05.07.2024 in WPPIL No. 17/2011 passed by the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “ High Court ”).
By the said interim order, the High Court had directed the State to
carry out the process of resumption of land from the Respondents
as per the State of Gujarat’s resolution dated 04.07.2024. The said
resolution was passed by the State without hearing the
Respondent, based on the oral instructions of the Court. While
issuing notice on 10.07.2024, this Court had stayed the impugned
interim order dated 05.07.2024 and noted as follows:
“ 1. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner makes a categorical statement that the order
passed by the authority was without giving an opportunity
to the petitioner.
2. He further states that though the learned counsel for the
petitioner was present before the High Court and attempted
to make submission, he was not heard by the High Court.
2
3. In that view of the matter, issue notice, returnable within
four weeks.
4. Dasti, in addition, is permitted.
5. In the meantime, the impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court shall remain stayed.”
3. The Civil Appeal was disposed of vide an order dated
27.01.2026, setting aside the interim order dated 05.07.2024 of
the High Court and the resolution dated 04.07.2024, granting
liberty to the State Government to pass a fresh order after hearing
all parties. It was also directed that the writ petition before the
High Court shall be treated to be disposed of and after passing of
the fresh order, the parties shall have the liberty to take recourse
as permissible under the law, keeping all contentions open to be
raised before the State or before the Court.
4. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the
Applicants claims that there was variance between the dictation
given to the Court-master by the Court on 27.01.2026 when the
matter was heard (hereinafter referred to as “ dictation ”) and the
order dated 27.01.2026 which was finally signed and uploaded on
12.02.2026 (hereinafter referred to as “ signed order ”). The
Applicants seek a clarification to the effect that the dictation given
to the Court-master on 27.01.2026 therefore is what is final and
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binding and the signed order dated 27.01.2026 uploaded on
12.02.2026 has no force of law.
5. In order to show such variance, the Applicants have filed
various media reports of the proceedings in the disposed of special
leave petition on 27.01.2026 and the letter dated 28.01.2026 sent
by the Respondent company to the Bombay Stock Exchange and
the National Stock Exchange in compliance of Regulation 30(11) of
the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements)
Regulations, 2015. The Applicants have also filed a pen drive
containing a video recording of the proceedings dated 27.01.2026
which was purportedly uploaded on YouTube (along with a web-
link), they have prepared a transcript of the order dictated in Court
in the said proceedings and they assert that the said transcript of
the dictation is correct and final in the matter.
6. The Applicants would contend that the dictation given in
Court on 27.01.2026 is the final pronouncement in the matter and
even prior to correction and signing, the transcript of the words
uttered during dictation as transcribed by the Applicants from a
video of the proceedings uploaded on YouTube shall form the
binding order in the matter.
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7. The Applicants have made a reference to Article 145(4) of the
Constitution of India which provides as follows:
“ Article 145
…
(4) No judgement shall be delivered by the Supreme Court
save in open Court, and no report shall be made under
article 143 save in accordance with an opinion also
delivered in open Court. ”
8. Article 145(4) of the Constitution of India is incorporated in
Order XII of the Supreme Court Rules, Rule 1 and 3 whereof has
been relied upon by the Applicants. They are also relevant, and are
therefore reproduced:
“ 1. The Court, after the case has been heard, shall
pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some
future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties
or their advocates on record, and the decree or order shall
be drawn up in accordance herewith.
…
3. Subject to the provisions contained in Order XLVII of these
rules, a judgment pronounced by the Court or by a majority
of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open Court shall not
afterwards be altered or added to, save for the purpose of
correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error
arising from any accidental slip or omission. ”
9. In reference to the aforesaid rules, it is submitted by the
Applicants that once the order had been dictated in open Court,
there was no occasion for the Court to alter or modify the order on
material aspects. It is submitted that the material changes which
have crept into the signed order as opposed to the dictation in
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Court were broadly twofold – that the Court in the dictation had
directed status quo over the subject land in question and that the
Court in the dictation had directed that the High Court shall
proceed independently with the writ petition in accordance with
law. However, the signed order dated 27.01.2026 does not provide
for any status quo with respect to the land in question and also
directs that the writ petition, being WP (PIL) No. 17 of 2011 shall
be treated to be disposed of.
10. To buttress the arguments made by the Applicants, they have
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar
1
Singh v. Banaras Hindu University , where this Court held that
as soon as a judgment is pronounced in open Court, it becomes
the final operative pronouncement of the Court and the judgment
becoming operative does not need to await signing thereof by the
Court. In case the Court finds, after pronouncement of the
judgment in open Court that there is something in the case which
was noticed by the Court at the time of pronouncement, the matter
ought to be placed for re-hearing. Relevant portion of the said
judgement is quoted herein for reference:
“ …
1
(1988) 1 SCC 80.
6
7. But, while the court has undoubted power to alter or
modify a judgment, delivered but not signed, such power
should be exercised judicially, sparingly and for adequate
reasons. When a judgment is pronounced in open court,
parties act on the basis that it is the judgment of the court
and that the signing is a formality to follow.
8. We have extensively extracted from what Bose, J. spoke
in this judgment to impress upon everyone that
pronouncement of a judgment in court whether immediately
after the hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered
later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of the
court with reference to the case. Bose, J. emphasised the
feature that as soon as the judgment is delivered that
becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. That
would mean that the judgment to be operative does not
await signing thereof by the court. There may be exceptions
to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgment is dictated
in open court, a feature which had not been placed for
consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel
of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts
from the record. In such a case the court may give direction
that the judgment which has just been delivered would not
be effective and the case shall be further heard. There may
also be cases — though their number would be few and far
between — where when the Judgment is placed for
signature the court notices a feature which should have
been taken into account. In such a situation the matter may
be placed for further consideration upon notice to the
parties. If the judgment delivered is intended not to be
operative, good reasons should be given.
9. Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is
complete by listening to submissions of counsel and perusal
of records and a definite view is reached by the court in
regard to the conclusion. Once that stage is reached and the
court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be
reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or
a review is asked for and is granted. When the judgment is
pronounced, parties present in the court know the
conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such
pronouncement, they proceed to conduct their affairs. If
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what is pronounced in court is not acted upon, certainly
litigants would be prejudiced. Confidence of the litigants in
the judicial process would be shaken. A judgment
pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there
be some exceptional feature and if there be any such, the
same should appear from the record of the case. In the
instant matter, we find that there is no material at all to
show as to what led the Division Bench which had
pronounced the judgment in open court not to authenticate
the same by signing it. In such a situation the judgment
delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition
should not have been placed for fresh hearing. The
subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not
available to be made once it is held that the writ petition
stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on
28-7-1986.
… ”
11. The Applicants have also placed reliance on the unreported
judgment of this Court in U.P. Housing & Development Board &
2
Ors. v. M/s Fast Builders, Lucknow and Anr. . This Court held
that a judgment dictated in Court can be modified or altered until
it is signed by the Judge concerned, but if material changes are to
be made in the order dictated in open Court, the Court should get
the matter listed once again and the Court should tell the parties
the reasons for which the matter is required to be reconsidered.
Relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted herein for
reference:
2
Judgment dated 10.12.2012 in Civil Appeal No. 9127 of 2012.
8
“ It is indeed true that an order dictated in Court can be
modified or altered until it is signed by the Judge concerned.
But, such an occasion should arise very rarely and if the
Judge wishes to make any material changes in the order
dictated in open court, then the least that is expected is that
he should get the matter once again listed in Court and
clearly tell the parties the reasons for which he wishes to
reconsider the matter, to hear the parties in the case again
and then pass the final order that may be at variance with
the earlier order dictated in Court.
In case an order dictated in open court is later changed
behind the back of the parties, it is bound to give rise to
unhealthy suspicion and doubts in the mind of the litigant
adversely affected by the changes introduced in the order
and this would create very wrong impression in regard to
the functioning of the Court. This should never happen.”
12. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi appearing for the
Respondent has placed reliance of the judgment of three judges of
3
this Court in Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat ,
where it was held in the context of Section 362 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “ CrPC ”) that until
the judgment of the Court is signed and sealed after it has been
delivered in Court, it is not a judgment and it can be changed or
altered at any time prior to such signature. Relevant portion of the
said judgment is quoted as under:
“ 7. We do not find any forcible submission advanced on
behalf of the petitioners that once the order had been
dictated in open court, the order to review or recall is not
permissible in view of the provisions of Section 362 CrPC for
3
(2014) 9 SCC 124.
9
the simple reason that Section 362 CrPC puts an embargo
to call, recall or review any judgment or order passed in
criminal case once it has been pronounced and signed. In
the instant case, admittedly, the order was dictated in the
court, but had not been signed.
…
11. This Court has also dealt with the issue in Surendra
Singh v. State of U.P. [Surendra Singh v. State of U.P.,
(1953) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1954 SC 194 : 1954 Cri LJ 475] ,
observing as under : (AIR pp. 196-97, para 12)
“12. Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered
Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a
sort of ‘locus paenitentiae’ and indeed last minute
alterations often do occur. Therefore, however much a
draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is
nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment
of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full-
fledged judgment and become operative. It follows that
the Judge who ‘delivers’ the judgment, or causes it to be
delivered by a Brother Judge, must be in existence as a
member of the Court at the moment of delivery so that he
can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has
changed his mind. There is no need for him to be
physically present in court but he must be in existence as
a member of the Court and be in a position to stop
delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last
minute change of mind on his part. If he hands in a draft
and signs it and indicates that he intends that to be the
final expository of his views it can be assumed that those
are still his views at the moment of delivery if he is alive
and in a position to change his mind but takes no steps
to arrest delivery.
But one cannot assume that he would not have changed
his mind if he is no longer in a position to do so. A Judge's
responsibility is heavy and when a man's life and liberty
hang upon his decision nothing can be left to chance or
doubt or conjecture; also, a question of public policy is
involved. As we have indicated, it is frequently the
practice to send a draft, sometimes a signed draft, to a
Brother Judge who also heard the case. This may be
merely for his information, or for consideration and
criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not
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necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be
against public policy to leave the door open for an
investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was
intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion or
was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with an
unwritten understanding that he is free to change his
mind should fresh light dawn upon him before the
delivery of judgment.”
12. Thus, from the above, it is evident that a Judge's
responsibility is very heavy, particularly, in a case where a
man's life and liberty hang upon his decision nothing can be
left to chance or doubt or conjecture. Therefore, one cannot
assume, that the Judge would not have changed his mind
before the judgment became final.
13. In Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of
Maharashtra [(1975) 3 SCC 140 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 764 : AIR
1974 SC 1880] , the judgment in Surendra Singh [Surendra
Singh v. State of U.P., (1953) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1954 SC 194
: 1954 Cri LJ 475] referred to hereinabove was considered
in this case. In that case, criminal appeal was heard by the
Division Bench of the High Court, the judgment was signed
by both of them but it was delivered in court by one of them
after the death of the other. It was held that there was no
valid judgment and the case should be reheard. This Court
took the view that the judgment is the final decision of the
court intimated to the parties and the world at large.”
13. Further, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent has
submitted that the instant miscellaneous application warrants
dismissal at the threshold, since it is not at all maintainable. He
has filed a compilation of judgments and orders: Supertech Ltd.
4
v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Assn. ,
Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset
4
(2023) 10 SCC 817.
11
5
Reconstruction Co. Ltd. , Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. &
6
Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. and Anr. , Ajay Kumar
7
Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. , to submit that this Court
has on multiple occasions deprecated the practice of filing
miscellaneous application in disposed of matters unless there is
an clerical or arithmetic error in the order, or unless the nature of
the order itself is executory and it has become impossible to
implement due to subsequent events or developments.
14. He has further argued that the aforementioned
pronouncements of this Court have resulted in the issuance of the
Circular F. No. 01/Judl./2025 dated 03.01.2025 by the Registrar
(Judl. Admn.) and Registrar (Judl. Listing) (hereinafter referred to
as “ Circular dated 03.01.2025 ”) where it was directed that any
party filing a miscellaneous application in a disposed of matter
may be required to specifically aver on oath that the filing of the
miscellaneous application has been necessitated as the order
passed in the main proceeding being executory in nature and have
become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent
5
2022 SCC OnLine SC 2241.
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 313.
7
M.A. Diary No. 39665 of 2024 in M.A. Diary No. 14381/2024 in M.A. No. 714 of 2022 in
W.P.(C) 429 of 2020.
12
events or developments and to make such a declaration on solemn
affirmation.
ANALYSIS
15. We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties and
perused the record. It goes without saying that in these
proceedings, the Court is not called upon to justify its order,
neither is the order itself under challenge. This Court is not sitting
in review over its order and it will suffice to say that the digitally
signed order dated 27.01.2026 which was uploaded on 12.02.2026
remains the only final order passed by the Court in this case. As
such, in these proceedings, the Court is not going to examine the
validity of the signed order dated 27.01.2026.
16. At the outset, the present miscellaneous application is not
maintainable in law. It is in the nature of a review petition, seeking
to rewrite the order of the Court. The prayer made in the
miscellaneous application is to declare the dictation given in Court
to the Court-master to be final and binding and the signed order
to be declared as not having any force of law. Such a prayer in the
first place is thoroughly misconceived. This Court, recently in Ajay
13
Kumar Jain (Supra) has relied upon a similar observation in
Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (Supra) and held as follows:
“ 17. Thus, this Court made it abundantly clear that a
miscellaneous application filed in a disposed of proceedings
would be maintainable only for the purpose of correcting
any clerical or arithmetical error. The Court further clarified
that a post disposal application for modification or
clarification of the order would lie only in rare cases where
the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and
the directions of the Court may have become impossible to
be implemented because of subsequent events or
developments.
18. The Registry shall not circulate any miscellaneous
application filed in a disposed of proceedings unless and
until there is a specific averment on oath that the filing of
the miscellaneous application has been necessitated as the
order passed in the main proceeding being executory in
nature and have become impossible to be implemented
because of subsequent events or developments.
19. The Registry shall insist from every applicant who
intends to file any miscellaneous application in a disposed
of proceedings for such a declaration as above on solemn
affirmation. ”
17. Pursuant to the judgment in Ajay Kumar Jain (Supra), the
Registry of this Court has issued Circular F. No. 01/Judl./2025
dated 03.01.2025 which requires that in case a miscellaneous
application is filed in a disposed of proceedings, there must be a
specific averment on oath that the filing of the miscellaneous
application is necessary since the order is executory in nature and
it has become impossible to implement due to subsequent events.
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Even otherwise, such an application can be filed by a party to point
out to the Court any arithmetic or clerical mistake which may have
crept into the order.
18. On perusal of the original file of the miscellaneous application
filed before this Court, it appears that the Applicants have not filed
an affidavit to meet the requirement as laid down in Ajay Kumar
Jain (Supra) and the Circular dated 03.01.2025. In any case, we
do not see how such an affidavit could have been filed in the first
place, since the prayer made in this miscellaneous application is
not for correction of a clerical or arithmetic error, nor does it
appear that the directions pursuant to the order have become
impossible due to subsequent events. In ideal circumstances, the
Registry of this Court should have raised a defect about non-
compliance of the Circular dated 03.01.2025. The Registrar
concerned shall submit an explanation in chambers in this regard
within one week from the date of this order, as to how the instant
miscellaneous application was permitted to be listed without
compliance of the above.
19. The Applicants herein are not merely seeking correction of
any clerical error or arithmetical correction in the signed order, but
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rather, they claim that the signed order ‘does not have any force of
law’. Such a prayer is prima facie erroneous and after the closing
of proceedings in the matter, making such a prayer by filing of a
miscellaneous application is completely misplaced, it is a gross
abuse of process of law and cannot be permitted. Further, it has
been pleaded in the miscellaneous application at paragraph 11
that the ‘ error appears to have crept due to inadvertence, as the law
does not permit the order to be changed on material aspect, after it
has been dictated / pronounced in open Court ’. A distinction must
be made between an error which may have crept into an order by
inadvertence and an error in application of the law itself, making
the order have no ‘force of law’. Here, the Applicants appear to be
contending the latter, in the garb of the former. The pleadings in
the miscellaneous application, in our view, are nothing but a
misconceived attempt to undermine the dignity of the Court and
browbeat its authority. Therefore, even though the application
itself is not maintainable in law, it is pertinent to make some
observations about the arguments which have been advanced.
20. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court
in Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra), relevant paragraph whereof has
been quoted in paragraph 9 of the present judgment. The factual
16
situation in that case was such that the Appellant in that case had
filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court seeking
admission in the Banaras Hindu University applying some
additional weightage. The matter which was heard by a division
bench of the said Court on 28.07.1986, and upon conclusion of
hearing, the judgment was pronounced in open Court allowing the
writ petition and directing the University to admit the petitioner in
the said course. The judgment, however, was not signed by the
learned judges and the petition was again listed in the hearing list
from September 1986 till 05.02.1987 when the same division
bench which had earlier disposed of the matter had directed the
matter to be taken up by another division bench. Upon subsequent
hearing, the writ petition was dismissed by the other division
bench on 23.03.1987. It was in those facts and circumstances that
this Court found that the judgment dictated in open Court on
28.07.1986 was the judgment of the Court and it did not need to
await its signing by the learned judges for it to become a judgment
in the eyes of law. As such, the subsequent judgment of a different
division bench dismissing the petition on 23.03.1987 could not be
a judgment in the matter once the judgment dated 28.07.1986 had
been dictated in open Court.
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21. Further, reliance has been placed on the judgment in U.P.
Housing (Supra) where the factual situation was such that the writ
petition filed by the Respondent in that case had been disposed of
by the division bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
on 06.10.2010. The same order was uploaded online on the
website and a certified copy thereof was obtained by the Appellant
in that case. Thereafter, on 24.02.2011, the Respondent in that
case submitted a modified copy of the order dated 06.10.2010 to
the Appellant’s office. Upon seeking a report from the Registrar
General of the High Court, it was clarified that the order submitted
by the Respondent (which was modified) was actually the order of
the Court on record. It was in that context that this Court
acknowledged that a judgment dictated in open Court can be
modified or altered until it is signed by the Judge, but such
occasion should arise very rarely and if material changes are to be
made in the order, the parties to the case must be heard again
prior to passing the order which is materially changed. Further,
this Court observed in that judgment that if an order dictated in
open Court is changed behind the back of the parties, it may give
rise to unhealthy suspicion and doubts in the mind of the litigant
who is adversely affected by the changes introduced in the order
18
and it would create a wrong impression about the functioning of
the Court.
22. On facts, the judgment of Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra) does
not apply to the instant case. The instant disposed of appeal has
not been listed for re-hearing after the signed order was uploaded,
nor is any other bench seized of the matter which has been
disposed of and also, this is not a situation where there are two
orders of the Court in the matter. For the same reason, the
situation which arose in UP Housing (Supra) was also quite
different, where also, two orders were signed and uploaded and the
first order was obtained by one of the parties. Certainly, once a
Court has taken a view about the outcome of the case listed before
it on merits, it cannot be materially changed without hearing the
parties. This proposition of law which can be derived from the two
above-mentioned judgments, cannot be put to question.
23. In the present application, the Applicants would urge that
closing the Writ Petition before the High Court amounts to a
material change from the dictation given in Court. Even from the
YouTube video and the transcript thereof containing the dictation
given by the Court, the High Court was given liberty to proceed in
19
the matter in accordance with law ‘after passing the order by the
State Government’. Such a direction was included in terms of the
suggestion made by the counsel for the Respondent in the main
appeal (Applicants herein) after the dictation of the order was
concluded. After correction, the signed order reflects that the Writ
Petition (PIL) No. 17 of 2011 was to be treated as disposed of and
after passing the order afresh by the State Government, parties
were given the liberty to take recourse as permissible under the
law, keeping all contentions open for the parties to raise before the
State Government or the Court in appropriate proceedings. This,
in our opinion, is not a material change, it is a correction and
refinement of the dictation. Although we are not called upon to
explain the intent behind our order, but there is no material
change which has crept into the signed order which would warrant
a re-hearing in terms of the judgments cited by the Applicants,
which in the first place are distinguishable on facts. The writ
petition before the High Court had been pending for long and it
had culminated in the resolution dated 04.07.2024 which was
passed without hearing the Respondent, on the oral directions of
the Court. Upon passing of a fresh order by the State Government,
it was envisaged by this Court that fresh proceedings may be
20
drawn reserving all rights and contentions of the parties. In any
case, all contentions of the parties have been kept open and all
requisite liberty has been granted to the parties to take recourse
as permissible under the law.
24. Further, it is vehemently urged by the learned counsel
appearing for the Applicants that the Court in its dictation had
directed that status quo as it exists today shall be maintained but
no such direction to maintain status quo is reflected in the signed
order. In this regard, at the very outset, prior to dictation being
given to the Court-master on 27.01.2026, on a request being made
by the counsel appearing for the Respondents (Applicants herein)
for status quo , it was clarified by the Court that whatever order has
been passed by this Court, shall continue. Even during dictation,
the Court first dictated ‘stay of the impugned order’, since that was
the stay order passed by this Court while issuing notice on
10.07.2024, but later it was uttered ‘ status quo as it exists today
shall be maintained’. Grant of status quo or non-grant thereof is
an ancillary direction and it cannot be said to be a material change
in the draft order which could not have been made prior to signing
of the order without re-hearing. In the main appeal, what was
under challenge was an interim order to implement a resolution
21
for resumption of land which was passed without hearing the
Respondent. The fact that the resolution was passed without giving
due hearing to the Respondent, merely on the oral directions of the
High Court was admitted by the State before this Court. In such
circumstances, the decision of the State to resume the said land
was bad in law from its very inception and therefore, it was directed
that a fresh decision be taken by the State in the matter.
25. The civil appeal which was disposed of by the signed order,
did not arise out of a civil suit or arbitration proceedings where
parties are in dispute with respect to title over a piece of land and
where preservation of the subject matter of dispute is material.
Although several prayers have been made in the writ petition, the
subject matter of the writ petition before the High Court, as
reflected from the High Court’s order dated 24.09.2014 originally
disposing of the writ petition, and the order dated 19.04.2024 post-
restoration, was in a narrow compass for replenishing ‘gauchar
land’ in the village Navinal in terms of prayer clause (b) of the Writ
Petition. Under the said prayer, replenishment of gauchar land was
prayed to be done out of the land allocated to the Respondent in
2005 or by providing sufficient alternative land. As such, the
manner of replenishment of gauchar land was never decided and
22
even in the prayer, it is mentioned that such replenishment can be
done by resumption of the land allocated or by providing sufficient
alternative land. In such circumstances, there was no occasion for
this Court to grant an order of status quo over the land resumed
by the State without hearing the Respondent. Although the learned
counsel for the Applicants have not shown us any order of
maintaining status quo passed by the High Court, we have gone
through the orders of the High Court in the writ petition. It appears
that at no point of time, during the proceedings before the High
Court or before this Court, any direction of maintaining status quo
has been passed. When the order directing resumption of the land
in question was found to be illegal due to want of hearing, on the
admission of the State, there was no occasion for this Court to
direct maintenance of status quo over the land since it would be
an unreasonable restraint over the rights of the Respondent in
respect of the land which was resumed. Whether the
replenishment of gauchar land has to be done out of the land
allocated to the Respondent or by providing alternative land is a
matter for the State to decide. Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme
Court Rules quoted in paragraph 8 above permits correction of
errors arising from accidental slip or omission. Even if it is
23
assumed that the dictation of the draft order to the Court-master
is sufficient for the purpose of ‘pronouncement’ of the judgment,
grant of over the land in question would be an error in
status quo
law and correction of the dictation by the Court in chambers, prior
to signing, cannot be said to be a material change which required
further hearing.
26. In view of the aforesaid, there is no material change which
has crept into the signed order. Differences between the dictation
and the signed order are a result of correction and enhancement
of the dictated draft order. The Respondent has placed reliance on
the judgment of this Court in Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit
(Supra) which although in the context of Section 362 of the CrPC,
does recognize that a judge may change their mind prior to signing
of the dictated order.
27. Another aspect of the matter is the question of practice and
practicality of making corrections in the draft prior to signing,
without making any material changes. The dictation given to the
Court-master on 27.01.2026 was a rough draft at best, since there
were multiple interruptions and corrections made in the dictation
itself. It was subject to correction and further enhancement in
24
chambers. The Applicants have placed reliance on a YouTube
video, which itself does not appear to be complete and it cuts out
while the Court is giving further directions to the Court-master in
respect of the dictation given. There is a distinction which must
necessarily be drawn between dictation of a draft order to the
Court-master and pronouncement of judgment in the matter.
Dictation given to the Court-master must be subject to correction
and enhancement by the Court in chambers. The intent behind
dictating a draft to the Court-master is to put the facts on record
and lay down the skeletal framework for the order, which may help
the judge recall the matter when the corrections and enhancement
in the order is made at a later stage. For all practical purposes, the
practice of dictating a skeletal draft order and enhancing it in
chambers with corrections and reasoning, prior to signing, which
is quite prevalent in this Court, has its own benefit in saving the
time of the Court, especially when the Court has a heavy docket of
71 matters listed on a miscellaneous day, which was the situation
on 27.01.2026. The practicalities of being a judge in India, with
docket explosion were noticed by a coordinate bench of this Court
in its recent judgment of Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors.
25
8
v. State of Gujarat and Ors. where the judgment of Vinod
Kumar Singh (Supra) was distinguished.
“ 19. The situation presents us with an opportunity where
we feel it expedient to share our thoughts only for the
purpose of future guidance to overcome adversity. Having
regard to the demands of changing times, one of the
significant aspects of judging that has been at the forefront
of discussion in many a conference/conclave or legal circle
is the need for prompt ‘pronouncement of judgments’. Order
XX of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ordains that a
judgment can be pronounced, in an open court, either at
once or as soon thereafter as may be practicable on a future
day. Guided by the principles enshrined in Order XX,
number of learned Judges scrupulously follow the same.
Learned Judges do come across cases requiring short
orders which, in their assessment, may not consume
more than 15/20 minutes. These orders are generally
dictated in open court immediately after a hearing is
over. On the other hand, if in any given case the judgment
could justifiably be reserved after hearing of extensive
arguments, it would not be proper to criticize a learned
Judge if he dictates the judgment in open court
notwithstanding the length of time to be taken therefor. As
per the ordainment of Order XX, the learned Judge would
be perfectly justified in doing so. In such cases, it could
roughly take any time between 20 minutes to a couple
of/few hours or even more spilling over to the next day (in
rare cases) to accomplish the task. This approach could
result in the board (if it is heavy) getting choked and the
remaining cases on the board having slim chances of being
considered. As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of
invention. The necessity to strike a balance, in turn,
has led to an innovative approach (many a times
followed even by this Court) which, though not strictly
in tune with Order XX, has transitioned into a regular
practice by passage of time. This contemplates a rough
assessment made by a learned Judge of the time to be
taken for dictating a judgment after hearing in a matter is
8
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985.
26
concluded and if, in such assessment, it is likely to take
more than 20/25 minutes, the learned Judge proceeds to
pronounce the operative part together with the outcome
while expressing “reasons to/would follow” and then
concludes the exercise of pronouncing the final judgment by
providing the reasons as soon as possible thereafter.
Having regard to the exploding docket of a majority
of the high courts, learned Judges consider it wise
and prudent to make optimum use of judicial time by
not dictating lengthy judgments in court. This
practice, no doubt, seeks to serve a salutary purpose.
People unversed with the functioning of the judicial
system are perhaps unaware as to how development
of this practice has contributed to saving of precious
judicial time, which the learned Judges invariably
devote and utilize for hearing more cases that are on
board in the anxiety to consider and decide as many
cases as are possible during the scheduled working
orders. Burdened though with immense pressure of
work and brushing aside fatigue, which is quite likely
to develop, the learned Judges after retiring for the
day dictate the judgment in their court chambers or
in their residential offices either on the same day or
within a few days thereafter. The hearing having
concluded not too long back, the arguments remain
fresh in the mind of the learned Judges and it
becomes all the more easy to dictate the judgment.
While this approach without a doubt has its own benefits,
recent happenings leave us to lament that reasons for the
conclusion reached are being placed in the public domain
much too late, as in the case of Balaji Baliram
Mupade (supra) as well as this case. In an attempt to save
time to attend to as many cases as possible, certain learned
Judges unwittingly are contributing to justice being delayed
in given cases which, concomitantly, have been giving rise
to criticism of unpleasant flavours. Critics of such practice
(to pronounce the operative part with the outcome and to
provide the reasons later in detailed final judgments) could
and do legitimately argue in favour of reserving judgments
as required by the procedural laws if the particular case so
demands but as Judges, we know, reserving too many
judgments has its own pitfalls. Once the files pile up, it
becomes increasingly difficult to remember the minute
27
details of the case and the arguments advanced by the
parties in support of their respective cases which leads to a
shift to rely on the written notes of arguments. However, if
only written notes were enough, there would be no need of
oral hearing in court. Additionally, drawing from our
experience on the bench, we can safely say that inclination
of learned Judges to reserve judgments is invariably the
course adopted where cases involving complex and intricate
points of law do call upon learned Judges to craft well-
researched and well-reasoned judgments. That apart, there
are cases arising from recent enactments involving
questions of law not having arisen hitherto and
consequently such questions have never been answered.
Such categories of cases demand the high courts to lay
down the law in clear terms for comprehension of all
concerned. Obviously, this process is time consuming and
the time limit for delivering judgments by the high courts as
laid down in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, at times, is breached.
We have full trust and confidence in the learned Judges of
the high courts since they are well-equipped to tackle any
kind of pressure situation. However, while it would be
prudent to leave it to the learned Judges to pick any
one of the three options [(i) dictation of the judgment
in open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and
pronouncing it on a future day, or (iii) pronouncing
the operative part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed”
or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously
expressing that reasons would follow in a detailed
final judgment supporting such outcome], it would be
in the interest of justice if any learned Judge, who
prefers the third option (supra), makes the reasons
available in the public domain, preferably within 2
(two) days thereof but, in any case, not beyond 5 (five)
days to eliminate any kind of suspicion in the mind
of the party losing the legal battle. If the pressure of
work is such that in the assessment of the learned Judge
the reasons in support of the final judgment cannot be made
available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would be a better
option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate order
would have the effect of changing the status of the parties
or the subject matter of the lis, it would always be advisable
to stick to the course envisaged in Order XX. Since, the
fraternity of learned Judges of all the courts are interested
28
to preserve the dignity of the respective judicial institutions
with which they are associated, all learned Judges must be
mindful of the impact of their actions on the society at large.
Dealing with lakhs of litigation is no mean task, but at the
same time we must realize that instances do emerge leaving
absolutely no margin for error. It is our duty as Judges to
stand tall and rise to the challenge.”
28. The Court in the aforementioned judgment recognized that in
cases which require short orders to be passed, orders are dictated
after hearing, in Court itself. If a detailed order is to be passed, it
might have the effect of clogging the day’s court docket and in such
cases normally the orders are reserved or operative portion of the
order is dictated while observing that detailed reasons are to follow.
We are of the view that the draft order dictated in Court has to be
subject to corrections and enhancement, removal of any accidental
inclusions or exclusions due to inadvertence, prior to signing, if
not anything else, but out of practical requirements. Subject, of
course, to further hearing, in case material changes are being
made in the draft order. Such an interpretation is also borne out
from Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules discussed
above, even if it is assumed that such dictation were to be
tantamount to ‘pronouncement’. The distinction between a draft
and the judgment of the Court was clarified by Vivian Bose, J in
29
9
the judgment of Surendra Singh v. State of U.P. , which in fact
was the basis of this Court’s judgment in Vinod Kumar Singh
(Supra). He observed as follows:
“ 10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these
sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the
formal
parties and to the world at large by
“pronouncement” or “delivery” in open court . It is a
judicial act which must be performed in a judicial
way. Small irregularities in the manner of
pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter
but the substance of the thing must be there : that can
neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture
nor can it be vague. All the rest—the manner in which it
is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated,
the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure
certainty about its content and matter—can be cured; but
not the hard core, namely, the formal intimation of the
decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way
in open court. The exact way in which this is done does not
matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or
read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced,
in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to
the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given
number of days for inspection.
11. An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the
decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a
declaration of the mind of the court as it is at the time of
pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of
delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it
must be done in a judicial way in open court. But however
it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the
court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is
the first judicial act touching the judgment which the court
performs after the hearing. Everything else uptil then is
done out of court and is not intended to be the operative act
9
(1953) 2 SCC 468.
30
which sets all the consequences which follow on the
judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss
the matter among themselves and reach a tentative
conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may
write and exchange drafts. Those are not the
judgments either, however heavily and often they may
have been signed. The final operative act is that
which is formally declared in open court with the
intention of making it the operative decision of the
court. That is what constitutes the “judgment” .
12. Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered,
the Judges have the right to change their mind. There
is a sort of locus poenitentiae, and indeed last minute
alterations often do occur. Therefore, however, much a draft
judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing
but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the
court. Only then does it crystallise into a full-fledged
judgment and become operative. It follows that the Judge
who “delivers” the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by
a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the
court at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary,
stop the delivery and say that he has changed his mind.
There is no need for him to be physically present in the court
but he must be in existence as a member of the court and
be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration
should there be any last minute change of mind on his part.
If he hands in a draft and signs it and indicates that he
intends that to be the final expository of his views it can be
assumed that those are still his views at the moment of
delivery if he is alive and in a position to change his mind
but takes no steps to arrest delivery. But one cannot assume
that he would not have changed his mind if he is no longer
in a position to do so. A Judge's responsibility is heavy and
when a man's life and liberty hang upon his decision
nothing can be left to chance or doubt or conjecture; also, a
question of public policy is involved. As we have indicated,
it is frequently the practice to send a draft, sometimes a
signed draft, to a brother Judge who also heard the case.
This may be merely for his information, or for consideration
and criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not
necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be
against public policy to leave the door open for an
31
investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was
intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion
or was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with
an unwritten understanding that he is free to change
his mind should fresh light dawn upon him before the
delivery of judgment. ”
29. The intent of the judge while making the dictation, therefore,
becomes material. The Court might dictate a draft to keep the facts
fresh in the mind and the draft so dictated then becomes final only
after signing, subject to corrections and alterations which do not
amount to a material change in the order. The signed order is what
embodies the final unalterable opinion of the Court, it is the only
version of the Court’s order which is reached after multiple rounds
of correction after dictation in Court. This practice, born out of
necessity, is not only in line with Order XII of the Supreme Court
Rules, but also acknowledged in the judgment of UP Housing
(Supra) where this Court had observed that an order dictated in
open Court can be altered and changed so long as no material
changes are being made in the order, at which stage re-hearing
would be required.
30. In such view of the matter, this miscellaneous application
deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable and also on merits.
32
31. In light of the frivolity of the application, the nature of
pleadings made and the attempt to undermine the authority of this
Court, symbolic and exemplary cost of ₹ 2000 each is imposed on
the Applicants, payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee, to be deposited within four weeks from the date of this
order.
….…..………………………….J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)
….…..………………………….J.
(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 12, 2026.
33