Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1975
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION:
1977 AIR 448 1977 SCR (1) 875
1976 SCC (1) 800
CITATOR INFO :
F 1977 SC1456 (6)
ACT:
Hyderabad land Acquisition Act-Acquisition of land for
a village market-If a public purpose-Excess land sold to a
housing colony-If acquisition mala fide.
HEADNOTE:
Certain lands belonging to the appellants were
compulsorily acquired under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition
Act for running a country fair or market (mondha). After the
acquisition, the municipality parcelled out the excess land
and sold it for a housing colony. The High Court dismissed
the appellants’ writ petition, in limine.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that the
acquisition was not for a public purpose and that it was
mala fide.
Dismissing the appeal,
^
HELD: (1)(a) Providing a village market is an obvious
public purpose.
[876C-D]
(b) A mondha is a country fair or village market.
Market is defined in s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District
Municipalities Act in wide terms and s. 72 of the said Act
enumerates the purposes for which property may be vested in
a municipality. This includes markets. It inexoorably
follows from a joint reading of Ss. 2(20) and 72(a) of the
District Municipalities Act that the purpose of providing a
market for the townsfolk falls within the powers of the
municipality. [876G-H]
(2)(a) Striking down any Act for mala fide exercise of
power is a judicial resered power exercised lethally, but
rarely. The charge of mala fides against public bodies and
authorities is more easily made than made out. It is the
last refuge of a losing litigant. [876D]
(b) What has to be established is mala fide exercise of
power by the State Government although the beneficiary is
the municipality. There is no evidence of malus animus in
Government. [877B]
(c) Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a
public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and
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title has vested in the municipality how it uses the excess
land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the
basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no
principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition
stands voided because long later the requiring authority
diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in
the declaration. [877C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 675 of
1968.
From the judgment and order dated the 19th January,
1967 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967.
S. J. Deshpande and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
appellant.
M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondent nos. 1,
2 and 4.
D. V. Patel, K. Laxmanrao and S. Gopalakrishnan, for
respondent no. 3
876
The Jugement of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. Brevity will do no inequity in this
appeal where three points were urged but only one survives
for serious scanning. The subject matter is the validity of
land acquisition proceedings whereby a Municipality
compulsorily purchased the appellant’s land for the stated
public purpose of running a country fair or market (mondha)
under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (for short, the
Act) which is closely similar to the Land Acquisition Act,
1923 (Central Act). The first charge is that the High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition in limine. Seven years after the
1968 event, we cannot consider sending back the case even if
there be justice in the submission. We have therefore heard
counsel Shri Deshpande on his substantive grievances. The
second contention is that there is no ’public purpose’ to
support the acquisition which is allegedly ultra a vires the
Municipality’s powers. We disagree. Providing a village
market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal
facility. The last plea which has been pressed strenuously
is that the acquisition exercise is bad being mala fide-an
uphill task to make out against a public body. Was this
colourable exercise of power ?
Striking down any act for mala fide exercise of power
is a judicial reserve power exercised lethally, but rarely.
The charge of mala-fides against public bodies and
authorities is more easily made than made out. It is the
last refuge of a losing litigant. Even so, we will examine
the merits of the contention here from the point of view of
the serious factors placed for our consideration.
Was this acquisition done colore officii ? The
circumstances relied on may be examined from this
standpoint. Section 5(3) of the Act provides for declaration
of the public purpose, like s. 6(3) of the Central Act. This
declaration was made in 1960 and covered at least 28 acres
of land belonging to the appellant. His counsel contends
that there in no public purpose mentioned in the
notification because what is stated is ’government purpose’.
There is no force in this terminological deviation. The
purpose has been set down as for a ’mondha’ or ’country
fair’ which is obviously a public purpose. So counsel
shifted to another shade of the same argument and state that
’mondha’ is not a word known to law and has not been defined
anywhere and so such a purpose cannot be taken cognizance of
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by the law. We cannot agree to the linguistic game
masquerading as a legal point. It is plain that a ’mondha’
is a country fair or village market. ’Market’ is defined in
s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in
wide terms, and s. 72 of the said Act enumerates the
purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality.
This includes ’markets’. It inexorably follows from a joint
reading of ss. 2(20) and 72(a) that the purpose of providing
a market for the townsfolk falls within the powers of a
municipality.
Failing here, counsel finally stressed that in any case
no market for a small municipal town requires 28 acres of
land, especially because the Master Plan prepared for the
Municipality had allotted
877
only 15 acres for this purpose. lt is not for the Court to
investigate into the area necessary for running a market.
Moreover there is no mala fides emerging from this
circumstance. What has to be established is mala fide
exercise of power by the State Government-the acquiring
authority-although the beneficiary of the acquisition is
eventually the Municipality. There is no scintilla of
evidence suggestive of malus animus in Government.
At this state Shri Deshpande complained that actually
the Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land
marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony,
apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public
necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title
has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land
is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis
for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of
law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided
because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a
public purpose other than the one stated in the s. 5(3)
declaration.
There is no merit in the appeal which is dismissed
without costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
878