Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MADHUSDAN SINGH & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/11/1983
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
CITATION:
1984 SCR (1) 849 1984 SCC (2) 381
1983 SCALE (2)856
ACT:
West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as amended by
Amendment Acts of 1972 and 1977-Sections 14M, 17(c) 17(6)
and 21B of constitutional validity of.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners, in this round of challenge assailed
the validity of Section 14M, 17(c), 17(6) and 21 B of the
West Bengal Land Reforms Act, calling to their aid certain
observations made by this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata
Thakurani and Sri Sri Raghunath Jain & Ors etc v. Union of
India & Ors. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 950 and the decisions in
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 1 S.C.R.
206 and Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 2
S.C.R. 1
The petitioners raised the following points:
(i) that the total ceiling area allowed to be retained
by the 1953 Act in respect of agricultural land in Khas
possession of the Raiyats was drastically reduced;
(ii) that although the status of Raiyats was conferred
on the erstwhile landlords which was heritable and
transferable, the institution of bargards was introduced in
order to enable the raiyats to cultivate their lands on a
50:50 basis and,
(iii) that while the Amendment Act of 1972 had given a
right to the raiyats to resume the lands given to the
bargardars for their personal cultivation; the subsequent
amendments took away this right and made the right of the
bargardar both heritable and transferable causing serious
detriment and prejudice to the raiyats.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court.
^
HELD :1.1 The impugned amendments were manifestly and
pointedly made for the purpose of giving effect to and
securing the objects of Article 39(b) because these Acts
clearly intended to distribute the material resources of the
community viz, the agricultural lands to a large number of
tillers of the soil in order to serve the common good on the
aforesaid people. The Amendments fall within the letter and
spirit of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. 1 lie Acts have
not touched the non-agricultural home stead lands, or
buildings of the Land owners standing thereon but has taken
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over only a major portion of the agricultural lands, leaving
with the landlords a portion prescribed within the
850
ceiling limit and distributed the excess to the tillers of
the soil which alone constitute their main source of
sustenance and livelihood. The claim of the raiyats
(erstwhile landlords) that the Acts amount to confiscation
is absolutely untenable and amounts only to shedding
crocodile tears and an anathema or taboo. [860 H; 861 A-B;
860 G]
1.2 The error regarding the addition of Amending Acts
as items of Entry in the Ninth Schedule was inadvertently
crept in the decision of Sri Sri Kalimata Thakarani’s
case. Even if the Acts were not included in the Ninth
Schedule their constitutional validity could not be
questioned because the provisions are otherwise reasonable
and give full effect to the pragmatic and socialistic
approach as contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution.
Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani and Sri Sri Raghunath Jew
and Ors v. Union of India & Ors. [1981]2 S.C.R 950 Minerva
Mills Ltd v. Union of India and Ors [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206;
Waman Rao & Ors v Union of India & Ors [1981] 2 S.C.R. 1
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd
and Anr [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147, Sasanka Sekhar Maity & Ors,
Union of India & Ors, 1980; 4 S.C.C. 716, State of Tamil
Nadu etc v. L. Abu Kavur Bai and Ors CA Nos 957-966 (N) of
1973 decided on 31-10-83 followed.
1.3 The Amendment Acts cannot be challenged as
violative of the doctrine of nexus or involving no process
of distributions;
State of Karnataka v Rangnatha Reddy & Anr [1978] 1
S.C.R. 641, Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India & Ors [1981]
2 S.C.R. 950, Sanjeeva Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/s Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd and Anr [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147, and State of
Tamilnadu etc v. L. Abukavar Bai & Ors C.A. No. 957-966 (N)
of 1973 decided on 31-10-1983 followed.
1.4 The provisions of the Amendment by which the raiyat
is enjoined to reside in the village itself for a large part
of the year cannot be said to be either harsh or arbitrary.
Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani etc. v. Union of India &
Ors. [1981]2 S.C.R. 950, applied.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 5545 of 1980.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
Pankaj Malik and Mr. R. P. Singh for the Petitioners.
S. N. Kacker and Rathin Das for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. True to the spirit and letter of our
Constitution and in fulfilment of the promises made by our
national leaders to the people of India, the Government
sought to introduce agrarian
851
reforms so as to reserve the lands to the tillers of the
soil giving marginal relief or compensation to the erstwhile
landlords or tenants in-chief, through various statutes
passed by almost all the States in the country. I n order to
hasten and safeguard the agrarian reforms the Constitution
takes full care by virtue of the insertion of the directive
principles of Stale policy- contained in part IV, which are
undoubtedly the heart and soul of our Constitution and have
in fact been complied with in a variety of spheres.
Ceaseless attempts made by the landlords to challenge the
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constitutional validity of the aforesaid reforms met with
little success. Having failed in their attempts to undo the
socialist reforms passed for the purpose of building an
egalitarian society and bringing about marked improvement in
the condition of the poor suffering tillers by the various
Acts passed by the States, the landlords left no stone
unturned and were always on the look out for an opportunity
to ’ seize the lands from the tenants on one pretext or the
other through manpowers muscle-power or money-power.
Nevertheless, the constitutional validity of most of the
Acts came up for decision in the High Courts and in this
Court and by and large each one of them was held to be
constitutionally valid, thus setting at naught the attempts
of the landlords to take back possession of the lands which
should have been given to the tillers of the soil long
before. The landlords were thus unable to get hold of any
opportunity to pounce upon the land which went and should
have gone to the actual tillers of the soil.
Thereafter, some of the bigger landlords tried through
their dextrous methods aud legal ingenuity to defeat the
laudable social endeavour of the Government by making a show
of the so-called complete destruction of their assess and
properties reducing them to starvation. This case is yet
another glaring illustration of such an adroit attempt made
by the tenants-in-chief to deprive the actual tillers of the
rights conferred on them by the Land Reforms Acts of West
Bengal passed from 1953 to 1977. In view, however, of the
modern trends of the decisions of this Court, which always
made a practical and pragmatic approach to any progressive
step taken by the Parliament, the attempts of the landlords
ultimately proved to be a grotesque failure.
Coming now to the facts of the case, a brief history of
the admirable object of the agrarian reforms introduced by
the Government of West Bengal may be necessary as a prelude
to our discussion of the subject, In fact, all the
contentions raised before us stand
852
concluded by a recent decision of this Court as we shall
show hereafter. Not content with the addition of Art.31C of
the Constitution which was introduced by the constitution
(25th Amendment) Act, 1971, the petitioners chose to call
into aid the decisions of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd.
v. Union of India & Ors and Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of
Indian & Ors, which also proved to be an exercise futility
because the ratio of, these cases is in no way of any
assistance to the petitioners.
In the instant case, we are concerned with agrarian
reforms achieved from time to time by the Government of West
Bengal in order to improve the lot of the tillers of the
land by giving them as many facilities as could be possible
within the framework of the law and the Constitution. Having
realised that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition ’Act, 1953
(hereinafter referred to as the ’1953 Act’) could not be
challenged the landlords waited for future litigations swoop
down on the validity of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act,
1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ’1955 Act’) as amended
by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 and
the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977 (for
facility, to be referred to as the ’Amendment Act of 1972’
and ’Amendment Act of 1977’ respectively).
In the first round which was the subject matter of a
decision of this Court Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani and Sri
Sri Raghunath Jew & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. to
which one of us Fazal Ali, J.) was a party, this Court
negatived the constitutional objections and contentions
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raised by the landlords against the reforms introduced by
the 1955 Act and the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts.
Unfortunately, however, there appears to be some small
lacuna in the above judgment which was unhesitatingly
exploited by the petitioners so as to attempt to destroy the
progressive amendments of 1972 and 1977 particularly taking
advantage of certain observations made in that case to which
we shall come later.
To begin with, in the 1953 Act which was enforced with
effect from 12th February, 1954, Section 4 introduced a more
or less radical reform for the benefit of the actual tillers
by abolishing the rights of
853
the intermediary (ex-landlords). By virtue of this section
all estates and the rights of every intermediary was to vest
in the State free from all encumbrances from a date
mentioned in a notification issued by the Government. In
order, however, to be just and fair to the erstwhile
landlords they were conferred the status of raiyats or
tenants. By virtue of s. 6 they were entitled to retain
certain categories of lands like lands comprised in home-
steads or’ appertaining to buildings and structures, etc.,
of non-agricultural land in khas possession. Section 6(d)
expressly provided that so far as agricultural land in khas,
possession was concerned it would not exceed twenty five
acres in area to be chosen by the landlord. No serious
grievance was made before us regarding the provisions of
sections 4 to 6 excepting that the ceiling of twenty five
acres was not sufficient for the landlords to make both
their ends meet and enable them to earn their livelihood
Such a plea has to be stated only to be rejected because the
landlords who had huge lands comprising home-stead lands or
those appertaining to buildings or structures and non-
agricultural lands in khas possession were not at all
touched by the 1953 Act. In these circumstance therefore, we
do not take any serious notice of this grievance which in
fact was not pressed before us.
Realising the current trends in the social, approach of
the agrarian reforms made by the courts, the counsel for the
petitioners confined his arguments to three infirmities from
which the 1953 Act and the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts
suffered. However, during the course of arguments the
challenge remained confined only to certain specific
amendments made by the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts and the
points raised before us may be summarised thus: -
(1) that the total ceiling area allowed to be retained
by the 1953 Act in respect of agricultural land in
khas possession of the raiyats was drastically
reduced,
(2) that although the status of raiyats was conferred
on the erstwhile landlords which was heritable and
transferable, the institution of bargardars was
introduced in order to enable the raiyats to
cultivate their lands on a 50:50 basis, and ’
(3) that while the Amendment Act of 1972 had given a
right to the raiyats to resume the lands given to
the
854
bargardars for their personal cultivation, the
subsequent amendments took away this right and
made the right of the bargardar both heritable and
transferable causing serious detriment and
prejudice to the raiyats.
We now proceed to refer only to those provisions whose
constitutional validity has been seriously challenged by the
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petitioners. It appears that by the 1972 Amendment Act
certain changes were made and a reference was made
particularly to s. 14M which may be extracted thus
"14M. Ceiling area-(1) The ceiling area shall be,-
(a) in the case of a raiyat, who is an adult
unmarried person, 2.50 standard hectares;
(b) in the case of a raiyat, who is the sole
surviving member of a family, 2.50 standard
hectares;
(c) in the case of a raiyat having a family
consisting of two or more but not more than
five members, 5.00 standard hectares;
(d) in the care of a raiyat having a family
consisting of more than five members, 5.00
standard hectares, plus 0.50 standard hectare
for each member in excess of five, so,
however that the aggregate of the ceiling
area for such raiyat shall not, in any case,
exceed 7.00 standard hectares,
(e) in the case of any other raiyat, 7.00
standard hectares;
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), where, in the family of a raiyat, there are
more raiyats than one, the ceiling area for the
raiyat, together with the ceiling area of all the
other raiyats in the family shall not, in any
case, exceed,-
(a) where the number of members of such family
does not exceed five, 5.00 standard hectares;
855
(b) where such number exceeds five, 5.00 standard
hectares, plus 0.50 standard hectare for each
member in excess of five, so, however, that
the aggregate of the ceiling area shall not,
in any case, exceed 7.00 standard hectares.
(3) For the purpose of sub-section (2), all the lands
owned individually by the members of a family or
jointly by some or all the members of such family
shall be deemed to be owned by the raiyats in the
family."
It was submitted that the drastic reduction of the area
of the raiyat has been reduced to 2.50 standard hectares
being the minimum and 7.00 standard hectares being the
maximum according to the nature of cases mentioned in
cls.(a) to (e) of s. 14M(I) and cls.(a) and (b) of s.
14M(2), as extracted above, which worked serious injustice
to the tenants.
A strong exception was taken to the amendment of s.17
of the 1955 Act particularly the substitution of s.17.(c)
and the various - provisos to that section. The validity of
s.17(6) was also challenged on the ground that the
legislation was confiscatory.
The provisions of the proviso to cl.(8) of s.2 added by
the 1977 Amendment Act to the 1955 Act was seriously
assailed. The said proviso runs thus:
"Provided that such person or member of his family
resides for the greater part of the year in the
locality where the land is situated and the principal
source of his income is produced from such land."
A similar challenge was made to the addition of s.21B
in the 1955 Act by the 1977 Amendment Act. On similar
grounds the aforesaid provisions were also challenged in the
decision of this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case
-(supra) which did not meet with any success. It was,
however, pointed out by the counsel for the petitioners that
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this Court did not accept the arguments of the petitioners
in that case because it was under an erroneous impression
that the 1955 Act and the Amendment Acts of 1972 and 1977
were added to the Ninth Schedule in the Constitution of
India and were
856
therefore, immune from challenge. To some extent the counsel
is right in his statement that such an inadvertent mistake
has crept in due to oversight because the 1955 Act and the
Amendment Acts of 1972 and 1977 were added to the ninth
Schedule by the 4th Amendment of the Constitution of 1976
being entry numbers 181 to 185. Hence, it could, be
reasonably argued that the constitutional validity’ of the
provisions, mentioned above, was justiciable and could be
gone into. Before dealing with these arguments it may be
necessary to extract certain portions of the decision of
this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case (supra)
where this Court after dealing with the various provisions’
observed thus:
"In the instant case, it is clear that the 1955
Act as also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the
Ninth Schedule, being entry Nos. 80 and 81, prior to
April 24, 1973. In these circumstances, it is manifest
that the aforesaid Acts are completely immune from
challenge on the ground that they are violative-of any
of the rights enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner,
therefore, was fully justified in making the concession
before us."
The error is undoubtedly there but neither the counsel
for the petitioners nor the counsel for the respondent drew
our attention to this omission. Even if the Acts were not
included in the Ninth Schedule their constitutional validity
could not be questioned because this Court has clearly held
in Sri Sri Kalimata Thankurani’s case that the provisions
are otherwise reasonable and give full effect to the
pragmatic and socialistic approach, where the following
observations were made:
"It would be seen that s.17 permits the cultivator
to terminate the Cultivation of the land by bargardar
and resume possession under his own cultivation if the
conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (d) of sub
section (l) of s. 17 are satisfied. Clause (d) may be
extracted thus:-
"That the person owning the land requires it
bonafide for bringing it under personal cultivation."
"Thus, the cultivator has a, right to get back the
land for personal cultivation if he requires it for his
bona fide
857
use and proves the some to the satisfaction of the
authority appointed under s.17(1)."
Referring to some of the provisions of the 1972
Amendment Act this Court held that the provision by which
the right of bargardar was protected and made heritable
could not be challenged as being either unconstitutional,
unreasonable or arbitrary.’ But this Court made some
observations which were in favour of the petitioner and
which may be extracted as follows .
"But when the Bargardor on his, own volition
surrenders or abandons the land, there is no reason why
the tenant should not be allowed to resume ’
cultivation and instead be compelled to get the land
cultivated by some other person nominated by the
authority concerned under s.49 of the 1955 Act. This
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provision therefore appears to us to be extremely harsh
and works serious injustice to the rights of the
tenants particularly after the ceiling are of the
tenant has been considerably reduced by the Amendment
Act of 1972. Thus, the tenant having a small area
guaranteed to him for his unit, he should have at least
fuller and more effective rights to get that area
cultivated by him or even ’by a bargardar of his choice
subject to resuming the same, if the bargardar
surrenders or abandons the land........ Unfortunately,
however, though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4)
and (5) of s.20B, which is only a penal section)
perilously border on arbitrariness and amounts to
serious curbs on the fundamental right of the
cultivator to pursue his occupation, we cannot however
strike down these provisions because they are contained
in the Amendment Act of 1972 which has been placed in
the Ninth Schedule prior to April 54, 1973, and
therefore fall within the protective umbrella and are
immune from challenge."
A capital was therefore made out of the above
observations in Sri . Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case.
Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in
Sasanka Sekhar Maity & Ors, v Union of India & Ors where
A.P. Sen, J., speaking for the Court, made the following
observations: -
858
In order, therefore, to reconcile the fundamental
rights of the community as a whole with the individual
rights of the more fortunate section of the community,
it was fundamentally necessary to make the impugned
legislation to secure to a certain extent the rights of
that part of the community which is denied its
legitimate share in the means of livelihood.
"The broad objectives or any, legislation relating
to agrarian reforms are materially four, viz., (I) to
maximise the agricultural output and productivity, (2)
a fair and equitable distribution, of agricultural
income, (3( increase in employment opportunities, and
(4) a social or ethical order. Though the abolition of
the zamidari system in the State of West Bengal was an
important step forward, the feudal structure remained
so far as the peasants were concerned. These objectives
have been achieved through progressive legislation "
These observations put the petitioners completely out
of court demolish the contentions advanced before us. The
four objectives mentioned by Sen,J. in the passage extracted
above are clearly brought out and implemented by virtue of
the impugned amendments in the 1955 Act.
So far as the decision in the case of Sri Sri Kalimata
Thakurani (supra) is concerned, in view of the
crystallisation of the law in Minerva Mills, Waman Rao
(supra) and Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/S. Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. cases which have been followed and
amplified is the recent decision of this Court in State of
Tamil Nadu , etc v. L Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. the matter is no
longer res integra and even if there was an inadvertent
error in the observations of this Court in Sri Sri Kalimata
Thakurani’s case, the same has become redundant as the
impugned provisions can be supported as squarely falling
within the four corners of Art.39(b) of the Constitution as
the intention of the Acts is to secure and promote the
objectives contained in Art.39(b). In this connection, we
might extract a few observations from L. Abu Kavur Bai Ors
(supra):
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859
"In view of Art.31C, which gives protective
umbrella against Art.31(2) also, the Court cannot
strike down the Act merely because the compensation for
taking over the transport services or its units is not
provided for. The reason for this is that Art.31C was
not merely a pragmatic approach to socialism but
imbibed a theoretical aspect by which all means of
production, key industries, mines, minerals, public
supplies, utilities and services may be taken gradually
under public ownership. management and control."
It was further argued by the petitioners that there was
no clear nexus between the Act and the objectives contained
in Art.39(b). We are, however, unable to agree with this
argument because the question of nexus has been clearly
expounded by this Court both in the Minerva Mills and
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co.’s cases as also in the case
of L. Abu Kavaur Bai & Ors. (supra) where a Constitution
Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us (Fazal
Ali,J.), made the following observations: D
"Another important facet of Art.31C which has been
emphasised by this Court is that there should be a
close nexus between the statute passed by the
legislature and the twin objects mentioned in clauses
(b) and (c) of Art.39. In approaching this problem and
considering the question of nexus a narrow approach
ought not to be made because it is well settled that
the courts should interpret a constitutional provision
in order to suppress the mischief and advance the
object of the Act. The doctrine of nexus cannot be
extended to such an extreme limit that the very purpose
of Art.39(b)&(c) is defeated If the nexus is present in
the law then the protection of Art.31C becomes complete
and irrevocable."
It was also argued that by virtue of the various
amendments made by the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts no
process of distribution is involved. This argument cannot be
accepted in view of the observations of this Court by
Krishna Iyer,J. in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy &
Anr. etc. where the learned Judge observed as follows:
860
"The next question is whether nationalisation can
have nexus with distribution...... To ’distribute’;
even in its simple dictionary meaning, is to allot to
divide into classes or into groups and ’distribution’
embraces arrangement, classification, placement,
disposition, apportionment, the way in which items, a
quantity, or the like is divided or apportioned; the
system of dispersing goods throughout a community.’’
The above observations were followed and amplified in
L. Abu Kavur Bai’ case (supra) thus:
"It is obvious, therefore, in view of the vast
range of transactions contemplated by the word
’distribution’ as mentioned in the dictionaries
referred to above, it will not be correct to construe
the word ’distribution’ in a purely literal sense so as
to mean only division of a particular persons. The
words, apportionment, allotment, allocation,
classification, clearly fall within the broad sweep of
the word ’distribution’. So construed, the word
’distribution’ as used in Art.39(b) will include
various facets, aspects, method and terminology of a
broad based concept of distribution
In view of the aforesaid observations, the challenge to
the impugned provisions of the Acts no longer survives.
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Moreover, what could have been a better mode of
distribution contemplated by Art.39(b) than to take away the
surplus agricultural lands from the landlords and distribute
it amongst the poor suffering landless tillers of the soil
who had suffered for centuries as vassals slaves of the rich
zamindars, The Acts have not touched the non agricultural
homestead lands or buildings ’standing thereon but has taken
over only a major portion of the agricultural lands, leaving
with the landlords a portion prescribed within the ceiling
limit, and distributed the excess to the tillers of the soil
which along constitute their main source of sustenance and
livelihood. The claim of the raiyats (erstwhile landlords
that the Acts amount to confiscation is absolutely untenable
and, if we dare say, it amounts only to shedding of
crocodile tears and an anathema or a taboo. We are
therefore convinced that the impugned amendments were
manifestly and pointedly made for the purpose of giving
effect to and securing the
861
Objects of Art.39(b) because these Acts clearly intended to
distribute the material resources of toe community, viz.,
the agricultural lands to a large number of tillers of the
soil. in order to serve the common good of the aforesaid
people. The challenge to the impugned Acts and amendments
must therefore fail as the amendments fall within the letter
and spirit. Of Art.39(b).
Finally, it was suggested that the provision of the
amendment by which the raiyat is enjoined to reside In the
village itself for a large part of the year seems to be
harsh and arbitrary. This argument does not hold any water
for two reasons-
(1) that when once it is found that the Act is meant
to promote and effectuate the objectives contained
in Art.39(b), which is no doubt the case here, no
other ground of challenge would survive because by
virtue of Art.31C any Act which seems to secure
the objects of Art.39(b) cannot be challenged
being violative of Art. 14, 19 or 31.
(2) Secondly, the provision that the land-owner should
reside in the village is both salutary and
beneficial, the object being that if a raiyat
wants to cultivate his own land he must give his
whole-hearted attention to the said land instead
of living the village and carrying on other
avocations of life.
One of us, (Fazal Ali,J.) had clearly adverted to this
aspect of the matter in Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani’s case
(supra) and observed h as follows:-
"The dominant object of the proviso is to abolish
the age-old institutions of absentee land-holder by
insisting that the cultivator to whom land is allotted
must give full and complete attention to the soil and
as a result of. which there will be maximum utilisation
of the agricultural resources which would increase
production......... It is obvious that the tenant has
to remain in the village for the purpose of cultivating
the lands. sowing the seeds, growing it and harvesting
it. These processes would doubtless requires the
presence of the tenant for a greater part of the year
which is that the proviso predicates. If
862
the tenant is permitted to leave the village for more
than half the year then the very purpose of giving such
a vast area for cultivation to a tenant will be foiled
Moreover the proviso merely insists that the tenant
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should remain in the village or its periphery for
’greater part of the year’ which appears to be not only
responsible but absolutely essential if the land has to
be cultivated in a scientific manner in order to yield
the maximum possible production, which would result in
better and equitable distribution of agricultural
products for the use of the people of the country."
For the reasons given above all the contentions raised
by the petitioners fail and the writ petition is dismissed
but without any order as to costs.
S.R. Petitions dismissed.
863