Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S.MOHAN LAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
R. KONDIAH
DATE OF JUDGMENT05/02/1979
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION:
1979 AIR 1132 1979 SCR (3) 12
1979 SCC (2) 616
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1988 SC 852 (8)
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act, 1960, s. 10(3)(a)(iii), "business,"
interpretation, whether includes practice of legal
profession-Construction of expressions, principles.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, an advocate, sought to evict his
tenant, the appellant, under s. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the
Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960, on the ground that he required the disputed
premises for carrying on his profession. The court of small
causes, Hyderabad, finding that the requirement was bona
fide, passed an eviction order against the appellant. In
revision, the High Court negatived the contention that the
expression "business" used in s. 10(3)(a)(iii), did not
include the ’profession’ of an advocate.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
^
HELD: 1. "Business" is a word of large and wide import,
capable of a variety of meanings. In a broad sense it is
taken to mean ’everything that occupies the time, attention
and labour of men, for the purpose of livlihood or profit’.
The practice of law is ’business’ within the meaning of that
expression in s. 10(3)(a)(iii). The Act is of general
application, and its protection is not confined to any
classes of tenants, nor is the right to evict under the Act,
limited to any class of landlords. There is no reason why a
landlord who is a member of the legal or medical professions
and who requires the premises for carrying on the practice
of his profession, should be wholly debarred from obtaining
possession of the premises. It would be anamolous to hold
that all the provisions of the Act apply to non-residential
buildings owned by an Advocate, excepting s. 10(3)(a)(iii).
[14D, E, 16A-B, C-D]
Williams’ Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China and Anr. v. Williams and Ors., [1953] 1
All. ELR 536; Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surey & Ors. 1971 MPLJ
888, approved.
M. P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty
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Amma’s daughter, Meenakshi Amma & Ors., AIR 1967 Kerala 88;
Bangalore Water-Supply Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa &
Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 207; Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident
Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd., [1949] 2 KBD 256;
distinguished.
2. It is a sound principle of construction that,
meaning of words and expressions used in an Act, must take
their colour from the context in which they appear. Neither
the meaning, nor the definition of a term in one statute,
affords a guide to the construction of the same term in
another statute, more so, if the two Acts in which the same
word is used, are not cognate Acts and the sense in which a
term has been understood in several statutes, does not
necessarily throw any light on the manner in which it should
be under stood generally. [14G-H & 15A]
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2047 of
1969.
A Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 25-6-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil
Revision Petition No. 346/67.
Y. S. Chitaley, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul
Anam for the Appellant.
A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHlNNAPPA REDDY, J.-The short question for
consideration in this appeal is whether the practice of the
legal profession is ’business’ within the meaning of Section
10(3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent
and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The question arises this
way. The respondent, an Advocate filed an application before
the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the appellant, his
tenant, from the premises in question on the ground that he
required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his
profession as an Advocate. The application was contested by
the appellant who was carrying on the business of
manufacturing art jewellery in the premises. We are not
concerned in this appeal with the several defences which
were raised by the appellant. Nor are we concerned with the
vicissitudes which the case underwent. For the purposes of
this appeal it is sufficient to say that the final Court of
fact, namely the Chief Judge of the Court of Small causes,
Hyderabad, found that the respondent bona fide required the
premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an
Advocate and that the tenancy was not such as could be split
up. The Appellate authorities passed an order of eviction
against the appellant. Before the High Court, in revision,
it was contended by the appellant that the practice of the
profession of an Advocate was not business within the
meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (iii) and, therefore, the
respondent could not seek the eviction of the appellant on
the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of
carrying on his profession as an Advocate. It was contended
that Section 10(3) (a) (iii) used the expression ’business’
only and not the expression ’profession.’ The contention was
negatived by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh consisting of Gopalrao Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao,
JJ. The tenant has appealed by special leave to this Court.
Dr. Chitaley learned counsel for the appellant argued
that there was a clear distinction between ’business’ and
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’profession’ and that the practice of a liberal profession
like that of an Advocate or a Doctor which
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had nothing commercial about it was not business within the
meaning of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings ( Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act 1960. He
argued that though the Andhra Pradesh Act broadly classified
buildings into residential and non-residential buildings,
the landlord of a non-residential building could not seek to
evict his tenant on the ground of his requirement unless it
was for the purpose of carrying on a business. According to
the learned Counsel this indicated that the expression
business was to be given a narrow meaning and was to be
confined to activities of a commercial nature. The learned
Counsel also urged that the Court should favour a
construction which would be beneficient to the tenant. Dr.
Chitaley relied on M. P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath
Kunhukutty Amma’s daughter, Meenakshi Amma and Ors. (1)
Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board etc. v. R. Rajappa &
Ors. (2) and Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and
Life Insurance Corporation Ltd.(3)
The expression business has not been defined in the
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960. It is a common expression which is sometimes used
by itself and sometimes in a collocation of words as in
"business, trade or profession". It is a word of large and
wide import,, capable of a variety of meanings. It is
needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the
various Dictionaries except to say that everyone of them
notices a large number of meanings of the word. In a broad
sense it is taken to mean everything that occupies the time
attention and labour of men for the purpose of livlihood or
profit’. In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial
activity. It is obvious that the meaning of the word must be
gleaned from the context in which it is used. Reference to
the provisions of the Constitution or other statutes where!
the expression is used cannot be of any assistance in
determining its meaning in Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the
Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960. It is not a sound principle of construction tn
interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to
their use in another Act; more so, if the two Acts in which
the same word is used are not cognate Acts. Neither the
meaning, nor the definition of the term in one statute
affords a guide to the construction of the same term in
another statute and the sense in which the term has been
understood in the several statutes does not necessarily
throw any light on the manner in which the term should be
understood generally. On the other hand it is a
(1) A.I.R. 1967 Kerala 88.
(2) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207.
(3) [1949] 2 K. B. D. 256.
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sound, and, indeed, a well known principle of construction
that meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must
take their colour from the content in which they appear. Dr.
Chitaley very frankly and fairly conceded as much.
Now the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction) Control Act, 1960, is an ’Act to consolidate, and
amend the law relating to the regulation of leasing of
buildings, the control of rent thereof an(l the prevention
of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State
of Andhra Pradesh. It applies to the cities of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad and to all municipalities in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. The provisions of the Act, however, do not
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apply to buildings owned by the Government and to buildings
constructed on or after 26th August, 1957. Building is
broadly defined as meaning any house or hut or a part of a
house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or
nonresidential purposes. Landlord is defined as the owner of
a building, including a person who is receiving or is
entitled to receive the rent of a building, on his own
account or on behalf of another person etc. Tenant is
defined as a person by whom or on whose account rent is
payable for a building. Section 4 provides for the
determination of a fair rent of a building on the
application of the tenant or landlord. Section 10(1)
provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in
execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 10, 12 and 13. Section 10(2)
mentions several grounds on which a landlord may seek to
evict a tenant. The grounds are default of payment of rent,
sub-letting of premises, used for a purpose other than that
for which it was leased, commission of acts of waste,
conduct amounting to nuisance to the occupiers of the other
portions in the same building, securing of alternative
accommodation by the tenant and denial of the title of the
landlord. The grounds mentioned in Section 10(2) apply both
to residential and non-residential buildings. Section 10(3)
(a) (i) provides for the eviction of a tenant where the
landlord of a residential building requires it for his own
occupation. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) provides for the eviction
of a tenant from a non-residential building where "the
landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in a
city town or village concerned which is his own or to the
possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or
otherwise-(a) for the purpose of a business which he is
carrying on on the date of the application, or (b) for the
purpose of a business which in the opinion of the
Controller, the landlord bona-fide proposes to commence".
Section 12 and 13 contain special provisions relating to
recovery of buildings by landlord for the purpose of
effecting repairs, alterations or additions or for
reconstruction. The scheme of the Act is to prevent
unreasonable eviction of
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tenants by landlords and to provide for eviction on
specified grounds. The Act is of general application and its
protection not confined to any classes of tenants nor is the
right to evict under the Act limited to any class of
landlords. There is no reason why a landlord who is a member
of the legal or medical professions and who requires the
premises for carrying on the practice of his profession
should be wholly debarred from obtaining possession of the
premises. It is impossible to discover any reason for so
making a discrimination against the liberal professions.
But, that would be the result if the expression ’business’
is given a narrow meaning which the appellant wants us to
give to that expression. It would indeed be anamolous to
hold that all the provisions of the Act including Section 4
which provides for the determination of fair rent and
Section 10(1) which bars the eviction of tenants apply to
nonresidential buildings owned by an Advocate but not
Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) only. In our view the expression
business occurring in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is used in a
wide sense so as to include the practice of the profession
of an Advocate.
The Kerala High Court in M.P. Sethurama Menon v.
Meenakshi Amma & Ors., (supra) construed the expression
’trade or business’ as connoting commercial activity and as
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not including the practice of the legal profession. The
learned Judges referred to Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution, Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the
Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and drew a
distinction between the words ’business’ and ’profession.’
As mentioned by us earlier, we do not think that it is right
to ascribe to the word ’business’ occurring in the Andhra
Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
1960, the same meaning that the word may have when it occurs
in other statutory provisions. The word must be interpreted
in the context of the statute in which it occurs and not in
the context of other statutes or in a manner alien to the
context of the statute concerned.
In Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board etc. v. R.
Rajappa Ors., (supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was)
observed ".. I find myself unable to accept the broad
formulation that a Solicitor’s establishment cannot be an
industry. A Solicitor, undoubtedly, does not carry on trade
or business when he acts for his client or advises him or
pleads for him, if and when pleading is permissible to him.
He pursues a profession which is variously and justifiably
described as learned, liberal or noble." The observations of
the Learned Judge were made in the context of the question
whether a Solicitor’s establishment would fall within the
definition of ’industry’ under the
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Industrial Disputes Act. It would be most unwise to apply
this A observation to determine whether the practice of the
liberal professions is within the meaning of the expression
’business’ in Rent Control legislation.
In Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corporation Ltd., (supra) it was observed that the
carrying on of a Solicitor’s business was the carrying on of
a profession and was not the carrying on of a trade or
business within the meaning of that phrase in the Landlord
and Tenant Act, 1927. The observation was made in the
context of that Act which made a distinction between ’trade
or business’ and ’profession’. In fact sub-section 3(a) of
Section 17 of the Act expressly said: "for the purposes of
this Section premises shall not be deemed to be premises
used for carrying on there at a trade or business by reason
of their being used for the purpose of carrying on there at
any profession". The question in that case was about the
right to compensation for the goodwill attached to the
premises where the "business" or "profession" was being
carried on. We do not think 1 that the case is of any help
to the appellant.
We may refer here to the decision of Danckwerts, J., in
Re Williams’ Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China and Another v. Williams and Others.(1) where the
question was whether the bequest to a son for the purpose of
starting him in ’business’ was affective to start the son in
medical practice. The learned Judge held that it did,
observing that the word ’business’ was capable of including
the practice of a profession and that it plainly included
the profession of a Doctor.
We may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v.
Laxman Sewak Surey Ors(2) where this very question whether
the practice of law was a ’business’ within the meaning of
the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for
consideration before A. P. Sen, J. The learned Judge held
that in the context of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the word
’business’ had to be given a wide meaning so as to include
any profession.
We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the
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practice of law is ’business’ within the meaning of that
expression in Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 196(). The
appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
M. R. Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1953] All E.R. 536.
(2) [1971] M.P.L.J. 888.
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