Inder Singh vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 382
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
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INDER SINGH …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the Order dated 29.01.2024
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by a
learned Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.03.21
18:37:37 IST
Reason:
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Gwalior Bench (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) in I.A.
No.2022/2020 in Second Appeal No.1253 of 2020 filed by the
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respondent, whereby the said I.A. under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay in filing the Second Appeal,
has been allowed with a direction for listing the Second Appeal to be
heard on admission as well as the accompanying stay application.
FACTS:
3. On 14.12.2012, the appellant filed Civil Suit No.17-A/2013
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit’) before the learned Second
Additional District Judge, Class-1, Ashoknagar, Madhya Pradesh
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) for declaration of title,
possession and permanent injunction in respect of Land Survey
No.8/1 having an area of 1.060 hectare (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘suit property’) situated in Village Mohrirai, Tehsil and District
Ashoknagar, contending that an order dated 30.08.1977 was
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‘ 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases .—Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court
that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause
within the meaning of this section. ’
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passed in his favour, wherein he was allotted the suit property.
Thereafter, by mistake, in place of the appellant’s name i.e., Inder
Singh, Ishwar Singh’s name was wrongly recorded in the revenue
records. Such mistake was rectified on an application filed by the
appellant before the Additional Collector, Gwalior by order dated
24.08.1978. Pursuant thereto, the appellant obtained a loan from a
bank for digging a well in the suit property. It is further averred in the
suit that the respondent had declared the land in question to be
‘ Government Land ’, without any prior notice to the appellant.
4. The respondent-State countered the pleadings of the
appellant before the Trial Court. The State contended that the entire
area admeasuring 5.696 hectares of Land Survey No.1 was
government land from the very beginning and the aforesaid land
has been recorded as graze land, out of which, by order dated
14.09.2006 in Case No.15A6A/05-06 of the Tehsildar Ashoknagar,
an area of 2.090 hectares land was reserved for the Youth Welfare
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Department and the remaining area of 3.606 hectares land for the
2
Now known as the Sports and Youth Welfare Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh.
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Collectorate. It was denied that the appellant was ever in
possession of the land.
5. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 16.08.2013, following
which the appellant filed Civil Appeal No.32A of 2015 before the
Second Additional District Judge, Ashoknagar (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘First Appellate Court’), which was allowed by order dated
01.10.2015, overruling the Trial Court’s judgment dated 16.08.2013.
The First Appellate Court declared the appellant as the landlord of
the suit property.
6. The respondent filed a Review Petition viz . Case No.92 of
2018 before the First Appellate Court, which was dismissed on the
ground of delay on 30.09.2019, as the delay in filing the Review
Petition was not explained with any sufficient cause from the
respondent’s side. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent, in
August, 2020, filed the Second Appeal bearing No.1253 of 2020
along with I.A. No.2022/2020, seeking condonation of delay in filing
the Second Appeal, in the High Court. The High Court by Impugned
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Order condoned the delay and ordered for listing the Second Appeal
for hearing on admission as well as application for stay.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High
Court had failed to deal with how ‘ sufficient cause ’ had been shown
by the respondent for condoning the delay, moreso when the
respondent’s Review Petition before the First Appellate Court was
also dismissed on the ground of delay as they did not provide any
justification for filing the review after a delay of over two years. He
contended that it is settled law that ‘ sufficient cause ’ means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or failed to
exercise due diligence. Therefore, the appellant’s argument that the
cause of delay was due to COVID-19 cannot be accepted, as the
respondent failed to remain vigilant, since the cause of action arose
much before the pandemic hit.
8. With regard to the Impugned Order referring to the judgment
in Sheo Raj Singh v Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 , where it
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has been observed that Courts must take a liberal approach
regarding delays in appeals filed by the State, the learned counsel
for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to Paragraphs no.17 and
22 of State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare And
Brothers , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151, wherein it was held:
‘ 17. The explanation as given in the affidavit in
support of the application for condonation of delay
filed by the Petitioners in the High Court does not
make out sufficient cause for condonation of the
inordinate delay of 337 days in filing the appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. The law of limitation binds
everybody including the Government. The usual
explanation of red tapism, pushing of files and the
rigmarole of procedures cannot be accepted as
sufficient cause. The Government Departments
are under an obligation to exercise due diligence
to ensure that their right to initiate legal
proceedings is not extinguished by operation of
the law of limitation. A different yardstick for
condonation of delay cannot be laid down
because the government is involved.
xxx
22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is
pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim
on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the
Courts lean towards consideration on merits by
adopting a liberal approach towards ‘sufficient
cause’ to condone the delay. The Court
considering an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie
merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the
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Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie
case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach,
may adopted when some plausible cause for
delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean
that an appeal should be allowed even if the
cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should
not waive limitation for all practical purposes by
condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy
lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning. ’
9. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the
judgment in Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector ,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, wherein Paragraph no.26(v) states:
‘ Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay
if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence. ’ Hence, it
was contended that this Court should not waive limitation, for all
practical purposes, by condoning delay caused by the lackadaisical
negligent manner of functioning of the respondent. It was urged that
the appeal ought to be allowed and the Impugned Order be set
aside.
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SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
10. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that out of the
delay of 1537 days in filing the Second Appeal, around three years
was consumed in filing the Review Petition before the First
Appellate Court and after its eventual dismissal on 30.09.2019, by
the time the filing process could begin for the Second Appeal, the
COVID-19 pandemic arose and it could only get filed in August,
2020. Therefore, the delay caused in filing the Second Appeal was
unintentional, much less due to any deliberate laches, and was well-
explained by the State before the High Court. It was contended that
hence, rightly the delay caused in filing of the Second Appeal was
condoned. The respondent further submitted that since the suit
property was important and valuable government land, this Court
should sustain the Impugned Order as it would entail substantial
justice being done to both parties by leading to the eventual
disposal of the matter on merits. Reliance was placed on the case
of State of Bihar v Kameshwar Prasad Singh , (2000) 9 SCC 94 .
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11. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the interpretation of the words ‘ sufficient cause ’
should be such that it is construed liberally. By referring to the
decision in State of West Bengal v Administrator, Howrah
Municipality , (1972) 1 SCC 366, the respondent contended that a
liberal interpretation should specially be taken in the present case
as the State has not been negligent in pursuing the remedies
available to it under law. Moreoever, the submission was that
COVID-19 not being an extraneous circumstance, the State should
not be punished for the delay in filing the Second Appeal.
12. With regard to the facts of the case, the respondent points
out that the Trial Court had initially dismissed the suit, inter alia , on
the grounds that he did not place any documentary evidence
reflecting his title and there were also instances of fraud played by
the appellant as he had exchanged certain vital documents. It was
urged that this was the reason why it was all the more important for
the underlying matter to be heard on merits by the High Court. It
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was canvassed that the appeal should be dismissed and the
Impugned Order be upheld.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
13. In the present case, the contentions of the appellant, on first
blush appears to be attractive, inasmuch as the State cannot be
given any undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant,
especially in matters of limitation. There is no doubt that all parties,
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whether or not State under Article 12 of the Constitution, are
required to act with due diligence and promptitude.
14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that
delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major
aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case,
the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on
the basis of limitation.

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15. In the present case, the filing of the Review Petition before
the First Appellate Court was with a delay of two years and four
months and the Second Appeal before the High Court was delayed
by about a year from the date of the dismissal of the Review Petition
i.e., 30.09.2019. Pausing for a moment, it is necessary to indicate
that in the present case, the dispute over title of a land is not
between private parties, but rather between the private party and
the State. Moreover, when the land in question was taken
possession of by the State and allotted for public purpose to the
Youth Welfare Department and the Collectorate and has continued
in the possession of the State, the claim of the State that it is
government land cannot be summarily discarded. We find, upon a
perusal of the record, that the appellant had, in fact, filed an
execution case for taking over possession of the land, which would
demonstrate clearly the admitted position that he was not in
possession thereof. Thus, the matter would, in our considered view,
require adjudication on its own merits due to various reasons, inter
alia , the fact that a new district has been formed after the initial
claim of the appellant of being allotted the land in the years 1975-
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1976/1977-1978. Therefore, the delay of 1537 days reckoned from
01.10.2015 i.e. when the First Appellate Court decreed the suit,
includes two years and four months delay in filing a Review Petition
(which was itself dismissed on the ground of delay by the First
Appellate Court) and of about a year thereafter for filing the Second
Appeal before the High Court, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, which, at the cost of repetition relate to
land claimed by the State as government land and in its possession,
persuade us to not interfere with the Impugned Order. Relevantly,
initially the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, which decision
was reversed by the First Appellate Court.
16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of
Maharashtra , (1974) 1 SCC 317 held:
‘ 10. …There was a delay of more than ten or
twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual
of the cause of complaint, and this delay,
contended the respondents, was sufficient to
disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not
think this contention should prevail with us. In the
first place, it must be remembered that the rule
which says that the Court may not inquire into
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belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a
rule of practice based on sound and proper
exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable
rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must
necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each
case must depend on its own facts. The question,
as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110,
116 :(1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for
this Court to follow from case to case. There is no
lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all
depend on what the breach of the fundamental
right and the remedy claimed are and how the
delay arose”. ’
(emphasis supplied)
17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar ( supra ) relates to
a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo Raj
Singh ( supra ) has also considered the impersonal nature of the
functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed in State
of Manipur v Kotin Lamkang , (2019) 10 SCC 408 . In A B
Govardhan v P Ragothaman , (2024) 10 SCC 613 , the Court
considered as under:
‘ 37.  In   Collector (LA)   v.   Katiji  [Collector
(LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107], the Court noted
that it had been adopting a justifiably liberal
approach in condoning delay and that “justice on
merits” is to be preferred as against what “scuttles
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a decision on merits”. Albeit, while reversing an
order of the High Court therein condoning delay,
principles to guide the consideration of an
application for condonation of delay were culled
out in   Esha Bhattacharjee   v.   Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014) 1
SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2
SCC (L&S) 595]. One of the factors taken note of
therein was that substantial justice is paramount
[Para 21.3 of Esha Bhattacharjee [Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy,
(2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713:
(2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S)
595]].
38.  In   N.L. Abhyankar   v.   Union of India  [N.L.
Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine
Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], a Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur considered,
though in the context of delay vis-à-vis Article 226
of the Constitution, the decision in   Dehri Rohtas
Light Railway Co. Ltd.   v.   District Board,
Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co.
Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC
598] , and held that: (N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L.
Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine
Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine
Bom para 22)
“22. … The real test for sound exercise
of discretion by the High Court in this
regard is not the physical running of time
as such, but the test is whether by
reason of delay there is such negligence
on the part of the petitioner, so as to
infer that he has given up his claim or
whether before the petitioner has moved
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the writ court, the rights of the third
parties have come into being which
should not be allowed to be disturbed
unless there is reasonable explanation
for the delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
39.  The Bombay High Court's eloquent statement
of the correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar
case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC
OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] found
approval in Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal
Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000)
2 SCC 48] and Mool Chandra v. Union of
India [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1
SCC 625: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878].
40.  In the wake of the authorities
abovementioned, taking a liberal approach
subserving the cause of justice, we condone the
delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019, subject to
payment of costs of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty
thousand) by the appellant to the respondent. ’
(emphasis supplied)
18. Considering the above pronouncements and on an overall
circumspection, we are of the opinion that the Second Appeal
deserves to be heard, contested and decided on merits. However, a
note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude
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in like matters henceforth and in futuro , failing which the Court may
not be as liberal.
19. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed. The
Impugned Order is upheld with the imposition of costs infra .
4 5
20. No order as to costs. I.A.s No.62432/2024 and 62433/2024
are allowed.
21. To offset, to some extent, the hardship of the appellant in
pursuing his legal remedies, we deem it appropriate that costs of
Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) be paid by the respondent to
the appellant, subject to which the delay in filing the Second Appeal
shall be treated as condoned. Let such payment be made within
one month from today. Failure to do so shall entail peremptory
dismissal of the Second Appeal.
22. Further, if the payment is made within the timeline stipulated
above, the High Court is requested to take up the Second Appeal on
priority and endeavour to dispose it of expeditiously.
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Seeking exemption from filing Certified Copy of the Impugned Judgment.
5
Seeking exemption from filing Official Translation(s).
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23. Our observations are in the context of the Impugned Order
alone. They will neither aid nor prejudice either party in the Second
Appeal. Parties are at liberty to raise all contentions of fact and law
before the High Court on merits.
.……………….......................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
.………………...................…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
MARCH 21, 2025
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