Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1441 of 1981
PETITIONER:
MONOTOSH KUMAR MITRA (DEAD) BY LRS. ...
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
AMARENDRANATH SHAW (DEAD) & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/02/2000
BENCH:
S.S.Ahamad, Y.K.Sabharwal
JUDGMENT:
L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J
SABHARWAL J.
In a mortgage suit, a preliminary decree was passed in
favour of the appellant on 18th November, 1968. The said
decree directed the payment of the sum of Rs.24,000/- in
four equal instalments. The first instalment was payable on
or before 31st March, 1969 and subsequent instalments by
31st day of March of each succeeding years. Thus the last
instalment was payable on 31st March, 1972. The decree
further stipulated that in case of default of payment of any
one of the instalments, the plaintiff may, subject to the
provisions of Bengal Money Lenders’ Act, 1960 (for short,
Bengal Act), apply to the Court for a final decree for sale
of the mortgaged property and on such application being
granted, the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof
shall be directed to be sold.
It has not been questioned that neither the first
instalment payable under the decree on or before 31st March,
1969, was paid by the defendants nor was any subsequent
instalment paid.
Order 34 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure inter alia
stipulates grant of six months’ time to the defendant to pay
the mortgage amount stipulated under the preliminary decree
and on default of payment, the plaintiff is entitled to
apply for final decree directing sale of the mortgaged
property as stipulated by Rule 4 of Order 34. Section 34 of
Bengal Act, however, empowers the Court to direct payments
by instalments notwithstanding the limit of six months fixed
in Order 34 of Code of Civil Procedure. Section 34 of the
Bengal Act reads as under :-
"34. Power of Court to direct payment by instalments
-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
time being in force, or in any agreement, the Court shall --
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(a) in suits in respect of loans to which the
provisions of Order XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply, on the application of the
defendant and after hearing the plaintiff, notwithstanding
the limit of six months provided herein, direct at the time
of the passing of the preliminary decree under rule 2 or
rule 4 of the said Order to the effect mentioned in
sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of the said
rule 2,-
(i) that the payment of the amount found or declared
due under sub-rule (1) of rule 2 or sub-rule (1) of rule 4
of the said Order, as the case may be, is to be made,
subject to such conditions as the Court may impose in such
number of annual instalments and on such dates as the Court
thinks fit having regard to the circumstances of the
plaintiff and the defendant and the amount of the decree;
and
(ii) that in default of payment of any such instalment
the plaintiff shall, after giving to the defendant such
notice as may be prescribed, be entitled to apply for a
final decree under sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of sub-rule
(1) of the said rule 2 or under sub-rule (1) of the said
rule 4, as the case may be, and the date of such default
shall be deemed to be the date fixed under sub-clause (I) of
clause (c) of sub- rule (1) of the said rule 2 for payment
of the whole amount fund or declared due under or by the
preliminary decree :
Provided that nothing in this clause shall affect the
power of the Court to allow extension of time under sub-rule
(2) of rule 2 or sub-rule (2) of rule 4 of the said Order :
Provided further that if the defendant, after
receiving the notice referred to in sub-clause (ii) and
before a final decree is passed, makes payment into Court of
the amount due from him in respect of any such instalment,
the payment of such instalment shall not be deemed to be in
default and the Court shall not pass a final decree;
(b) in suits in respect of loans advanced before the
commencement of this Act other than those referred to in
clause (a) --
(i) on the application of a defendant and after
hearing the plaintiff, order at the time of the passing of
the decree, or
(ii) on the application of a judgment-debtor against
whom a decree in such suit has been passed whether before or
after the commencement of this Act and after notice tot he
decree- holder, order at any time after the decree has been
passed, that the amount of the decree shall, subject to such
conditions as the Court may impose, be payable without
interest in such number of annual instalments, on such dates
and within such period not exceeding twenty years as the
Court thinks fit having regard to the circumstances of the
plaintiff and the defendant or the decree-holder and the
judgment-debtor and the amount of the decree, and that, if
default is made in making payment of any instalment, that
instalment and not the whole of the decretal amount shall be
recoverable;
(c) during the pendency of any enquiry under
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sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) order, subject to such
conditions as the Court may impose, the stay of execution of
the decree.
(2) In default of payment of any instalment referred
to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the decree-holder
shall, after giving to the judgment-debtor such notice as
may be prescribed, be entitled to apply for execution of the
decree in respect of such instalment together with interest
thereon at the rate of not more than six per centum per
annum from the date of such default:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect
the power of the Court to allow, prior to an order for
execution of the decree, an extension of time of not less
than one year for the payment of any instalment, and if such
extension of time is allowed, the payment of such instalment
shall not be deemed to be in default:
Provided further that if the judgment- debtor, after
receiving the notice referred to in this sub-section and
prior to an order for execution of the decree, makes payment
into Court of the amount due from him in respect of any such
instalment, the payment of such instalment shall not be
deemed to be in default and the Court shall not order
execution of the decree.
(3) Any order made under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b)
of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been passed under
section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
On failure of the defendants to pay any instalments,
the appellant served on them notice under the aforesaid
provision stating that the defendants had defaulted in
payment of all the instalments in terms of the decree, an
application will be made in the High Court of Calcutta
within 30 days for final decree for sale of the property.
The defendants having still failed to make any payment, an
application for passing final decree was filed by the
appellant in the High Court on or about 15th February, 1973.
The said application was dismissed by the learned Single
Judge as time barred and the appeal having been dismissed by
the Division Bench, the present appeal has been preferred by
the plaintiff.
An application for passing of the final decree is
governed by Residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
1963, under which application for passing of final decree
has to be filed within three years from the date when the
right to apply accrues. If the right to apply for final
decree had accrued to the plaintiff on default being
committed by the defendants in payment of the first
instalment itself on 31st March, 1969, the application for
passing of final decree would be required to be filed within
three years from the date of default. Not disputing that
the default was committed by defendants in payment of the
first instalment, learned counsel for the appellant contends
that default committed in each subsequent year in payment of
instalment gives rise to a fresh cause of action to apply
for passing of final decree and, therefore, such an
application having been filed on 15th February, 1973, would
not be time barred at least in respect of the instalments
which were payable under the decree on 31st March 1970, 1971
and 1972. It is further contended that the application may
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be time barred, at best, in relation to default committed by
defendants for payment of the first instalment payable on or
before 31st March, 1969.
It is evident from Section 34 of the Bengal Act that
in default of payment of any instalment, the date of such
default shall be deemed to be date fixed under sub-clause
(i) of clause (c) of Sub- Rule (1) of Rule 2 for payment of
the whole amount. The whole amount found or declared due
under or by a preliminary decree becomes payable and the
plaintiff becomes entitled to apply for a final decree
[Section 34(1)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Act]. It is thus clear
that notwithstanding the dates of the instalments having
been fixed under the preliminary decree which was subject to
the provisions of the Bengal Act, a right accrued to the
appellant to apply for final decree on default having been
committed by the defendants in payment of the amount of the
first instalment. It is not a case of a simple money
decree. It is a case of a mortgage where under the
preliminary decree, an opportunity is granted to the
defendants to pay the mortgage amount in default whereof the
plaintiff becomes entitled to apply for a final decree for
sale of the mortgaged property. That right accrued to the
plaintiff in this case on 31st March, 1969. The plaintiff
cannot extend the period of limitation by delaying service
of notice on defendant under Section 34 of the Bengal Act,
which is a pre-condition for making of an application by
plaintiff for passing of final decree. The period of
limitation would start running from the time the right to
apply for final decree accrues and is not dependent on the
date of sending of notice by the plaintiff to the defendant
as required under the Bengal Act. In Nalini Kanto
Bhattacharjee v. Mohan Chand Biswas (AIR 1960 Cal. 477), a
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court rightly held that the
starting point of limitation for making an application for
final decree was the date when the first default was made
and as the application was made more than three years after
from the date of the first default, it was barred by
limitation. It also held that though the giving of notice
prescribed by Section 34 of Bengal Act is a condition
precedent to the making of application for final decree, the
fact of giving of the prescribed notice had not the effect
of arresting the running of normal period of limitation or
enlarging the period of limitation and further upon default
being made in payment of any instalment, the whole of the
amount payable under the decree becomes due on the date of
such default and right to apply, therefore, accrues once and
for all on the date of the default. It may also be noted
that the notice under Section 34 sent by the appellant was
based on all the four defaults committed by the defendants
and it was not stated that any default was waived or
condoned. In this view, we need not go into the question
whether in law plaintiff could at all waive or condone the
default for the purposes of the Limitation Act. Rightly
relying upon the aforesaid decision, the application of the
appellant for passing of the final decree was dismissed by
the High Court. We find no infirmity in the impugned
judgment.
For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.