Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
I N SAKSENA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/01/1976
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SHINGAL, P.N.
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2250 1976 SCR (3) 237
1976 SCC (4) 750
CITATOR INFO :
R 1987 SC2310 (14)
ACT:
Constitution of India-Articles 245 & 246-Schedule
seven-List 11 entry 41-interpretation of legislative
entries-subsidiary or ancillary to subject covered by
entries-Judicial function and legislative function-Whether
legislature can overrule a judicial pronouncement by a bare
declaration-Whether can remove basis of judicial
pronouncement,
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was a District & Sessions Judge. By a
Memorandum dated 28-2-1963, the State Government raised the
age of compulsory retirement for Government servants to 58
years. The said Memorandum, however, empowered the
Government to retire a Government servant after he attains
the age of 55 years. Thereafter, rules under the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution were framed whereby the age
of superannuation was raised to 58 years. However the clause
empowering the Government to retire a Government servant
after the age of SS years, was not incorporated in the said
rules. The appellant was retired from service after he
completed SS years and before he completed 58 years. The
challenge to the said order of compulsory retirement
succeeded in this Court. This court held on 23-1-1967 as
under:
"The appellant will be deemed to have continued in
the service of the Government in spite of that order.
As. however. the appellant attained the age of 58
years, in August, 1966, it is not possible now to
direct that he should be put in service. But he will be
entitled to such benefits as may accrue now to him by
virtue of the success of the writ petition. The
appellant will get his costs from the State -
throughout."
Thereafter. an ordinance was promulgated which later on
became an Act of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. The said
Act validated the retirement of certain Government servants
including the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.
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The act was made effective from 1st March 1963 and It
empowered the Government to retire a Government servant on
his attaining the age of 55 years.
The appellant again filed a Writ Petition in the High
Court which was dismissed.
In an appeal the appellant contended before this Court:
1. The Act has been passed to overrule a decision of
this Court which the legislature has no power to do.
2. The matter having once been decided by the Supreme
Court was barred by the principle of res judicata.
3. The Act gives naked power to the authorities to
retire any employee after he attains the age of 55 years and
provides no guidelines for the exercise OF the power.
4. A right of property being a judgment debt protected
by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, the impugned Act
could not have expropriated without providing for any
compensation. It is ultra vires Article 31(2) of the
Constitution.
5. The impugned, Act is ultra vires the Constitution
since it seeks to validate the retirement of the appellant
and others like him by changing their service conditions
with retrospective effect. In doing so, the Legislature has
over-stepped the limits of legislative power.
6. Even if the impugned Act is valid, on a proper
construction it does‘not vacate the decree of this Court.
238
Dismissing the appeal by certificate under Article
132(1) and 133(1)(a) to
^
HELD: 1. The decree of this Court is not a money decree
raising a judgement debt. It is a declaratory decree
declaring that the order compulsorily retiring the appellant
was invalid. The further declaration that he would be
entitled to such benefits as might accrue to him by virtue
of the success of the Writ Petition, was only incidental or
anciliary, to the main relief and will fall or stand with
the same. [242 G-HI
2. The distinction between a Legislative act and a
Judicial act is well known though in some specific instances
the line which separates one category from the other may not
be easily discernible. Adjudication of the rights of the
parties according to law enacted by the Legislature is a
judicial function. It is for the Legislature to lay down the
law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties
and transactions and to require the court to give effect to
that law. The Legislature cannot by a bare declaration,
without more, directly overrule, reverse or override a
judicial decision. It may at any time in exercise of the
plenary powers conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of
the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by
enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative
field, fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective
curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such
decision is based. Judgments in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj
Narain, [1976] 2 S.C.R, 347 and Hari Singh v. Military
Estate Officer[1973] 1 S.C.R. 516 followed. [243 A-D]
3. In enacting the impugned Act the State Legislature
derives its competence not only from Article 309 but also
from Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It is well
settled that the entries in these legislative lists are to
be construed in their widest possible amplitude and each
general word used in such entries must be held to comprehend
anciliary or subsidiary matters. The Legislature has
legislative competence not only to change the service
conditions of Civil Servants with retrospective effect but
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also to validate with retroactive force invalid executive
orders retiring the servants because such validating
legislation must be regarded as subsidiary or anciliary to
the power of legislation on the subject covered by Entry 41.
[245 A-D]
4. The impugned Act by introducing a legal fiction on
giving the said memorandum statutory status with effect from
its inception, effectively cures the defects from which this
Memorandum and the orders of retirement made there under
were suffering. Thus the said legislation removes or cures
the defect which this Court found in the Memorandum which
was the basis of the impugned orders of retirement. [246 A-
B]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 131
of 1971 and 350 of 1971.
(From the Judgments and orders dated 2-5-1970 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos. 504 and 92
of 1967 respectively).
G. L. Sanghi, Bishamber Lal and M. Iyngar for the Appe
llant (In CA 131/71).
M. N. Phadke, S. S. Khanduja for the Appellant (In CA
350/71).
I. N. Shroff for the Respondent (In both appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J. This appeal on certificate is directed
against a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
dismissing the Appellant’s writ petition under Art. 226 of
the Constitution.
239
The appellant joined the service of the State
Government as a A subordinate Judge in the year 1936. On
promotion, he was confirmed as District and Sessions Judge
with effect from December 2, 1957. The appellant attained
the age of 55 years on August 22, 1965 which was the age of
superannuation according to Fundamental Rule 56 (Ch IX)
governing the Civil Services of the State. But prior to that
on February 28, 1963, by a memorandum No. 433-259-1 (iii)
/63, the State Government raised the age of compulsory
retirement for government servants to 58 years subject to
certain exceptions. The material part of the memorandum
dated February 28, 1963, read as follows:
"5. Notwithstanding anything contained in the
foregoing paragraphs the appointing authority may
require a Government servant to retire after he attains
the age of SS years on 3 months notice without
assigning any reasons
A Government servant may also after attaining the
age of 55 years voluntarily retire after giving 3
months notice to the appointing authority.
6. These orders will have effect from the 1st
March 1963 .
7. Necessary amendments to the State Civil Service
Regulations will be issued in due course."
Thereafter, by Government Notification dated November
29, 1963, F. R. 56 was amended on December 6, 1963 in
exercise of the power under the Proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution, raising the age of compulsory retirement
of the State Civil Servants to 58 years with effect from
March 1, 1963 but the clause in the aforesaid Memorandum,
empowering the Government to retire servants above the age
of 55 years by giving them three months’ notice was not
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incorporated in the Rule.
Tn view of this memorandum, the appellant was allowed
to continue in office after he had attained the age of 55
years.
On September 11, 1963, the respondent passed an order
retiring the appellant from service with effect from
December 31, 1963. To impugn this order, the appellant filed
a Writ Petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution on the ground that F. R. 56 as it stood after
the amendment of November 29, 1963, (published on 6-12-1963)
did not contain any provision authorising the respondent to
retire the appellant after the attainment of 55 years of age
and that his retirement was contrary to Art. 311(2) and Art.
14 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition by its judgment dated April 30, 1964.
The appellant came up in appeal to this Court. During
the pendency of that appeal Saksena attained the age of 58
years. By its judgment dated January 23, 1967, this Court
quashed the impugned order of retirement holding that:
"The appellant will be deemed to have continued in
the service of the Government in spite of that order.
As, how ever, the appellant attained the age of 58
years, in August,
240
1966 it is not possible now to direct that he should be
put back in service. But he will be entitled to such
benefits as may accrue now to him by virtue of the
success of the writ petition. The appellant will get
his costs from the State throughout."
Before the decision of that appeal (Civil Appeal No.
670 of 1965) however, the Governor had promulgated the
Madhya Pradesh (Age of Compulsory Retirement) Rules, 1965
under Art. 309 of the Constitution. These Rules were
published in the Government Gazette of July 17, 1965. By a
deeming clause, these Rules were made effective from March
1, 1963. The age of retirement was thereby raised to 58
years and under r. 6 thereof, the appointing authority was
empowered to retire a Government Servant on his attaining
the age of 55 years on 3 months’ notice without assigning
any reason. By r. 8, the aforesaid memorandum, dated
February 28, 1963, was cancelled, and it was provided that
notwithstanding the cancellation of that memorandum anything
done or any action taken in pursuance of the directions
contained in that memorandum shall be and shall always be
deemed to have been done or to have been taken under the
relevant provisions of these Rules.
At the hearing of the earlier appeal, these Rules were
not brought to the notice of this Court.
On February 10, 1967, after the judgment by this Court,
the State promulgated an ordinance which was replaced on
April 20, 1963 by the Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Sevak Anivarya
Sevanivitrika Vidhi- manyatakaran Vidyayaktakaran Vidyeyak
Adhiniyam 1967 (Act 5 of 1967) validating the retirement of
certain Government servants, including that of the
appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.
By virtue of this Act, the State is vested with a right
not to pay the dues of the appellant from the date of his
retirement (December 3, 1963 onwards.
Sections 2 and 5 of the Act, which are material for our
purpose, read as follows:
"2. (1) The Madhya Pradesh (Age of Compulsory
Retirement Rules, 1965 replacing the provisions of the
, Government of Madhya Pradesh General Administration
Department Memorandum No. 1433-258-l(iii)/63, dated the
28th February 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the
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Memorandum) shall be deemed to have come into force
with effect from the 1st March 1963.
(2) Anything done or any action taken in pursuance
of the directions contained in the memorandum shall be
and shall always be deemed to have been done or taken
under corresponding provisions of the aforesaid rules
as if the aforesaid rules were in force on the date on
which such thing was done or action was taken and shall
now be called into
241
question in any court on the ground that the provisions
of the A memorandum were not issued in the form of
rules made by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh under Art.
309 of the Constitution and could not therefore
regulate the conditions of service of Government
servants serving in connection with the affairs of the
State."
"5. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order
of any Court, all Government servants serving in
connection with the affairs of the State who were
compulsorily retired or purported to have been
compulsorily retired in accordance with the memorandum
as replaced by the Madhya Pradesh (Age of Compulsory
Retirement) Rules, 1965 referred to in Section 2 during
the period beginning with 1st March, 1965 and ending on
15th July, 1965 shall be and shall always be deemed to
have been validly retired in accordance with the
condition of service applicable to them at the relevant
time as if the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 had been
in force at all material time when such retirement was
ordered, as accordingly:
(a) all notices served on such Government
servants’ after their completion of age of 55
years shall be deemed to be and to have been
issued in accordance with the rules governing
their conditions of service;
(b) no suit or other proceedings shall be
maintained or continued in any Court for any
amount whatsoever as a payment towards salary
for the period beginning with the date on
which a Government servant had been
compulsorily retired and ending on the date
of his attainment of age of 58 years.
c) no court shall enforce any decree or order
directing the payment of any such amount
referred to in clause (b) above."
In substance, and effect, this Act has made provisions
of the Compulsorily Retirement Rules, 1965 applicable from
March 1, 1963.
On November 10, 1967, the appellant again moved the
High Court by a writ petition out of which the present
appeal has arisen, challenging the validity of this Act,
particularly of sections 2 and S extracted above.
Four contentions were raised by him before the High
Court: (1) that the Act has been passed to over-rule the
decision of the Supreme Court which the legislature has no
power to do, (2) that the statement of objects and Reasons
attached to the Bill when it was introduced, indicates that
its main object was to avoid financial burden which would
fall on the State on account of its having to pay arrears of
pension etc. to a large number of officers who had been
retired under the said memorandum which was treated to be a
rule and which the Supreme Court held was not an effective
rule but merely an executive instruction: (3) that the
matter having once been decided by the Supreme Court, was
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barred by the principle of res judicata and (4)
242
that the Rules give naked power to the authorities to retire
any employee after he has attained the age of 55 years by
giving him three months’ notice, and provide no guidelines
for the exercise of this power.
The High Court negatived these contentions, dismissed
the writ ,, petition but granted a certificate under Art.
132 (1) and 133(1)(a) to (c) of the Constitution.
Hence this appeal.
The contentions advanced before the High Court have
been repeated before us with amplification and addition.
It is argued on behalf of the appellant: (i) that a
right of property, being a judgment-debt, protected by
Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, had been created by
this Court’s decree dated January 30, 1967 in favour of the
appellant and against the State. Since the impugned Act in
effect, seeks to expropriate the appellant of that right
without providing for any compensation, it is ultra vires
Article 31(2) of the Constitution, (ii) The impugned Act is
ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it seeks to
validate the retirement of the appellant, and others like
him, by changing their service conditions with retrospective
effect. In so doing, the State legislature has overstepped
the limits of legislative powers conferred on it by Article
309 of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed on the
decision of this Court in The State of Mysore v.
Padamanabhacharya etc.(1) (iii) The impugn ed Act encroaches
upon the judicial field inasmuch as it over-rules and makes
unenforceable the decision, dated January 30, 1967 of this
Court in Civil Appeal No. 670 of 1963 and in so doing, it
offends Article 141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution, (iv)
Even if the impugned Act is valid, cls. (b) and (c) of s. 5
of the Act, on a proper construction, do not vacate the
decree of this Court, requiring the respondent to pay to the
appellant the pecuniary benefits resulting from the success
of his earlier appeal (C. A. 670/65) in this Court. Clause
(b) of s. S merely bars the maintenance or continuation of
any proceeding for any amount as a payment towards salary.
The appellant is not seeking to maintain or continue any
execution proceeding in court, for the recovery of any
amount towards salary, the decree being a declaratory one.
None of these contentions appears to be tenable.
A perusal of this Court’s decree, dated January 30,
1967, (extracted above) would show that it is not a money
decree, raising a judgment-debt. It is a declaratory decree,
declaring that the respondents’ order, dated September 11,
1963, compulsorily retiring the appellant r was invalid, and
consequently the appellant would be deemed to have continued
in service till he attained the age of 58 years. The further
declaration that "he will be entitled to such benefits as
may accrue to him by virtue of the success of the writ
petition" was only incidental or ancillary to the main
relief and will fall or stand with the same. This being the
position, the decree did not create an indefeasible right -.
[1966] 1 S.C.R. 494.
243
of properly in favour of the appellant. We therefore do not
find any A substance in the argument that the impugned Act
seeks to acquire without payment of compensation property
vesting in the appellant and is consequently
unconstitutional.
The distinction between a "legislative" act and a
"judicial" act is well known, though in some specific
instances the line which separates one category from the
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other may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the
rights of the parties according to law enacted by the
legislature is a judicial function. In the performance of
this function, the court interprets and gives effect to the
intent and mandate of the legislature as embodied in the
statute. On the other hand, it is for the legislature to lay
down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern
parties and transactions and to require the court to give
effect to that law.
While, in view of this distinction between legislative
and judicial functions, the legislature cannot by a bare
declaration, without more, directly over-rule, reverse or
over-ride a judicial decision, it may, at any time in
exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Article
245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision
ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its
legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with
retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the
conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out
by Ray C.J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,(1) the
rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent
courts and tribunals by changing their basis by legislative
enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts.
Such validating legislation which removes the causes for
ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is
not an encroachment on judicial power.
In Hari Singh v. Military Estate officer,(2) a Bench of
seven learned Judges of this Court laid down that the
validity of a validating law is to be judged by two tests.
Firstly, whether the legislature possesses competence over
the subject matter, and, secondly, whether by validation
the legislature has removed the defect which the courts had
found in the previous law. To these we may add a third .
Whether it is consistent with the provisions of Part III of
the Constitution.
We have noticed already, that the impugned provisions
do not offened Articles 19 and 31 or anything else in Part
III of the Constitution.
We may now see whether the provisions in question
satisfy the first two tests. G
Mr. Sanghi’s argument is that by virtue of the power
conferred by Article 309, the State Legislature is not
competent to pass a law validating retrospectively an
invalid order of retirement of a State civil servant, made
by the State Government, or render ineffective a decree of
this Court declaring invalid such an order. The point sought
to be made out is that the legislative power conferred on
the State legislature by Article 309, is confined to
regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of me
persons appointed to public services of the
(1) [1976 2 S.C.R. 347. (2) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 5-16.
244
State, and that the impugned provisions not being such
regulatory provisions, are ultra vires Article 309.
In Padmanabhacharya’s case (supra), which is the sheet
anchor of this contention, the Court was considering the
scope of Article 309 in the context of Rule 294(a) Note 4,
of the Mysore Service Regulations. There, the respondent was
a teacher in a Government School. He was ordered to be
retired from service with effect from February 3, 1958 on
attaining the age of 55 years. He challenged the validity of
the order by a writ petition under Article 226 in the High
Court and contended that rule 294 (a) having been amended in
April 1955, the normal age of superannuation was fixed at 58
years, instead of 55 years. On behalf of the State, it was
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canvassed that a notification of the Governor under Article
309 of the Constitution, issued on March 25, 1959 had
validated the action taken in retiring the respondent, and
others upon their attaining the age of 55 years.
Wanchoo J. (as he then was), speaking for this Court
held that such a rule cannot be made under the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution, but was cautious enough to
add: ’
‘We are expressing no opinion as to the power of
the legislature to make a retrospective provision under
Article 309 of the Constitution wherein the appropriate
legislature has been given the power to regulate the
recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public service and posts in connection
with the affairs of the Union or of any State by
passing Acts under Art. 309 of the Constitution read
with item 70 of List I of the Seventh Schedule or item
41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The present rule
has been made by the Governor under the proviso to Art.
309. That proviso lays down that it shall be competent
for the Governor or such person as he may direct in the
- case of services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the State to make rules regulating the
recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons
appointed, to such services and posts until provision
in that behalf is made by or under an Act by the
appropriate legislature. Under the proviso the Governor
has the power to make rules regulating the recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to such
services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the State. The question is whether the notification of
March 25, 1959 can be said to be such a rule. We are of
opinion that this notification cannot be said to be a
rule regulating the recruitment and conditions of
service of persons appointed to the services and posts
in connection with the affairs of the State."
From what has been quoted above, it is clear that this
Court advisedly did not express any opinion about the
competency of the appropriate legislature to enact
validating provisions of this type concerning the public
servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State
or the Central Government, as the case may be.
245
It is noteworthy that in enacting the impugned Act, the
State A legislature derives its competence not only from
Article 309, but also from Entry 41 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule. Indeed, within its allotted sphere, that
is, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II
of the Seventh Schedule the State legislature has, by virtue
of Art. 246(3), exclusive, plenary powers of legislation.
Entry 41, List II, reads as under: B
"41. State public services; State Public Service
Commission."
It is well settled that the entries in these
legislative lists in Schedule VII are to be construed in
their widest possible amplitude, and each general word used
in such Entries must be held to comprehend ancillary or
subsidiary matters. Thus considered, it is clear that the
scope of Entry 41 is wider than the matter of regulating the
recruitment and conditions of service of public servants
under Article 309. The area of legislative competence
defined by Entry 41 is far more comprehensive than that
covered by the proviso to Article 309. By virtue of Articles
246, 309 and read with Entry 41, List II, therefore, the
State legislature had legislative competence not only to
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change the service conditions of State Civil Servants with
retrospective effect but also to validate with retrospective
force invalid executive orders retiring the servants,
because such validating legislation must be regarded as
subsidiary or ancillary to the power of legislation on the
subject covered by Entry 41.
Thus the impugned provisions satisfy the first test.
This takes us to the second test, whether the impugned
legislation removes or cures the defect which this Court had
found in the Memorandum which was the basis of the impugned
orders of retirement. For reasons that follow, the answer to
this question also must be in the affirmative.
The basis of this Court’s decision dated January 30,
1967 in Civil Appeal 670 of 1965 was that the Government
Memorandum dated February 28, 1963, in pursuance of which
the impugned order on retirement of I. N. Saksena had been
passed on September 11, 1963, had not attained the status of
a statutory rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution, but was merely an administrative
instruction. This provision in the Memorandum empowering the
Government to retire a servant on his attaining the age of
55 years, after three months notice, was not incorporated in
the statutory rules. On the other hand the amendment made
with effect from March 1963 in Fundamental Rule 56, in
exercise of its powers under Article 309 by the Government
under notification dated December 6, 1963, had raised the
age of retirement for State Government servants from 55 to
58 years. I. N. Saksena had therefore, by virtue of this
amended statutory rule a right to remain in service up to
the age of 58 years. This right could not be taken away by
mere executive instructions embodied in the Memorandum. H
Madhya Pradesh Act 5 of 1963 gives the said Memorandum
the statutory status with effect from its very inception. By
introducing
246
a legal fiction the Act effectively cures the defect from
which this Memorandum and the orders of retirement made
thereunder were suffering.
Thus the second test was also satisfied. The conclusion
is there fore inescapable that the impugned provisions were
valid. Hence, the order, dated September 11, 1963, of
Saksena’s compulsory retirement became valid as the basis of
this Court’s judgment dated January 30, 1967 was removed.
There is no force in the fourth contention of Mr.
Sanghi. Section 5, particularly Clauses (b) and (c),
effectively vacate the previous decree of this Court in
favour of Saksena. For removing doubts, these clauses
declare that this Court’s decree will not be enforceable by
initiating proceedings in any court thereon, in future.
In the light of the above discussion, it is abundantly
clear that in enacting the impugned provisions, the
legislature has not exceeded the limits of its legislative
powers nor encroached on the judicial field. We will close
the discussion by noticing only one decision out of the many
that had been cited at the bar.
In Piare Dusada and Ors. v. The King Emperor,(1) the
Governor General by ordinance repealed the Special Criminal
Courts ordinance II of 1942. There was a provision in the
repealing-ordinance for confirmation and continuance of
sentences of Special Courts and retrial of pending case. The
appellant therein had been convicted and sentenced by
Special Criminal Court which was held to have no
jurisdiction to try the case by an order of a court. Section
3(1) of the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) ordinance, 1943
conferred validity and full effectiveness on sentences
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passed by Special Criminal Courts by conferring jurisdiction
on them with retrospective effect. The Federal Court held
that by promulgating the validating and repealing ordinance
of 1943, the legislative authority had not attempted to do
indirectly what it could not do directly or to exercise
judicial power in the guise of legislation. It was further
held that the ordinance was not invalid on the ground that
the legislative authority had validated by retrospective
legislation proceedings held in courts which were void for
want of jurisdiction as there was nothing in the Indian
Constitution which precluded the legislature from doing so.
The ratio of the above decision applies with greater
force to the present case.
For all the foregoing reasons, we negative all the
contentions canvassed by Mr. Sanghi and dismiss this appeal
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1971
SARKARIA, J. For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal
No. 131 R of 1971 entitled I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, this appeal fails and is dismissed without any
order as to costs.
247