Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, MADHYA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
JASWANT SINGH CHARAN SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
23/02/1967
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION:
1967 AIR 1454 1967 SCR (2) 720
CITATOR INFO :
E 1973 SC 78 (5)
F 1973 SC2440 (3)
R 1974 SC1362 (3)
R 1977 SC 153 (7)
R 1977 SC 597 (34)
R 1981 SC1079 (4)
D 1985 SC1201 (12)
R 1985 SC1387 (11)
F 1985 SC1644 (8)
RF 1989 SC 516 (27)
R 1990 SC1579 (39)
RF 1991 SC 583 (29)
ACT:
Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958-- Charcoal
whether ’coal’ within meaning of Entry I Part III of Sch.
II to the Act-rate of tax applicable.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent was a dealer in firewood and charcoal. in
ings for assessment of sales tax under the Madhya Pradesh,
General sales Tax Act. 1958, the respondent claimed that
charcoal was ’coal’ within the meaning of Entry I of Part
Ell of the Schedule II to the Act and fore was taxable at
the rate of 2%. The sales tax authorities however held that
charcoal was not ’coal’ and was taxable at 4% as it fell the
rwsiduary Entry I of Part VI of Schedule II. The Board of
India the High Court held in favour of the respondent
relying on the dictionaty meaning of the word ’coal’. The
Commissioner of Salex tax appealed.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that coal wag a
mineral while charcoal was manufactured from products like
wood and other things by human agency and therefore the
dictionary meaning ought not to have been relied upon.
Reliance was also placed on legislative practice which had
treated coal and charcoal as different items.
In interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax resort
should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning of
the terms used but to their popular meaning or the meaning
attached ter them by those dealing in them, that is to say,
in their commercial sense. Viewed from this angl both a
merchant dealing in coal and a consumer wanting to purchase
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it would reaard coal not in its geological sense but in the
sense as ordinarily understood and would include ’charcoar
in the term ’coal’. Under the Entries.’ ’coal’ as well as
’firewood’ were taxed at 2%. It could not have been
intended to tax charcoal alone at 4%. Entry I of Part III
of Sch. II must therefore be read broadly and held to
include charcoal. It was not possible to adopt its
connotation from other statues passed for different purposes
or in the context of different objects.[713 B; 725 A-E; 726
c]
Ramavtar Budhaiprasad etc. v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer,
Akola, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279 and His Majesty the King v.
Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Limited, [1951] C.L.R.
(Ex.) 122, relied on.
Attorney-General v. Winstanley, (1831) 2 D & Cl. 302,
Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1876) 1 Ex-. D.
242 Holt & Co. v. Collyer, (1881) 16 Ch. D. 718, referred
to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2011 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
February 23, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.C.C.
No. 169 of 1965.
721
B. Sen and L N. Shroff for the appellant.
Rameshwar Nath and Mohinder Narain, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. The appellant has been carrying on business and
s a dealer in firewood and charcoal. For the period from
March 29, 1962 to April 29, 1962, he was assessed to sales
tax under s. 18(6) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax
Act, 1958 as he did not have any registration certificate in
respect of this period. The Additional Sales Tax Officer,
Ujjain, and the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner,
Indore, both held that charcoal in which the appellant was
dealing was not covered by Entry I of Part III of Sch. II
to the Act, but that it fell under the residuary Entry I of
part VI of that Schedule; and consequently was liable to be
assessed at the rate of 4 % of the price of charcoal. In a
further appeal before the Board of Revenue, the Board,
relying on the dictionary meaning of the word ’coal’ as
given in Blackies’ concise Dictionary, held that charcoal
would be included in the term ’coal’, and, therefore, Entry
I in Part III of Schedule II would Apply and the tax
chargeable would be at 2 % only. At the instance of the
Commissioner of Sales Tax, the Board referred the following
question to the High Court
"Whether charcoal is covered under Entry I of
Part III of Sch. 11 to the M.P. General.
Sales Tax Act, 1958, and is taxable at the
rate of 2 % or will be taxable at the rate of
4 % under Entry I of Part VI of Sch. II to
the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 ?"
The High Court held that while construing entries in a sta-
tute like the Sales Tax Acts, the court should prefer the
popular meaning of the terms used in such entries and not
their dictionary meanings and that so construed charcoal
would be included in the word ’coal’. Consequently, it
answered the question, in favour of the respondent.
According to the High Court, charcoal would be covered by
Entry I of Part III of Sch. 11 and was taxable at 2 %. Hence
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this appeal by special leave.
Entry I of- Part III of Sch. 11 reads as follows
"1. Coal, including coke in ill its forms..2 per cent"
Entry I of Part VI of the said Schedule reads as follows
"I All other goods not included in Schedule 1 or any other
part of this Schedule. 4 per cent"
We may also reproduce Entry 8 of Part III of Schedule II2
percent" which is "8. Firewood
722
The meaning given to the word ’Coal’ in Blackies’ Concise
Dictionary, New Edition, page 134 relied on by the Board
reads as follows :-
"Coal : Kol : A piece of wood or other
combustible substance burning or charred;
charcoal; a cinder; now, usually a solid black
substance found in the earth, largely employed
as fuel, and formed from vast masses of vege-
table matter deposited through the luxurious
growth of plants in former epochs of the
earth’s history."
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at pages 330 and 331
gives the meaning of coal as follows :-
"1. A piece of carbon glowing without a flame.
2. A piece of burnt wood, etc. that is still
capable of combustion without flame, cinder,
ashes, 3. Charcoal. 4. A mineral, solid, hard,
opaque black or blackish, found in seams in
the earth, and largely used as fuel; it
consists of carbonized vegetable matter".
At page 293, the said Dictionary gives the
meaning of charcoal as follows
"The suggestion that Char=chare v. or sb. as
if turn coal, i.e. wood turned into coal,
lacks support. 1. The black porous residue,
consisting (when pure) wholly of carbon,
obtained from partly burnt wood, bones, etc.
Hence specified as wood, vegetable, animal
etc.".
The Webster’s New International Dictionary gives the
following meaning of charcoal at page 452 :-
"(Char to burn, reduce to coal; Coal);
1.A dark coloured or black porous form of
carbon prepared from vegetable or animal
substance, as that made by charging wood in a
kiln, retort, etc., from which air is
excluded."
According to these Dictionaries ’coal’ would appear to in-
clude ’charcoal’. The contention of the respondent was that
charcoal is one of the species of coal, and, therefore,
would be covered by Entry I of Part 111, and, therefore, the
answer given by the High Court is correct. Counsel for the
State, however, raised three contentions; (1) that coal and
charcoal are different products, one being a mineral product
and the other prepared from wood and other articles by human
agency, and, therefore, the term ’coal’ would not cover
charcoal; (2) that while construing such entries, the
dictionary meaning should not be preferred to the popular
meaning or the meaning in the commercial sense; and (3) that
the Legislative policy in reference to the term ’coal’
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shows that it is not used by the Legislature in India so as
to include charcoal.
Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is technically
understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manufactured by
human agency from products like wood and other things. But
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it is now well-settled that while interpreting items in
statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not
to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms’
but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them
by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their
commercial sense. In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc. v.
Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola,(1) the petitioners who
were dealers in betel leaves were assessed to sales tax
under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. They
contended that under section 6 read with the Second Schedule
of the Act betel leaves were not taxable. Section 6
provided that articles mentioned in that Schedule were
exempt from gales tax and articles not mentioned were
taxable. There were two items in the, Schedule, namely,
item 6, "vegetables", and item 36, "betel leaves", but
subsequently item. No. 36 was deleted by an amendment of
the Act. This Court held that the use of two distinct and
different items i.e., ’vegetables’ and ’betel leaves’ and
the subsequent removal of betel leaves from the Schedule
were indicative of the Legislature’s intention of not
exempting betel leaves from taxation. The Court laid down
that the word ’vegetable’ must be interpreted not in a
technical sense but in its popular sense as understood in
common language i.e., denoting a class of vegetables which
are grown in a kitchen garden or on a farm and are used for
the table. The same principle was also laid down in His
Majesty the King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company
Limited.(2). The question there was whether salted peanuts
and cashew nuts fell within the category of either fruits or
vegetables. A considerable expert opinion was led in that
case, but the court ultimately found that the Parliament in
enacting the, Excise Tax Act, 1927, Part XIII and Schedule
III was not using words which were applied to any particular
science or art and, therefore, the words used are to be
construed as they are understood in common language. It
also held that what constitutes a ’fruit’ or ’vegetable’
within the meaning of the Excise Tax. Act is what would
ordinarily in matters of commerce in Canada be included
therein and not what would, be a botanist’s conception of
the subject matter. If a statute uses the ordinary words in
every day use, such words should be construed according to-
their popular sense. At page 128 of the Report Cameron, J.
observed, "The object of the Excise Tax Act is to raise
revenue, and for this purpose to class substance according
to the general usage and known denominations of trade. In
my view, therefore, it is not the botanist’s conception as
to what constitutes a
(1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279.
CI/67-17.
(2), [1951] C.L.R. 122.
724
’fruit’ or ’vegetable’ which must govern the interpretation
to be placed on the words, but rather what would ordinarily
in matters of. commerce in Canada be included therein.
Botanically, oranges and lemons are berries, but otherwise
no one would consider them as such." This rule was stated as
early as 1831 by Lord Tenterden in Attorney-General v.
Winstanley(1). Similarly, in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue
Commissioner(2) Pollock, D. observed, "that if a statute
contains language which is capable of being construed in a
popular sense such statute is not to be construed according
to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained
in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning
of course, by the words ’popular-sense’, that sense which
people conversant with the subject-matter with which the
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statute is dealing would attribute to it.". But "if a word
in its popular sense and read in an ordinary way is capable
of two constructions, it is wise to adopt such a
construction as is based on the assumption that Parliament
merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for
carrying out the objects of the Act and not to give any
unnecessary powers. In other words, the construction of the
words is to be adapted to the fitness of the matter of the
statute"., On the other hand, as Fry, J. said in Holt & Co.
v. Collyer(3) "If it is a word which is of a technical or
scientific character then it must be construed according to
that which is its primary meaning, namely, its technical or
scientific meaning."
Our attention was drawn to the decision in K. V. Varkey V,
Agricultural Income Tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer,
Peelmedu and others(4), where green leaves plucked from tea
bushes were held to fall under the word ’tea’. But this
decision turned on the definitions of turnover in s. 3 of
the Travancore General Sales Tax Act, XVIII of 1124 which
while including sales of agricultural ,or horticultural
produce included ’tea, coffee, rubber’ etc. in the turnover.
The court held there that ’tea’ was not in the statute in
the sense in which it is used in commerce but in the sense
of a product of plant life, and, therefore, green leaves
plucked from tea plants were covered by the term ’tea.
The result emerging from these decisions is that while cons-
truing the word ’coal’ in Entry I of Part III of Sch. II,
the test that would be applied is what would be the meaning
which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it
as fuel would give to that word. A sales tax statute is
being one levying a tax on goods must in the absence of a
technical term or a term of science or art, be presumed to
hive used an ordinary term as coal according to the meaning
ascribed ’to it in common parlance. Viewed
(1) 11831] 2 D & Cl. 302.
(3) [1881]16 Ch. D. 718,720.
(2) [1876] I Ex-D. 242,248.
(4) [1954] S S.T.C. 384.
725
from that angle both a merchant dealing in coal and a
consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its
geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood
and would include ’charcoal’ in the term ’coal’. It is only
when the question of the kind or variety of coal would arise
that a distinction would be made between coal and charcoal;
otherwise, both of them would in ordinary parlance as also
in their commercial sense be spoken as coal.
There is another aspect also from which Entry I of Part III
may be considered. Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956 declares certain goods as goods of special importance
in inter-State trade or commerce. One of these is ’coal
including coke in all its forms’. Section 15 of that Act
provides that the State Legislatures in theirrespective
sales tax laws can impose only 2 % tax on these goods.That
is why in Entry I of Part III ’coal’ is stated to include
’coke in all its forms’, and coal including coke in all its
forms is charged at 2 % tax. The State Legislature,
however, knew or must be presumed to know that firewood is
also used by the people as fuel, but would not fall within
that Entry, and, therefore, provided 2 % tax on it by a
separate entry, namely, Entry 8 in Part III. Having taxed
coal and firewood at 2 %, it does not appear to be possible
that the Legislature deliberately left out charcoal from the
connotation of the word ’coal’ and left it to be charged ,it
4% under the residuary Entry 1 in Part VI. The object of
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the Legislature clearly was to tax coal and firewood as
articles used as fuel and did not make a separate entry in
regard to charcoal as it must be aware that coal is
understood in ordinary and commercial sense would include
charcoal. Had that not been so, instead of leaving it to be
dealt with under the residuary item, it would have enacted a
separate entry just as it did in the case of firewood which
it knew would not in its ordinary meaning fall under the
term ’coal’. In this view, the contention of counsel for
the State must be rejected.
Counsel then relied upon s. 5 of the Colliery Control Order,
1945, in order to show that the Legislature there had dealt
with coal in its strict and technical meaning. He also
relied upon certain other statutory provisions with a view
to show that the Legislature has all along been using the
word ’coal’ as a mineral product only. The Colliery Control
Order deals with collieries and obviously, therefore, the
term ’coal’ there is used as a mineral product. It is a
well-settled principle that in construing a word in an Act
motion is necessary in adopting a meaning ascribed to that
word in other statutes. As Lord Loreburn stated in Macbeth
v. Chislett,(1) ’it would be a new terror in the
construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to
limit a word to an unnatural
(1) [1910] A.C. 220.224.
726
sense because in some Act which is not incorporated or
referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the
purposes of that Act alone’. The strict sense in which such
a word is to be found in another statute may mean
the.etymological or scientific sense and would not in the
context of another statute be applicable. From the Colliery
Control Order, 1945 or the other provisions to which our
attention was drawn, it would neither be possible nor safe
to adopt the meaning of the word ’coal’ given in those
provisions for the purposes of the Act under construction.
Nor can we infer that there is a Legislative policy
consistently followed by the Legislature merely because the
word ’coal’ has been used as meaning a mineral product in
the context of these statutes, It would not, therefore, be
possible to discard the meaning of the word ’coal’ in this
statute as understood in its commercial or popular sense and
to adopt its connotation from other statutes passed for dif-
ferent purposes or in context of different objects.
We agree with the meaning of the word ’coal’ given by the
High Court and hold that charcoal would be taxable at the
rate of 2 % only.
The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
727