Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MILKHI RAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1990
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 808 1990 SCR (1) 278
1990 SCC (2) 134 JT 1990 (1) 176
1990 SCALE (1)136
ACT:
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section
2(h)(i) ’Tenant’-Meaning and scope of--Whether includes a
person claiming to be a tenant.
Section 13(2)(i)--Proviso--Tendering of rent
arrears--Benefit available to a person claiming to be a
tenant--Existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord
and tenant not necessary.
Statutory Interpretation: Statute-interpretation
clause--Definition of a word--Governs that word used in the
Statute unless the context requires otherwise--’The con-
text’--’Internal context’--’External context’--What is.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition
against the appellants under section 13 of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 on the grounds of arrears
of rent, sub-letting and making material alterations impair-
ing the utility of the building. On the first date of hear-
ing before the Rent Controller the appellants tendered the
arrears of rent but the respondent-landlord refused to
accept it on the ground that the tender of rent was not
valid since it included rent on behalf of a disputed tenant.
Accepting the case of unauthorised subletting the Rent
Controller allowed the eviction petition holding that the
rent tendered was not in terms of the proviso to sub-section
(2)(i) of section 13 because only the undisputed tenant
alone ought to have tendered the rent.
The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on the
preliminary point of validity of tendering of rent, holding
that the rent deposited by the appellants was not valid,
since one of the appellants was a stranger.
The High Court confirmed the order of the appellate
authority by dismissing the tenant’s revision in limine.
In the appeal to this Court on the question, whether the
word ’tenant’ included a person claiming to be a tenant,
allowing the appeal, this Court,
279
HELD: 1. When a word has been defined in the interpreta-
tion clause, prima facie that definition governs wherever
that word is used in the body of the Statute unless the
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context requires otherwise. The context is both internal and
external. The internal context requires the interpreter to
situate the disputed words within the section of which they
are part and in relation to the rest of the Act. The exter-
nal context involves determining the meaning from ordinary
linguistic usage (including any special technical meanings)
from the purpose for which the provision was passed, and
from the place of the provisions within the general scheme
of statutory and common law rules and principles. [286E-G]
Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. p. 48, referred to.
1.1 Even where the definition is exhaustive in as much
as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is
possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning
in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject
or context. [287B]
Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s
Fraser and Ross & Anr., [1960] 3 SCR 857, followed.
2. The opening sentence in the definition of Section 2
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 states
"unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or con-
text". In view of this qualifications, the Court has not
only to look at the words but also to examine the context
and collocation in the light of the object of the Act and
the purpose for which a particular provision was made by the
Legislature. [286G-H]
3. The apparent purpose of the proviso to Section
13(2)(i) was to relieve the defaulting tenant from the
extreme penalty of eviction. The provision is analogous to
Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which
confers discretion on the Court to grant relief against
forfeiture for non-payment of rent. But the proviso goes a
step further and leaves no such discretion to the controller
or Court even if the tenant is a constant defaulter. If the
arrears and other amounts specified are paid or tendered on
the first date of hearing, the default as a ground for
eviction disappears and the Controller is precluded from
passing a decree for eviction. The governing principle of
the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay an action
for eviction on default. At the same time, the landlord is
ensured payment of arrears, interest and the costs that he
has incurred without the necessity of going to civil court
to
280
recover it. The proviso affords a real and sanctified pro-
tection to tenant against eviction on the ground of default.
It should not be given a hypothetical or literal construc-
tion, but should be meaningfully construed. The legislative
protection concerning the tenants should not be narrowly
tailored. Indeed, it should be given wider meaning and
broader concept. [287G-H; 288A; D]
Court should try to understand the spirit of the text
and not be bound by letter. [288D]
Mangat Rai v. Kidarnath, [1981] 1 SCR 476, followed.
Hudson County Water Co. v. Me Carter, 209 US 349, referred
to.
4. Taking into account the intention of the legislature
and the purposes for which the proviso was enacted, it is
clear that the obligation to tender the rent under the
proviso to Section 13(2)(i) on the first hearing date does
not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship
of landlord and tenant. When an action for eviction is
brought by the landlord or the ground of default, the provi-
so stands attracted. The benefit of the proviso could be
availed of by the tenant and also by those who claim to be
the tenant. [289D-E]
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Ram Gopal & Ors. v. Ram Prakash & Ors., [1963] RLR 1112
and Punjab Rajasthan Goods Carriers & Ors. v. Onkar Mal,
[1977] RLR 1195, overruled.
5. Law as creative response should be so interpreted to
meet the different fact situations coming before the Court.
For, Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine pres-
cience and perfect clarity. It Is not possible for the
legislators to foresee the manifold sets of facts and
controversies which may arise while giving effect to a
particular provision. Indeed, the legislators do not deal
with the specific controversies. When conflicting interests
arise or defect appears from the language of the Statute,
the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must
supplement the written word with ’force and life’. [287E-F]
Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 263 of
1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.1983 of the Punjab and
281
Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 3243 of 1982.
M.K. Ramamurthi and S.K. Agarwal for the Appellants.
S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda and K.L. Verma for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. The appeal concerns the scope
and construction of Section 13 sub-section 2(i) proviso of
the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (called
shortly as ’The Act’). The point at issue relates to the
validity of the arrears of rent deposited by the tenant
under the proviso.
Milkhi Ram-the respondent in this appeal is the landlord
of the premises consisting of a shop at Ludhiana. In Febru-
ary 1958 the shop was taken on rent by Amar Chand. The rent
agreed was Rs.45 per month. In December 1975 Amar Chand
died. His brother Diwan Chand succeeded to the tenancy
rights. In November 1976 he also died leaving behind his
widow Pushpa Devi and his minor son Yashpal. They are appel-
lants 1 and 2 in this appeal. The landlord brought an action
for eviction under section 13 of the Act on the ground of
arrears of rent, sub-letting etc. His case was that appel-
lants 1 and 2 inducted Saligram appellant No: 3 as a sub-
tenant and delivered exclusive possession of the shop prem-
ises. The eviction was also sought on the ground that the
tenant has made alterations resulting in material impairment
in the value and utility of the premises. The appellant’s
case was that the shop was taken on lease by Amar Chand as
partner of the firm M/s Amar Chand in which Amar Chand,
Diwan Chand and Saligram were all partners in the business
from the very commencement of tenancy. They denied that
Saligram was inducted as subtenant. They also refuted the
allegations as to material alterations affecting the value
and utility of the premises.
Before the Rent Controller the respondents on the first
date of hearing tendered the arrears of rent, with interest
and cost determined by the Controller. The amount was ren-
dered evidently under the proviso to Section 13 sub-section
(2)(i) of the Act. Mr. Satpal Singh the common counsel for
all the respondents tendered the amount alongwith his state-
ment, which reads as follows:
"I tender Rs.2025 as arrears of rent from 1.12.1975 to
282
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31.8. 1979, Rs.240 as interest and Rs.25 as costs as as-
sessed on behalf of all the respondents, total amounting to
Rs.2290."
The landlord did not accept the amount but made the
following endorsement:
"1 do not accept the tender as it is neither legal nor
valid. The respondent No. 3 Saligram, is a sub-tenent."
The Rent Controller at that stage did not state whether
the objection of the landlord was legal and justified. Since
the eviction was also based on other grounds, he allowed the
parties to lead evidence on all the questions. After consid-
ering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Controller
found no substance in the allegations that the tenant has
made any material alteration impairing the utility of the
building. On the question of original tenancy agreement, he
found that the original tenant was not in the partnership
firm of which Amar Chand was partner, but Amar Chand took
the premises in his personal name and the tenancy was there-
fore personal to him. He also accepted the case of unautho-
rised sub-letting and held that respondent No. 3 was a sub-
tenant inducted into the premises without consent of the
landlord. On the validity of the amount tendered on behalf
of all respondents including Saligram it was held that the
tender was not legal and valid since Saligram was not a
tenant. In other words, he held that the rent tendered by
counsel for and on behalf of all the respondents was not a
legal tender in terms of Section 13 sub-section (2)(i)
proviso and the undisputed tenant alone ought to have ten-
dered the rent. With these findings the Controller accepted
the eviction petition and directed the tenant’s eviction
from the premises.
The appeal preferred by the tenant was disposed of on a
preliminary point, that is, on the validity of the amount
deposited by the common counsel for the parties on the first
date of hearing of the case. The appellate authority held
that the amount deposited on behalf of the three respondents
was not valid since Saligram was a stranger. On this aspect,
the appellate authority had little discretion in view of the
two decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Ram Gopal &
Ors. v. Ram Prakash and Ors., [1963] RLR 1112 and Punjab
Rajasthan Goods Carriers & Ors. v. Onkar Mal, [1977] RLR 1
195. In both the cases, the High Court has held that the
tenant as defined under the Act could deposit or tender the
amount under the proviso and not a stranger. Following those
decisions, the appellate authority confirmed
283
the eviction and dismissed the appeal without examining
whether Saligram was also a tenant, or whether the original
tenancy was in favour of the partnership firm of which Amar
Chand was a partner.
The order Of the appellate authority has been confirmed
by the High Court by dismissing the tenant’s revision in
limine.
The tenant alongwith Saligram by obtaining leave have
preferred this appeal.
Since the validity of the deposit made by the tenant
under the proviso to sub-section (2)(i) of Section 13 is in
question and which in turn depends upon the principle laid
down by the High Court in the said two authorities, it is
convenient at this stage to have those cases properly analy-
sed. In Ram Gopal case the arrears of rent were tendered by
Chetan Ram, the tenant, his son Ram Bhagat alongwith Banarsi
Das and Dhani Ram who were said to be the strangers. The
landlord refused to accept that amount on the ground that
the tenant was Chetan Ram alone and as the amount was ten-
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dered by persons other than Chetan Ram as well, there was no
proper tender. The trial court accepted the contention of
the landlord. Before the High Court it was contended for the
tenant that the tender was valid since one of the tenderers
was the tenant himself and the mere fact that he has joined
the other persons who are strangers would not make any
difference. The tender must be deemed to be by the tenant
and his associates should be ignored. The High Court did not
accept the submission. By following some of the previous
cases, it held that under the proviso the payment or tender
must be made exclusively by or on behalf of the tenant and
on his account. The payment or tender made by the tenant
alongwith the strangers and also on their account would be
in contravention of the proviso and invalid. The High Court
accordingly affirmed the order of eviction.
Onkar Mal is also a case of eviction based on arrears of
rent as one of the grounds. The action was brought against
Gulab Chand and Bhanwar Lal, the original tenants and Sohan
Lal, Jagan Nath and Balkar Singh alleged to be the sub-
tenants inducted into the premises without consent of the
landlord. The undisputed tenant did not attend the court
despite due service of notice and was proceeded ex-parte.
The alleged sub-tenants in their written statement claimed
that they shared the tenancy since they had entered into
partnership with the tenant for carrying on theft business.
They tendered the arrears of rent together with interest and
costs of the proceedings on the first date of
284
hearing of the case. The question arose whether the tender
was valid and whether the alleged sub-tenants could deposit
the arrears of rent on their own account and also on behalf
of the undisputed tenant. The landlord however, refused to
accept the amount on the ground that those who deposited the
arrears were not his tenants and they had no authority to
tender the rent on behalf of Bhanwar Lal and Gulab Chand.
The Rent Controller did not make any specific order on that
contention. He proceeded to consider the question of sub-
letting. After considering the evidence produced by the
parties he recorded a finding that there was sub-letting by
the tenant and consequently ordered eviction. The appellate
authority and also the High Court concurred with that opin-
ion. The High Court further held that it is only the persons
who fall within the definition of ’tenant’ could tender the
rent under the proviso and not a third party or sub-tenant
inducted into the premises without consent of the landlord.
In the instant case, the appellate authority being bound
by those two authorities has rejected the amount tendered by
counsel as being invalid. The correctness of that view has
been challenged in this appeal.
We may begin with the relevant provisions of the Act.
The Act provides inter-alia to restrict the increase of rent
of certain premises situated within the limits of urban
areas, and the eviction of tenants therefrom. Section 13
sets out the grounds for eviction and prohibits eviction of
tenants except in accordance with the provisions contained
therein. Sub-section (2) provides that a landlord who seeks
to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a
direction in that behalf. Clause (i) to (v) set out the
grounds of eviction. Clause (i) nonpayment of rent; clause
(ii) sub-letting without the consent of the landlord or
misusing the building for a purpose other than that for
which it was leased; clause (iii) committing such acts as
are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the
building or rented land; clause (iv) tenant has been guilty
of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupiers
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of buildings in the neighbourhood; and clause (v) tenant not
occupying the building for a continuous period of four
months without reasonable cause where the building is situ-
ated in a place other than a hill station. If the landlord
establishes any one of these grounds against the tenant, the
Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if
the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order
rejecting the application.
285
Although the Act makes default in payment of rent as a
ground for eviction, yet, the efficacy of the ground is
different. In this context. Section 13 sub-section (2)(i) is
more important and it is, therefore. fully extracted hereun-
der:
"13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply
to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the
Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied
(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by
him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen
days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of
tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such
agreement, by the last day of the month next following that
for which the rent is payable.
Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of applica-
tion for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the
arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on
such arrears together with the cost of application assessed
by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly
paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid."
This is a special provision made for the benefit of the
tenant who has defaulted to pay the agreed rent.
Various Rent Control Acts provide protection from evic-
tion to the tenant with provisions similar to the proviso in
question. Reference may be made to Section 13 sub-section
2(i) proviso of the Haryana Act, (ii) Section 12 Sub-section
3(b) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, (iii) Section 14 sub-
section 2(j) proviso of the Himachal Pradesh Act.
Mr. Mehta learned counsel for the landlord-respondent
sought to justify the view taken by the High Court of Punjab
in Ram Gopal and Onkar Mal Cases. His argument went on the
literal construction or strict construction based on the
word ’tenant’ defined under section 2(h)(i) of the Act. He
urged that the word ’tenant’ referred to in the proviso must
carry the same meaning as given to it under the definition
and ’tenant’ as defined thereunder is alone entitled to
avail of the benefit of the proviso and no others.
286
We recognise that Section 13 sub-section (2)(i) proviso
refers to the tenant and his obligation to pay or tender the
arrears of rent, interest and costs if he wants to save
himself from eviction. We also recognise that under section
2(h)(i) the word ’tenant’ is defined to mean "any person by
whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or
rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession
after the termination of the tenancy in his favour but does
not include a person placed in occupation of a building or
rented land by its tenant unless with the consent in writing
of the landlord ..... But the law in the Court’s keeping
is just not a system of logical abstraction. Nor it is a
bucket of ready made answers determined by any general
formula or principle in advance. In a famous passage Mr.
Justice Holmes said:
"All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
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logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neigh-
bourhood of principles of policy which are other than those
on which the particular right is rounded, and which becomes
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached ..... The boundary at which the conflicting inter-
ests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in
advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it,
are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls
on the nearer or farther side." (Hudson County Water Co. V.
MeCarter, 209 US 349,355-356).
It true when a word has been defined in the interpretation
clause, prima facie that definition governs wherever that
word is used the body of the Statute unless the context
requires otherwise. "The context" as pointed out in the book
Cross-Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed. 48) is both inter-
nal and external". The internal context requiers the inter-
preter to situate the disputed words within the section
of which they are part and in relation to the rest of the
Act. The external context involves determining the meaning
from ordinary linguistic usage (including any special tech-
nical meanings) from the purpose for which the provision was
passed, and from the place of the provisions within the
general scheme of statutory and common law rules and princi-
ples.
The opening sentence in the definition of the Section states
unless mere is anything repugnant in the subject or
context". In view of this qualification, the Court has not
only to look at the words but also to examine the context
and collocation in the light of the object of the Act and
the purpose for which a particular provision was made by
287
the Legislature. Reference may be made to the observations
of Wanchoo, J., in Vanguard Five and General Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. M/s Fruser and Ross & Anr., [1960] 3 SCR 857 at 863
where the learned Judge said that even where the definition
is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean
a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a
somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act
depending upon the subject or context. In that case, the
learned judge examined the construction of the word ’insur-
er’ as used in Section 33(1) and 2-D of the Insurance Act,
1938, in the light of the definition of that word under
Section 2(9) thereof. The Insurance Act by Section _(9)
defines an ’insurer’ as a person carrying on the business of
insurance’. The question arose whether sections 33(1) and
2-D did not apply to an insurer who had closed his business
completely as the definition of the word insurer in section
2(9) postulates actual carrying on of the business. It was
pointed out that in the context of sections 33(1) and 2-D
and taking into account the policy of the Act and the pur-
poses for which the control was imposed on insurers, the
word ’Insurer’ in the said sections also refers to insurers
who were carrying on the business of insurance but have
closed it.
Great artistry on the Bench as elsewhere is, therefore,
needed before we accept, reject or modify any theory or
principle. Law as creative response should be so interpreted
to meet the different fact situations corning before the
court. For, Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine
prescience and perfect clarity. It is not possible for the
legislators to foresee the manifold sets of facts and con-
troversies which may arise while giving effect to a particu-
lar provision. Indeed, the legislators do not deal with the
specific controversies. When conflicting interests arise or
defect appears from the language of the statute, the Court
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by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement
the written word with ’force and life’. See, the observation
of Lord Denning in Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB
481 at 498.
The apparent purpose of the proviso was to relieve the
defaulting tenant from extreme penalty of eviction. There
cannot be any doubt on this purpose. The provision seems to
be analogous to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1892 which confers discretion to the Court to grant relief
against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. But the proviso
goes a step further and leaves no such discretion to the
controller or court even if the tenant is a constant de-
faulter. If the arrears and other amounts specified are paid
or tendered on the first date of hearing, the default as a
ground for eviction disappears and the Controller is pre-
cluded from passing a decree for eviction. The
288
governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant could
pay and stay in an action for eviction on default. At the
same time, the landlord is ensured payment of arrears,
interest and the costs that he has incurred without the
necessity of going to civil court to recover it. This seems
to be the will and intention of the legislature in the shape
and scope or’ the proviso.
Against this backdrop, we have to construe the word
’tenant used in the proviso. Mr. Ramamurthy, learned counsel
for the appellants urged for liberal construction of the
word so as to include a person claiming to be a tenant.
Reference was made to the observation of this Court in
Mangat Rai v. Kidarnath, [1981] 1 SCR 4-76. There Fazal Ali,
J., said that the proviso in question affords a real and
sanctified protection to tenant against eviction on the
ground of default. It should not be given a hypothetical or
literal construction, but should be meaningfully construed.
We agree with this observation. The legislative protection
concerning the tenants should not be narrowly tailored.
Indeed, it should be given wider meaning and broader con-
cept. We should try to understand the spirit of the text and
not be bound by letter.
The argument of counsel for the landlord however, was
that the proviso was intended to protect the tenant as
defined under the statute and not a person claiming to be a
tenant. The persons who are not tenants could not, there-
fore, be given the benefit of the proviso. This submission
or the interpretation suggested by counsel does not provide
a square answer for all problems coming before the court. If
there are proceedings for eviction with persons claiming
tenancy along with the undisputed tenant or to his exclu-
sion, the acceptance of that submission may lead to arbi-
trary and unjust result. Take for instance, the landlord
brings an action for eviction on default against A and B
where A is recognised as the tenant, but not B. B however
claims that he shares the tenancy with A and joins A in
tendering the arrears on the first date of hearing of the
case. A also does not dispute that claim. But if the conten-
tion of the landlord that the tenant as defined under the
Act is alone entitled to tender the amount is accepted, the
court could make an order of eviction by discarding the
deposit. That would be repugnant to our notions of justice.
Take another hypothetical case whose occurrence is more
probable and which often arises for decision. The landlord
brings an action for eviction against A on the ground of
default and also on sub-letting to B. But B denies sub-
letting and contends that he was
289
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inducted into the premises with the consent of the landlord.
A remains absent, perhaps he is not interested in the prem-
ises. B however, tenders the rent on his own account, but
the landlord refuses to accept it on the plea that B has no
right to tender the rent since he is not a recognised ten-
ant. The acceptance of that view may result in ejectment of
A and B before determining the controversy between the
parties. Both of them may have to be thrown out without
deciding the issue raised in the pleadings.
We cannot have "Sentence first--verdict afterwards".
That is possible only by the demand of Queen in "Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland" (By Lewis Carroll p. 186). We must
construe the proviso so as to effectuate the twin considera-
tions which we discussed earlier. We must eliminate the
construction which is productive of injustice. arbitrary
result and undesirable consequence.
It is time for us to be explicit. Taking into account of
the intention of the legislature and the purposes for which
the proviso was enacted, we are of the opinion that the
obligation to tender the rent under the proviso on the first
hearing date does not depend upon the existence of admitted
jural relationship of landlord and tenant. When an action
for eviction is brought by the landlord on the ground of
default, the proviso stands attracted. The benefit of the
proviso could be availed of by the tenant and also by those
who claim to be the tenant. The view to the contrary ex-
pressed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ram Gopal
and Onkar Mal cases is likely to be of greater mischief to
the tenants than a protection for them and is therefore
overruled.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of
the appellate authority as affirmed by the High Court is
reversed. The matter stands remitted to the appellate au-
thority for disposal in the light of the observations made
and in accordance with law.
In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to
costs.
N.V.K. Appeal
allowed.
290