M.SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. vs. MAHANT SURESH DAS

1 REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  10866    ­10867 OF 2010 M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS.                   … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MAHANT SURESH DAS AND OTHERS ETC.        … RESPONDENT(S) WITH C.A.   No. 4768­4771/2011,   C.A.   No.   2636/2011, C.A. No. 821/2011, C.A. No. 4739/2011, C.A. No. 4905­ 4908/2011,  C.A. No. 2215/2011, C.A. No. 4740/2011, C.A. No. 2894/2011, C.A. No. 6965/2011, C.A. No. 4192/2011, C.A.   No.   5498/2011,   C.A.   No.   7226/2011,   C.A.   No. 8096/2011,       C.A.No.   ________   of   2018   (@   Diary   No. 22744/2017). J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.(For Self & Dipak Misra, CJI.) These appeals were fixed for commencement of final arguments on 05.12.2017, when Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants   (C.A.   No. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK GUGLANI Date: 2018.09.27 16:02:26 IST Reason: 10866­10867 of 2010 and C.A. No. 2215 of 2011) submitted that the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in 2 Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.,   (1994)   6   SCC   360   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “ Ismail   Faruqui’s   case”)   needs   reconsideration,   hence the   reference   be   made   to   a   larger   Bench.     The   above submission of Dr. Dhavan was opposed by learned counsel appearing for the respondents.  After completion of the pleadings, when matter was again taken on 14.03.2018, we thought it appropriate that we should hear Dr. Dhavan as to   whether   the   judgment   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case requires reconsideration.   2. We   have   heard   Dr.   Rajeev   Dhavan,   learned   senior counsel for the appellants, Shri K. Parasaran and Shri C.S.   Vaidyanathan,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 4768­4771 of 2011, Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General has appeared for the State of U.P.  We have also heard Shri P.N. Mishra, Shri S.K. Jain and several other learned counsels.       Shri   Raju   Ramachandran,   learned   senior counsel   has   also   addressed   submissions   supporting   the reference   to   larger   Bench.     Learned   counsel   for   the parties have given their notes of submissions.  3. Before   we   notice   the   respective   submissions   of 3 learned counsel for the parties, we need to notice few facts, leading to the   Constitution Bench decision in Ismail   Faruqui’s   case.     The   sequence   of   events   which lead   filing   of   these   appeals   be   also   noticed.       The Constitution   Bench   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   has extracted   few   facts   from   White   Paper,   which   was published by Central Government.  In Para 5 and 6 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench noticed:­ “ 5.  The ‘Overview’ at the commencement of the White Paper in Chapter I states thus: “1.1   Ayodhya   situated   in   the   north of India is a township in District Faizabad   of   Uttar   Pradesh.   It   has long been a place of holy pilgrimage because of its mention in the epic Ramayana   as   the   place   of   birth   of Sri   Ram.   The   structure   commonly known   as   Ram   Janma   Bhoomi­Babri Masjid   was   erected   as   a   mosque   by one Mir Baqi in Ayodhya in 1528 AD. It is claimed by some sections that it was built at the site believed to be the birthspot of Sri Ram where a temple   had   stood   earlier.   This resulted in a long­standing dispute. 1.2   The   controversy   entered   a   new phase with the placing of idols in the   disputed   structure   in   December 1949.   The   premises   were   attached under   Section   145   of the   Code   of Criminal Procedure. Civil suits were filed   shortly   thereafter.   Interim orders   in   these   civil   suits 4 restrained the parties from removing the idols or interfering with their worship. In effect, therefore, from December   1949   till   6­12­1992   the structure   had   not   been   used   as   a mosque.” 6.  The movement to construct a Ram Temple at the site of the disputed structure gathered momentum   in   recent   years   which   became   a matter of great controversy and a source of tension.   This   led   to   several   parleys   the details   of   which   are   not   very   material   for the present purpose. These parleys involving the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC), however, failed to resolve the dispute. A new dimension   was   added   to   the   campaign   for construction of the temple with the formation of   the   Government   in   Uttar   Pradesh   in   June 1991 by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) which declared   its   commitment   to   the   construction of the temple and took certain steps like the acquisition   of   land   adjoining   the   disputed structure   while   leaving   out   the   disputed structure   itself   from   the acquisition.   The focus   of   the   temple   construction   movement from October 1991 was to start construction of the temple by way of  kar sewa  on the land acquired by the Government of Uttar Pradesh while leaving the disputed structure intact. This   attempt   did   not   succeed   and   there   was litigation   in   the   Allahabad   High   Court   as well as in this Court. There was a call for resumption of  kar sewa  from 6­12­1992 and the announcement made by the organisers was for a symbolic   kar   sewa   without   violation   of   the court   orders   including   those   made   in   the proceedings pending in this Court. In spite of initial reports from Ayodhya on 6­12­1992 indicating an air of normalcy, around midday a   crowd   addressed   by   leaders   of   BJP,   VHP, etc.,   climbed   the   Ram   Janma   Bhumi­Babri Masjid   (RJM­BM)   structure   and   started 5 damaging the domes. Within a short time, the entire structure was demolished and razed to the   ground.   Indeed,   it   was   an   act   of “national shame”. What was demolished was not merely an ancient structure; but the faith of the   minorities   in   the   sense   of   justice   and fairplay of majority. It shook their faith in the rule of law and constitutional processes. A   five­hundred­year­old   structure   which   was defenceless   and   whose   safety   was   a   sacred trust   in   the   hands   of   the   State   Government was demolished.” 4. The Constitution Bench has noticed details of suits, which were filed in the year 1950 and thereafter, which suits were ultimately transferred to the Allahabad High Court to be heard together in the year 1989.  In Para 9 of the judgment, following has been noticed:­ “ 9.   A   brief reference   to   certain   suits   in this connection may now be made. In 1950, two suits were filed by some Hindus;  in one of these suits in January 1950, the trial court passed   interim   orders   whereby   the   idols remained   at   the   place   where   they   were installed in December 1949 and their puja by the Hindus continued. The interim order was confirmed by the High Court in April 1955. On 1­2­1986,   the   District   Judge   ordered   the opening of the lock placed on a grill leading to the sanctum sanctorum of the shrine in the disputed structure and permitted puja by the Hindu devotees. In 1959, a suit was filed by the   Nirmohi   Akhara   claiming   title   to   the disputed structure. In 1981, another suit was filed   claiming   title   to   the   disputed structure by the Sunni Central Wakf Board. In 1989,   Deoki   Nandan   Agarwal,   as   the   next friend   of   the   Deity   filed   a   title   suit   in respect of the disputed structure. In 1989, 6 the aforementioned suits were transferred to the Allahabad High Court and were ordered to be   heard   together.   On   14­8­1989,   the   High Court ordered the maintenance of status quo in   respect   of   the   disputed   structure (Appendix­I to the White Paper). As earlier mentioned,  it is stated in  para 1.2 of the White Paper that: “…  interim   orders   in   these   civil suits   restrained   the   parties   from removing   the   idols   or   interfering with   their   worship.   In   effect, therefore,   from   December   1949   till 6­12­1992 the structure had not been used as a mosque.” 5. As   a   result   of   the   happenings   at   Ayodhya   on 06.12.1992, the President of India issued a proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution of India assuming to himself all the functions of the Government of Uttar Pradesh,   dissolving   the   U.P.   Vidhan   Sabha.     As   a consequence of the events at Ayodhya on 06.12.1992, the Central   Government   decided   to   acquire   all   areas   in dispute   in   the   suits   pending   in   the   Allahabad   High Court. It was also decided to acquire suitable adjacent area, which would be made available to two Trusts for construction of a Ram Temple and a Mosque respectively. The Government of India has also decided to request the President to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on the question whether there was a Hindu temple existing 7 on   the   site   where   the   disputed   structure   stood.     An ordinance was issued on 07.01.1993 namely “Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Ordinance” for acquisition of 67.703 acres of land in the Ram Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid complex.  A reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution was also made on the same day, i.e. 07.01.1993.   The Ordinance No. 8 of 1993 had been replaced by the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 (No. 33 of 1993) (hereinafter referred to as “Act,   1993”).     A   Writ   Petition   Under   Article   32   was filed in this Court challenging the validity of the Act No.   33   of   1993.     Several   writ   petitions   at   Allahabad High Court were also filed challenging various aspects of the Act, 1993. This Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 139A had transferred the writ petitions, which   were   pending   in   the   High   Court.     The   Writ Petitions under Article 32, transferred cases from High Court   of   Allahabad   as   well   as   Reference   No.1   of   1993 made   by   President   under   Article   143   were   all   heard together   and   decided   by   common   judgment   dated 24.10.1994, where the Constitution Bench had upheld the validity of the Act except that of Section 4(3) of the 8 Act, 1993 which was struck down.   6. After   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   above Constitution   Bench,   all   the   suits,   which   had   been transferred   by   the   High   Court   to   be   heard   by   a   Full Bench of the High Court stood revived.  One Mohd. Aslam, who   was   also   one   of   the   petitioners   in   Constitution Bench   Judgment   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   filed   a   writ petition seeking certain reliefs with regard to 67.703 acres of land acquired under the Act, 1993.  This Court on 13.03.2002 passed an interim order.  Paras 4 and 5 of the interim order are as follows:­ “ 4.     In   the   meantime,   we   direct   that   on 67.703   acres   of   acquired   land   located   in various plots detailed in the Schedule to the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993,   which   is   vested   in   the   Central Government, no religious activity of any kind by anyone either symbolic or actual including bhumi puja or shila puja, shall be permitted or allowed to take place. 5.     Furthermore,   no   part   of   the   aforesaid land shall be handed over by the Government to anyone and the same shall be retained by the Government till the disposal of this writ petition nor shall any part of this land be permitted   to   be   occupied   or   used   for   any religious   purpose   or   in   connection therewith.” 7. The above writ petition was ultimately decided on 31.03.2003   by   a   Constitution   Bench,   which   judgment   is 9 reported in  (2003) 4 SCC 1, Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure Vs. Union   of   India   and   Others.   Before   the   Constitution Bench, both the parties had placed reliance on   Ismail Faruqui’s  case. This Court disposed of the writ petition directing that order of this Court dated 13.03.2002 as modified   on   14.03.2002   should   be   operative   until disposal of the suits in the High Court of Allahabad. The Allahabad High Court after hearing all the suits on merits   decided   all   the   suits   vide   its   judgment   dated 30.08.2010.  The parties aggrieved ­ both plaintiffs and defendants   in   the   original   suits   have   filed   these appeals in this Court.   8. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan submits that judgment in   Ismail Faruqui’s   case had made observations that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam   and   namaz   (prayer)   by   Muslims   can   be   offered anywhere, even in open.   The observations made by the Constitution   Bench   has   influenced   the   decisions   under the   appeal,   the   law   laid   down   in   in Ismail   Faruqui   relation to praying in a mosque not being an essential practice is contrary to both, i.e. the law relating to essential   practice   and   the   process   by   which   essential 10 practice is to be considered. Whether essential practice can   be   decided   on   a   mere   ipse   dixit   of   the   Court   or whether the Court is obliged to examine belief, tenets and practices, is a pure question of law.   The   Ismail Faruqui ’s   judgment   being   devoid   of   any   examination   on the above issues,   the matter need to go to a larger Bench.  9. Dr. Dhavan specifically referred to paras 78 and 82 of   the   judgment   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case.     He specifically   attacked   following   observations   in Paragraph 78 :­ “78. While offer of  prayer or worship  is a religious   practice,   its   offering   at   every location   where   such   prayers   can   be   offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a   particular   significance   for   that   religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof.   Places   of   worship   of   any   religion having   particular   significance   for   that religion, to make it an essential or integral part   of   the   religion,   stand   on   a   different footing   and   have   to   be   treated   differently and more reverentially.” 10. In   Para   82,   following   observation   is   specifically attacked:­ “A   mosque   is   not   an   essential   part   of   the practice   of   the   religion   of   Islam   and namaz(prayer)   by   Muslims   can   be   offered 11 anywhere, even in open.” 11. He   submits   that   essential   practice   of   a   religion requires   a   detailed   examination.     He   has   referred   to various   judgments   of   this   Court   to   support   his submission that wherever this Court had to determine the essential practice of a religion, detailed examination was undertaken.   He submits that   Ismail Faruqui ’s case does   not   refer   to   any   material   nor   enters   into   any detailed examination before making the observations in Paragraphs   78   and   82   as   noticed   above.     Dr.   Dhavan further   submits   that   a   broad   test   of   essentiality   as laid   down   by   Seven   Judges   Bench   in   The   Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005  cannot be   cut   down   by   a   later   judgment   of   lesser   strength, which judgments have introduced the test of integrality. He   submits   that   the   test   of   integrality   is interchangable   with   essentiality   test.     Dr. Dhavan, during his submissions, has taken us to submissions made by various parties before the High Court, where reliance was   placed   on   Ismail   Faruqui ’s   case.     He   has   also referred to various grounds taken in these appeals, 12 which grounds rely on the judgment of   Ismail Faruqui ’s case.  He submits that the above furnishes ample grounds for   appellants   to   pray   for   reconsideration   of   Ismail Faruqui ’s case.  Dr. Dhavan in his notes 'For reference to   a   larger   Bench'   has   clarified   that   questionable aspects   as   noted   above   are   not   the   ratio   of   Ismail Faruqui ’s case.  Dr. Dhavan submits that ratio in  Ismail Faruqui ’s   case   can   be   summed   up   to   the   following effect:­ (i) The suits revive in their entirety. (ii) The   acquisition   was   legally   competent, traceable   to   List   III   and   Entry   42   of   the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. (iii) The   word   ‘vest’   has   multiple   meanings   and implied   that   the   status   of   the   Central Government   was   that   of   a   statutory   receiver which would dispense with the land (including the   other   areas   acquired)   in   accordance   with the   judgment   in   the   suits   rather   than   the Reference which was declined.  (iv) Status quo as in Section 7(2) of the Act would be   maintained,   justified   on   the   basis   of comparative user since 1949. (v) Secularism   is   a   facet   of equality   and represents equal treatment of all religions in their   own   terms   and   with   equal   respect   and 13 concern for all. 12. Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel refuting the submissions of Dr. Dhavan submitted that the prayer for reconsideration of the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui ’s case   is   not   maintainable   at   the   instance   of   the appellants.   He submitted that those who were eo nomine parties   to   the   proceedings   in   the   case   in   Ismail Faruqui,   litigated   bona   fide   in   respect   of   a   public right viz. the right of the Muslim public, all persons interested   in   such   right   shall,   for   the   purposes   of Section   11   Civil   Procedure   Code,   be   deemed   to   claim under the persons so litigating and are barred by Res Judicata in view of Explanation VI to Section 11 C.P.C. He submits that the interests of Muslim community were adequately   represented   before   this   Court   in   Ismail Faruqui ’s case.     He further submits that the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui ’s case is binding on those who are eo­ nomine parties thereto.  Even apart from the question of res judicata, the doctrine of representation binds those whose interests are the same in the subject matter of Ram   Janam   Bhumi­Babri   Masjid   as   those   of   eo­nomine parties.     He   submitted   that   the   appellants   are   not 14 entitled   to   request   for   reconsideration   of   the   said judgment on the principle of doctrine of representation. Mr. Parasaran submitted that to reconsider the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui ’s case will be an exercise in futility as   the   judgment   therein   is   binding   on   the   present appellants. Assuming without admitting that by a further reference   to   a   larger   bench   Ismail   Faruqui ’s   case   is overruled,   nevertheless,   in   so   far   as   “Ayodhya Janmasthan Babri Masjid” is concerned, the judgment in Ismail   Faruqui ’s   case   will   still   be   binding   on   the appellants   on   the   principle   of   finality.     He   submits that in the present case, the submissions made were a reargument of the submissions made in   Ismail Faruqui ’s case as if it were an appeal against the said judgment by canvassing the correctness of the said judgment.   He further submits that in addition to being binding on the parties, the judgment operates as a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution.       13. Shri Parasaran further submits that observations in Ismail Faruqui’s  case that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam have to be read in the context   of   validity   of   the   acquisition   of   the 15 suit property under the Act, 1993.     He submits that this Court has not ruled that offering namaz by Muslims is not an essential religious practice. It only ruled that   the   right   to   offer   namaz  at   every   mosque   that exists  is   not   essential   religious   practice.   But   if   a place   of   worship   of   any   religion   has   a   particular significance   for   that   religion,   enough   to   make   it   an essential   or   integral   part   of   the   religion,   then   it would stand on a different footing and would have to be treated   differently   and   more   reverentially. Mr.Parasaran respectfully submitted that the thrust of the reasoning of this Court has to be understood as to the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution   in   the   context   of the   inherent   sovereign power of the State to compulsorily acquire property in the exercise of its jurisdiction of eminent domain in a secular democracy.    14. Shri Parasaran further submits that the fundamental right of the Muslim community under Article 25, to offer namaz, is not affected because the Babri Masjid was not a mosque with particular significance for that religion. The faith/practice to offer namaz is an essential part 16 of Muslim religion and, therefore, it may be performed in   any   mosque   at   Ayodhya.     Ayodhya   is   of   particular significance   to   the   Hindus   as   a   place   of   pilgrimage because   of   the   ancient   belief   that   Lord   Ram   was   born there.     He   further   submits   that   the   impact   of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of both the communities. Shri Parasaran, during his submissions, has also tried to  distinguish  the cases relied by the appellants   to   support   their   submissions   in   favour   of reference.   15. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan has submitted that present is not a case where judgment of  Ismail Faruqui ’s case need any   reference   to   a   larger   Bench.   He   has   adopted   the submissions made by Shri Parasaran. 16. Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Additional   Solicitor General,   submits   that   Constitution   Bench   judgment   of this Court in   Ismail Faruqui ’s case is a correct law, which does not deserves to be disturbed by referring it to a larger Bench.  Shri Mehta further submits that the prayer made by the appellants for referring to larger Bench   deserves   to   be   rejected   on   the   ground   of inordinate delay. He submits that judgment was rendered 17 in 1994.   The judgment came for consideration in   Mohd. Aslam’s case, (2003) 4 SCC 1  where both the parties have relied   on   the   judgments.     Had   there   been   any   genuine grounds, request for reference ought to have been made at that time.  He further submits that a request is not a bona fide request and has been made with the intent to delay   the   proceedings.     Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned Additional   Solicitor   General   has   reiterated   his submissions that State of U.P. is neutral in so far as merits   of   the   case   of   either   of   the   parties   is concerned.   17. Shri   Parmeshwar   Nath   Mishra,   learned   counsel appearing for one of the respondents submits that all Mosques of the World are not essential for practice of Islam.   During the submissions, he referred to various texts, sculptures of the religion of Islam.  He further submits that the Al­Masjid, Al­Haram i.e. Ka‘ba in Mecca is a mosque of particular significance for the reasons that there is Quranic command to offer prayers facing towards   Ka‘ba   and   to   perform   Haj   as   well   as   Umra   in Ka‘ba without which right to practise the religion of Islam is not conceivable.  Two other Mosques namely, Al­ 18 Masjid Al­Aqsa i.e. Baitul Muqaddas in Jerusalem and Al­ Masjid   of   Nabi   at   Madina   also   have   particular significances   for   the   reason   that   besides   Ka‘ba, pilgrimage to these two mosques have also been commanded by the sacred Hadiths.   Shri Mishra in his submission has   referred   to   and   relied   on   various   texts   and sculptures.  He has referred to verses of Holy Quran and Hadiths,   which   are   principal   source   of   religion   of Islam, its beliefs, doctrine, tenets and practices.   18. Shri S.K. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for Nirmohi Akhada has also refuted the submission of Dr. Dhavan that   Ismail Faruqui ’s case needs to be referred to a larger Bench. 19. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan in his submissions in rejoinder refutes the submission of Shri Parasaran that principle of res judicata is attracted in the present case.   He submits that  Ismail Faruqui ’s case was about a challenge to the Act, 1993 and the Presidential Reference and the question as to whether in the light of the Act, 1993 the suits abated due to Section 4(3) of the Act, 1993.  The cases   under   these   appeals   are   from   suits,   where   the issues were entirely different. He submits that for 19 constituting   a   matter   res   judicata   the   following conditions must be satisfied, namely:­ 1. The matter directly and substantially in issue in   the   subsequent   suit   or   issue   must   be   the same   matter   which   was   directly   and substantially in issue in the former suit; 2. The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; 3. The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; 4. The court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the   suit   in   which   such   issue   is   subsequently raised; and 5. The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. Further Explanation I shows that it is not the date on which the suit is filed that matters but the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a suit was filed later, it will be a former suit if it has been decided earlier. In   order   therefore   that   the   decision   in   the earlier two appeals dismissed by the High Court operates   as   res   judicata   it   will   have   to   be seen whether all the five conditions mentioned above have been satisfied.           20 20. He   submits   that   matter,   which   was   directly   and substantially   in   issue   in   the   suits   is   entirely different from the issues, which came for consideration in the case of   Ismail Faruqui.   His submission is that Ismail Faruqui ’s case was concerned with the Act, 1993 and the Presidential Reference.  He further submits that issue   of   essentiality   of   a   Mosque   generally   was   not before the Court and emerged only in the judgment.   He further submits that pure questions of law are not res judicata.   The ipse dixit of the Court that something is, or not the essential practice is contrary to law. He further submits that in the Constitution Bench, the suits   were   not   transferred   rather   it   was   the   writ petitions,   which   were   filed   in   the   High   Court challenging   the   Act,   1993,   were   transferred.     No transfer   of   the   suit   having   been   made   in   the   Supreme Court to be heard alongwith   Ismail Faruqui ’s case, the judgment in   Ismail Faruqui ’s case cannot be said to be judgment   in   the   suits.     What   constitute   an   essential practice   and   how   it   is   to   be   established   is   a   pure question of law and not amenable to res judicata.  It is open   to   this   court   to   examine   the   law   relating   to 21 determination and application of the essential practices test.  The observations on prayer in a Mosque not being essential   or   concept   of   particular   significance   and comparative   significance   are   without   foundation. Replying   to   the   submission   of   Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   Dr. Dhavan submits that State has not taken a non­neutral stance   in   the   present   proceedings.     He   submits   that there   is   no   delay   on   the   part   of   the   appellants   in praying   for   reconsideration   of   Ismail   Faruqui ’s judgment.  He submits that impugned judgment of the High Court is affected by the observations made in the  Ismail Faruqui ’s   case.     He   submits that   submission   of   Shri Tushar Mehta that prayer is not bonafide and has been made   only   to   delay   the   proceedings   are   incorrect   and deserves to be rejected.   Dr. Dhavan has also referred to various observations made by judgment in High Court to   support its   submissions   that   judgment   of   Ismail Faruqui’s   case has influenced the judgment of the High Court.  He has further referred to various submissions     made by the learned counsel for the parties relying on judgment of  Ismail Faruqui ’s case before the High Court. He further submits that in these appeals also, several 22 grounds have been taken by the different learned counsel relying on  Ismail Faruqui ’s case.   21. Learned counsel for the parties have referred to and relied on various judgments of this Court, which shall be   referred   to   while   considering   the   submissions   in detail.  22. Before   we   enter   into   the   submissions   advanced   by the learned counsel for the parties it is relevant to notice   certain   established   principle   on   reading   of   a judgment of the Court. The focal point in the present case being Constitution Bench judgment in  Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported   in (1994) 6 SCC 360.   We have to find out the context of observations made in the judgment which according to the appellant   are   questionable   and   to   decide   whether   the said observations furnish any ground for reconsideration of the Constitution Bench judgment. The most celebrated principle on reading of a judgment of a Court of law which has been approved time and again by this Court is the statement by LORD HALSBURY in  Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495,  where following was laid down: “Before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood   (1898)   AC   1   and   what   was   decided 23 therein,   there   are   two   observations   of   a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law,   but   are   governed   and   qualified   by   the particular   facts   of   the   case   in   which   such expressions   are   to   be   found.   The   other   is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow   logically   from   it.   Such   a   mode   of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a   logical   code,   whereas   every   lawyer   must acknowledge   that   the   law   is   not   always logical at all. ” 23. The following words of LORD DENNING in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is   not   enough   because   even   a   single significant   detail   may   alter   the   entire aspect,   in   deciding   such   cases,   one   should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by  Cardozo, J.  )  by matching  the colour of one   case   against   the   colour   of   another.   To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.    * Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut   the   dead   wood   and   trim   off   the   side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the 24 path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” The above passage has been quoted with approval by this Court in  Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2008) 1 SCC 494. 24. In   the   Constitution   Bench   judgment   in   Islamic Academy of Education and another v. State of Karnataka and others, (2003) 6 SCC 697,   Chief Justice   V.N. Khare speaking for majority held: “The ratio decidendi of a Judgment has to be found   out   only   on   reading   the   entire Judgment. In fact the ratio of the judgment is  what is  set out  in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. In case   of   any   doubt   as   regards   any observations,   reasons   and   principles,   the other part of the judgment has to be looked into. By reading a line here and there from, the judgment, one cannot find out the entire ratio   decidendi   of   the   judgment.   We, therefore,   while   giving   our   clarifications, are deposed to look into other parts of the Judgment other than those portions which may be relied upon.”  25. Justice S.B. Sinha, J. in his concurring opinion has reiterated   the   principles   of   interpretation   of   a judgment in paragraphs 139 to 146. Following has been 25 held in paragraphs 139­146: “ INTERPRETATION OF A JUDGMENT 139. A judgment, it is trite, is not to be read as a statute. The ratio decidendi of a   judgment   is   its   reasoning   which   can   be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety.   The   ratio   decidendi   of   a   case   or the   principles   and   reasons   on   which   it   is based   is   distinct   from   the   relief   finally granted   or   the   manner   adopted   for   its disposal. [See   Executive   Engineer,   Dhenkanal   Minor Irrigation   Division   v.   N.C.   Budharaj [2001]2 SCC 721]. 140.   In   Padma   Sundara   Rao   v.   State   of T.N. ,(2002) 3 SCC 533, it is stated: (SCC p. 540 paragraph 9) "There   is   always   peril   in   treating   the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are   made   in   the   setting   of   the   facts   of   a particular   case,   said   Lord   Morris   in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR   537   [Sub   nom   British   Railways   Board   v. Herrington,   (1972)   1   All   ER   749. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." [See   also   Haryana   Financial   Corporation   v. Jagadamba Oil Mills  (2002 3 SCC 496] 141. In  General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power   Co.,   (1987)   4   SCC   137 ,   it   was   held: (SCC p.157, paragraph 20) "As often enough pointed out by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or   as   words   and   expressions   defined   in 26 statutes. We do not have any doubt that when the words "adjudication of the merits of the controversy   in   the   suit"   were   used   by   this Court in  State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra   [1974]1SCR31   ,   the   words   were   not used   to   take   in   every   adjudication   which brought to an end the proceeding before the court   in   whatever   manner   but   were   meant   to cover only such adjudication as touched upon the   real   dispute   between   the   parties   which gave   rise   to   the   action.   Objections   to adjudication   of   the   disputes   between   the parties, on whatever ground are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to   such   progress.   Adjudication   of   such objections   cannot   be   termed   as   adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. As we said earlier, a broad view has to be taken of the principles involved and narrow and   technical   interpretation   which   tends   to defeat the object of the legislation must be avoided."  142. In  Rajeshwar Prasad Mishra v. The State of   West,   Bengal,   AIR   1965   SC   1887,   it   was held:  "Article 141 empowers the Supreme Court to  declare the  law and  enact  it. Hence the observation of the Supreme Court should not be read as statutory enactments. It is also well known that ratio of a decision is the reasons assigned therein." (See also   Amar Nath Om Prakash and Ors. v. State   of   Punjab [1985]   1   SCC   345   and   Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam,  2001 (7) SCC 573). 143. It will not, therefore, be correct to   contend,   as   has   been   contended   by   Mr. Nariman, that answers to the questions would be  the ratio to a judgment. The answers to the   questions   are   merely   conclusions.   They have to be interpreted, in a case of doubt or dispute with the reasons assigned in support 27 thereof   in   the   body   of   the   judgment,   where for, it would be essential to read the other paragraphs of the judgment also. It is also permissible for this purpose (albeit only in certain cases and if there exist strong and cogent reasons) to look to the pleadings of the parties. 144. In  Keshav Chandra Joshi  v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272 , this Court when faced   with   difficulties   where   specific guidelines   had   been   laid   down   for determination of seniority in  Direct Recruits Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra , (1990) 2 SCC 715, held that   the   conclusions   have   to   be   read   along with the discussions and the reasons given in the body of the judgment. 145. It is further trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. [See Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568. 146. The judgment of this Court in  T.M.A. Pai   Foundations,   (2002)   8   SCC   481,   will, therefore,   have   to   be   construed   or   to   be interpreted on the aforementioned principles, The   Court   cannot   read   some   sentences   from here   and   there   to   find   out   the   intent   and purport   of   the   decision   by   not   only considering   what   has   been   said   therein   but the text  and context  in which it was  said. For   the   said   purpose   the   Court   may   also consider   the   constitutional   or   relevant, statutory   provisions   vis­a­vis   its   earlier decisions on which reliance has been placed.” 26. Justice Arijit Pasayat, J. speaking for the Court in Commissioner  of  Central   Excise,   Delhi   vs.   Allied  Air­ conditioning Corporation (Regd.), (2006) 7 SCC 735,  held 28 that the judgment should be understood in the light of facts of the case and no more should be read into it than what it actually says. In paragraph 8 following has been laid down: “8.....A judgment should be understood in the light of facts of the case and no more should be read into it than what it actually says. It is neither desirable nor permissible to   pick   out   a   word   or   a   sentence   from   the judgment   divorced   from   the   context   of   the question under consideration and treat it to be   complete   law   decided   by   this   Court.   The judgment   must   be   read   as   a   whole   and   the observations   from   the   judgment   have   to   be considered   in   the   light   of   the   questions which   were   before   this   Court.   (See   Mehboob Dawood   Shaikh   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   , (2004) 2 SCC 362.....” 27. In the light of the above principles, we now revert back   to   the   Constitution   Bench   judgment   in     Ismail Faruqui.  We need to notice   the issues which had come up for   consideration   before   the   Constitution   Bench,   the ratio of the judgment and the context of observations. We   have   noticed   above   that   the   Constitution   Bench   in Ismail Faruqui case   decided five transferred cases, two writ   petitions   filed   under   Article   32   and   Special Reference No.1 of 1993. The Special Reference No.1 of 1993 made by the President of India under Article 143 29 was   respectfully   declined   to   be   answered   by   the Constitution Bench. The challenge in the writ petitions under Article 32 and transferred cases was to the Act, 1993.   The   Act,   1993   was   enacted   to   provide   for   the acquisition of certain area at Ayodhya and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(a) defines the area as: “2(a)   “area”   means   the   area   (including all   the   buildings,   structures   or   other properties   comprised   therein)   specified   in the Schedule; 28. The Schedule of the Act contained the description of the area acquired. Apart from the other plots Revenue Plot Nos.159 and 160  situated in village Kot Ramchandra wherein   structure   commonly   known   as   Ram   Janam   Bhumi­ Babri   Masjid   was   situated   was   also   included.   Several other   plots   including   all   the   building   structure   on other properties comprised therein were acquired.  29. The validity of Act, 1993 was challenged on several grounds. The ground for challenge has been noticed in paragraph 17 of the judgment which is to the following effect: “17.   Broadly   stated,   the   focus   of challenge to the statute as a whole is on the 30 grounds of secularism, right to equality and right   to   freedom   of   religion.   Challenge   to the acquisition of the area in excess of the disputed   area   is   in   addition   on   the   ground that   the   acquisition   was   unnecessary   being unrelated   to   the   dispute   pertaining   to   the small   disputed   area   within   it.   A   larger argument   advanced   on   behalf   of   some   of   the parties   who   have   assailed   the   Act   with considerable vehemence is that a mosque being a place of religious worship by the Muslims, independently of whether the acquisition did affect   the   right   to   practice   religion,   is wholly   immune   from   the   State's   power   of acquisition   and   the   statute   is,   therefore, unconstitutional as violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India for this reason   alone.   The   others, however,   limited this   argument   of   immunity from   acquisition only   to   places   of   special   significance, forming an essential and integral part of the right   to   practice   the   religion,   the acquisition   of   which   would   result   in   the extinction   of   the   right   to   freedom   of religion itself. It was also contended that the   purpose   of   acquisition   in   the   present case   does   not   bring   the   statute   within   the ambit of Entry 42, List III but is referable to   Entry   1,   List   II   and,   therefore,   the Parliament   did   not   have   the   competence   to enact the same. It was then urged by learned Counsel   canvassing   the   Muslim   interest   that the legislation is tilted heavily in favour of   the   Hindu   interests   and,   therefore, suffers from the vice of non­secularism, and discrimination in   addition   to   violation   of the   right   to   freedom   of   religion   of   the Muslim community.....” 30. The   challenge   to   the   acquisition   of   the   area   in excess of area which is disputed area was on the ground 31 that same was unnecessary, hence, ought to be declared invalid.   The   challenge   to   excess   area   was   laid   by members of the Hindu community to whom the said plots belonged.   One   of   the   grounds   of   attack   was   based   on secularism. It was contended that Act read as a whole is anti­secular and against the Muslim community. A mosque has immunity from State's power of acquisition. It was contended   on   behalf   of   the   Muslim   community   that   the defences   open   to   the   minority   community   in   the   suits filed by other side including that of adverse possession for over 400 years since 1528 AD when the Mosque was constructed have been extinguished by the acquisition. The suits have been abated without the substitution of an alternate dispute resolution mechanism to which they are entitled in the Constitutional scheme.  31. The Constitution Bench held that acquisition of the properties under the Act affects the rights of both the communities   and   not   merely   those   of   the   Muslim community. In paragraph 49 following has been noticed: “49.   The   narration   of   facts   indicates that the acquisition of properties under the Act   affects   the   rights   of   both   the communities   and   not   merely   those   of   the Muslim community. The interest claimed by the Muslims is only over the disputed site where 32 the mosque stood before its demolition. The objection of the Hindus to this claim has to be adjudicated. The remaining entire property acquired under the Act is such over which no title is claimed by the Muslims. A large part thereof comprises of properties of Hindus of which the title is not even in dispute.... ” 32. This Court also noticed that Ayodhya is said to be of particular significance to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was   born   there.   The   Court   also   noticed   that   equally mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as an   ancient   mosque   built   by   Mir   Baqi   in   1528   AD.   In paragraph 51 of the judgment following has been noticed: “51. It may also be mentioned that even as   Ayodhya   is   said   to   be   of   particular significance   to   the   Hindus   as   a   place   of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born there, the mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 A.D. As   a   mosque,   it   was   a   religious   place   of worship   by   the   Muslims.   This   indicates   the comparative significance of the disputed site to   the   two communities   and   also   that   the impact of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of the Hindu community. Mention of this aspect is made only in the context of the argument that the statute as a whole, not merely   Section   7   thereof,   is   anti­secular being   slanted   in   favour   of   the   Hindus   and against the Muslims.”  33. As   noted   above,   one   of   the   principal   submission 33 which   was   raised   by   the   petitioners   before   the Constitution   Bench   was   that   mosque   cannot   be   acquired because of a special status in the Mohammedan Law.  The Constitution Bench in  Ismail Faruqui case  by a separate heading   “MOSQUE   –   IMMUNITY   FROM   ACQUISITION”   from paragraphs 65 to 82 considered the above ground.  34. The discussion from paragraphs 65 to 82 as per above heading   indicates   that   the   discussion   and   all observations   were   in   the   context   of   immunity   from acquisition of a mosque. In paragraph 65 of the judgment a larger question was raised at the hearing that there is   no   power   in   the   State   to   acquire   any   mosque, irrespective   of   its   significance   to   practice   of   the religion of Islam. The Court after noticing the above observation has observed that the proposition advanced does   appear   to   be   too   broad   for   acceptance.   We   re­ produce paragraph 65 which is to the following effect: “65.   A   larger   question   raised   at   the hearing   was   that   there   is   no   power   in   the State to acquire any mosque, irrespective of its significance to practice of the religion of Islam. The argument is that a mosque, even if it is of no particular significance to the practice   of   religion   of   Islam,   cannot   be acquired because of the special status of a mosque   in   Mahomedan   Law.   This   argument   was not   confined   to   a   mosque   of   particular 34 significance without which right to practice the   religion   is   not   conceivable   because   it may   form   an   essential   and   integral   part   of the practice  of Islam. In the view  that we have taken of limited vesting in the Central Government   as   a   statutory   receiver   of   the disputed area in which the mosque stood, for the purpose of handing it over to the party found   entitled   to   it,   and   requiring   it   to maintain status quo therein till then, this question   may   not   be   of   any   practical significance   since   there   is   no   absolute divesting of the true owner of that property. We may observe that the proposition advanced does   appear   to   us   to   be   too   broad   for acceptance inasmuch as it would restrict the sovereign   power   of   acquisition   even   where such   acquisition   is   essential   for   an undoubted   national   purpose,   if   the   mosque happens   to   be   located   in   the   property acquired   as   an   ordinary   place   of   worship without any particular significance attached to   it   for   the   practice   of   Islam   as   a religion. It would also lead to the strange result that in secular India there would be discrimination   against   the   religions,   other than   Islam.   In   view   of   the   vehemence   with which   this   argument   was   advanced   by   Dr. Rajeev   Dhavan   and   Shri   Abdul   Mannan   to contend that the acquisition is invalid for this reason alone, it is necessary for us to decide this question. ” 35. Although in paragraph 65 the Court observed that the proposition is too broad for acceptance but in view of the vehemence with which argument of the learned counsel appearing   for   the   petitioners   was   put   the   Court proceeded to decide the issue. 35 36. The contention   before the Constitution Bench was also   that   acquisition   of   a   mosque   violates   the   right given under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.   After   noticing   the   law   in   the   British   India, prior   to   1950,   and   the law   after   enforcement   of   the Constitution,   the   Constitution   Bench   came   to   the conclusion   that   places   of   religious   worship   like mosques,   churches,   temples   etc.   can   be   acquired   under the   State's   sovereign   power   of   acquisition.   Such acquisition per se does not violates either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. After noticing the various decisions following was laid down in paragraph 74: “74.It   appears   from   various   decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and   26   of   the   Constitution,   places   of religious   worship   like   mosques,   churches, temples   etc.   can   be   acquired   under   the State's sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition   per   se   does   not   violate   either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property. ” 37. The Constitution Bench further held that the right to practice, profess and propagate religion guaranteed 36 under   Article   25   of   the   Constitution   does   not necessarily   include   the   right   to   acquire   or   own   or possess property. Similarly, this right does not extend to   the   right   of   worship   at   any   and   every   place   of worship.   Further,   it   was   held   that   protection   under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. In paragraphs 77 and 78 following has been held: “77. It may be noticed that Article 25 does   not   contain   any   reference   to   property unlike   Article   26   of   the   Constitution.   The right   to   practice,   profess   and   propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of  worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular   place   per   se   may   infringe   the religious   freedom   guaranteed   under   Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is   to   religious   practice   which   forms   an essential and integral part of the religion. A   practice   may   be   a   religious   practice   but not   an   essential   and   integral   part   of practice of that religion.  78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious   practice,   its   offering   at   every location   where   such   prayers   can   be   offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a   particular   significance   for   that   religion 37 so as to form an essential or integral part thereof.   Places   of   worship   of   any   religion having   particular   significance   for   that religion, to make it an essential or integral part   of   the   religion,   stand   on   a   different footing   and   have   to   be   treated   differently and more reverentially. ” 38. With   the   above   observation   the   Constitution   Bench held   that   offer   of   prayer   or   worship   is   a   religious practice, its offering at every location would not be an essential   or   integral   part   of   such   religious   practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion   so   as   to   form   an   essential   or   integral   part thereof. Places   of   worship   of   any   religion   having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.  39. From   what   we   have   noticed   above   following   are deducible: (i) Places   of   religious   worship   like   mosques, churches, temples, etc. can be acquired under the   State's   sovereign   power   of   acquisition, which does not violate Articles 25 or 26 of the Constitution. 38 (ii) The   right   to   practice,   profess   and   propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place   of   worship   so   that   any   hindrance   to worship   at   a   particular   place   per   se   may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. (iii)The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution   is   to   religious   practice   which forms   an   essential   or   integral   part   of   the religion. (iv) A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion. (v) While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such   prayers   can   be   offered   would   not   be   an essential   or   integral   part   of   such   religious practice   unless   the   place   has   a   particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. The Court itself has drawn a distinction with regard 39 to   the   place   of   a   particular   significance   for   that religion   where   offer   of   prayer   or   worship   may   be   an essential or integral part of the religion. 40. The Court held that the mosques were subject to the provisions   of   statute   of   limitation   thereby extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosque. In paragraph 80 following was held: “80. It has been contended that a mosque enjoys   a   particular   position   in   Muslim   Law and once a mosque is established and prayers are   offered   in   such   a   mosque,   the   same remains for all time  to come  a  property of Allah and the same never reverts back to the donor or founder of the mosque and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque and even  if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where the   Namaz   can   be   offered.   As   indicated hereinbefore,   in   British   India,   no   such protection   was   given   to   a   mosque   and   the mosque   was   subjected   to   the   provisions   of statute of limitation there by extinguishing the right of Muslims  to offer prayers in  a particular mosque lost by adverse possession over that property.” 41. The Constitution Bench unequivocally laid down that every immovable property be a temple, church or mosque etc.   is   liable   to   be   acquired   and   a   mosque   does   not enjoy any additional protection which is not available to religious places of worship of other religions.  40 42. Now, we come to paragraph 82 of the judgment which is   the   sheet   anchor   of   the   submission   raised   by   Dr. Rajiv Dhavan. Serious objections have been raised by Dr. Rajiv Dhavan to some observations made in paragraph 82. Entire paragraph 82 is quoted below: “82.   The   correct   position   may   be summarised   thus.   Under   the   Mahomedan   Law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost   by   adverse   possession   (See   Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn. by M. Hidaytullah   ­   Section   217;   and   AIR   1940   PC 116). If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold that a mosque has a unique or special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular   India   to   make   it   immune   from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion   of   Islam   and   Namaz   (prayer)   by Muslims   can   be   offered   anywhere,   even   in open.   Accordingly,   its   acquisition   is   not prohibited   by   the   provisions   in   the Constitution   of   India.   Irrespective   of   the status of a mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity from acquisition in the   secular   ethos   of   India   under   the Constitution is the same and equal to that of the places of worship of the other religions, namely,   church,   temple   etc.   It   is   neither more   nor   less   than   that   of   the   places   of worship   of   the   other   religions.   Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be   made   only   in   unusual   and   extraordinary situations   for   a   larger   national   purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not   result   in   extinction   of   the   right   to 41 practice the religion, if the significance of that   place   be   such.   Subject   to   this condition,   the   power   of   acquisition   is available for a mosque like any other place of   worship   of   any   religion.   The   right   to worship   is   not   at   any   and   every   place,   so long   as   it   can   be   practised   effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place   is   itself   an   integral   part   of   that right. ” “ A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open.” 43. Dr. Dhavan submits that above observation in Para 82 of the Constitution Bench judgment in   Ismail Faruqui ’s case is the reason for reconsideration of the judgment. He submits that the above statements in paragraph 82 are wrong because it is wrong to say that  (vi) A mosque is not essential to Islam. (vii) The   essential   practices   doctrine   does   not protect   places   of   worship   other   than   those having particular significance.    44. Elaborating   his   submission,   Dr.   Dhavan   relies   on several   judgments   of   this   Court   where   what   are   the essential practice of a religion had been elaborated and how the Court should determine the essential practice of a   religion   has   been   noticed.     The   submission   is   that 42 above observations were made by the Constitution Bench on its  ipse dixit  without consideration of any material due to which reason the statement is unsustainable.  45. Before we proceed to examine the nature and content of above statement, it is relevant to have an overview of   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   with   regard   to essential practices of a religion.  The  locus classicus of the subject is Constitution Bench judgment of this Court   in   Commissioner,   Hindu   Religious   Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.    The Mathadipati of Shirur Mutt filed a writ petition in Madras High Court challenging various   provisions   of   Madras   Hindu   Religious   and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.   Challenge to the Act was   on   various   grounds   including   the   ground   that provisions   of   the   Act   violate   the   fundamental   right guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of   India.     The   High   Court   had   struck   down   various provisions of the Act against which appeal was filed by the   Commissioner,   Hindu   Religious   Endowments,   Madras. Justice   B.K.   Mukherjea   speaking   for the   Constitution Bench held that it would not be correct to say that a 43 religion is nothing but a doctrine or belief.   It was held that a religion may also lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers and it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion.  In Para 17, following was held:­ “17.....Religion   is   certainly   a   matter   of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known   religions   in   India   like   Buddhism   and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent   First   Cause.   A   religion undoubtedly   has   its   basis   in   a   system   of beliefs   or   doctrines   which   are   regarded   by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not   be   correct   to   say   that   religion   is nothing   else   but   a   doctrine   or   belief.   A religion   may   not   only   lay   down   a   code   of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might   prescribe   rituals   and   observances, ceremonies   and   modes   of   worship   which   are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.” 46. Further, in Para 18, following was laid down:­ 18.  The guarantee under our Constitution not only   protects   the   freedom   of   religious opinion   but   it   protects   also   acts   done   in pursuance   of   a   religion   and   this   is   made clear by the use of the expression “practice of religion” in Article 25......” 47. The Court further held; what constitutes the 44 essential   part   of   a   religion   is   primarily   to   be ascertained   with   reference   to   the   doctrines   of   that religion itself.   In Para 19, following has been laid down:­ “ 19.   The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first   place,   what   constitutes   the   essential part   of   a   religion   is   primarily   to   be ascertained   with   reference   to   the   doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at   particular   hours   of   the   day,   that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or   that   there   should   be   daily   recital   of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all   these   would   be   regarded   as   parts   of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and   servants   or   the   use   of   marketable commodities   would   not   make   them   secular activities   partaking   of   a   commercial   or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of   religion   within   the   meaning   of   Article 26(b).  What   Article   25(2)(a)   contemplates   is   not regulation   by   the   State   of   religious practices   as   such,   the   freedom   of   which   is guaranteed   by   the   Constitution   except   when they run counter to public order, health and morality   but   regulation   of   activities   which are   economic,   commercial   or   political   in their   character   though   they   are   associated with religious practices......”  48. Two other judgments were delivered in the same year, 45 which had relied and referred to Madras judgment.   In Ratilal Panachand   Gandhi and Others Vs. State of Bombay and Others, AIR 1954 SC 388 , in paragraph Nos. 10 and 13 following was held:­ “ 10.     Article   25   of   the   Constitution guarantees to every person and not merely to the   citizens   of   India,   the   freedom   of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise   and   propagate   religion.   This   is subject,   in   every   case,   to   public   order, health   and   morality.   Further   exceptions   are engrafted   upon   this   right   by   clause   (2)   of the   article.   Sub­clause   (a)   of   clause   (2) saves   the   power   of   the   State   to   make   laws regulating   or   restricting   any   economic, financial,   political   or   other   secular activity   which   may   be   associated   with religious   practice;   and   sub­clause   (b) reserves   the   State’s   power   to   make   laws providing   for   social   reform   and   social welfare even though they might interfere with religious practices.  Thus, subject to the restrictions which this   article   imposes,   every   person   has   a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may   be   approved   of   by   his   judgment   or conscience   but   to   exhibit   his   belief   and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned   by   his   religion   and   further   to propagate   his   religious   views   for   the edification of others..... 13.   Religious   practices   or   performances   of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that 46 certain   rites   and   ceremonies   are   to   be performed   at   certain   times   and   in   a particular   manner,   it   cannot   be   said   that these   are   secular   activities   partaking   of commercial   or   economic   character   simply because they involve expenditure of money or employment   of   priests   or   the   use   of marketable commodities. No outside authority has   any   right   to   say   that   these   are   not essential   parts   of   religion   and   it   is   not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like   under   the   guise   of   administering   the trust estate.....”  49. Another   judgment,   which   followed   the   Shirur   Mutt case was  Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another Vs. State .  The Constitution of Orissa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 400 Bench in   Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1958 SC 255   had occasion to consider Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India in   context   of   Madras   Temple   Entry   Authorisation   Act, 1947 as amended in 1949.  Referring to  Shirur Mutt  case, following was stated in para 16(3):­ “16(3)....Now, the precise connotation of the expression "matters of religion" came up for consideration   by   this   Court   in   The Commissioner,   Hindu   Religious   Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282), and it was held   therein   that   it   embraced   not   merely matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the religion but also the practice of it, or to   put   it   in   terms   of   Hindu   theology,   not 47 merely its Gnana but also its Bakti and Karma Kandas....”   50. Another judgment, which needs to be noticed is  Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC   731 .     A   writ   petition   under   Article   32   was   filed questioning the validity of three legislative enactments banning the slaughter of certain animals passed by the States   of   Bihar,   Uttar   Pradesh   and   Madhya   Pradesh respectively.   One   of   the   submissions   raised   by   the petitioner   was   that   banning   of   slaughter   of   cows infringes fundamental right of petitioner to sacrifice the cow on Bakra­Id.  The Court proceeded to dwell with essential   practice   of   the   religion   of   Islam   in   above context.  The Court examined the material placed before it   for   determining   the   essential   practice   of   the religion   and   made   following   observations   in   paragraph 13:­ “What   then,   we   inquire,   are   the   materials placed   before   us   to   substantiate   the   claim that the  sacrifice  of a cow is  enjoined or sanctioned by Islam? The materials before us are   extremely   meagre   and   it   is   surprising that   on   a   matter   of   this   description   the allegations   in   the   petition   should   be   so vague. In the Bihar Petition No. 58 of 1956 are set out the following bald allegations: Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 48 We have, however, no material on the record before us which will enable us to say, in the face   of   the   foregoing   facts,   that the sacrifice   of   a   cow   on   that   day   is   an obligatory   overt   act   for   a   Mussalman   to exhibit his religious belief and idea. In the premises, it is not possible for us to uphold this claim of the petitioners.” 51. Next case to be considered is   Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853. The issue raised before this Court in the above case was regarding   validity   of   law   interfering   with   right   of religious   denomination   to   excommunicate   its   members. Articles 25 and 26   came to be considered in the above context.  In paragraph 34 of the judgment, referring to earlier   decisions   of   this   Court,   main   principles underlying have been noticed, which is to the following effect:­   “ 34.  The content of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court in 1954 SCR 1005 : (AIR 1954 S.C. 282);   Ramanuj   Das   v.   State   of   Orissa,   1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1954 SC 400); 1958 SCR 895 : (AIR 1958 S.C. 255); (Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1969 D/­17­3­1961 : (AIR 1961 S.C. 1402) and several other cases and the main principles underlying   these   provisions   have   by   these decisions been placed beyond controversy. The first   is   that   the   protection   of   these articles is not limited to matters of 49 doctrine or belief, they extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain   a   guarantee   for   rituals   and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which   are   integral   parts   of   religion.   The second is that what constitutes an essential part of a religion or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the   doctrine   of   a   particular   religion   and include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion.” 52. Next judgment to be noticed is Constitution Bench judgment   of   Tikayat   Shri   Govindlalji   Maharaj   etc.   Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1638.     The validity of Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 was challenged in the Rajasthan High Court.  It was contended by Tilkayat that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple and all the properties pertaining to it were his private properties   and   hence,   the   State   Legislature   was   not competent to pass the Act. It was also contended that if the temple was held to be a public temple, then the Act would be invalid because it contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed to the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.  Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for   the   Court   in   Paragraphs   58   and   59   laid   down following:­ 50 “ 58.  In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be   whether   it   is   regarded   as   such   by   the community following the religion or not. This formula   may   in   some   cases   present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one section of the community   claims   that   while   performing certain rites white dress is an integral part of   the   religion   itself,   whereas   another section   contends   that   yellow   dress   and   not the white dress is the essential part of the religion,   how   is   the   Court   going   to   decide the question? Similar disputes may arise in regard   to   food.   In   cases   where   conflicting evidence   is   produced   in   respect   of   rival contentions   as   to   competing   religious practices   the   Court   may   not   be   able   to resolve the dispute by a blind application of the formula that the community decides which practice   in   an   intergral   part   of   its religion,   because   the   community   may   speak with   more   than   one   voice   and   the   formula would,   therefore,   break   down.   This   question will always have to be decided by the Court and   in   doing   so,   the   Court   may   have   to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it   can   be   regarded   as   an   integral   or essential   part   of   the   religion,   and   the finding of the  Court  on such  an issue will always   depend   upon   the   evidence   adduced before   it   as   to   the   conscience   of   the community and the tenets of its religion. It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court struck   a   note   of   caution   in   the   case   of Dungah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.18   and   observed   that   in   order   that   the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral 51 part; otherwise even purely secular practices which   are   not   an   essential   or   an   integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated   as   religious   practices   within   the meaning of Article 26. 59.   In this connection, it cannot be ignored that what is protected under Articles 25(1) and   26(b)   respectively   are   the   religious practices and the right to manage affairs in matters   of   religion.   If   the   practice   in question   is   purely   secular   or   the   affair which   is   controlled   by   the   statute   is essentially   and   absolutely   secular   in character,   it   cannot   be   urged   that   Article 25(1) or Article 26(b) has been contravened. The   protection   is   given   to   the   practice   of religion and to the denomination’s right to manage   its   own   affairs   in   matters   of religion. Therefore, whenever a claim is made on behalf of an individual citizen that the impugned statute contravenes his fundamental right to practise religion or a claim is made on   behalf   of   the   denomination   that   the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its   own   affairs   in   matters   of   religion   is contravened,   it   is   necessary   to   consider whether the practice in question is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of   management   is   alleged   to   have   been contravened   are   affairs   in   matters   of religion.   If   the   practice   is   a   religious practice   or   the   affairs   are   the   affairs   in matter   of   religion,   then,   of   course,   the right guaranteed by Article 25(1) and Article 26 (b) cannot be contravened.” 53. The above decisions of this Court clearly lay down that   the   question   as   to   whether   particular   religious 52 practice is essential or integral part of the religion is a question, which has to be considered by considering the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of the religion.  What Dr. Dhavan contends is that Constitution Bench in  Ismail Faruqui ’s   case without there being any consideration of essentiality   of   a   religion   have   made   the   questionable observations in paragraph 82 as noticed above.   54. We   have   to   examine   the   observations   made   in paragraph 82 of the Constitution Bench judgment in the light of the above submission, law and the precedents as noticed above.  The statement “a mosque is not essential part   of   the   practice   of   religion…..”   is   a   statement which   has   been   made   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in specific context and reference.  The context for making the above observation was claim of immunity of a mosque from acquisition.  Whether every mosque is the essential part of the practice of religion of Islam, acquisition of   which   ipso   facto   may   violate   the   rights   under Articles 25 and 26, was the question which had cropped up   for   consideration   before   the   Constitution   Bench. Thus, the statement that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of religion of Islam is in context 53 of issue as to whether the mosque, which was acquired by Act, 1993 had immunity from acquisition.     55. The above observation by the Constitution Bench has been made to emphasise that there is no immunity of the mosque   from   the   acquisition.   We   have   noticed   that Constitution Bench had held that while offer of prayer or   worship   is   a   religious   practice,   its   offering   at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. The above observation made in paragraph 78 has to be read along with observation made in paragraph 82.   What   Court   meant   was   that   unless   the   place   of offering of prayer has a particular significance so that any   hindrance   to   worship     may   violate   right   under Articles 25 and 26, any hindrance to offering of prayer at any place shall not affect right under Articles 25 and   26.   The   observation   as   made   in   paragraph   82   as quoted   above   has   to   be   understood   with   the   further observation made in the same paragraph where this Court held: 54 “82....Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and   extraordinary   situations   for   a   larger national   purpose   keeping   in   view   that   such acquisition should not result in extinction of the   right   to   practice   the   religion,   if   the significance of that place be such. Subject to this   condition,   the   power   of   acquisition   is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right. ” 56. The Court held that if the place where offering of namaz is a place of particular significance, acquisition of   which   may   lead   to   the   extinction   of   the   right   to practice   of   the   religion,   only in   that   condition   the acquisition   is   not   permissible   and   subject   to   this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. Thus, observation made in paragraph 82 that mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz even in open can be made was made in reference to the argument of the petitioners regarding immunity of mosque from acquisition. 57. The   submission   which   was   pressed   before   the Constitution   Bench   was   that   there   is   no   power   in   the 55 State   to   acquire   any   mosque,   irrespective   of   its significance to practice of the religion of Islam. The said contention has been noticed in paragraph 65 of the judgment as extracted above.   58. The sentence “A mosque is not essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by Muslims   can   be   offered   anywhere,   even   in   open”   is followed   immediately   by   the   next   sentence   that   is “Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India” which makes it amply clear that the above sentence was confined to the question of immunity from acquisition of a mosque which was canvassed before the Court. First sentence cannot be read divorced from the second sentence which immediately followed the first sentence.  59. No   arguments   having   been   raised   before   the Constitution Bench that Ram Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid is a   mosque   of   a   particular   significance,   acquisition   of which   shall   extinct   the   right   of   practice   of   the religion, the Court had come to the conclusion that by acquisition of mosque rights under Articles 25 and 26 are   not   infringed.     We   conclude   that   observations   as 56 made by the Constitution Bench in paragraphs 78 and 82 which   have   been   questioned   by   the   petitioners   were observations made in reference to acquisition of place of   worship   and   has   to   confine   to   the   issue   of acquisition   of   place   of   worship   only.   The   observation need not be read broadly to hold that a mosque can never be an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam. "Comparative significance” & “Particular significance” . 60. Dr. Rajiv Dhavan submits that the Constitution Bench has   entered   into   the   comparative   significance   of   both the places that is birth place of Ram for Hindus and Ram Janam   Bhumi­Babri   Masjid   for   Muslims.   He   submits   that India is a secular country and all religions have to be treated equal and the Court by entering into comparative significance   concept   has   lost   sight   of   the   secular principles   which   are   embedded   in   the   Constitution   of India. It is true that the Constitution Bench has used phrase   “comparative   significance”   but   comparative significance of both the communities were noticed only to highlight the significance of place which is claimed by both the parties and to emphasise that the impact of 57 acquisition is equally on the  right and interest of the Hindu   community   as   well   as   Muslim   community.   In paragraph 51 of the judgment following has been noticed: “51. It may also be mentioned that even as   Ayodhya   is   said   to   be   of   particular significance   to   the   Hindus   as   a   place   of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born there, the mosque was of significance   for   the   Muslim   community   as   an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 A.D. As   a   mosque,   it   was   a   religious   place   of worship   by   the   Muslims.   This   indicates   the comparative significance of the disputed site to   the   two   communities   and   also   that   the impact of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of the Hindu community. Mention of this aspect is made only in the context of the argument that the statute as a whole, not merely   Section   7   thereof,   is   anti­secular being   slanted   in   favour   of   the   Hindus   and against the Muslims. ” 61. Dr. Dhavan has also taken exception to the phrase 'particular   significance'   as   is   occurring   in   the Constitution   Bench   judgment.   He   submits   that   all religions are equal and have to be equally respected by all including the State. All mosques, all churches and all temples are equally significant for the communities practicing   and   professing   such   religions.   The   concept that   some   places   are   of   particular   significance   is itself faulty. We have bestowed our consideration to the 58 above aspect of the matter. We have already noticed that the   Constitution   Bench   held   that   acquisition   is   a sovereign or prerogative power of the State to acquire property   and   all   religious   places,   namely,   church, mosque,   temple   etc.   are   liable   to   be   acquired   in exercise of right of eminent domain of the State. The Constitution   Bench   also   observed   that   acquisition   of place of religious worship like church, mosque etc. per se does not violate rights under Articles 25 and 26. The Court,   however,   has   noticed   one   fetter   on   such acquisition.   The   Constitution   Bench   held   that   if   a particular   place   is   of   such   significance   for   that religion   that   worship   at   such   place   is   an   essential religious practice and the extinction of such place may breach   their   right   of   Article   25,   the   acquisition   of such   place   is   not   permissible. A   place   of   particular significance has been noticed by the Constitution Bench in   the   above   context.   When   acquisition   of   such   place results   in   extinction   of   the   right   to   practice   the religion, there is violation of Article 25, which was an exception   laid   by   the   Constitution   Bench   while   laying down general proposition that acquisition of all places 59 of   worship   is   permissible.   Thus,   no   exception   can   be taken to the Constitution Bench having used expression 'place   of   particular   significance'   for   carving   out   an exception   to   the   general   power   of   acquisition   of   the State of religious places like church, mosque and temple or   gurudwara.   The   above   exception   carved   out   by   the Constitution   Bench   is   to   protect   the   constitutional right guaranteed under Article 25. 'Particular significance' of place of birth of Lord Rama 62. Dr.   Dhavan   has   taken  exception  to   observation   of Constitution Bench, where, place of birth of Lord Rama, has been held to be of particular significance.     He submits   that   the   above   observation   was   uncalled   for since   there   cannot   be   any   comparison   between   two religions.   We   have   observed   above   that   phrase “particular significance” was used by the Constitution Bench only in context of immunity from acquisition. What the   Court   held   was   that   if   a   religious   place   has   a particular   significance,   the   acquisition   of   it   ipso facto   violates the right of religion under Articles 25 and   26,   hence   the   said   place   of   worship   has   immunity from acquisition.   It is another matter that the place 60 of birth of Lord Rama is referred as sacred place for Hindu community, which has been pleaded throughout. In any   view   of   the   matter   acquisition   under   Act,   1993 having   been   upheld,   the   use   of   expression   “particular significance” has lost all its significance for decision of the suits and the appeals. RES­JUDICATA 63. Shri Parasaran submits that appellants are precluded from   questioning   the   Ismail   Faruqui’s   judgment.   The petitioner   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   represented   the right   of   the   Muslim   public,   hence,   all   persons interested in such rights for the purposes of Section 11 be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating and are barred by res­judicata in view of Explanation VI to Section   11,   CPC.   He   further   submits   that   judgment   in Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   is   part of   the   judgment   in   the suit itself, in view of the fact that IA in suits were transferred   and   decided   alongwith   petitions   under Article 32. The appellants are thus clearly bound by the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s case .  64. Dr.   Dhavan   replying   the   submissions   of   Shri Parasaran submits that  Ismail Faruqui’s case  was about a 61 challenge   to   the   Act,1993,   the   Presidential   reference and further as to whether in the light of Act, 1993 the suits abated due to Section 4(3) of the Act. The cases under   appeal   are   from   suits   where   the   issues   are entirely   different.   The   suits   having   never   been transferred   to   be   decided   with   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case, the decision rendered in  Ismail   Faruqui’s   case  cannot be said to be part of the judgment in suits. He submits that the issues which were raised in   Ismail   Faruqui’s case   were   not   the   issues   which   are   directly   and substantially in issue in the suits. He further   submits that   res   judicata   is   not   attracted   in   the   present proceedings. 65. The   principle   of   res   judicata   as   contained   in Section   11   of   Civil   Procedure   Code   as   well   as   the general principles are well settled by several judgments of this Court. For applicability of the principle of  res judicata   there   are   several   essential   conditions   which need to be fulfilled. Shri Parasaran, in support of his submission, states that the parties in  Ismail Faruqui’s case   represented   the   interest   of   Muslim   community   and those petitioners bonafidely litigated in respect of 62 public   rights,   hence,   all   persons   interested   in   such rights   be   deemed   to   claim   under   the   person   so lititgating attracting the applicability of Explanation VI of Section 11, CPC. He placed reliance on judgment of this   Court   in   Ahmed   Adam   Sait   &   others   versus Inayathullah Mekhri & others, 1964 (2) SCR 647.   In the above case, in suit under Section 92, CPC, a scheme had already been framed by Court of Competent Jurisdiction. Another   suit   was   instituted   under   Section   92   of   CPC praying for settling a scheme for proper administration of the Jumma Masjid. The plea of  res judicata  was urged. Upholding the plea of   res judicata , following was laid down:­ “...   In   assessing   the   validity   of   this argument,   it   is   necessary   to   consider   the basis of the decisions that a decree passed in a suit under s.92 binds all parties. The basis of this view is that a suit under s.92 is a representative suit and is brought with the   necessary   sanction   required   by   it   on behalf of all the beneficiaries interested in the Trust. The said section authorises two or more persons having an interest in the Trust to file a suit for claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (h) of sub­section (1) after consent in writing there   prescribed   has   been   obtained.   Thus, when   a   suit   is   brought   under   s.92,   it   is brought by two or more persons interested in the Trust who have taken upon themselves the 63 responsibility   of   representing   all   the beneficiaries of the Trust. In such a suit, though   all   the   beneficiaries   may   not   be expressly impleaded, the action is instituted on their behalf and relief is claimed in a representative   character.   This   position immediately   attracts   the   provisions   of explanation   VI   to   s.11   of   the   Code. Explanation   VI   provides   that   where   persons litigate   bona fide   in   respect   of   a   public right or of a private right claimed in common for   themselves   and   others,   all   persons interested   in   such   right   shall,   for   the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It is clear that s.11 read with its explanation VI leads to the result that a decree passed in a suit instituted by persons to which explanation VI applies   will   bar   further   claims   by   persons interested   in   the   same   right   in   respect   of which   the   prior   suit   had   been   instituted. Explanation VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive   res   judicata.   Where   a representative suit is brought under s.92 and a   decree   is   passed   in   such   a   suit,   law assumes   that   all   persons   who   have   the   same interest   as   the   plaintiffs   in   the representative   suit   were   represented   by   the said   plaintiffs   and,   therefore,   are constructively   barred   by   res   judicata   from reagitating   the   matters   directly   and substantially   in   issue   in   the   said   earlier suit.” 66. Learned Counsel for both the parties have referred to   and   relied   on   Constitution   Bench   Judgment   of   this Court   in   Gulabchand   Chhotalal   Parikh   versus   State   of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 . Whether a decision of High 64 Court on merits on certain matters after contest in a writ   petition   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution operates as  res judicata  in regular suit with respect to the   same   matter   between   the   same   party   was   the   issue considered by this court. This Court after referring to almost all relevant judgments on the subjects laid down following in paragraphs 60 and 61:­ ”60. As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the provisions of S.11, C.P.C., are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier   decision   operating   as   res   judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and   that   on   the   general   principle   of   res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after   affording   fair   opportunity   to   the parties   to   prove   their   case   by   a   Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not   necessary   that   the   Court   deciding   the matter   formerly   be   competent   to   decide   the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and   the   subsequent   suit   have   the   same subject­matter.   The   nature   of   the   former proceeding is immaterial. 61. We do not see any good reason to preclude such decisions on matters in controversy in writ   proceedings   under   Arts.   226   and   32   of the   Constitution   from   operating   as   res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties   and   thus   to   give   limited   effect   to the   principle   of   the   finality   of   decisions after full contest. We therefore, hold that, on the general principle of res judicata, the 65 decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art.226 on the merits on a matter after contest   will   operate   as   res   judicata   in   a subsequent   regular   suit   between   the   same parties with respect to the same matter.” 67. In  Daryao and others versus State of U.P. & others , this   Court   held   that   on   general AIR   1961   SC   1457,   consideration   of   public   policy   there   seems   to   be   no reason   by   which   the   rule   of   res   judicata   should   be treated as not admissible or irrelevant in deciding writ petition filed under Article 32.  68. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Sheodan Singh versus   Daryao   Kunwar,   AIR   1966   SC   1332,   after elaborately considering the principles underlined under Section   11   of   the   CPC,   held   that   there   are   five essential conditions which must be satisfied before plea of   res judicata   can be pressed. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, the conditions have been enumerated which are to the following effect:­  ”9.   A   plain   reading   of   S.11   shows   that   to constitute   a   matter   res   judicata,   the following   conditions   must   be   satisfied, namely   ­(I)   The   matter   directly   and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly   and   substantially   in   issue   in   the 66 formar suit; (II) The former suit must have been   a   suit   between   the   same   parties   or between   parties   under   whom   they   or   any   of them   claim;   (III)   The   parties   must   have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (IV) The court which decided the former suit   must   be   a   Court   competent   to   try   the subsequent   suit   or   the   suit   in   which   such issue   is   subsequently   raised;   and   (V)   The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally   decided   by   the   Court   in   the   first suit. Further Explanation I shows that it is not the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a suit was filed later, it will be   a   former   suit   if   it   has   been   decided earlier. In order therefore that the decision in the earlier two appeals dismissed by the High Court operates as res judicata it will have   to   be   seen   whether   all   the   five conditions   mentioned   above   have   been satisfied.” 69. One   of   the   submissions   put   on   forefront   by Dr. Dhavan   is   that   issues   which   were   involved   in   Ismail Faruqui’s   case   are   not   issues   which   are   directly   and substantially involved in the suits giving rise to these appeals, hence, the plea of  res judicata  should fail on this ground alone. One of the conditions as enumerated by   this   Court   in   Sheodan   Singh’s   case(supra)   is   that “the   matter   directly   and   substantially   in   issue,   in subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit.” Dr. Dhavan elaborating 67 the principle of directly and substatially in issue has relied on judgment of this court in  Sajjadanashin Sayed vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350 . This Court while   considering   the   condition   of   “directly   and substantially in issue” in reference to Section 11 laid down following principles in paragraph 12, 13 & 14:­  ”12. It will be noticed that the words used in   Section   11   CPC   are   “directly   and substantially in issue”. If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the   decision   would   be   res   judicata   in   a subsequent   proceeding.   Judicial   decisions have however held that if a matter was only “collaterally   or   incidentally”   in   issue   and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in   a   latter   proceeding   where   the   matter   is directly and substantially in issue.  13.   As   pointed   out   in   Halsbury’s   Law   of th England(Vol.16,   para  1538,  4   edition),  the fundamental   rule   is   that   a   judgment   is   not conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question[R.v.knaptoft   Inhabitants;   Heptulla Bros. v. Thakore WLR at p.297(PC)]; or if any matter   was   incidentally   cognizable [Sanders(otherwise   Saunders)v.   Sanders (otherwise Saunders) All ER at p.771]. 14. A collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxillary issue and the   latter   the   principal   issue.   The expression “collaterally or incidentally” in issue   implies   that   there   is   another   matter which   is   “directly   and   substantially”   in th issue(Mulla’s   Civil   Procedure   Code,   15 68 edn.,p.104). Difficulty in distinguishing whether a matter was   directly   in   issue   or   collaterally   or incidentally in issue and tests laid down in various courts.  70. In   Mahila   Bajrangi(dead)   through   Lrs.   versus Badribai w/o Jagannath and another, (2003) 2 SCC 464, above   principle   was   reiterated   in   following   words   in paragraph 6 which is to the following effect:­ ” 6. ....That apart, it is always the decision on   an   issue   that   has   been   directly   and substantially   in   issue   in   the   former   suit between the same parties which has been heard and   finally   decided   that   is   considered   to operate   as   res   judicata   and   not   merely   any finding   on   every   incident   or   collateral question   to   arrive   at   such   a   decision   that would constitute res judicata.” 71. The   impugned   judgment   has   also   categorically   held that issues, which have been raised in the suits are not the issues, which can be said to have been noticed and adjudicated by this court in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case. The High Court has clearly held that the authority of the Superior   Court   laying   down   a   law   is   binding   on   the courts below provided a matter has been decided by the court.  In Para 4054, following has been held:­ 69 “ 4054.     The mere fact that  some facts have been   noticed   by   the   Government   of   India   in White Paper and those facts have simply been noticed by the Apex Court while referring to the   facts   mentioned   in   the   White   Paper,   it cannot   be   said   that   those   facts   can   be construed   as   if   they   have   been   accepted   by the   Apex   Court   to   be   correct   and   stand adjudicated.   The   law   of   precedent   is   well known.   The   authority   of   the   superior   Court laying  down a law is binding  on the Courts below provided a matter has been decided by the Court. An issue can be considered to be decided   by   a   superior   Court   when   it   was raised, argued and decided and only then it is a binding precedent for the other courts.” 72. We   have   noticed   above   that   the   issues   which   were involved in  Ismail Faruqui’s case  were validity of Act, 1993. One of the issues which was taken up by   Ismail Faruqui’s case  was as to whether by virtue of Section 4 sub­section (3) of Act, 1993 suits pending in Allahabad High   Court   stands   abated.   The   Presidential   Reference No.1   of   1993   was   also   heard   along   with   the   writ petitions and transferred cases. The issues which have been framed in the suits giving rise to these appeals are different issues which cannot be said to be directly and   substantially   in   issue   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case . Non­fulfilment of this condition itself is sufficient to reject   the   plea   of   res   judicata   as   raised   by   Shri 70 Parasaran.  73. We may further notice submissions of Shri Parasaran that IA which was filed in the suit was also taken up along   with   the   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case,   hence,   the judgment   rendered   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   shall   be treated to be the part of judgment in the suits which preclude the appellant to reagitate the same issue. For appreciating the above submissions we need to look into as   to   what   matters   were   before   this   Court   in   Ismail Faruqui’s case. 74. The Act, 1993 was preceded by an ordinance which was issued   on   07.01.1993.   Section   4(3)   of   the   Ordinance contemplated   that   suit,   appeal   or   other   proceeding   in respect   of   right,   title   or   interest   having   to   any property   vested   in   Central   Government   under   Section   3 shall abate. After the ordinance plaintiff had applied for   amendment   of   plaints   challenging   the   legality   and validity   of   the   Ordinance.   High   Court   in   the   suits framed the issue namely “whether the suits have abated or survive”. Many writ petitions were also filed in the High   Court   challenging   the   Ordinance.   Writ   Petition No.208 of 1993, Mohd. Aslam versus Union of India & Ors. 71 was also filed under Article 32 in this Court. The Union of India had filed transfer petitions under Article 139A for   transferring   of   writ   petitions   filed   in   Allahabad High Court. By an Order dated 24.09.1993 passed in  Union of   India   &   Others   versus   Dr.   M.Ismail   Faruqui   and others,   (1994)   1   SCC   265,   this   Court   allowed   the transfer application transferring five writ petitions to be heard alongwith the Presidential Reference and writ petitions filed under Article 32. The preliminary issue which was framed by the High Court in both the suits was stayed. It is useful to extract paragraph 4 and 7 of the order:­  “ 4.   After   the   issuance   of   the   Ordinance   it appears that in the pending suits renumbered O.O.S. Nos. 3 and 4 of 1989 the plaintiffs applied   for   amendment   of   the   plaints challenging the legality and validity of the Ordinance by which the suits abated. The Full Bench   of   the   High   Court   heard   the   said applications and passed an order on March 15, 1993. By the said order the High Court framed the question ‘whether the suit has abated or survives’   and   since   the   said   issue necessarily touched upon the validity of the Ordinance,   the   Court   ordered   notice   to   the Attorney   General   and   listed   the   case   for hearing   of   the   issue   on   April   26,   1993. Although this order was passed in Suit O.O.S. No.   4   of   1989,   it   was   also   to   govern   the amendment application in Suit O.O.S. No. 3 of 1989. It also appears that in the meantime as 72 many   as   five   Writ   Petition   Nos.   552,   925, 1351, 1532 and 1809 of 1993 came to be filed in the High Court challenging the validity of the   Ordinance,   now   the   Act.   Besides   these proceedings in the High Court a Writ Petition No. 208 of 1993 also came to be filed in this Court   under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution challenging the legality and validity of the very same law. 7.   In the result, we allow this application by ordering the withdrawal of the five Writ Petition Nos. 552, 925, 1351, 1532 and 1809 of 1993 to this Court to be heard along with the Presidential reference and Writ Petition No. 208 of 1993 pending in this Court. The hearing   of   the   preliminary   issue   framed   by the High Court ‘whether the suit has abated or   survives’   in   both   the   suits   will   stand stayed   till   further   orders.   In   order   to expedite the hearing we direct as under:” 75. From the above, it is clear that suits which were pending in the High Court were never transferred to be heard alongwith Presidential Reference and writ petition filed under Article 32. This Court had only stayed the hearing of preliminary issue framed by the High Court as to whether the suits have abated or survive. It is also relevant to notice that in Special Reference No. 1 of 1993, individual notices were issued to the parties to the proceeding which stood abated by virtue of Section 4(3) of the Ordinance but mere issuance of notice when the suits were not transferred by this Court to be heard 73 alongwith   Presidential   Reference   is   not   sufficient   to conclude that the judgment of   Ismail Faruqui   should be treated as part of judgment in suits. We, thus, also do not   accept   the   submissions   of   Shri   Parasaran   that judgment of Ismail Faruqui   is part of the judgment in the suit itself. We, thus, do not find any substance in the above submissions raised by Shri Parasaran. Reliance on the judgment of Ismail Faruqui 76. Dr.   Dhavan   submits   that   Ismail   Faruqui’s   judgment goes to the core of the issues in these appeals and it permeates throughout the impugned judgment in the suits. He   submits   that   observations   concerning   comparative significance   of   the   disputed   site   and   the   observation that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam, have permeated the impugned judgment as the Hindu parties have successfully claimed that   the   disputed   site,   which   is   allegedly   the birthplace of Lord Ram is protected by Articles 25 and 26.  Dr. Dhavan has referred to various observations of the HIGH Court in the impugned judgment to support his submission.     He   has   also   referred   to   various   grounds 74 taken in the appeals filed against the judgment of the High Court. 77. Shri Parasaran and Shri Tushar Mehta refuting the above submission contend that even if the judgment of Ismail Faruqui  has been referred to in the submission of the counsel for the parties before the High Court and has been noticed in the impugned judgment, the impugned judgment in no way is affected by the observations made in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case.   78. It is relevant to notice some of the observations made   by   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   and certain grounds taken in some of the appeals, which are before   us.   Justice   S.U.Khan   referring   to   Ismail Faruqui’s   case   in   his   judgment   made   following observations:­ “A mosque even if its construction remains as a mosque cannot be treated to be mosque if no prayers are offered in it and it is in the possession, occupation and use of non­Muslims as held by the Privy Council in Mosque known as Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. S.G.P.C. Amritsar, AIR 1940 P.C. 116 approved in Dr. M. Ismail Farooqi Vs. Union of India, 1994 (6) S.C.C. 360.   Accordingly,   unless   it   is   proved   that prayers were being offered in the premises in dispute,   or   the   Hindus   had   not   exclusively possessed   the   constructed   portion   and   inner court yard it cannot be held to be a mosque 75 or   a   continuing   mosque   uptil   22nd/   23rd December,   1949.   The   case   set   up   and   the argument   of   some   of   the   Hindu   parties   that till 1855 no prayers (Namaz) were offered in the   mosque   is   not   at   all   acceptable.   If   a mosque   is   referred   to   as   mosque   in   several gazetteers,   books   etc.   and   nothing   else   is said then it means that it is a mosque in use as such. A defunct mosque where prayers are not   at   all   offered,   whenever   mentioned   as mosque, is bound to be further qualified as defunct   and   not   in   use.   If   construction   of mosque could not be obstructed, how offering of   prayer   in   it   could   be   obstructed. Moreover,   there   was   absolutely   no   sense   in dividing the premises in dispute by railing in 1856 or 1857 if Muslims were not offering Namaz in the constructed portion till then. In   the   riot   of   1855   seventy   Muslims   were killed while taking shelter in the premises in   dispute.   After   such   a   huge   defeat   Namaz could   not   be   for   the   first   time   started thereat.”  79. Justice   Sudhir   Agarwal   in   his   judgment   has   also noticed   Ismail Faruqui’s   case.   Dr. Dhavan referred to the   submissions   made   by   Shri   Ravi   Shankar   Prasad   in Paras 3501 and 3502 of the impugned judgment:­ “ 3501.   Sri   Prasad   argued   that   belief   of Hindus that Lord Ram as incarnation of Vishnu having born at Ayodhya forms an integral part of Hindu religion which cannot be denied to be practised, observed and performed by them and   refers   to   Commissioner   of   Police   and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (para 9) and Sri   Adi   Visheshwara   of   Kashi   Vishwanath Temple,   Varanasi   (supra).   In   order   to   show 76 what   constitutes   public   order   under   Article 25   of   the   Constitution,   he   also   placed reliance on Dalbir Singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1106 (para 8). 3502.   Next   he   submits   that   applying   the doctrine   of   Eminent   Domain,   the   place   in dispute,   having   special   significance   for Hindus,   cannot   be   touched   at   all   either   by any   particular   person   or   even   by   State   and the provisions of even acquisition would not apply   to   it   though   with   respect   to   the alleged mosque, it has been already held and observed by the Apex Court that the disputed building   could   not   be   shown   to   be   of   any special significance to Muslims. He refers to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (para 65, 72, 75 and 96); Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (1975) 1 SCC 11. The relief sought by the plaintiff (Suit­4) is barred by Section 34 Specific Reliefs Act, 1963   and   reliance   is   placed   on   Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, (1976) 2 SCC   58   (para   20   and   27);   American   Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and others, (1993) 2 SCC 199 (pare 22).” 80. Justice Sudhir Agarwal has noticed  Ismail Faruqui’s case in Para 2723 in following manner:­ “ 2723.  In   Ismail   Farooqui   (supra), Supreme   Court   has   considered   the   plea   of validity   of   acquisition   of   land   under   Land Acquisition Act that once a waqf of mosque is created, the property vests in almighty and it always remain a waqf hence such a property cannot   be   acquired.   While   negativing   this plea,   the   Apex   Court   said   that   a   plea   in regard to general religious purposes cannot 77 be said to be an integral part of religion which   will   deprive   the   worshippers   of   the right   of worship   at   any   other   place   and therefore, such a property can be acquired by the   State.   However,   the   position   would   be otherwise   if   the   religious   property   would have been of special significance and cannot be one of several such kind of properties. It will   be   useful   to   reproduce   the   relevant observation in this regard: “78.   lt   appears   from   various   decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and   26   of   the   Constitution,   places   of religious   worship   like   mosques,   churches, temples   etc.   can   be   acquired   under   the State’s sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition   per   se   does   not   violate   either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property.” “82.   While   offer   of   prayer   or   worship   is   a religious   practice,   its   offering   at   every location   where   such   prayers   can   be   offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that  religion  so as   to   form   an   essential   or   integral   part thereof.   Places   of   worship   of   any   religion having   particular   significance   for   that religion, to make it an essential or integral part   of   the   religion,   stand   on   a   different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.” 81. There   are   references   of   judgments   of   Ismail Faruqui’s   case in various other places in the judgment of Justice Sudhir Agarwal like Para 5 in the judgment 78 where   it   has   been   observed   that   area   of   the   land   in dispute, which is to be adjudicated by this Court (High Court) is now restricted to what has been referred to in Ismail Faruqui’s   case.   Para 5 of the judgment is as follows:­ “5.    In  view   of  the   decision   of   the   Apex Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui etc. v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC  360 : AIR 1995   SC   605,   the   area   of   land   in   dispute which is to be adjudicated by this Court is now restricted to what has been referred to in para 4 above, i.e. main roofed structure, the inner Courtyard and the outer Courtyard. In fact, the area under the roofed structure and   Sahan,   for   the   purpose   of   convenience shall   be   referred   hereinafter   as   “inner Courtyard” and rest as the “outer Courtyard”. Broadly, the measurement of the disputed area is about 130X80 sq. feet.” 82. Dr.   Dhavan,   in   his   written   submissions,   has mentioned details of several other places, where Justice Sudhir Agarwal has referred to  Ismail Faruqui’s  case in the impugned judgment.    83. Justice   Dharam   Veer   Sharma,   while   giving   a dissenting   judgment   has   referred   to   submission   of parties in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case at Paras 3038 and 3039 of   Volume   III,   following   observations   have   been   made 79 while considering the Issue No.19(d):­ “On behalf of defendants it is contended that   the   building   in   question   was   not   a mosque   under   the   Islamic   Law.     It   is   not disputed that the structure has already been demolished on 6.12.1992.  According to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and   others,   (1994)   6   SCC   360,   the   Hon’ble Apex Court held at para 70 that the sacred character   of   the   mosque   can   also   be   lost. According   to   the   tenets   of   Islam,   minarets are required to give Azan.  There cannot be a public   place   of   worship   in   mosque   in   which Provision of Azan is not available, hence the disputed structure cannot be deemed to be a mosque.” 84. Further, Justice Dharam Veer Sharma while noticing submission of Shri H.S. Jain has observed as follows:­ “Shri H.S. Jain, advocate relied upon para 78 of  Ismail Faruqui’s  judgment to argue that since birth place of Lord Ram was considered as a place of worship which was integral part of   religious   practice   of   Hindu   from   times immemorial.   The deity stood on a different footing and had to be treated reverentially.” 85. Justice Sharma has observed that, in para 78 of the Ismail Faruqui’s  judgment, the Apex Court held that the place of birth has a particular significance for Hindus and should be treated on a different footing. At page 3455, following observations have been made by Justice Sharma while referring to  Ismail Faruqui’s  case:­ 80 “Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the validity of provisions of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya,   1993   in   Dr.   Ismail   Faruqui   case (supra) and held that the Central Government can acquire any place of worship. At para­78 Apex Court held that the place of birth has a particular   significance   for   Hindus   and   it should be treated on different footing, which reads as under:  “78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious   practice,   its   offering   at   every location   where   such   prayers   can   be   offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a   particular   significance   for   that   religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof.   Places   of   worship   of   any   religion having   particular   significance   for   that religion, to make it an essential or integral part   of   the   religion,   stand   on   a   different footing   and   have   to   be   treated   differently and more reverentially.” On behalf of Hindus it is urged that the plaintiffs   are   not   entitled   for   the   relief claimed and as such the relief is barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is at par with Section 34   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act,1963   on   the ground   that   they   have   superior   fundamental rights. Contentions of Hindus are as under: The Hindus have superior fundamental right than the  Muslims under articles 25 & 26 of the   Constitution   of   India   for   the   reasons that   performing   customary   rituals   and offering   services   worship   to   the   lord   of universe   to   acquire   merit   and   to   get salvation   as   such   it   is   integral   part   of Hindu Dharma & religion in view whereof it is humbly submitted that the instant suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost:”  81 86. Dr. Dhavan further submits that Justice Sharma has relied on submissions advanced by Shri P.N. Mishra, who had relied on paragraphs  77,  78,  80 and 82 of   Ismail Faruqui’s   case.   Dr.   Dhavan   has   also   referred   to submission   of   Shri   Ravi   Shankar   Prasad,   which   was noticed by Justice Sharma that the right of Hindus to worship at the Rama Janam Bhumi, continuing since times immemorial was an integral part of their religious right and   faith   and   was   also   sanctified   by   judicial   orders since 1949.   This right has concretised and has to be protected.  87. Although Dr. Dhavan has referred to various passages from impugned judgment, where reference has been made of Ismail Faruqui’s  case but main paragraphs where findings have been returned in reference to  Ismail Faruqui’s  case are   Paragraphs   4049   to   4054   (Vol.   II)   of   judgment   of Justice Sudhir Agarwal, as has been pointed out by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General. 88. Paragraphs   4049   and   4050   are   to   the   following effect:­ “4049.   Some   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the 82 parties   sought   to   rely   on   the   Constitution Bench   decision   in   Dr.   M.   Ismail   Faruqui (supra)   by   reading   certain   passages   in   a manner as if the Apex Court has expressed its opinion   on   certain   aspects   which   are contentious issues before this Court in the suits   pending   before   us   and   said   that   the said observations are binding on this Court and,   therefore,   those   aspects   cannot   be looked into. 4050.   Sri   Iyer,   Senior   Advocate   sought   to read   the   aforesaid   judgement   where   the contents   of   the   White   Paper   issued   by   the Central   Government   quoted   to   suggest   that these are the findings of the Government of India   having   taken   note   by   the   Apex   Court and,   therefore,   should   be   treated   to   be concluded. It is suggested that the issues, if any, in those matters should be deemed to be   concluded   by   the   judgement   of   the   Apex Court.” 89. The   above   submission   was   noted   and   expressly rejected by the High Court in Paragraph 4051, which is to the following effect:­ “ 4051.   We,   however,   find   no   force   in   the submission. The Constitution Bench considered the   validity   of   Ayodhya   Act,   1993   whereby certain   land   at   Ayodhya   including   the   land which   was   subject   matter   in   these   suits sought   to   be   acquired   by   the   Government   of India.   Further,   the   Apex   Court   was considering the special reference made by the th President of India on 7  January, 1993 under Article   143   of   the   Constitution   seeking opinion   of   the   Apex   Court   on   the   following question:   "Whether   a   Hindu   temple   or   any Hindu   religious   structure   existing   prior   to the   construction   of   Ram   Janma   Bhumi­Babari 83 Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyard of said structure) in the area on which the structure stood." 90. The High Court has clearly held that mentioning of certain   facts   in   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   does   not   mean that those facts stood adjudicated by this Court for the reason that those facts were neither in issue before the Supreme Court  nor  had  been adjudicated.    The  relevant discussion   in   the   above   context   is   contained   in Paragraph 4053, which is to the following effect:­ “ 4053.     It is in this context that certain facts place on record are mentioned therein but it cannot be said that those facts stood adjudicated by the Apex Court for the reason that those facts neither were in issue before the Court nor actually have been adjudicated. The only one question which has specifically been   considered   and   decided   that   was necessary in the light of challenge thrown to the power of acquisition of land over which a mosque   existing.   It   appears   that   pro­mosque parties   raised   a   contention   that   a   mosque cannot be acquired because of special status in   Mohammedan   Law   irrespective   of   its significance to practice of the religion of Islam.   This   argument   in   the   context   of acquisition of land was considered from para 68   (AIR)   and   onwards   in   the   judgement.   The Court has held that the right to worship of Muslims in a mosque and Hindus in a temple was   recognised   only   as   a   civil   right   in British   India.   Relying   on   the   Full   Bench decision of Lahore High Court in Mosque Known as Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak   Committee,   Amritsar,   AIR   1938 84 Lahore 369 where it was held that a mosque if adversely   possessed   by   non   muslims   it   will loose   its   sacred   character   as   mosque,   the Apex Court held that, "the view that once a consecrated mosque, it remains always a place of worship as a mosque was not the Mahomedan Law of India as approved by Indian Courts." The   Lahore   High   Court   also   held   that,   "a mosque in India was an immovable property and the right of worship at a particular place is lost when the right to property on which it stands is lost by adverse possession." Both these   views   were   approved   by   the   Privy Council and the Apex Court followed the said view.   Besides, independently also the Court took the view that the sovereign power of the State empowers it to acquire property. It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take an appropriate private property belonging to individual   citizens   for   public   use.     This right   is   described   as   eminent   domain   in American   Law   and   is   like   the   power   of taxation   of   offering   of   political   necessity and is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation   by   the   Government   that   private property acquired by its citizens under its protection   may   be   taken   or   its   use   can   be controlled for public benefit irrespective of the   wishes   of   the   owner.   The   Court   also considered   the   right   of   worship   whether   a fundamental right enshrined under Article 25 or   26   of   the   Constitution   and   observed, "while   offer   of   prayer   or   worship   is   a religious   practice,   its   offering   at   every location   where   such   prayers   can   be   offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a   particular   significance   for   that   religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof.   Places   of   worship   of   any   religion having   particular   significance   for   that religion, to make it an essential or integral part   of   the   religion,   stand   on   a   different footing   and   have   to   be   treated   differently 85 and more reverentially".   Ultimately the law has been laid down by the Constitution Bench by   majority   that   under   the   Mohammedan   Law applicable in India title to a mosque can be lost   by   adverse   possession.   If   that   is   the position in law, there can  be no reason to hold   that   a   mosque   as   a   unique   or   special status,   higher   than   that   of   the   places   of worship of other religions in secular India to   make   it   immune   from   acquisition   by exercise   of   the   sovereign   or   prerogative power   of   the   State.   A   mosque   is   not   an essential part of the practice of religion of Islam   and   namaz   (prayer)   by   Muslims   can   be offered anywhere even in open.  The Court also held that unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of   that   right,   i.e.,   the   place   is   of   a particular   significance,   its   alienability cannot   be doubted.   The   Apex   Court   having answered   the   various   questions   on   the validity   of   the   Act   1993   decline   to   answer the reference and returned the same as such as it is. The suits having been revived due to striking down of Section 4(3) of the Act, this Court trying the original suits has to decide the entire matter on merits unless it can be shown that a particular issue which is engaging attention of this Court in trial of the   original   suit   has   already   been   raised, argued   and   decided   by   the   Apex   Court.   The learned   counsels   for   the   parties   have   not been able to show any such finding in respect to the matters which are involved in various issues before this Court and, therefore, we are   not   in   agreement   with   the   counsels   for the parties as argued otherwise.” (underlined by us) 91. The High Court has clearly held that an issue can be considered to be decided by a superior Court only when 86 it was raised, argued and decided.   Following was held in Paragraph 4054:­ “ 4054.    The mere fact that  some facts have been   noticed   by   the   Government   of   India   in White Paper and those facts have simply been noticed by the Apex Court while referring to the   facts   mentioned   in   the   White   Paper,   it cannot   be   said   that   those   facts   can   be construed   as   if   they   have   been   accepted   by the   Apex   Court   to   be   correct   and   stand adjudicated.   The   law   of   precedence   is   well known.   The   authority   of   the   superior   Court laying  down a law is binding  on the Courts below provided a matter has been decided by the Court. An issue can be considered to be decided   by   a   superior   Court   when   it   was raised, argued and decided and only then it is a binding precedent for the other courts.” 92. The   above   view   expressed   by   majority   judgment   in appeal,   thus,   makes   it   clear   that   the   High   Court   has held   that   judgment   of   Ismail   Faruqui's   case   does   not decide any of the issues which are subject matter of the suit.   Whatever   observations   have   been   made   in   the judgment   of   Ismail   Faruqui   are   not   to   govern   the decision in suits and the suits were to be decided on the basis of the evidence on record.   The questionable observations made in   Ismail  Faruqui's  case   have to be treated as only observations and not for the purpose of deciding   suits   and   these   appeals,   they   are   not   to   be 87 treated   as   governing   factor   or   relevant.     The   said observations are to be understood solely as observation made in context of land acquisition and nothing more.      93. It is due to above finding of the High Court that in several appeals filed against impugned judgment by the plaintiff of Suit Nos.1 and 5 grounds have been taken which grounds have been referred to and    relied by Dr. Rajiv   Dhavan   in   his   submission   as   noted   above.   The grounds taken in the appeal, to which exception is being taken by Dr. Dhavan are: (i) Partition   of   the   site   would   effectively extinguish   the right  of  Hindus   to   worship   at the site protected by Article 25 being a site which is integral and essential part of Hindu religion; (ii) The purported Muslim structure on the area was never   pleaded   to  be  an   essential  or  integral part of the Islamic religion. 94. The   above   grounds   are   yet   to   be   looked   into   and considered by this Court in these appeals. 95. We have already dealt with and noticed the extent and   nature   of   the   observations   made   by   this   Court   in 88 Paragraphs   78   and   82   of   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case.   The expression   “particular   significance”   and   “comparative significance”   as   occurring   in   the   judgment   in   Ismail Faruqui’s   case has also been noted and explained by us in foregoing paragraphs.  The observations of this Court in   case has to be understood as above. Ismail Faruqui’s The   question   as   to   whether   in   the   impugned   judgment, reliance on   Ismail Faruqui’s   case affects the ultimate decision of the High Court and needs any clarification or correction is a task, which we have to undertake with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties in the present appeals.   We,  thus, conclude  that reliance on the judgment of  Ismail Faruqui  by the High Court in the impugned   judgment   and   reliance   by   learned   counsel   for the appellants and  taking  grounds  in  these  appeals on the strength  of judgment  of   Ismail Faruqui’s   case are all questions, on the merits of the appeals, which need to   be   addressed   in   these   appeals.     Thus,   the   above submission   does   not   help   the   appellant   in   contending that   judgment   of   Ismail   Faruqui’s   case   needs reconsideration. Additional grounds for reference to larger Bench 89 96. Shri   Raju   Ramachandran,   learned   senior   counsel appearing for some of the parties has pressed for the reference to larger Bench for reconsideration of   Ismail Faruqui’s  case on some additional grounds in addition to what has been canvassed by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan. Shri Raju Ramachandran submits that looking to the importance of the   case   the   matter   should   be   referred   to   the Constitution   Bench   for   reconsideration   of   Ismail Faruqui’s   judgment.   He submits that there are various instances, where this court had made reference to larger Bench   looking   to   the   importance   of   the   matter.   He submits that High Court vide its order dated 10.07.1989 had withdrawn the suits to be tried by the High Court by Full Bench looking to the importance of the case.   The case being very important and appeals having been filed by all the sides, the case is of such magnitude that it is appropriate that matter may be referred to a Bench of a   larger   strength   to   consider   the   case.     Shri Ramachandran   has   referred   to   and   relied   on   several judgments   of   this   Court,   which   shall   be   noted   by   us hereinafter.   97.   The submission of Shri Raju Ramachandran has been 90 refuted by Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan.   They submit that if there are constitutional   principles   involved,   the   matter   can   be referred to a larger bench, but present is not a case where any principle of constitutional interpretation is involved, hence reference of the case to a larger bench needs   to   be   refused.     Shri   Parasaran   submits   that present appeals arise out of a suit where for deciding the issues in a suit, the evidence is to be appreciated, which need not be done by five judges. He submits that five judges are to appreciate the evidence only in case of Presidential Election. 98. Before we enter into submission of learned counsel for the parties, the constitutional provision regarding reference   of   a   case   for   hearing   by   the   Constitution Bench consisting of five judges need to be looked into. Article 145(3) of the Constitution provides that minimum number of judges, who are to sit for purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the   interpretation   of   the   Constitution   or   for   the purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall be five.  The proviso to Article 145(3) provides:­ 91 “Provided   that,   where   the   Court   hearing   an appeal   under   any   of   the   provisions   of   this Chapter   other   than   Article   132   consists   of less than five  Judges and in  the course of the   hearing   of   the   appeal   the   Court   is satisfied   that   the   appeal   involves   a substantial   question   of   law   as   to   the interpretation   of   this   Constitution   the determination of which is necessary for the disposal   of   the   appeal,   such   Court   shall refer   the   question   for   opinion   to   a   Court constituted   as   required   by   this   clause   for the   purpose   of   deciding   any   case   involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion” 99.   As per proviso, the reference to a bench of five judges can be made by judges sitting in lesser strength than five judges while hearing an appeal, on fulfilment of following two conditions:­ (i) The   Court   is   satisfied that   the   appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution; (ii) The   determination   of   which   is   necessary   for the disposal of the appeal.           100. The proviso to Article 145(3) as noted above, thus, clearly   indicate   that   on   fulfilment   of   both   the conditions as noticed above, a bench of smaller strength 92 than five judges can make a reference of a case to be heard by a Bench strength of five judges.  This Court in Abdul  Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola  Vs.  State  of Bombay, AIR   1959   SC   1315   had   occasion   to   consider   Article 145(3).     In   the   above   case,   question   pertaining   to Article 19(1)(d), (e) and sub­section (5) of Article 19 came for consideration.   A five Judge Bench in   Ebrahim Vazir Mavat Vs. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1954 SC 229   had   already   held   that   requirement   that   an   Indian citizen to produce a passport before entering into India is a proper restriction upon entering India.  Before two judge bench in  Abdul Rahim Ismail (supra) , challenge was made to Rule 3 of Passport Rules, 1950, which provided that no person, proceeding from any place outside India, shall enter, or attempt to enter, India by water, land or air unless he is in possession of a valid passport. Contention raised was that Section 3 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules in so far as it purported to relate to an Indian citizen is ultra vires the Constitution, as they offended against the provisions of Articles 19(1)(d) and (e).  This Court had held that issue having already been decided by a five judges Bench no substantial question 93 of   law   as   to   the   interpretation   of   the   Constitution arises.  In Para 6, following was held:­ “ 6.... It   was,   however,   urged   that   as   a constitutional question has been raised this matter cannot be decided by Judges less than five in number. Therefore, the case should be referred   to   what   is   described   as   the Constitution   Bench.   Article   145(3)   of   the Constitution   states   that   the   minimum   number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding   any   case   involving   a   substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the   Constitution   or   for   the   purpose   of hearing any reference under Article 143 shall be   five.   It   is   clear   that no   substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises in the present case as the very question raised has been decided by a Bench of this Court consisting of five Judges. As the question raised before us has been already decided by this Court it cannot be said that any substantial question of law arises   regarding   the   interpretation   of   the Constitution.” 101. In   Bhagwan   Swarup   Lal   Bishan   Lal   Vs.   State   of Maharashtra,   AIR   1965   SC   682 ,   this   Court   held   that   a substantial question of interpretation of a provision of the   Constitution   cannot   arise   when   the   law   on   the subject has been finally and effectively decided by this Court.  In Para 11, following has been laid down:­ “ 11.   .... Learned   counsel   suggests   that   the question   raised   involves the   interpretation of   a   provision   of   the   Constitution   and 94 therefore   the   appeal   of   this   accused   will have to be referred to a Bench consisting of not less than 5 Judges. Under Article 145(3) of the Constitution only a case involving a substantial   question   of   law   as   to   the interpretation   of   the   Constitution   shall   be heard by a bench comprising not less than 5 Judges. This Court held in State of Jammu and Kashmir   v.   Thakur   Ganga   Singh,   AIR   1960   SC 356     that   a   substantial   question   of interpretation   of   a   provision   of   the Constitution cannot arise when the law on the subject   has   been   finally   and   effectively decided by this Court………………… XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX As   the   question   raised   has   already   been decided by this Court, what remains is only the application of the principle laid down to the   facts   of   the   present   case.   We   cannot, therefore,   hold   that   the   question   raised involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution within the   meaning   Article   145(3)   of   the Constitution.” 102.   A   three   Judge   Bench   in   People’s   Union   for   Civil Liberties   (PUCL)   and   Another   Vs.   Union   of   India   and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 399  had also occasion to consider Article 145(3).  Submission was made that a substantial question   of   law   as   to   the   interpretation   of   the Constitution   has   arisen,   hence,   the   matter   may   be referred to a Bench consisting of Five Judges.   Three Judge Bench notices that question raised having already 95 been   decided   in   Union   of   India   Vs.   Association   for Democratic Reforms and Another, (2002) 5 SCC 294 – (A no   other   substantial Three   Judge   Bench   Judgment),   question of law regarding interpretation of Constitution survives,  following was laid  in Paragraph  Nos. 28,  32 and 78:­ “28.   Mr Arun Jaitley, learned Senior Counsel and   Mr   Kirit   N.   Raval,   learned   Solicitor­ General submitted that the question involved in these petitions is a substantial question of   law   as   to   the   interpretation   of   the Constitution   and,   therefore,   the   matter   may be   referred   to   a   Bench   consisting   of   five Judges. 32.   From the judgment rendered by this Court 1 in   Assn.   for   Democratic   Reforms   it   is apparent that no such contention was raised by   the   learned   Solicitor­General,   who appeared   in   appeal   filed   on   behalf   of   the Union of India that question involved in that matter was required to be decided by a five­ Judge Bench, as provided under Article 145(3) of   the   Constitution.   The   question   raised before   us   has   been   finally   decided   and   no other   substantial   question   of   law   regarding the   interpretation   of   the   Constitution survives. Hence, the matter is not required to be referred to a five­Judge Bench. 78.    What emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus:­ Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ( C )   The   judgment   rendered   by   this 96 Court in   Assn. for Democratic Reforms has   attained   finality,   therefore, there   is   no   question   of   interpreting constitutional   provision   which   calls for reference under Article 145(3).” 103.   On question of reference to a larger bench, one more Constitution Bench judgment of this Court needs to be   noticed,   i.e.   Central   Board   of   Dawoodi   Bohra Community   and   Another   Vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   and Another, (2005) 2 SCC 673.    Constitution Bench of this Court while noticing provisions of Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and Articles 141 and 145(2) noticed in Paragraph 12 of the judgment that the law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding   on   any   subsequent   Bench   of   lesser   or   coequal strength. A bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law laid down by a Bench of larger quorum.   In case of doubt, the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice   and   request   for the   matter   being   placed   for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose   decision   has   come   for   consideration.     Two exceptions   were   also   noticed   to   the   above   noted principles   in   Para   12(3),   which   is   to   the   following 97 effect:­ “(3)   The   above   rules   are   subject   to   two exceptions:   (i)   The   abovesaid   rules   do   not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom   vests   the   power   of   framing   the   roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the   rules   laid   down   hereinabove,   if   the matter has already come up for hearing before a   Bench   of   larger   quorum   and   that   Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt,   needs   correction   or   reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of   the   previous   decision   in   question dispensing   with   the   need   of   a   specific reference   or   the   order   of   Chief   Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Ors. and Hansoli Devi and Ors. (supra). ” 104.  In the present case, since the submission of Shri Raju Ramachandran and Dr. Dhavan is for a reference to a Constitution Bench to reconsider   Ismail Faruqui’s   case, the question needs to be considered in view of the law laid down by this Court in reference to Article 145(3) as   noticed   above.   Both   Shri   Raju   Ramachandran   and Dr. Dhavan have placed heavy reliance on order passed by this Court on 26.03.2018 in W.P. (C) No. 222 of 2018 – Sameena Begum Vs. Union of India & Ors.   Learned counsel 98 submit that reference to the Constitution Bench has been made by a three Judge Bench of this Court looking to the importance of the issue.   A perusal of the order dated 26.03.2018   indicates   that   challenge   in   those   writ petitions pertains to the prevalent practice of polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and Nikah Misyar on the ground that they are unconstitutional.  Referring to a five Judges Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of   Shayara Bano etc. Vs. Union of India & Ors.   etc.,   (2017)   9   SCC   1 ,   where   this   Court   declared that practice of talaq­e­biddat or triple talaq is not protected   by   Article   25   and   it   is   not   an   essential religious   practice,   it   was   contended   that   the   five Judges Bench judgment in   Shayara Bano (supra)   has not dealt with the aspect of Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and Nikah Misyar.  Thus, the question as to those religious practices   are   protected   by   Article   25   was   very   much involved in the Writ Petition before three Judge Bench. The three Judge Bench also came to the conclusion that the above noted concepts have not been decided by the Constitution Bench, hence the reference was made to the Constitution   Bench,   looking   to   the   importance   of   the 99 issue. The reference made by order dated 26.03.2018 was in the facts as noted above and does not support the submissions   made   by   Shri   Raju   Ramachandran   in   the present case.    105. Now, we come to those cases, which have been relied by Shri Raju Ramachandran in support of his submission. 106. The Judgment of this Court in   Hyderabad Industries Ltd. And Another Vs. Union of India And Others, (1995) 5 SCC 338  was a case where a three Judge Bench had doubted the correctness of an earlier judgment, i.e.,  Khandelwal Metal   and   Engineering   Works   and   Another   Vs.   Union   of India   and   Others,   (1985)   3   SCC   620.     Similarly,   S.S. Rathore Vs. State of M.P., 1988 (Supp.) SCC 522  was also a case where correctness of a five Judges decision in Sita  Ram  Goel Vs.  Municipal Board, Kanpur  and  Others, AIR   1958   SC   1036   was   doubted.     Further,   judgments   of this Court due to difference of opinion in two judgments or conflict of opinion in judgments insisted reference, which   are   cases   of   this   court   in   Ashwani   Kumar   and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 577 and   Balasaria   Construction   (P)   Ltd.   Vs.   Hanuman   Seva Trust and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 662 , hence these cases 100 also does not support the submission.   The judgment of this  Court  in   Acchan Rizvi  (I)  Vs.  State  of U.P. and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 751  and  Acchan Rizvi (II) Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 752  are the cases where interlocutory   applications   in   contempt   petitions   were filed and decided.  No principle regarding reference was noticed,   the   said   judgments   have   no   relevance   with regard   to   issue   of   reference   of   larger   Bench. Similarly, judgment of this Court in   Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 2 SCC   576 was a  case where  an interim order  was  passed  by this Court with regard to acquisition of 67.703 acres of land as was noticed in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case.  This judgment has   no   relevance   with   regard   to   reference   to   larger Bench.     Judgment   of   this   Court   in   Mohd. Aslam   alias Bhure Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 4 SCC 1,  has been relied, which was a case decided by a five Judges Bench. A public interest writ petition under Article 32 was filed with regard to manner in which the adjacent land,   i.e.,   adjacent   land   to   the   disputed   structure should be preserved till the final decision in the suit pending in the High Court, which was revived consequent 101 to judgment in   Ismail Faruqui’s   case.   The five Judges Bench noticed various observations and directions passed in     case   and   ultimately   had   directed Ismail   Faruqui’s that interim order passed by this Court on 13.03.2002 as modified   on   14.03.2002   should   be   operative   until disposal of the suits in the High Court of Allahabad not only   to   maintain   communal   harmony   but   also   to   fulfil other   objectives   of   the   Act.   The   Writ   Petition   was disposed   of   accordingly.   No   principle   regarding reference   to   larger   Bench   was   laid   down   in   the   said case,   which   may   support   the   submission   of   learned counsel.   107. A two Judge Bench judgment in  Vinod Kumar Shantilal Gosalia Vs. Gangadhar and Others, 1980 (Supp.) SCC 340 has   also   been   relied,   in   which   following   order   was passed:­ “After having heard counsel for the parties we   reserved   judgment.   On   going   through   the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner and the documents   and   after   a   careful   consideration of the arguments of the parties, we find that these appeals involve a substantial question of law of great importance which is likely to govern   a   number   of   cases   arising   out   of mining   leases   in   the   present   territory   of Goa, Daman & Diu. We, therefore, direct that this   case   be   placed   before   a   larger   Bench. Let   these   appeals   be   placed   before   the 102 Hon’ble the Chief Justice for orders.” 108.   The   above   order   was   passed   by   two   Judge   Bench, which had directed the appeal to be placed before Chief Justice for hearing the matter by a larger Bench due to the fact that appeal involves a substantial question of law of great importance.  The said matter cannot be read as an order directing the matter to be placed before a Constitution   Bench   nor   any   proposition   regarding reference to Constitution Bench is decipherable from the above   order,   which   may   help   the   learned   counsel. Another judgment, which was relied by Shri Ramachandran is   an   order   passed   by   Justice   E.S.   Venkatramiah   – Vacation   Judge   in   Ram   Jethmalani   Vs.   Union   of   India, (1984) 3 SCC 696.   The above order was passed in a Writ Petition   (Criminal).   Issue   in   the   above   case   involves release   of   Sikh   leaders   detained   after   Punjab   action. One   of   the issues   noticed   in   the   order   was   that   it relates to personal liberty of a sizeable section of the community.  Court was of the view that question involved are too large and complex for the shoulders of a Single Judge.   The Court opined that these and other cases of 103 like nature should be heard by a seven Judges Bench of this Court.  The above order was passed in the peculiar circumstances   as   noticed   in   the   judgment   and   no principle   of   law   has   been   laid   down   in   context   of reference of a case to a Constitution Bench.  The above order was, thus, in peculiar facts of the case.   109.   In   Krishan   Kumar   Vs.   Union   of   India   and   Others, , the Court noticed that on the issue, (1989) 2 SCC 504 there   are   no   decided   cases   of   this   Court,   hence   the Court observed that in the above view, the matter should be   referred   to   a   larger   Bench.     That   again   was   a judgment of two Judge Bench and there was no direction that   reference   should   be   made   to   a   larger   Bench contemplated in the order, which might have been a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges deciding the issue. In  Union of , an India Vs. M. Gopalakrishnaiah, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 81 earlier Constitution  Bench  judgment in   Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, 1991   was   noticed   and   the   question   as   to Supp   (1)   SCC   600 whether   the   reasoning   of   the   decision   in   the   Delhi Transport Corporation (supra)   and   Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath 104 Ganguly and Another, (1986) 3 SCC 156 , which applied to permanent employees can be extended to the Director on their fixed tenure in the Scheme should be considered. Thus, whether the Constitution Bench Judgment applied in aforesaid case was the question referred, which is again an order passed in the peculiar facts of the case and does  not  contain  any  ratio  pertaining  to  reference to larger Bench.    110.  Similarly,   in  Syndicate Bank Vs. Prabha D. Naik and Another,  (2002) 10 SCC  686 , a  two  Judge Bench  made a reference to larger Bench to consider the interpretation of   Article   535   of   the   Portuguese   Civil   Code   and applicability of the Limitation Act.  The reference was not to a  Constitution  Bench and was only  to a  larger Bench, which might be to a three Judge Bench. Similarly, in   Charanjeet Singh  Vs.  Raveendra Kaur,  (2008) 17 SCC 650   looking   to   the   importance   of   the   question,   a   two Judge Bench had made reference to a larger Bench.   Two Judge Bench reference was not to a Constitution Bench, hence, does not support the submission.  To the similar effect   is   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam 105 Limited (2014) 3 SCC 304 , where two Judge Bench has made a   reference   to   a   larger   Bench.     In   Securities   and Exchange   Board   of   India   Vs.   Sahara   India   Real   Estate Corporation   Limited   and   Others,   (2014)   8   SCC   751 ,   an earlier order passed by three Judge Bench was sought to be enforced, hence reference was made to a Three Judge Bench, which  again  was  not  a  case for  reference to a Constitution   Bench   of   five   Judges.     Judgment   of   this Court   in   Rajeev   Dhavan   Vs.   Gulshan   Kumar   Mahajan   and Others, (2014) 12 SCC  618   was  a case pertaining to a contempt petition, which is not relevant for the present controversy.   Last judgment relied by Shri Ramachandran is  Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC 388.   The three Judge Bench was considering the issue of notification   dated   08.11.2016   demonetizing   currency notes of Rs. 500/­ and Rs. 1000/­.   Various aspects of demonetization   came   for   consideration   in   the   writ petition   filed   under   Article   32   and   the   transfer petitions,   where   this   Court   noticed   following   in Paragraph 3:­ "3.   Keeping   in   view   the   general   public importance and the far­reaching implications which the answers to the questions may have, we   consider   it   proper   to   direct   that   the 106 matters be placed before the larger Bench of five   Judges   for   an   authoritative pronouncement. The Registry shall accordingly place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice   for   constituting   an   appropriate Bench.” 111.  In the above background, the three Judge Bench has directed the matter to be placed before larger bench of five judges.   112.   Present is a case where appeals  have been filed against   judgment   dated   30.09.2010   of   Allahabad   High Court   by   which   Four   Original   Suits,   which   were transferred   by   the   High   Court   to   itself   have   been decided.  Four Civil Suits were filed claiming title to the disputed structure. Parties lead elaborate evidences running in several thousands  pages.    The  Court, after marshalling   the   evidences   before   it   has   decided   the Civil Suits giving rise to these appeals.   The issues, which   have   arisen   in   these   appeals   are   no   doubt important issues, which have to be heard and decided in these appeals. Normally appeals arising out of suits are placed before a Bench of Two Judges but looking to the importance   of   the   matter,   the   present   appeals   have already been placed before three Judge Bench.   For the 107 aforesaid reasons, we do not agree with the submission of Shri Raju Ramachandran that these appeals be referred to Constitution Bench of Five Judges to reconsider the Constitution Bench judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case. 113. Before we close we remind us as well as members of both the major communities of this country, Hindus and Muslims,   the   thoughtful   message   given   by   Justice   S.U. Khan   in his judgment as well as the words of Justice J.S. Verma, speaking for majority in    Ismail Faruqui’s case. Justice S.U. Khan made following appeal: 'Muslims must also ponder that at present the entire     world   wants   to   know   the   exact teaching of Islam in respect of relationship of   Muslims   with   others.   Hostility­peace­ friendship­tolerance­opportunity   to   impress others with the Message­opportunity to strike wherever   and   whenever   possible­or   what?   In this regard Muslims in India enjoy a unique position.   They   have   been   rulers   here,   they have been ruled and now they are sharers in power (of course junior partners). They are not   in   majority   but   they   are   also   not negligible   minority   (Maximum   member   of Muslims are in huge majority which makes them indifferent to the problem in question or in negligible   minority   which   makes   them redundant. Indian Muslims have also inherited huge   legacy   of   religious   learning   and knowledge.   They   are   therefore   in   the   best position   to   tell   the   world   the   correct position. Let them start with their role in the resolution of the conflict at hand.”  108 114. Justice J.S. Verma in paragraph 156 of the judgment expressed great hope into Hinduism which is a tolerant faith. In paragraph 156 it was observed: "156.Before   we   pass   final   orders,   some observations of a general nature appear to be in order. Hinduism is a tolerant faith. It is that   tolerance   that   has   enabled   Islam, Christianity,   Zoroastrianism,   Judaism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism to find shelter and support upon this land. We have no doubt that the moderate Hindu has little taste for the tearing down of the place of worship of another to replace  it with  a  temple. It is our fervent hope that that moderate opinion shall   find   general   expression   and   that communal   brotherhood   shall   bring   to   the dispute at Ayodhya an amicable solution long before the courts resolve it.” 115.   We are also reminded of rich culture and heritage of this ancient country which has always been a matter of great learning and inspiration for the whole world.  116.   The great King Asoka in 245 B.C. (Before Christ), had   given   several   messages   to   the   world   which   are engraved in rock edicts which   shows reverence towards faith of others. The   Twelfth Rock Edict of the great King Asoka stated: "'The   King,   beloved   of   the   Gods,   honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the   substance   of   religion;   whereof   this   is 109 the   root,   to   reverence   one's   own   faith   and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrong's another's.' 'The texts of all forms of   religion   shall   be   followed   under   my protection.'” 117.   Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, most Learned and respected former President of India, in his celebrated book   “The Hindu View of Life”   while dealing with the subject of “conflict   of   religion”   has   expressed   great   hope   with Hindu view of life. Dr. Radhakrishnan in prophetic words states: “That the Hindu solution of the problem of the conflict of religions is likely to be accepted   in   the   future   seems   to   me   to   be fairly certain. The spirit of democracy with its   immense   faith   in   the   freedom   to   choose one's   ends   and   direct   one's   course   in   the effort to realize them makes for it. Nothing is   good   which   is   not   self­chosen;   no determination is valuable which is not self­ determination.   The   different   religions   are slowly   learning   to   hold   out   hands   of friendship to each other in every part of the world.   The   parliaments   of   religions   and conferences   and   congresses   of   liberal thinkers   of   all   creeds   promote   mutual understanding   and   harmony.   The   study   of comparative   religion   is   developing   a   fairer attitude to other religions. It is impressing onus the fundamental unity of all religions by   and   the   need   of   the   hour   determine   the emphasis in each religion. We are learning to think   clearly   about   the   inter­relations   of religions.   We   tend   to   look   upon   different religions not as incompatibles but as 110 complementaries, and so indispensable to each other for the realization of the common end. Closer   contact   with   other   religions   has dispelled the belief that only this or that religion   has   produced   men   of   courage   and patience,   self­denying   love   and   creative energy.   Every   great   religion   has   cured   its followers of the swell of passion, the thrust of   desire   and   the   blindness   of   temper.   The crudest religion seems to have its place in the   cosmic   scheme,   for   gorgeous   flowers justify   the   muddy   roots   from   which   they spring.” 118.  We are confident that observations made by Justice S.U.   Khan   of   Allahabad   High   Court   as   quoted   above   as well   as   observations   of   Justice   J.S.   Verma   made   in paragraph   156   of   the   judgment   are   observations   which shall guide both the communities in their thought, deed and action. 119.  To   conclude,   we   again   make   it   clear   that questionable observations made in   Ismail Faruqui's case as noted above were made in context of land acquisition. Those   observations   were   neither   relevant   for   deciding the suits nor relevant for deciding these appeals. 120. In view of our foregoing discussions, we are of the considered   opinion   that   no   case   has   been   made   out   to refer the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in 111 Ismail Faruqui case (supra)  for reconsideration.  121.   We   record   our   appreciation   to   the   valuable assistance rendered by the learned counsel for both the parties,   especially   Shri   Ejaz   Maqbool   and   P.V. Yogeswaran   who   have   rendered   great   assistance   to   the Court   in   compiling   various   volumes   in   orderly   manner which   had   been   of   great   help   to   the   Court,   both,   in hearing and deciding the issue.  122.   The   appeals   which   are   awaiting   consideration   by this Court for quite a long period, be now listed in th week commencing 29  October, 2018 for hearing. ..........................CJI.  ( DIPAK MISRA ) ...........................J.       ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) NEW DELHI,   SEPTEMBER 27, 2018. 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10866-10867 OF 2010 M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS. ETC. … RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4768-4771 OF 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2636 OF 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 821 OF 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4739 OF 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4905-4908 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2215 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4740 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2894 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6965 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4192 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7226 of 2011 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8096 of 2011 DIARY NO. 22744 OF 2017 J U D G M E N T S.ABDUL NAZEER, J. 1. I have had the privilege of reading the erudite Judgment of my learned Brother Justice Ashok Bhushan. My learned Brother has 2 held that the questionable observations made in paragraph 82 of the judgment in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 360 (for short ' Ismail Faruqui ') are not relevant for deciding these appeals. Therefore, His Lordship has concluded that no case has been made out seeking reference of these appeals to a Constitution Bench of this Court. I am unable to accept this view expressed by my learned Brother. However, I am in respectful agreement with his opinion on the question of res judicata contained in paragraphs 63 to 75 of the Judgment and have restricted this judgment to the other issues. 2. Since the facts of the case and the rival contentions of the parties have been set out by my learned Brother in detail, it is not necessary to reiterate them. Therefore, I have stated only certain relevant facts. 3. In Ismail Faruqui , the Court started by elucidating the background of the case leading to the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 (No. 33 of 1993) (for short ' 1993 Act') and the reasons for making Special Reference to this Court by the President of India in exercise of his power in clause (1) of Article 143 of the 3 Constitution of India. Herein the Special Reference mentioned, had the following question for consideration and opinion: "Whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the construction of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure) in the area on which the structure stood?" 4. After narrating the facts, the Court went on to examine the constitutional validity of the 1993 Act. On this issue, the Court concluded that the Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the said legislation and except for Section 4(3), the entire 1993 Act is constitutionally valid. While deciding so, the Court in paragraph 51 went on to discuss the "comparative significance" of the disputed site to the two communities. The following is reproduced as under: "51. It may also be mentioned that even as Ayodhya is said to be of particular significance to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born there, the mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 AD. As a mosque, it was a religious place of worship by the Muslims. This indicates the comparative significance of the disputed site to the two communities and also that the impact of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of the Hindu 4 community. Mention of this aspect is made only in the context of the argument that the statute as a whole, not merely Section 7 thereof, is anti-secular being slanted in favour of the Hindus and against the Muslims." 5. After the aforementioned conclusion, in paragraphs 65 to 82 the Court examined the question as to whether a mosque is immune from acquisition. Among these paragraphs, the observations in paragraphs 77, 78 and 80 are important for the matter in hand and are reproduced as under:- "77. It may be noticed that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion. 78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of 5 such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially . 80. It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim Law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah and the same never reverts back to the donor or founder of the mosque and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where the namaz can be offered. As indicated hereinbefore, in British India, no such protection was given to a mosque and the mosque was subjected to the provisions of statute of limitation thereby extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosque lost by adverse possession over that property." (Emphasis supplied) 6. In paragraph 82 this Court summarised the position as under: "82. The correct position may be summarised thus. Under the Mahomedan Law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession (See Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law , 19th Edn., by M. 6 Hidayatullah - Section 217; and Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara [AIR 1940 PC 116, 121]. If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold that a mosque has a unique or special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open . Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Irrespective of the status of a mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitution is the same and equal to that of the places of worship of the other religions, namely, church, temple etc. It is neither more nor less than that of the places of worship of the other religions. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practise the religion, if the significance of that place be such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right." (Emphasis supplied) 7 7. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel, submits that the observations made in the above mentioned paragraph, reading "A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open." is contrary to law and the Court was obliged to examine the faith to make this statement. He further contends that the observations on the concepts of particular significance and comparative significance are without foundation. Moreover, he contends that what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself as has been done by the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005 (for short 'Shirur Mutt' ). It has also been submitted that the broad test of "essentiality" in Shirur Mutt cannot be cut down by later Five and Two Judges' decisions. "Integral" is interchangeable with "essential". The latter cannot be short circuited by the use of the former. This may lie at the root of many mal-understandings and needs to be clarified. Further, it is precisely this error of integrality that Ismail Faruqui uses when it 8 speaks of "particular significance". He also submits that the test used in paragraph 78 of Ismail Faruqui was essential and integral even though the word "or" was used. The Court has failed to examine the tenets of faith and proceeded in its own intuitive understanding to make ipse dixit observations. Learned senior counsel has also relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his contentions. Ismail Faruqui being devoid of any examination on this issue, the matter needs to go to a larger Bench. Dr. Dhavan further submits that the impugned judgment was affected by the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui . He has taken us through various paragraphs in the impugned judgment in this regard. Dr. Dhavan has also referred to various observations made in the impugned judgment to support his submission that Ismail Faruqui has influenced the said judgment. 8. On the other hand, Shri Parasaran, learned senior counsel submits that the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui that a mosque not being an essential part of the practice of Islam have to be read in the context of the validity of the acquisition of the suit property under the 1993 Act. He submits that this Court has not ruled that offering Namaz by Muslims is not an essential religious 9 practice. It only ruled that right to offer Namaz at every mosque that exists is not essential religious practice. But if a place of worship of any religion has a particular significance for that religion, enough to make an essential or integral part of the religion, then it would stand on a different footing and would have to be treated differently and more reverentially. It is argued that the fundamental right of Muslim community under Article 25, to offer namaz is not affected in the present case as the Babri Masjid was not a mosque with particular significance for that religion. 9. We have also heard S/Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, Raju Ramachandran, S.K. Jain, learned senior counsel and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri P.N. Mishra, learned advocate. 10. Learned counsel for the parties have also produced Islamic religious texts on mosque, relevant excerpts of the holy Quran and illuminating discourses on the holy Quran in support of their respective contentions on whether a mosque is an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam. 11. It is evident from Ismail Faruqui that the principal submission of the petitioners was that mosque cannot be acquired 10 because of a special status in Mahomedan Law. The Constitution Bench has discussed this aspect under a separate heading "Mosque – Immunity from Acquisition" from paragraph 65 of the judgment. Specifically in paragraph 74, the Court observed that subject to protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of religious worship, like mosques, churches, temples, etc. can be acquired under the State's sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. Further, the Court in paragraph 77 noted that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practice, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly, this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Additionally, in paragraph 78, it noted that places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated 11 differently and more reverentially. While summarizing the position, in paragraph 82, the Court has observed that a mosque is not an essential part of practice of religion of Islam and namaz by Muslims can be offered anywhere even in open. 12. What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of that religion itself. This has been laid down at page 1025 in Shirur Mutt : "……..The learned Attorney-General lays stress upon clause (2)( a ) of the article and his contention is that all secular activities, which may be associated with religion but do not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to State regulation. The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of 12 priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26( b ). What Article 25(2)( a ) contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices ." (Emphasis supplied) 13. Further, at pages 1028-1029 it is stated that, " Under Article 26( b ), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters. Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances would be a matter of administration of property belonging to the religious denomination and can be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a competent legislature; for it could not be the injunction of any religion to destroy the institution and its endowments by incurring wasteful expenditure on rites and ceremonies." (Emphasis supplied) 13 14. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and Ors. 1954 SCR 1055, a Constitution Bench of this Court has held thus: "It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and religious belief . xxx xxx xxx ….. No outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like under the guise of administering the trust estate ." (Emphasis supplied) 15 . In Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors. 1958 SCR 895, a Constitution Bench of this 14 Court had the opportunity to consider Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India in the context of Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947 as amended in 1949. After referring to Shirur Mutt , this Court has held as under: "16(3)…. Now, the precise connotation of the expression “matters of religion” came up for consideration by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [(1954) SCR 1005] and it was held therein that it embraced not merely matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the religion but also the practice of it, or to put it in terms of Hindu theology, not merely its Gnana but also its Bhakti and Karma Kandas . …." 16. In The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors. (1962) 1 SCR 383, a Constitution Bench of this Court, after considering the historical background of the dispute, has held thus:- " Having thus reviewed broadly the genesis of the shrine, its growth and the story of its endowments and their management, it may now be relevant to enquire what is the nature of the tenets and beliefs to which Soofism subscribes . Such an enquiry would serve to assist us in determining whether the Chishtia sect can be regarded as a religious 15 denomination or a section thereof within Art 26." (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay 1962 Supp (2) SCR 496, this Court was considering the validity of the law interfering with the right of religious denominations to ex-communicate its members. In this context Articles 25 and 26 came to be considered. After referring to the various decisions a Constitution Bench of this Court has held as under:- "The content of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt; Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa; Sri Venkatamana Devaru v. The State of Mysore; Durgah Committee; Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali and several other cases and the main principles underlying these provisions have by these decisions been placed beyond controversy. The first is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief they extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion. 16 The second is that what constitutes an essential part of a religious or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion ." (Emphasis supplied) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj State of Rajasthan 18. In v. and Ors . (1964) 1 SCR 561, a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering the validity of Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (No. XIII of 1959). The same was challenged on behalf of the denomination of followers of Vallabha. The case originally involved challenge to the Nathdwara Ordinance, 1959 (No. II of 1959) which was issued on February 6, 1959. Subsequently, this Ordinance was repealed by the Act and the petitioner was allowed to amend his petition. It was contended that if the temple was held to be a public temple then the Act is to be invalid because it contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. After considering the rival contentions, the Court has held as under: 17 " In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the community following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one section of the community claims that while performing certain rites white dress is an integral part of the religion itself, whereas another section contends that yellow dress and not the white dress is the essential part of the religion, how is the Court going to decide the question? Similar disputes may arise in regard to food. In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the dispute by a blind application of the formula that the community decides which practice in an integral part of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one voice and the formula would, therefore, break down. This question will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion . It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court struck a note of caution in the case of Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed [(1962) 1 SCR 383 at p. 411] and Hussain Ali 18 observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Article 25(1)." (Emphasis supplied) 19. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that the question as to whether a particular religious practice is an essential or integral part of the religion is a question which is to be considered by considering the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of the religion. It is also clear that the examination of what constitutes an essential practice requires detailed examination as reflected in the aforesaid judgments. 20. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to note the observations in Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 606, at paragraph 28, where it is stated: "…. The concept of essentiality is not itself a determinative factor. It is one of the circumstances to be considered in adjudging whether the particular matters of religion or religious practices or belief are 19 an integral part of the religion. It must be decided whether the practices or matters are considered integral by the community itself. Though not conclusive, this is also one of the facets to be noticed. The practice in question is religious in character and whether it could be regarded as an integral and essential part of the religion and if the court finds upon evidence adduced before it that it is an integral or essential part of the religion, Article 25 accords protection to it…." (Emphasis supplied) 21. As mentioned above, parties have produced various texts in Islam in support of their respective contentions. For the present, we are concerned with the approach of the Court in concluding questionable observations without examining the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of the religion. The conclusion in paragraph 82 of Ismail Faruqui that "A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open" has been arrived at without undertaking comprehensive examination. 22. Now, the question is whether the impugned judgment has been affected by the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui . A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that learned advocates 20 appearing for the parties have repeatedly quoted various paragraphs of Ismail Faruqui while arguing the case and have also placed strong reliance on the questionable observations made in Ismail Faruqui . 23. A few paragraphs mentioned at page Nos. 3038-3039, 3061, 3392, 3429 and 3439 of the impugned judgment delivered by Justice D.V Sharma wherein Ismail Faruqui is quoted have been reproduced as under: " ISSUE NO. 19 (d): Whether the building in question could not be a mosque under the Islamic Law in view of the admitted position that it did not have minarets? FINDINGS: On behalf of defendants it is contended that the building in question was not a mosque under the Islamic Law. It is not disputed that the structure has already been demolished on 6.12.1992. According to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others , case, 1994 (6) SCC 360, the Hon'ble Apex Court held at para 70 that the sacred character of the mosque can also be lost. According to the tenets of Islam, minarets are required to give Azan. There cannot be a public place of worship in mosque in which Provision of Azan is not available, hence the disputed structure cannot be deemed to be a mosque. According to Islamic tenets, there cannot be a mosque without place of Wazoo and 21 surrounded by a graveyard on three sides. Thus, in view of the above discussions, there is a strong circumstance that without any minaret there cannot be any mosque. Issue No. 19(d) is decided accordingly, against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants." [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3038-3039] "Defendants further claim that the property in suit was not in exclusive possession of Muslims right from 1858. It is further submitted that in view of the possession of Hindus from 1858 and onwards which is evident from Ext. 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27 and 31, the outer Courtyard was exclusively in possession of Hindus and the inner Courtyard was not exclusively in possession of Muslims but also in joint possession of Hindus and Muslims till 1934. Muslims were dispossessed from the inner Courtyard also in 1934 and plaintiffs admit that Muslims were dispossessed on 22/23December 1949 from the inner Courtyard. Thus, on the basis of Islamic tenets the Muslims claim that the property shall be construed as a Mosque. In this reference the controversy has already been set at rest by the Privy Council in the decision of Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116. The aforesaid view has been approved in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union Of India, 1994 (6) SCC 360, Para 70 of the ruling is relevant which reads as under……" [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3061] 22 "Sri Jain has relied upon para 78 of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others 1994(6) SCC 360, which is reproduced as under : “While offer of prayer or worship is are religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and move reverentially." Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate has further argued that since birth place of Lord Ram was considered as a place of worship which was integral part of religious practice of Hindu from times immemorial. It is deity and it stands on a different footing and have to be treated reverentially. Sri Jain has further urged that in view of the constitutional mandate as provided under Article 25 of the Constitution this place which was all the time being worshipped has be treated by this Court as a place of worship because of the belief of the Hindu based on religious book and religious practice to be birth place of Lord Ram as the temple was constructed in the 12th century. It is expedient to say that prior to 12th century there is evidence that earlier temples were also constructed at the site. Thus, according to Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate there is overwhelming 23 evidence to establish the site of Ram Janambhumi and the Court has to recognize the same. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs which causes hindrance for worship of Hindu is liable to be dismissed on this count as no relief can be granted under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, now Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963." [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3392] "LORD RAM AS THE AVATAR OF VISHNU HAVING BEEN BORN AT AYODHYA AT THE JANMASTHAN IS ADMITTEDLY THE CORE PART OF HINDU BELIEF AND FAITH WHICH IS IN EXISTENCE AND PRACTICED FOR THE LAST THOUSANDS OF YEARS. THE HINDU SCRIPTURES ALSOS SANCTIFY IT. ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION BEING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENSUES ITS PRESERVATION AND NO RELIEF CAN BE TAKEN BY THE COURT WHICH SEEKS TO RESTRICT OR ALTOGETHER EXTINGUISH THIS RIGHT. The fact that Ram Janambhumi is an integral part of Hindu Religion and the right to worship there is a fundamental right of the Hindu religion and can be enforced through a suit can be clearly made out through a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court." [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3429] "THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT OF HINDUS TO WORSHIP RAM LALA AT THE JANMASTHAN BECAME CONCRETISED BEFORE THE 24 CONSTITUTION CAME INTO BEING AND THE SAME REQUIRES TO BE PROTECTED. It is well-known that the Constitution of India th was enacted, i.e. given to ourselves, w.e.f. 26 January, 1950. Before it, the right of Hindus to worship was duly sanctified and recognized by judicial orders. In fact, the Supreme Court records in the Ismail Faruqui case above the contention in paragraph 1.2 of the White Paper of the Government of India as recorded in Paragraph 9, Page 380, of the said judgment. It reads as follows: "Interim orders in these civil suits restrained the parties from removing the idols or interfering with their worship. In effect, therefore, from December 1949 till 6.12.1992 the structure had not been used as a mosque." It is further very significant to note that the Muslims for the first time, after 1949, assert their right howsoever unsustainable, only in th 18 December, 1961. Therefore, the right of the Hindus to worship at the Rama Janma Bhumi, continuing since times immemorial as an integral part of their religious right and faith was also sanctified by judicial orders from 1949 continuously. This right has concretised and remains an integral part of Hindu religion and has to be protected." [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3439] 25 24. Similarly, in the judgment rendered by Justice Sudhir Agarwal, Ismail Faruqui has been quoted at page No. 2015 in the printed volume of the judgment, which is as under: "3501. Sri Prasad argued that belief of Hindus that Lord Ram as incarnation of Vishnu having born at Ayodhya forms an integral part of Hindu religion which cannot be denied to be practised, observed and performed by them and refers to Commissioner of Police & others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta& another , (2004) 12 SCC 770 (para 9) and Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra). In order to show what constitutes public order under Article 25 of the Constitution, he also placed reliance on Dalbir Singh & others v. State of Punjab , AIR 1962 SC 1106 (para 8). 3502. Next he submits that applying the doctrine of Eminent Domain, the place in dispute, having special significance for Hindus, cannot be touched at all either by any particular person or even by State and the provisions of even acquisition would not apply to it though with respect to the alleged mosque, it has been already held and observed by the Apex Court that the disputed building could not be shown to be of any special significance to Muslims. He refers to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India & others , (1994) 6 SCC 360 (para 65, 72, 75 and 96); Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anand prasadji Maharaj and others v. State of Gujarat & others , (1975) 1 SCC 11. The relief sought by the plaintiff (Suit-4) is barred by Section 34 Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 and 26 reliance is placed on Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others , (1976) 2 SCC 58 (para 20 and 27); American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and others , (1993) 2 SCC 199(para 22)." 25. After considering Ismail Faruqui, Justice Sudhir Agarwal in paragraphs 2722 to 2725 has opined as under: "2722. The Fourth angle: It is a deity which has filed the present suit for enforcement of its rights. The religious endowment in the case in hand so far as Hindus are concerned, as they have pleaded in general, is a place of a peculiar and unique significance for them and there cannot be any other place like this. In case this place is allowed to extinguish/extinct by application of a provision of statutes, may be of limitation or otherwise, the fundamental right of practicing religion shall stand denied to the Hindus permanently since the very endowment or the place of religion will disappear for all times to come and this kind of place cannot be created elsewhere. 2723. In Ismail Farooqui (supra), Supreme Court has considered the plea of validity of acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act that once a waqf of mosque is created, the property vests in almighty and it always remain a waqf hence such a property cannot be acquired. While negativing this plea, the Apex Court said that a plea in regard to general religious purposes cannot be said to be an integral part of religion which will deprive the worshippers of the right of worship at any other place and therefore, such a property can 27 be acquired by the State. However, the position would be otherwise if the religious property would have been of special significance and cannot be one of several such kind of properties. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant observation in this regard: "78. It appears from various decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of religious worship like mosques, churches, temples etc. can be acquired under the State's sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property." "82. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially." 2724. The above observations show if the religious endowment is of such nature, which 28 is of specific significance or peculiar in nature, could not have been found elsewhere, the acquisition of such property by the Government will have the effect of depriving the worshippers their right of worship under Article 25 of the Constitution and such an acquisition even under the statutory provision, cannot be permitted. We find sufficient justification to extend this plea to the statute of limitation also, inasmuch as, if the statute pertaining to acquisition cannot be extended to a religious place of special significance which may have the effect of destroying the right of worship at a particular place altogether, otherwise the provision will be ultra vires, the same would apply to the statute of limitation also and that be so, it has to be read that the statute of limitation to this extent may not be availed where the debutter's property is of such a nature that it may have the effect of extinction of the very right of worship on that place which is of peculiar nature and specific significance. This will be infringing the fundamental right under Article 25 of the Constitution. 2725. In fact this reason could have been available to the plaintiffs (Suit-4) also had it been shown by them that the mosque in question for them was a place of special significance but this has already been observed by the Apex Court in respect to this particular mosque that like others it is one of the several mosques and by acquisition of the place it will not have the effect of depriving such fundamental right of Muslims. It is always open to them to offer prayer at any other place like they could have done here but Hindus are not placed on similar footing. 29 According to Hindus, this is a place of birth of lord Rama and that be so, there cannot be any other place for which such belief persists since time immemorial. Once this land is allowed to be lost due to the acts of persons other than Hindus, the very right of this Section of people, as protected by Article 25, shall stand destroyed. This is another reason for not attracting the provisions of limitation in the present case. " 26. Similarly, Justice D.V. Sharma has stated thus: "A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT EVEN BY EXERCISING THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAN CANNOT EXERCISE THE POWER OF ACQUISITION OF LAND OR PROPERTY WHICH EXTINGUISHES THE CORE OF THE FAITH OR THE PLACE OR THE INSTITUTION WHICH IS HELD TO BE SACRED. What clearly follows is that a sovereign Government cannot extinguish the core of the Hindu religion which is the Ram Janambhumi, let alone the same be extinguished through a suit, by transferring the same to some other party in this case the plaintiff thereby ensuring that the said fundamental right to worship at the Ram Janambhumi is extinguished forever. RELEVANT CASE LAW… (b) Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others v. Union of India & Others , 1994 (6) SCC Para 76, Page 416 – Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anand Prasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat , (1976) 2 SCR 317 at pages 327-328: (AIR 1974 SC 2098 at p. 2103), has held : 30 "One thing is, however, clear that Article 26 guarantees inter alia the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for managing religious affairs. This right, however, cannot take away the right of the State to compulsorily acquire property ......If, on the other hand, acquisition of property of a religious denomination by the State can be proved to be such as to destroy or completely negative its right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for even the survival of a religious institution the question may have to be examined in a different light." Para 82 - A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of religion of Islam and Namaz by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in the open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose. Keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practice the religion if the significance of that place be such. Note (i) Ram Janmasthan in Ayodhya where Ram Lala is Virajman is a place of religious significance as described in the above judgment. If the sovereign authority, under the power of eminent domain, cannot acquire it, can a plea at the instance of plaintiffs who are private persons in Suit No. 4 be entertained, upholding of which would lead to denial of such sacred place altogether to the Hindus. 31 Note (ii) At page 413, Para 65 of Ismail Faruqui – No argument made about a mosque of special significance which forms an essential part of Islam. Hence, no question raised about Baburi Mosque as integral to Islam and it has not been raised in the plaint here or evidence laid or any contention ever made that the said mosque was of any significance to the practice of Islam as a religion……." [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos.3438-3439] "FINDINGS ….. Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the validity of provisions of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya, 1993 in Dr. Ismail Faruqui case (supra) and held that the Central Government can acquire any place of worship. At para- 78 Apex Court held that the place of birth has a particular significance for Hindus and it should be treated on different footing, which reads as under:- “78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.” 32 On behalf of Hindus it is urged that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief claimed and as such the relief is barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is at par with Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 on the ground that they have superior fundamental rights. Contentions of Hindus are as under: "The Hindus have superior fundamental right than the Muslims under articles 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that performing customary rituals and offering service worship to the lord of universe to acquire merit and to get salvation as such it is integral part of Hindu Dharma & religion in view whereof it is humbly submitted that the instant suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost: … 2. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 360, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Right to Practise, Profess and Propagate Religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not extend to the Right of Worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 is to religious practice which forms integral part of practice of that religion. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion 33 having particular significance of that religion to make it an essential or integral part of the religion stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially. Relying on said judgment it is submitted that Sri Ramjanamsthan has particular significance for the Hinduism as visiting and performing customary rites confer merit and gives salvation it is firm belief of the Hindus based on their sacred Divine Holy Scriptures which belief neither can be scrutinized by any Court of Law nor can be challenged by the persons having no faith in Hinduism as this is conscience of the Hindus having special protection under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 77 and 78 of the said judgment read as follows: 77. It may be noticed that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an 34 essential and integral part of practice of that religion. 78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially. 3. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of India (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered any where even in open. The Right to Worship is not at any and every place so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the Right to Worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right. Relying on said ratio of law it is submitted that without offering prayer at Sri Ramjanamsthan described as Babri mosque in the plaint it can be practised somewhere else but offering prayer instead of Sri Ramjanamsthan at any other place cannot be practised because the merit which is obtained by worshiping at the birth place of Sri Ram cannot be obtained by doing so at other places and it will be contrary to the holy Divine Sacred Scripture of the Hindus and will cause extinction of a most sacred shrine of the 35 Hindus. Relevant paragraph Nos. 80 to 87 of the said judgment read as follows: 80. It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim Law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah and the same never reverts back to the donor or founder of the mosque and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where the namaz can be offered. As indicated hereinbefore, in British India, no such protection was given to a mosque and the mosque was subjected to the provisions of statute of limitation thereby extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosque lost by adverse possession over that property. 81. Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act comprehends the categories of properties known to Indian Law. Article 367 of the Constitution adopts this secular concept of property for purposes of our Constitution. A temple, church or mosque etc. are essentially immovable properties and subject to protection under Articles 25 and 26. Every immovable property is liable to be acquired. Viewed in the proper perspective, a mosque does not enjoy any additional protection which is not 36 available to religious places of worship of other religions. 82. The correct position may be summarised thus. Under the Mahomedan Law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession (See Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn., by M. Hidayatullah — Section 217; and Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara. If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold that a mosque has a unique or special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Irrespective of the status of a mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitution is the same and equal to that of the places of worship of the other religions, namely, church, temple etc. It is neither more nor less than that of the places of worship of the other religions. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to 37 be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practise the religion, if the significance of that place be such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right…..” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos.3454-3458] 27. Hence, it is clear that the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui have certainly permeated the impugned judgment. Thus, the impugned judgment can be claimed to be both expressly and inherently affected by the questionable observations made in Ismail Faruqui . Further, Ismail Faruqui prima facie leads a different approach regarding the application of essential and/or integral test which also needs to be resolved as a matter of constitutional significance. In my view, Ismail Faruqui needs to be brought in line with the authoritative pronouncements in Shirur Mutt and other 38 decisions referred to in paragraphs 14 to 18 and 20 of this judgment. 28. The importance and seriousness of the matter can be better understood by the observations made by Justice S.U. Khan in the impugned judgment itself, in the following words:- "Here is a small piece of land (1500 square yards) where angels fear to tread. It is full of innumerable land mines. We are required to clear it. Some very sane elements advised us not to attempt that. We do not propose to rush in like fools lest we are blown. However, we have to take risk. It is said that the greatest risk in life is not daring to take risk when occasion for the same arises. Once angels were made to bow before Man. Sometimes he has to justify the said honour. This is one of those occasions. We have succeeded or failed? No one can be a judge in his own cause. Accordingly, herein follows the judgment for which the entire country is waiting with bated breath." 29. It is relevant here to state that by an order dated 26.3.2018 a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sameena Begum v. Union of India & Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 222 of 2018] has referred the matter relating to polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikha Mutah; and Nikah Misya to a Constitution Bench. The order of reference in the said case reads as under: 39 "It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the challenge in these writ petitions pertains to the prevalent practice of polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and Nikah Misyar as they are unconstitutional. Various grounds have been urged in support of the stand as to how these practices, which come within the domain of personal law, are not immune from judicial review under the Constitution. It is urged by them that the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench in the case of Shayara Bano etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. (2017) 9 SCC 1 has not dealt with these aspects. They have drawn our attention to various paragraphs of the judgment to buttress the point that the said issues have not been really addressed as there has been no delineation on these aspects. On a perusal of the judgment, we find the submission of the learned counsel for the parties/petitioners is correct that these concepts have not been decided by the Constitution Bench. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx At this juncture, a submission has been advanced at the Bar that keeping in view the importance of the issue, the matter should be placed before the Constitution Bench. Accepting the said submission, it is directed that the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of appropriate Constitution Bench for dwelling upon the 40 issues which may arise for consideration from the writ petitions ." (Emphasis supplied) 30. Moreover, a two-Judge Bench of this Court on 6.7.2018 in Jyoti Jagran Mandal v. NDMC & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 5820 of 2018] has referred the matter in relation to the policy decision permitting Ram Leela and Puja once in a year in public parks to a Constitution Bench holding as under: "Application seeking exemption from filing certified copy of the impugned order is allowed. Appeal admitted. The order of the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi has rejected an application made by the appellant to have what is known as “Mata-ki-Chowki” in a public park. The appellant has expressly relied upon earlier orders, including a policy decision, which permits Ram Leela and Puja to be allowed once in a year in such public parks. The appeal raises a question of great constitutional importance as to whether such activities can be allowed in state owned premises in view of our Constitution being secular in nature. The Hon’ble Chief Justice is, therefore, requested to constitute an appropriate Bench to hear the aforesaid matter ." (Emphasis supplied) 41 31. In Sunita Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors . {Writ Petition (Civil) No. 286 of 2017} a Three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering the question relating to banning the practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Khatna or Female Circumcision (FC) or Khafd. It was submitted by the senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondent that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement because the practice is an essential and integral practice of the religious sect. Learned Attorney General for India also submitted that it deserves to be referred to a larger Bench. By Order dated 24.09.2018, the matter was referred to a larger Bench, the relevant portion of which is as under: " Regard being had to the nature of the case, the impact on the religious sect and many other concomitant factors, we think it apposite not to frame questions which shall be addressed to by the larger Bench. We also think it appropriate that the larger Bench may consider the issue in its entirety from all perspectives . In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that the matter should be placed before a larger Bench. The Registry is directed to place the papers of the instant matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate directions in this regard." (Emphasis supplied) 42 32. Considering the Constitutional importance and significance of the issues involved, the following need to be referred to a larger Bench: (a) Whether in the light of Shirur Mutt and other aforementioned cases, an essential practice can be decided without a detailed examination of the beliefs, tenets and practice of the faith in question? (b) Whether the test for determining the essential practice is both essentiality and integrality? (c) Does Article 25, only protect belief and practices of particular significance of a faith or all practices regarded by the faith as essential? (d) Do Articles 15, 25 and 26 (read with Article 14) allow the comparative significance of faiths to be undertaken? 33. The Registry is directed to place this matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. …….……………………………J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER) New Delhi; September 27, 2018.