Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3568 OF 2005
SARUP SINGH & ANR. …. Appellants
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …. Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3566 OF 2005
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3567 OF 2005
JUDGMENT
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.
1. As the facts and issues involved are similar and
interconnected, we propose to dispose of all the appeals by
this common judgment and order. However, we may record
the facts of each of the cases separately and deal with the
issues at one place as they are interconnected.
Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005
2. This appeal arises out of the acquisition of land of Sarup
Singh, the appellant herein, by issuing a notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”] on 09.10.1974. Possession of the
land was taken on 03.12.1974 and the award was passed
on 11.06.1975. As against the award passed by the Special
Land Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda Cantonment, a
reference case was filed which was decided by the
Reference Court on 31.07.1979. Finally, the matter came
to be decided by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The
High Court by an order dated 08.12.1982, determined the
market value of the land and the appellants herein were
also granted solatium at 15 per cent and also interest at 6
per cent per annum. The aforesaid judgment and order
passed by the High Court became final and binding as no
appeal was brought to this Court thereafter.
2
3. Subsequently, however, the decree holders-appellants filed
Civil Miscellaneous Applications No. 1296 of 1985 under
Sections 151 and 152 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for
short “C.P.C.”] praying for solatium and interest at the
enhanced rate as provided for by the amendment in the Act
(by way of Act 68 of 1984) which was given effect from
24.09.1984. The High Court allowed the said
Miscellaneous Petition by order dated 17.02.1986 by
passing an order enhancing the payment of solatium from
15 per cent to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9
per cent per annum for the first year after acquisition and
15 per cent per annum thereafter till the date of actual
payment of the enhanced amount of compensation.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid order dated 17.02.1986, the
appellants filed an execution application before the
Additional District Judge, Bhatinda. The execution
application was dismissed by the Additional District Judge,
Bhatinda by an order dated 30.08.2001 holding that the
appellants herein are not entitled to enhanced rate of
solatium and interest as the award of the Collector and
that of the reference court in their case was passed prior to
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30.04.1982. The Additional District Judge further held that
the order passed by the High Court under Sections 151
and 152 of C.P.C. was without jurisdiction and as such a
nullity.
5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein
filed a miscellaneous petition before the High Court which
was registered as Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 and by
the impugned order dated 24.09.2002, the same was
dismissed upholding the order passed by the Additional
District Judge, Bhatinda as against which the present
appeal was filed.
Civil Appeal No. 3566 of 2005
6. This appeal arises out of the same notification dated
09.10.1974, as that of Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005,
issued by the respondents under Section 4 of the Act
proposing to acquire land belonging to one Chuhar Singh.
Chuhar Singh died subsequently and therefore his sons,
viz., Hardev Singh, Balwant Singh and Gurbachan Singh
preferred claim on the basis of which the Special Land
Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda Cantonment gave his
4
award on 11.06.1975. As the appellants sought for
reference, a reference case was registered in which the
Additional District Judge passed a judgment and order
dated 31.07.1979. The matter was taken to the High Court
which was initially registered as RFA No. 10687 of 1980
and was decided on 30.07.1981. After which a Letters
patent Appeal No. 128 of 1982 was filed which was decided
on 18.12.1985 and the said was partly allowed and the
respondents were directed to pay solatium at the rate of 30
per cent of the market value of the acquired land as
determined by the court and also interest at the rate of 9
per cent for the first year from the date of their possession
by the Land Acquisition Collector and at the rate of 15 per
cent thereafter till the date of actual payment of enhanced
amount of compensation.
7. The appellants herein filed an execution application for
realization of the balance amount in pursuance to the
order of the High Court in LPA No. 128 of 1982 dated
18.12.1985 which was rejected by the Additional District
Judge, Bhatinda by his order dated 30.08.2001 and the
aforesaid execution applications of the appellants were
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dismissed by holding that they were not entitled to
enhanced rate of solatium and interest as the award of the
Collector and that of the reference court were prior to
30.04.1982. Additional District Judge, Bhatinda further
held that the aforesaid order passed by the High Court is
nullity in the eyes of law as the benefit of the order of the
High Court dated 18.12.1985 cannot be given to the
appellants in view of various decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court.
8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order
passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda the
appellants filed Civil Revision which was registered as Civil
Revision No. 6171 of 2001. The aforesaid matter was also
heard along with the Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 filed
by Sarup Singh and Gurdip Singh which was disposed of
by the impugned judgment and order which is under
challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 3568 and 3566 of 2005.
Civil Appeal No. 3567 of 2005
9. In this case, the lands of the appellants were acquired by
Bhatinda Cantonment in the year 1976 and Special Land
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Acquisition Collector of Bhatinda Cantonment gave his
award on 18.06.1979. On an application being filed by the
appellants for reference the same was referred to
Additional District Judge, Bhatinda and it was decided on
31.7.1980. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the
Additional District Judge, Bhatinda appellants filed FRA
No. 412 of 1981 before the High Court which was decided
on 27.07.1983. Still aggrieved, appellants filed Special
Leave Petition No. 6701-23 of 1984 in this Court
culminating in Civil Appeal Nos. 4132-65 of 1986. This
Court on 1.9.1986 decided the aforesaid appeals alongwith
the Civil Appeal Nos. 5142-65 of 1986 and enhanced the
compensation holding that the ends of justice require that
compensation shall be awarded to the appellants at the
rate of Rs. 17/- per sq. yard upto the depth of 500 meter of
the acquired and at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yard
beyond the depth of 500 meters. This Court also held that
consequential payments would also be made on the basis
of the aforesaid rate of compensation. Appellants then filed
their first execution application before the Additional
District Judge for getting said enhanced amount which
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was accordingly ordered vide order dated 9.3.1998 but
with regard to benefits of amended Sections, viz., 23(2) and
28 of the Act, it rejected the prayer of the appellants
holding that since the award of the Collector was given on
18.6.1979 and award of the Court was given on 31.7.1980,
appellants are not entitled to the said benefits.
Respondents then filed revision before the High Court but
the same was dismissed. Respondents then filed appeals
before this Court and vide order dated 12.7.99, the matter
was directed to be filed before the High Court.
10.All the above-mentioned three appeals were listed for
hearing and we heard the learned counsel appearing for
the parties who have ably taken us through all the relevant
documents on record and also placed before us the various
decisions which may have a bearing on the issues raised in
the present appeals.
11.On the basis of the arguments advanced before us the
following issues arise for our consideration: -
a) Whether the benefit of enhancement in the rate of
solatium and interest as introduced by the
Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be given to such
of the claimants whose cases for payment of
8
compensation were finalized prior to coming into force
of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 98 of 1984?
AND
b) Whether the judgment and order given by the High
Court enhancing the quantum of compensation by
giving benefit of enhanced solatium from 15 per cent
to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9 per
cent per annum in view of the Amendment Act of 68
of 1984 could be negated by the Court of Additional
District Judge, Bhatinda while acting as an Executing
Court and whether the Executing Court of Additional
District Judge, Bhatinda could go behind the
judgment and decree passed by the High Court?
12.In order to answer the aforesaid two issues which arise for
our consideration, we need to point out that the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be amended by virtue of the
Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The said amendment became
effective from 24.09.1984. By the aforesaid Amendment Act
of 68 of 1984, amendments were brought in to the
provisions of Section 23, in that provisions of Sub-Section
23 1(A) and Sub-Section 23 (2) were inserted and added,
which read as follows: -
“Section 23 - Matters to be considered in determining
compensation […]
[…] [(1A) In addition to the market value of the land
above provided, the Court shall in every case award
an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum
per annum on such market-value for the period
commencing on and from the date of the publication of
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the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in
respect of such land to the date of the award of the
Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,
whichever is earlier.
Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in
this sub-section, any period or periods during which
the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were
held up on account of any stay or injunction by the
order of any court shall be excluded.
(2) In addition to the market-value of the land as
above provided, the court shall in every case award a
sum of [thirty per centum on such market-value, in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the
acquisition.]”
13.Similarly, an amendment was brought in to the provisions
of Section 34 by way of Amendment Act of 68 of 1984,
which deals with the quantum of compensation of interest
to be paid to the claimants. In the said section interest
became payable on amendment at 9 per cent per annum
for the period of first one year from the date on which
possession was taken, and thereafter, at the rate of 15 per
cent per annum on expiry of the period of one year on the
amount of compensation. The aforesaid amendment was
made effective by the amending Act of 68 of 1984 from
24.09.1984.
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14.We may also refer to the provisions in Sub-Sections 30 (1)
& 30 (2) of the Act of 68 of 1984 regarding application of
the provisions of the aforesaid amendment to proceedings
pending on or after 30.04.1982 which read as follows: -
“30. Transitional Provisions –
(1) The Provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of
the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section
15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to
have applied, also to, and in relation to:
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land
th
under the principal Act pending on the 30 day of
April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of
the People], in which no award has been made by the
Collector before that date.
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land
under the principal Act commenced after that date,
whether or not an award has been made by the
Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and
Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause
(b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act
respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to
have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award
made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed
by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
any such award under the provisions of the principal
th
Act after the 30 day of April, 1982 [the date of
introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,
1982, in the House of the People] and before the
commencement of this Act..”
11
15.The aforesaid amended provisions and their application
came to be considered in various decisions of this Court.
Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of
Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs.
Etc. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754 . This Court in the
aforesaid case was called upon to determine as to which
awards, references and/or appeals would be entitled to
avail of the enhanced rates of interest by virtue of the
Amendment of 1984. In adjudicating the matter, this Court
clearly held that the award made by the Collector under
Section 11 of the Act made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984, i.e., the dates of introduction of the Land Acquisition
Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People and that
of commencement of operation of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 respectively, will be entitled to the
enhanced rates under the Amendment. This Court also
held that an award made by the Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on
a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of
the Act between the aforesaid dates would also be entitled
to the same, even though it be upon reference from an
12
award made before 30-4-1982,. in which this Court held
as follows: -
“31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to
be clear that the award made by the Collector
referred to here is the award made by the Collector
under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award
made by the Court is the award made by the Principal
Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of
the parent Act on a reference made to it by the
Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There
can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced
solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an
award made by the Collector between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced
solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of
an award made by the Court between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, even though it be upon reference from an
award made before 30-4-1982.
On the question of appeals to the High Court or Supreme
Court, however, this Court adopted a different stand. It held:-
32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words
“or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court on appeal against any such award?” Are they
limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals
against an award of the Collector or the Court made
between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, or do they include
also, as contended by the respondents, appeals
disposed of between 30-4-1982 and September
24,1984 even though arising out of awards of the
Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are
of opinion that the interpretation placed by the
appellants should be preferred over that suggested by
the respondents. The submission on behalf of the
respondents is that the words ‘any such award’
mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and
carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this
13
context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order
in appeal is an appellate order made between 30-4-
1982 and 24-9-1984 — in which case the related
award of the Collector or of the Court may have been
made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words ‘any
such award’ cannot bear the broad meaning
suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. […]
The words ‘any such award’ are intended to have
deeper significance, and in the context in which those
words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are
intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or
Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other
words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends
the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where
the award by the Collector or by the Court is made
between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or to appeals
against such awards decided by the High Court and
the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High
Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-
1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the
award by the Collector or by the Court should have
been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 […]
[T]o our mind it must necessarily intend that the
appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in
which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be
given, must be confined to an appeal against an
award of the Collector or of the Court rendered
between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.
[...] 34. Learned counsel for the respondents has
strenuously relied on the general principle that the
appeal is a rehearing of the original matter, but we
are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking
that principle. [...] If the proceeding has terminated
with the award of the Collector or of the Court made
between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of
Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made
between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding
has passed to the stage of appeal before the High
Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when
the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in
every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court
14
must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984.”
16.This decision of the Court, passed by a Bench of 5 Judges,
squarely applies to the appeals in this case, and makes it
amply clear that the award of the Land Acquisition
Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must have been
made between the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e., between
30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.
17.The applicability of the Amendment Act to a proceeding of
the aforesaid nature was made clear by the Act of 18 of
1984 by enacting the provision of Section 30(2). In all the
appeals before us, the award of the Collector and that of
the reference court in their case was passed prior to
30.04.1982. Therefore, the said amendment brought in by
the Act of 18 of 1984 to the concerned provisions could not
have been made applicable to the proceeding of the present
cases. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the High
Court giving the benefit provided by under the Amendment
Act of 68 of 1984, viz., Section 23(1A) and 23(2) and the
amended provision of Section 34 of the Act, cannot be
made applicable in the cases of the appellants herein.
15
18.In so far as the second issue is concerned, it is true that
the executing court cannot go behind the decree and grant
interest not granted in the decree as submitted by the
counsel appearing for the appellants in the light of the
decision rendered by this Court in State of Punjab &
Others v. Krishan Dayal Sharma reported in AIR 1990
SC 2177 .
19.But, if a decree is found to be nullity, the same could be
challenged and interfered with at any subsequent stage,
say, at the execution stage or even in a collateral
proceeding. This is in view of the fact that if a particular
Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or
making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court
would be without jurisdiction and the same is non-est and
void ab initio .
20.The aforesaid position is well-settled and not open for any
dispute as the defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very root
and authority of the Court to pass decree which cannot be
cured by consent or waiver of the parties. This Court in
several decisions has specifically laid down that validity of
any such decree or order could be challenged at any stage.
16
In Union of India v. Sube Ram & Others reported in
(1997) 9 SCC 69 this court held thus:
“5. […] here is the case of entertaining the application
itself; in other words, the question of jurisdiction of
the court. Since the appellate court has no power to
amend the decree and grant the enhanced
compensation by way of solatium and interest under
Section 23(2) and proviso to Section 28 of the Act, as
amended by Act 68 of 1984, it is a question of
jurisdiction of the court. Since courts have no
jurisdiction, it is the settled legal position that it is a
nullity and it can be raised at any stage.”
21.In yet another case of Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Others v.
Kashinath Janardhan Trade & Anothers reported in
(1983) 3 SCC 437 this Court has held that when a
Tribunal of limited jurisdiction erroneously assumes
jurisdiction by ignoring a statutory provision and its
consequences in law on the status of parties or by a
decision are wholly unwarranted with regard to the
jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and its validity
can be raised in collateral proceeding.
22.In Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others v. Yadav Sadashiv
Mule (Dead) Through Lrs. & Others reported in (2004) 8
SCC 706 this Court stated thus:
17
“9. The main question which arises for our
consideration is whether the decree passed by the
trial court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our
opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The
distinction between a decree which is void and a
decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in
accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored.
Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a
decree or making an order, a decree or order passed
by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est
and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court
goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very
authority of the court to pass a decree or make an
order. Such defect has always been treated as basic
and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a
court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a
nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be
challenged at any stage, even in execution or
collateral proceedings.”
23.In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs. v.
Jasjit Singh & Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 this
Court stated thus:
“18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court
without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the
grounds on which the decree made which goes to the
root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a
coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is
a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up
whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon
as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of
execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of
jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to
pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or
waiver of the party. ………….”
24.In the present cases the judgment and order passed by the
High Court before the amendment Act of 68 of 1984
became final and binding as no appeal was brought to this
18
Court thereafter. However, consequent to the Amendment
in the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants had filed civil
miscellaneous applications for the grant of 30 per cent
solatium and 9 per cent interest for first year and 15 per
cent interest thereafter. This Court has also held in a
catena of decisions that a decree once passed and which
has become final and binding cannot be sought to be
amended by filing petition under Sections 151 and 152,
C.P.C. In the case of Union of India v. Swaran Singh &
Others reported in (1996) 5 SCC 501 this Court held
thus:-
“8. The question then is whether the High Court has
power to entertain independent applications under
Sections 151 and 152 and enhance solatium and
interest as amended under Act 68 of 1984. This
controversy is no longer res integra. In State of Punjab
v. Jagir Singh and also in a catena of decisions
following thereafter in Union of India v. Pratap Kaur;
State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar;
State of Punjab v. Babu Singh; Union of India v.
Raghubir Singh and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of
Kerala, this Court has held that the Reference Court
or the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
entertain any applications under Sections 151 and
152 to correct any decree which has become final or
to independently pass an award enhancing the
solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984.
Consequently, the award by the High Court granting
enhanced solatium at 30% under Section 23(2) and
interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the date of
taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% till
date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under
Act 68 of 1984 is clearly without jurisdiction and,
therefore, a nullity. The order being a nullity, it can be
challenged at any stage. Rightly the question was
raised in execution. The executing court allowed the
19
petition and dismissed the execution petition. The
High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing
the revision and setting aside the order of the
executing court.”
25.In the case of Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead) by
Lrs. Reported in (1995) 5 SCC 585 held as follows: -
“4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has
considered the scope of the power of the High Court
under Sections 151 and 152, CPC and also under
Section 13-A of the Act. This Court has held that once
the civil court made an award as per law then in force
which became final and that there is no error of law
as on that date. Subsequent amendment does not
give power to the court to amend the decree under
Sections 151 and 152, CPC. This was held in State of
Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar and Union
of India v. Pratap Kaur. In Maharau Srawan Hatkar
case this Court held that the civil court lacked
inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to
entertain an application to award additional benefits
under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The facts
therein were that the award had become final and the
Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-
9-1984. The respondents made an application under
Sections 151 and 152, CPC to award enhanced
solatium and additional benefits etc. and the civil
court allowed and granted the same. In that context,
considering the civil court’s power under Sections 151
and 152, CPC, this Court laid the above law.”
26.In the case of Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. & Another
reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 this Court described the
scope of Section 152, C.P.C. thus:
“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical
or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or
orders of errors arising therein from any accidental
slip or omission. The exercise of this power
contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of
20
its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of
passing effective judicial orders after the judgment,
decree or order. The settled position of law is that
after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the
court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus
being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments,
decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections
contemplated are of correcting only accidental
omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and
mistakes which might have been committed by the
court while passing the judgment, decree or order.
The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the
merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152
for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is
to file appeal or review application. It implies that the
section cannot be pressed into service to correct an
omission which is intentional, however erroneous that
may be. It has been noticed that the courts below
have been liberally construing and applying the
province of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even
after passing of effective orders in the lis pending
before them. No court can, under the cover of the
aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of
its original judgment, decree or order. ………….”
27.There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it has
also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High
Court cannot be taken as precedence for perpetrating such
wrong. In the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Ram
Kumar Mann reported in (1997) 3 SCC 321 held as
follows: -
“3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken
by the High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the
respondent had voluntarily resigned from the service
21
and the resignation was accepted by the Government
on 18-5-1982. On and from that date, the relationship
of employer and the employee between the
respondent and the State ceased and thereafter he
had no right, whatsoever, either to claim the post or a
right to withdraw his resignation which had already
become effective by acceptance on 18-5-1982…The
doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence
of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and
denied equality as some similarly situated persons
had been given the same relief. Article 14 would
apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out
to equals and similarly circumstanced without any
rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The
respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be
given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of
withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was
wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there
was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a
wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing
mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service
and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is
reinstated into the service. Can a similarly
circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14
for reinstatement? The answer is obviously “No”.. A
wrong decision by the Government does not give a
right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or
equality. Two wrongs can never make a right. Under
these circumstances, the High Court was clearly
wrong in directing reinstatement of the respondent by
a mandamus with all consequential benefits.”
28.In the case of State of Bihar & Others v. Kameshwar
Prasad Singh & Another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 this
Court held thus: -
“30. The concept of equality as envisaged under
Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept
22
which cannot be enforced in a negative manner...
Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or
illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the
plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High
Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465, para 9)
“Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within
the equality clause this concept nor Article 226
empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of
equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it
shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate
an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending
similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on
equality clause is upheld, it must be established by
the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has
been denied to him, while it has been extended to
others and in this process there has been a
discrimination.”
Again in Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat
Mal Jain reported in 1996 (7) SCALE 135 this Court
considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and
reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality
holding: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 28)
“Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded
upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to
some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal
premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or
perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised.
In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to
perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold
that the High Court was clearly in error in directing
the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.”
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31. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann this
Court observed: (SCC p. 322, para 3)
“The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon
existence of an enforceable right. He was
discriminated and denied equality as some similarly
situated persons had been given the same relief.
Article 14 would apply only when invidious
discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly
circumstanced without any rational basis or
relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no
right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief
wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of
resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in
reaching the conclusion that there was invidious
discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to
perpetrate, an employee, after committing
misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service
and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is
reinstated into the service. Can a similarly
circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14
for reinstatement? The answer is obviously ‘No’. In a
converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong
but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for
claiming equality for enforcement of the same order.
As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon
enforceable right to entitle him to the equality
treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision
by the Government does not give a right to enforce the
wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs
can never make a right.”
29.In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, when
we examine the facts of the present cases it is patently
obvious that the reference case and the matter of payment
of compensation to the appellants became final and
binding after the award was passed and the judgment was
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pronounced by the reference court and further by the High
Court and thereafter, no appeal having been filed in this
Court. Such a judgment and decree which has become
final and binding could not have been reopened by the
High Court on the basis of revision applications filed under
Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C.
30.In view of the two issues that we have discussed and
elaborated herein, we are of the considered opinion that
the executing court as also the High Court were justified in
holding that the orders passed by the High Court granting
enhanced solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of
1984 is without jurisdiction and a nullity.
31.We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals. The orders
passed by the executing court and the High Court are
found to be legal, valid and justified. We, accordingly,
dismiss all these appeals, but, we leave the parties to bear
their own costs.
............................................J
[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
............................................J
[ Anil R. Dave ]
25
New Delhi
November 25, 2010.
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