Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1705 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Sarabjit Rick Singh
RESPONDENT:
Union of India
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2007
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1705 OF 2007
[Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 178 of 2007]
S.B. SINHA, J
1. Leave granted.
Introduction
2. The scope and ambit of the provisions of International Treaty
vis-a-vis the Extradition Act, 1962 is involved in the present appeal.
Background Facts
3. Appellant herein is said to be an Indian citizen. He allegedly
holds an Indian Passport. He, however, indisputably is a resident of
United States of America. Allegedly he had been running an event
management company and promoting clubs into organizing
entertainment, cultural events and shows in various parts of the United
States of America for a long time.
4. The Government of the United States of America made a formal
request to the Government of India for his extradition alleging that the
appellant had conspired in aiding and abetting the sale and supply of
MDMA, a controlled substance and other offensive substances. He is
said to be one of the members of a criminal organization involved in
drug trafficking and money laundering. His organization has been
found to be responsible for distributing millions of tablets of MDMA
and laundering millions of dollars in drug proceeds. The organization
is said to have purchased large quantities of MDMA from various
sources in Netherlands and obtained them in USA through couriers and
exchanged them for cash to be distributed to the lower levels of the
organization, who in turn, would sell MDMA to buyers/consumers in
Houston.
5. United States of America is a Treaty State. An Extradition
Treaty was entered into between the Government of the Republic of
India and the Government of the United States of America on or about
21st July, 1999.
Proceedings
6. A warrant of arrest is said to have been issued by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Housing Division for
the arrest of the appellant. Pursuant to the request made by the
Government of the United States of America, he was arrested on 10th
November, 2002. The Government of India in exercise of its power
conferred upon it under Section 5 of the Extradition Act, 1962 (for
short, ’the Act’) made a request to the Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi, to make an enquiry in respect of the alleged
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offences levelled against him. He was produced before the said court.
The documents appended to the formal request for extradition
containing 154 pages were supplied to him. He was granted an
opportunity to file written statement.
7. On the premise that the said formal request did not satisfy the
requirements of Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty as well as Section 7
of the Act, he filed an application for supply of deficient documents and
requested supply of copies thereof to lead his defence. He also filed an
application for adjourning the case for three weeks to engage a counsel.
According to him, he felt handicapped having not been supplied with
the statute of the US Sec 846. Affidavit affirmed by one Merietta I.
Geckos and enclosed with the extradition request did not contain any
document in support of the statement made in the said affidavit in
which he had stated about the arrest of few alleged co-defendants, but
no arrest memo or transcribes of the alleged conversations with the
appellant which had led to their arrest had been annexed with the
affidavit. His request to supply copies of the documents however, was
declined by the learned Magistrate by an order dated 1st April, 2003.
8. Extradition enquiry was directed to proceed only on the
documents filed by the respondent in the trial court subject to all legal
consequences. By reason of an order dated 4th February, 2004 the
learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate recommended the
extradition of the appellant to United States of America. A writ petition
filed thereagainst by the appellant questioning the legality and validity
of the said order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has
been dismissed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court by reason
of the impugned judgment.
Contentions
9. Mr. Viswanathan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, inter alia, would submit that having regard to the
fundamental right of the appellant as envisaged under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, it was obligatory on the part of the learned
Magistrate as also of the High Court to pass an order of extradition on
the basis of the material which would constitute ’evidence’ and as some
of the documents upon which the reliance was placed by the respondent
did not satisfy the requirement of the said term within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Act, the impugned judgment must be held to be
perverse and in any event suffers from procedural irregularities.
10. The learned counsel would urge that the purported affidavits of
the accomplice, Michael Ryan ’O’ Mealey and Alan Lane Lackley, who
have presumably been granted pardon could not have been relied upon
by the learned Magistrate as ’evidence’ for forming the basis for
directing his extradition without corroboration thereof in material
particulars. Summary of evidence disclosed by Mr. Keith Brown did
not satisfy the statutory requirement of Section 7 of the Act which
postulates an enquiry by the Magistrate into the case in the same
manner as if the case were one triable by a Court of Session or High
Court which would mean the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1898 being incorporated by reference in Section 7 of the Act
would apply.
11. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 repealing and replacing
the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Mr. Vishwanathan submitted,
cannot be said to have any application whatsoever under the new Code
as the Magistrate has no power to discharge and only remedy available
to an accused facing sessions trial is to file an application for discharge
under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the
Trial judge.
In terms of Section 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
the prosecution had an obligation to produce all such evidence in
support of the prosecution. The same when read into Section 10 of the
Extradition Act would lead to a conclusion that the records of the
criminal case in United States were to be placed before the Magistrate
so as to enable him to apply his mind thereupon so as to form an
opinion that there existed a prima facie case against the appellant for
passing an order of extradition. It is one thing to say, Mr.
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Vishwanathan, would urge, that a document has to be taken in evidence
but it is another thing to say that the contents thereof are received in
evidence without any formal proof. A document by reason of a
provision of a statute, it was submitted, can be taken into evidence but
so as to bring its contents within the meaning of the term "evidence" its
contents must be proved. The failure to produce the document, it was
contended, had disabled the Magistrate from exercising his power under
Section 7 of the Extradition Act. Article 9 of the Indo U.S. Treaty also
casts an obligation to examine the accused for the purpose of enabling
him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him. As despite requests, the documents, being 45 in number, which
had been asked for by the appellant but were not furnished, the
impugned order must be held to be bad in law.
12. Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the Union of India, on the other hand, submitted
that the Magistrate entrusted to make an enquiry for the purpose of
passing an order under Section 7 would be entitled to take into
consideration the documents which had been furnished by the
Government of the United States of America in terms of the bi-lateral
treaty. It was pointed out that the appellant in terms of the provisions of
the said Act as also the bi-partite treaty, although was entitled to lead
evidence in support of his defence as contemplated under the said Act,
failed and/or neglected to do so and in that view of the matter the
Magistrate was justified in passing the order of extradition. Learned
counsel would contend that it was for the Government of India to
satisfy itself to make a fugitive criminal available to the United States
of America by answering the indictment upon satisfying itself inter alia
on the basis of the report to be submitted by the learned Magistrate.
Mr. Malhotra would submit that while making an enquiry in terms of
the provisions of the said Act an accused is not put to trial and the
Magistrate is only required to form a prima facie view on the basis of
the documents supplied in terms of Section 10 of the Act.
The Treaty
13. The Treaty between the Government of Republic of India and the
Government of the United States of America was entered into on 21st
July, 1999. It was published in the official gazette on 14th September,
1999. By reason of Article 1 thereof the Contracting States agreed to
extradite to each other, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, person
who, by the authorities in the Requesting State are formally accused of,
charged with or convicted of an extraditable offence, whether such
offence was committed before or after the entering into force of the
Treaty.
14. Article 2 defines extraditable offenses to mean an offence
punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by deprivation of
liberty, including imprisonment, for a period of more than one year or
by a more severe penalty. An offense shall also be an extraditable one
if it consists of an attempt or a conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting,
counseling or procuring the commission of or being an accessory before
or after the fact to, any offense described in paragraph 1.
15. Article 4 defines political offenses. Clause (2) of Article 4 inter
alia provides that offences related to illegal drugs, shall not be treated to
be political offence.
16. Article 9 provides for extradition procedures and required
documents of which we may immediately notice :-
"Article 9 \026 Extradition Procedures and Required
Documents :-
1. All requests for extradition shall be submitted
through the diplomatic channel.
2. All requests for extradition shall be supported by :
(a) documents, statements, or other types of
information which describe the identity and
probable location of the persons sought ;
(b) information describing the facts of the
offense and the procedural history of the
case ;
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(c) a statement of the provisions of the law
describing the essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is requested ;
(d) a statement of the provisions of the law
describing the punishment for the offense ;
and
(e) the documents, statements, or other types of
information specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of this Article, as applicable.
3. A request for extradition of a person who is sought
for prosecution shall also be supported by :
(a) a copy of the warrant or order of arrest,
issued by a judge or other competent
authority ;
(b) a copy of the charging document, if any, and
(c) such information as would justify the
committal for trial of the person if the
offense had been committed in the
Requested State.
4. A request for extradition relating to a person who
has been convicted of the offense for which
extradition is sought shall also be supported by :
(a) a copy of the judgment of conviction or, if
such copy is not available, a statement by a
judicial authority that the person has been
convicted ;
(b) information establishing that the person
sought is the person to whom the conviction
refers ;
(c) a copy of the sentence imposed, if the
person sought has been sentenced, and a
statement establishing to what extent the
sentence has been carried out ; and
(d) in the case of a person who has been
convicted in absentia, the documents
required in paragraph 3."
17. Article 10 provides that the documents accompanying an
extradition request shall be received and admitted as evidence in
extradition proceedings if in the case of a request from the United
States, they are certified by the principal diplomatic or principal
counsular officer of the Republic of India resident in the United States
or they are certified or authenticated in any other manner accepted by
the laws in the Requested State.
18. Article 17 provides that a person extradited under the Treaty may
not be detained, tried or punished in the Requesting State except for the
offenses enumerated therein.
The Act
19. The Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to
extradition of fugitive criminals and to provide for the matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.
It is a special statute.
20. "Extradition treaty" has been defined in Section 2(d) to mean a
treaty or agreement made by India with a foreign State relating to the
extradition of fugitive criminals, and includes any treaty or agreement
relating to the extradition of fugitive criminals made before the 15th day
of August, 1947, which extends to, and is binding on, India. "Fugitive
criminal" has been defined in Section 2(f) to mean an individual who is
accused or convicted of an extradition offence committed within the
jurisdiction of a foreign State or a commonwealth country and is, or is
suspected to be, in some part of India. Section 4 occurring in Chapter II
of the Act provides for requisition for surrendering of fugitive criminal
of a foreign State. It also provides for the manner in which such
requisition is to be made. When such a requisition is made in terms of
Section 5 of the Act, the Central Government may, if it thinks fit, issue
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an order to any Magistrate who would have had jurisdiction to inquire
into the offence, if it had been an offence committed within the local
limits of his jurisdiction, directing him to inquire into the case. Section
6 empowers the Magistrate to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
fugitive criminal on receipt of the order of Central Government.
21. Section 7 provides for the procedure required to be followed
when a requisition for extradition is made by Treaty-State which reads
as under :-
"Section 7 - Procedure before Magistrate
(1) When the fugitive criminal appears or is brought
before the Magistrate, the Magistrate shall inquire into
the case in the same manner and shall have the same
jurisdiction and powers, as nearly as may be, as if the
case were one triable by a Court of Session or High
Court.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
provisions, the Magistrate shall, in particular, take such
evidence as may be produced in support of the requisition
of the foreign State and on behalf of the fugitive criminal,
including any evidence to show that the offence of which
the fugitive criminal accused or has been convicted is an
offence of political character or is not an extradition
offence.
(3) If the Magistrate is of opinion that a prima facie case
is not made out in support of the requisition of the
foreign State, he shall discharge the fugitive criminal.
(4) If the Magistrate is of opinion that a prima facie case
is made out in support of the requisition of the foreign
State, he may commit the fugitive criminal to prison to
await the orders of the Central Government and shall
report the result of his inquiry to the Central
Government, and shall forward together with such report,
and written statement which the fugitive criminal may
desire to submit for the consideration of the Central
Government."
22. Section 10 deals with the receipt in evidence of exhibit,
depositions and other documents and authentication thereof in the
following terms :-
"Section 10 - Receipt in evidence of exhibit depositions
and other documents and authentication thereof
(1) In any proceedings against a fugitive criminal of a
foreign State under this chapter, exhibits and depositions
(whether received or taken in the presence of the person
against whom they are used or not) and copies thereof
and official certificates of facts and judicial documents
stating facts may, if duly authenticated, be received as
evidence.
(2) Warrants, depositions or statement on oath which
purport to have been issued or taken by any Court of
Justice outside India or copies thereof, certificates of, or
judicial documents stating the facts of conviction before
any such Court shall be deemed to be duly authenticated
if--
(a) the warrant purports to be signed by a Judge.
Magistrate or officer of the State where the same was
issued or acting in or of such State ;
(b) the depositions of statements or copies thereof
purport to be certified under the hand of a Judge,
Magistrate or officer of the State where the same were
taken or acting in or for such State, to be original
depositions or statements or to be true copies thereof,
as the case may require ;
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(c) the certificate of, or judicial document stating the
fact of, a conviction purports to be certified by a
Judge, Magistrate or officer of the State where the
conviction took place or acting in or for such State ;
(d) the warrants, depositions, statements, copies,
certificates and judicial documents, as the case may
be, are authenticated by the oath of some witness or
by the official seal of a Minister of the State where the
same were issued, taken or given."
Documents
23. The Government of the United States of America made a formal
request on or about 7th January, 2003 for extradition of the appellant
stating that he was wanted to stand trial in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, Housing Division for drug trafficking
and money laundering.
24. It contained a certificate of authentication by the First Secretary
(Consular), Embassy of India, Washington DC in terms of the Treaty.
It also contained a certificate from the Secretary of State certifying that
the documents annexed thereto were under the authority of the
Department of Justice of the United States of America and that such
seal is entitled to full faith and credit. It also contained a certificate of
the Attorney General for the United States of America stating that
Ernestine B. Gilpin, whose name was signed to the accompanying
paper, was at the relevant time was an Associate Director in the Office
of the International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
United States of America. The certificate issued by of Mr. Gilpin reads
as under :-
"CERTIFICATE
I, Ernestine B. Gilpin, Associate Director, Office
of International Affairs, United States Department of
Justice, United States of America, do hereby certify that
the attached affidavit, with attachments, by Marietta I.
Geckos, Senior Trial Attorney, Narcotic and Dangerous
Drug Section, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice, United States of America, is
authentic and was duly executed pursuant to United State
laws. These documents were prepared in connection
with the request for the extradition of Sarabjeet "Rick"
Singh from India.
True copies of these documents are maintained in
the official files of the United States Department of
Justice in Washington, D.C. "
25. One Marietta I. Geckos has affirmed an affidavit stating about :-
i) prosecutor’s background and experience ;
ii) procedural history ;
iii) the charges and potential sentences ;
iv) penalties ;
v) statutory provisions ;
vi) exhibits ; and
vii) his professional opinion on the charges and made his
conclusion as under :-
26. Indictments against the appellant are 27 in number which can
briefly be classified as \026
a) conspiracy
b) possession of drugs ;
c) drug trafficking ;
d) money laundering ; and
e) use of telecommunication facilities for drug trafficking.
Report of the Learned Magistrate
27. Admittedly the learned Magistrate did not find any prima facie
case in regard to Count Nos. 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22 and 23.
Allegations against the Appellant
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28. Documents received from the Government of United States of
America show that the substance recovered and described as MDMA or
ecstasy was 3,4-Methylendeioxymethamphetamine. The chemical
composition of the drug described as MDMA finds place at Serial
No.80 in the schedule. The list also describes MDMA at Serial No.15
as 3,4-Methylendeioxymethamphetamine. The last entry states
"SALTS & PREPARATION OF ABOVE". The article recovered is a
psychotropic substance under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, possession whereof by itself contributes an
offence. The quantity of the drug recovered answers the description of
commercial quantity. In India, an accused found guilty of the
commission of the said offence, may be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years which may extend to
20 years besides fine.
29. The chemical reports also show that the drug is a controlled drug.
Procedure
30. Article 9(3) of the Treaty says that the request for extradition
should be supported by such information as would justify the committal
for trial of the person if the offense had been committed in the
Requested State. Section 7 of the Extradition Act prescribes that the
Magistrate shall inquire into the case in the same manner and shall have
the same jurisdiction and powers, as nearly as may be, as if the same
were one triable by a Court of Sessions or High Court.
31. Difference between incorporation by reference and a mere
citation is now well known in view of the decisions of this Court in
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. B.A. Jayaram and
Ors. [1984 Supp. SCC 244] and Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs.
Vasantrao and Ors. and Jaswantibai and others [(2002) 7 SCC 657].
Incorporation by reference provides for a legislative device where the
legislature instead of repeating the provisions of the statute incorporates
it in another statute.
32. We may, however, notice that in M/s. Girnar Traders vs. State of
Maharashtra and others [2007 (10)) SCALE 391], the question has
been referred to a larger bench. We would, however, proceed on the
assumption that the doctrine of incorporation of reference as said to be
containing in Section 7 of the Act would apply in the instant case. We
may, however, hasten to add that the said Act being a self contained
Code, the provisions thereof must be applied on their own terms.
Application of the Statutory provisions
33. Sections 208 and 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1898
contemplate taking of such evidence as may be produced in support of
the prosecution or on behalf of the accused that may be called for by the
Magistrate. Compliance of the principle of natural justice or the extent
thereof and the requirement of law is founded in the statutory scheme.
The Magistrate is to make an enquiry. He is not to hold a trial. Code of
Criminal Procedure makes a clear distinction between an enquiry,
investigation and trial. Authority of the Magistrate to make an enquiry
would not lead to a final decision wherefor a report is to be prepared.
Findings which can be rendered in the said enquiry may either lead to
discharge of the fugitive criminal or his commitment to prison or make
a report to the Central Government forwarding therewith a written
statement which the fugitive criminal may desire to submit for
consideration of the Central Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 7
envisages taking of such evidence as may be produced in support of the
requisition of the foreign State as also on behalf of the fugitive criminal.
It is open to the fugitive criminal to show that the offence alleged to
have been committed by him is of political character or the offence is
not an extraditable offence. He may also show that no case of
extradition has been made out even otherwise. The Magistrate,
therefore, in both the situations is required to arrive at a prima facie
finding either in favour of fugitive criminal or in support of the
requesting state. [ See Sohan Lal Gupta (dead) through LRs. And
others vs. Asha Devi Gupta (Smt) and others : (2003)7 SCC 492 ].
34. What would constitute "evidence" came up for consideration
before this Court in Ramnarayan Mor and another vs. State of
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Maharashtra [1964] 5 SCR 1064 to hold that the documents also
formed part of the evidence within the meaning of Section 207A (6) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
35. In a proceeding for extradition no witness is examined for
establishing an allegation made in the requisition of the foreign State.
The meaning of the word "evidence" has to be considered keeping in
view the tenor of the Act. No formal trial is to be held. Only a report is
required to be made. The Act for the aforementioned purposes only
confers jurisdiction and powers on the Magistrate which he could have
exercised for the purpose of making an order of commitment. Although
not very relevant, we may observe that in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the powers of the committing Magistrate has greatly
been reduced. He is now required to look into the entire case through a
very narrow hole. Even the power of discharge in the Magistrate at that
stage has been taken away.
36. Law in India recognizes affidavit evidence. (See Order IXX of
the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure). Evidence in a situation of this nature would, thus, in our
opinion mean, which may be used at the trial. It may also include any
document which may lead to discovery of further evidence. Section 3
of the Indian Evidence Act which defines "evidence" in an enquiry
stricto sensu may not, thus, be applicable in a proceeding under the Act.
37. Section 10 of the Act provides that the exhibits and depositions
(whether received or taken in the presence of the person, against whom
they are used or not) as also the copies thereof and official certificates
of facts and judicial documents standing facts may, if duly
authenticated, be received as evidence. Distinction must be borne in
mind between the evidence which would be looked into for its
appreciation or otherwise for a person guilty at the trial and the one
which is required to make a report upon holding an enquiry in terms of
the provisions of the Act. Whereas in the trial, the court may look into
both oral and documentary evidence which would enable him to ask
question in respect of which the accused may offer explanation, such a
detailed procedure is not required to be adopted in an enquiry envisaged
under the said Act. If evidence stricto sensu is required to be taken in
an enquiry forming the basis of a prima facie opinion of the Court, the
same would lead to a patent absurdity. Whereas in a trial the court for
the purpose of appreciation of evidence may have to shift the burden
from stage to stage, such a procedure is not required to be adopted in an
enquiry. Even under the Code of Criminal Procedure existence of
strong suspicion against the accused may be enough to take cognizance
of an offence which would not meet the standard to hold him guilty at
the trial.
38. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Vishwanathan, learned counsel
for the appellant, on Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue
Officer vs. V. Narasaiah : (2001) 3 SCC 530 wherein interpreting
Section 51-A of the Land Acquisition Act this Court held that the
certified copy of a registered sale deed would be admissible in
evidence. The said decision, we may notice, has been approved by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Cement Corporation of India Ltd.
vs. Purya and others: (2004) 8 SCC 270. It may be true that a
document does not prove itself. Its contents, unless admitted, should
be proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act, unless the
contents of the documents are said to be admissible by reason of a
provision of a statute, as for example Section 90 of the Evidence Act.
But what misses the aforementioned submission/contention is that
whereas the contents of the document is to be proved for the purpose of
trial but not for the purpose of arriving at an opinion in regard to
existence of a prima facie case in an enquiry. Strict formal proof of
evidence in an extradition proceeding is not the requirement of law.
While conducting an enquiry the Court may presume that the contents
of the documents would be proved and if proved, the same would be
admitted as evidence at the trial in favour of one party or the other. We,
therefore, are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Vishwanathan that
even at this stage the affidavits by way of evidence of the accomplices
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Michael Ryan ’O’ Mealey and Alan Lane Blackley who had been
arrested and pleaded guilty and had been cooperating with DEA Agent
were required to be excluded from consideration by the learned
Magistrate without any corroboration.
39. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in
Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia and another vs. The State of Bombay:
[1958] SCR 618 wherein this Court upon noticing the decisions of the
Bombay High Court in Queen Empress v. Namdev Satvaji [(1887)
I.L.R. 11 Bom. 372 and of the Allahabad High Court in Lachman v.
Juala : [(1882) I.L.R. 5 All. 161] held that the Magistrate should
commit the accused for trial if he is satisfied that sufficient grounds for
doing so have been made out. It is difficult to apply those crucial words
"sufficient grounds" in an extradition case.
Therein, this Court considering the evidence brought on records,
posed a question as to whether the same constituted a prima facie case,
or that the voluminous evidence adduced therein was so incredible that
no reasonable body of persons could rely upon it.
40. Existence of prima facie case or bringing on record credible
evidence at the stage of commitment is again a requirement of a statute.
Section 7 speaks of manner, the jurisdiction and power of the
Magistrate. It does not set the standard of proof. What is necessary for
passing a judicial order may not stricto sensu be necessary for making a
report.
41. Reliance has also been placed on Rajpal Singh and others vs. Jai
Singh and another : (1970) 2 SCC 206 wherein this Court opined :
"Though the language of Section 209 differs from that in
Section 207A, it is well settled that under neither of them
has the Magistrate the jurisdiction to assess and evaluate
the evidence before him for the purpose of seeing
whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. The
reason obviously is that if he were to do that he would be
trying the case himself instead of leaving it to be tried by
the Sessions Court, which alone has under the Code the
jurisdiction to try it. As stated earlier, both the parties led
evidence. Instead of finding out whether there was
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, what
the Magistrate did was to evaluate the evidence by an
elaborate assessment of it and held, as if he was trying
the case, that between the two versions the evidence of
witnesses examined by the appellants was preferable to
that led by the complainant, that the defence evidence
was more probable and that there were inconsistencies
and improbabilities in the prosecution evidence, and
finally that that evidence was interested and liable,
therefore, to be discarded. There may perhaps be some
force in what the Magistrate has said about the evidence,
but it is clear that there was something which could be
said on both the sides. The Magistrate, therefore, ought to
have left the case for the Sessions Court to decide and
come to its conclusion which of the two rival versions
was acceptable on the facts and circumstances of the
case."
The said decision, thus, is an authority for the proposition that at
that stage the Magistrate was not required to evaluate the evidence so as
to arrive at a finding that the accused is or is not guilty. Evaluation of
evidence or appreciation thereof, in our opinion, is not within the
domain of the Magistrate at that stage.
42. Decision of the Queen’s Bench Division in "Re Tomlin’s
application" disposed of on 18th November, 1994 has been relied upon
to say that the court was under an obligation to see that the evidence of
the witnesses be not unfairly admitted. Queen’s Bench Division therein
excluded the hearsay evidence in regard to the contents of a document.
Contention in regard to unfair admission of the document, however,
was not pursued. The said principle would apply in a case where there
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is no evidence to establish that the crime has been committed by the
defendants or where a judge comes to the conclusion that the
prosecution evidence taken at its face value would not lead to
conviction. Approach of the English Courts is to lay test as in the case
of the submission of the defendant at the end of the prosecution
evidence i.e. end of trial, the defendant would not be called upon either
to explain the prosecution case or to enter into his defence. There may
not be any dispute in regard to the said proposition of law.
43. Consistent view of the courts of India in this behalf, however,
appears to be that an enquiry conducted pursuant to the order of the
Central Government is only to find out whether there was a prima facie
case against the fugitive criminal for extradition to the treaty country.
Mode and manner of enquiry has nothing to do with the rule in regard
to standard of proof. (See Charles Gurmukh Shobhraj vs. Union of
India and others : 1986 RLR 7 : 1986 (29) DLT 410 and Nina Pillai vs.
Union of India : 1997 Crl. L.J. 2359 paragraphs 9 and 11).
44. Counsel for both the parties have relied upon the decision of this
Court in Rosiline George vs. Union of India and others : (1994) 2
SCC 80. This Court therein noticed a commitment of this country to
honour the international obligations arising out of the 1931 treaty. For
the said purpose even the international statute like the Fugitive
Offenders Act, 1881 was held not to be applicable.
Municipal law of the land undoubtedly would apply. Section 10
of the Act provides that the documents are liable to be treated and
received as evidence. What is, therefore, necessary for the purpose
thereof is to supply the copies of the documents to the fugitive criminal.
In Rosiline George this Court held :-:
"41. It is obvious from the plain language of Section 5
of the "Act that the Central Government can direct any
Magistrate to hold inquiry provided the said Magistrate
would have had jurisdiction to inquire into the offence if
it had been an offence committed within the local limits
of his jurisdiction. It is not disputed that the offence
alleged to have been committed by George in the letter of
request by the State of America would, if committed in
the local limits of the Magistrate, have given the
Magistrate jurisdiction to inquire into the same. The Act,
being a special provisions dealing with the extradition of
fugitive criminals, shall exclude from application the
general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. In any case, Section 5 of the said Code gives
overriding effect to the special jurisdiction created under
any special or local laws. Sections 177, 188 and 190 of
the Code have no application to the proceedings under
the Act. We see no force in the contention of the learned
Counsel and reject the same."
Statute 846 issue
45. Mr. Vishwanathan complained that copy of Statute 846 was not
supplied. The effect of the said statute was stated as under :-
" In order to convict a person of conspiracy in
violation of 21 USC 846, the government must prove the
following to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt : First, that two or more persons made
an agreement to commit the crime which is stated to have
been the object of the conspiracy, and second, that the
defendant somehow knew the purpose of the agreement
and joined in it with the intent to further the illegal
purpose. The government need not prove that the alleged
conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that
they directly stated between themselves all the details of
the scheme. Similarly, the government need not prove
that all the details of the scheme were agreed upon or
carried out, nor must it prove that all of the persons
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alleged to have been conspirators were such, or that the
alleged conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing
their unlawful objectives."
In regard thereto, no grievance was made in the High Court. No
ground has also been taken in this behalf in the special leave petition.
No prejudice is shown to have been caused. It might have been better if
the statute itself has been reproduced but then it has clearly been stated
what was required to be proved and what was not required to be proved.
We must bear in mind that the High Court was dealing with a writ
petition filed by the appellant herein under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and not an appeal from the order of the learned
Magistrate.
The superior courts while entertaining a writ petition exercises a
limited jurisdiction of judicial review, inter alia, when
constitutional/statutory protection is denied to a person. But when it is
required to issue a writ of certiorari, the order under challenge should
not undergo scrutiny of an appellate court. Jurisdiction of the superior
court in this behalf being limited inter alia to the question of
jurisdiction, it was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to show that a
jurisdictional error has been committed by the court while exercising
the statutory powers. Contention in regard to prejudice in such a
situation is required to be considered. A person informed in law and
having taken all possible objections evidently knew that non disclosure
of the Statute 846 in verbatim did not prejudice him. Had he been
prejudiced he would have taken the said point at the outset. He did not
do so. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not possible for us to
allow the appellant to raise such a contention for the first time before
us.
Information viz-a-viz Evidence
46. The provisions of a statute, it is trite law, must be harmoniously
construed. When a statute is required to be read with an International
Treaty, consideration of the provisions contained in the latter is also
imperative. On a conjoint reading of Section 7 and Section 10 of the
Act read with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 9 of the Treaty, we are of
the opinion that the word "information" occurring in Section 7 could
not mean an evidence which has been brought it on record upon strict
application of the provisions of the Evidence Act. The term
"information" contained therein has a positive meaning. It may in a
sense be wider than the words "documents and the evidence", but when
a document is not required to be strictly proved upon applying the
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act or when an evidence is not
required to be adduced strictly in terms thereof, the use of the word
"information" in Section 10 of the Extradition Act as also Articles 9(2)
and 9(3) of the Treaty becomes relevant. Documentary evidence, no
doubt form part of a judicial record; but then even in a court governed
by Criminal Procedure Code 1973 documents are to be supplied only
when the cognizance of the offence is taken. At this stage, therefore,
the requirement of sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was not necessary.
Section 10 of the Extradition Act speaks of certification of facts.
Such certification is found in the affidavit of Mr. Gilpin. How such
certificate of fact is to be furnished does not appear from the provisions
of the said Act and the affidavit may serve the said purpose. It is not,
therefore, possible to hold that the report of the learned Magistrate is
vitiated on the premise that he has failed to apply a mandatory
provision thereof.
Jurisdictional Issue
47. Section 208 of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure is not
required to be applied in its entirety. The said provision were required
to be applied as far as practicable. The provisions of the Act confer
power and jurisdiction upon the Magistrate as the case is not brought
before it by the prosecutor or the complainant, but an enquiry is
entrusted to the designated court by the Central Government. A power
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was, therefore, required to be conferred under a statute to the
Magistrate, so that, it may have the requisite power and jurisdiction to
make an enquiry. Its function are quasi judicial in nature; its report
being not a definitive order. Further section does not stop at that. It
refers to the committal proceeding only for the manner in which the
same is to be conducted. While a court would commit an accused in
terms of Section 208, it was required to arrive at a finding for the said
purpose. It postulates that a finding has to be arrived at only for the
purpose of discharge of an accused or his extradition upon formation of
a prima facie view. The legal principle in this behalf has clearly been
laid down in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 7 of the Extradition
Act. The said sub-sections cannot be ignored. Unlike Section 208 of
the Code, no witnesses need be examined and cross-examined. If the
State has been able to prima facie establish that a case has been made
out for bringing an accused to trial, it will be for the accused to show
that no such case is made out of the offences complained or for
extradition.
48. In a case of this nature the second part of Section 10 of the Act
would apply which does not contemplate production of any oral
evidence by the Central Government. No fact needs to be proved by
evidence. What is necessary is to arrive at a prima facie case finding
that a case has been made out for extradition from the depositions,
statements, copies and other informations which are to be gathered from
the official certification of facts and judicial documents that would
include the indictment by the Grand Jury.
49. Section 10 of the Act provides as to what would be received in
evidence. The marginal note although may not be relevant for
rendition of decisions in all types of cases but where the main
provision is sought to be interpreted differently, reference to marginal
note would be permissible in law. [See Deewan Singh and Ors. vs.
Rajendra Pd. Ardevi and Ors. 2007 (1) SCALE 32]
50. The use of the terminology ’evidence’ in Section 7 of the Act
must be read in the context of Section 10 and not d’hors the same. It
is trite that construction of a statute should be done in a manner which
would give effect to all its provisions.
In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424] this Court stated:
"...If a statute is looked at, in the context of its
enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker,
provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at
without the glasses provided by the context. With
these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole
and discover what each section, each clause, each
phrase and each word is meant and designed to say
as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act...."
[See also Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs . Pure
Industrial Cock and Chem. Ltd. and others : AIR 2007 SC 2458]
Section 7 of the Act should not be read, thus, in isolation and the
literal interpretation, as was sought to be resorted to by Mr.
Viswanathan, would render the statute unworkable. See M/s. Girnar
Traders (supra)
The Act is a special statute. It shall, therefore, prevail over the
provisions of a general statute like the Code of Criminal Procedure.
All the evidences envisaged under Section 10 of the Act have
been produced before the learned Magistrate. The statute speaks of
information specified therein to be the evidence for the purpose of the
provisions of the said Act.
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The term "information" although is of wide import, must be read
in the context of which it has been used.. Information may include
statement which falls short of confession as well as statement which
amounts to confession. [See R.V. Babulal ILR 6 All 509 at 537]
In Commissioner of Income Tax vs. A. Raman and Co. [AIR
1968 SC 49], the expression ’information’ has been held to mean
instruction or knowledge derived from an external concerning facts or
particulars, or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment.
We may also notice that in Hirachand Kothari vs. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 1985 SC 998] this Court held that a statement by the
referee as to the truth or otherwise regarding a question in a dispute,
when the court needs information on such question, is information.
51. Section 10 of the Act clearly provides that any exhibit or
deposition which may be received in evidence need not be taken in the
presence of the person against whom they are used or otherwise. It also
contemplates the copies of such exhibits and depositions and official
certificates of facts and judicial documents stating facts would, if duly
authenticated, be received as evidence.
52. We, therefore, are of the opinion that an information need not be
a documentary evidence or an oral evidence as is understood under the
Indian Evidence Act.
53. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no
case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.
The appeal is dismissed.