Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 641 of 1998
PETITIONER:
State of Madhya Pradesh
RESPONDENT:
Sanjay Rai
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/03/2004
BENCH:
DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
State of Madhya Pradesh calls in question legality of
the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court directing acquittal of the respondent by
upsetting judgment of conviction recorded by the Trial
Court. The Trial Court found the respondent (hereinafter
referred to as ’the accused’) guilty of offences punishable
under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ’the
IPC’) and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and a fine
of Rs.200/- in addition to sentence of three years RI
imposed for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and
fine of Rs.200/- with default stipulation for fines.
Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
Anita Bai (hereinafter referred to as the ’deceased’)
was married to the accused on 14.12.1990 at Allahabad (U.P.)
whereafter she came to Dhanpuri along with the accused on
15.12.1990. Anita Bai died on 25.12.1990 at Dhanpuri in her
room in their house. Written report about the incident
(Ex.P-14) was lodged by the accused at P.S. Amlai, District
Shahdol on 25.12.1990 at about 11.40 p.m. It was reported
in Ex.P-14 by accused Sanjay Rai that he had gone to the
house of one Rajendra Sharma and had returned from there at
about 9.00 p.m. and went to his room. The room was bolted
from inside. On being pushed, the latch fell down and the
door opened. He found that his wife, deceased, was hanging
from the bolt of the almirah, upon which he caught hold of
her by the waist and called his father, who cut the piece of
cloth by which she was hanging. Thereafter, Dr. Gautam (PW-
1) and Dr. Pathak (PW-2) were called, who advised them to
take Anita to the hospital where she was declared dead. On
the basis of the above report, FIR (Ex.P-15) was recorded.
Inquest report was made and dead body was sent for post-
mortem examination which was conducted by two doctors (PW-6
and PW-12). Four injuries were found on the dead body of the
deceased.
The investigating officer made a query from the doctor
as to whether in case of hanging, ligature marks may be
absent. The doctor gave opinion that even in case of hanging
ligature marks may be absent and the presence of ligature
marks would depend upon the nature of ligature and the time
for hanging. It was also found that asphyxia could have
resulted even if the body was hanging by a piece of cloth
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which was cut immediately after the hanging. During
investigation, it came to light that the respondent-accused
and his parents who also faced trial with the accused were
treating the deceased with cruelty on account of unfulfilled
demand of dowry. Initially, the investigation started on the
background of offence relatable to Section 306 read with
Section 34 IPC. On completion of investigation, charge sheet
was placed and the respondent-accused and his parents faced
trial. They pleaded innocence.
The accused persons faced trial for alleged commission
of offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B and 201 IPC.
All the three accused persons including respondent were
found not guilty of offences relatable to Sections 302 and
201 IPC. The parents of the respondent were also found to be
not guilty of offence relatable to Section 302 IPC. So far
as respondent is concerned, the conviction was made, as
afore-noted and sentences imposed.
An appeal was preferred by the State before the High
Court which by the impugned judgment held the respondent-
accused to be not guilty. It was found that the case was
based merely on circumstantial evidence and there was no
clinching material to substantiate all or any of the
continuous link of incriminating circumstances and show that
the respondent was guilty of the alleged offences. Several
factors were taken note of. Firstly, the respondent-accused
and his father immediately after the occurrence called the
doctors PW-1 and PW-2. There was no motive for killing as
the alleged demand of dowry was not established and for that
reason the Trial Court itself had directed acquittal of the
accused persons from the allegations relatable to Section
304B. The High Court also noted that there was no evidence
of any strangulation, as was held to have been done by the
respondent-accused. The Trial Court wile discarding the
evidence of the doctor referred to some authorities to
discard the evidence of the doctor. Holding the evidence to
be not sufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused,
acquittal was directed.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant-State submitted that the Trial Court had analysed
the evidence in its proper perspective and had held the
accused to be guilty. The High Court was not justified in
holding that the circumstances were not sufficient to
establish guilt of the accused. The circumstances presented
unerringly pointed out at the guilt of the accused.
In response, Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior advocate
for the respondent submitted that the Trial Court had
proceeded on surmises and conjectures and, therefore, the
High Court was justified in directing acquittal.
It has been consistently laid down by this Court that
where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt
of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan
AIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad
(AIR 1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka
(AIR 1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR
1985 SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987
SC 350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989
SC 1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to
the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond
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reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely
connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from
those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR
1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends
upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative
effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the
innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond
any reasonable doubt.
We may also make a reference to a decision of this
Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996
(10) SCC 193), wherein it has been observed thus:
"In a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the settled law is that the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is drawn should be fully proved and
such circumstances must be conclusive in
nature. Moreover, all the circumstances
should be complete and there should be no gap
left in the chain of evidence. Further the
proved circumstances must be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused and totally inconsistent with his
innocence....".
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the
following tests:
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt
is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite
tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability the crime
was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only
be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should
be inconsistent with his innocence.
In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.
L.J. 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken
in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence
relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also
pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found
to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of
all the facts so established must be consistent only with
the hypothesis of guilt.
Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills’
Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the
following rules specially to be observed in the case of
circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis
of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond
reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2)
the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the
existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability;
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(3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial
evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature
of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of
guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon
any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5)
if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted".
There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely
on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the
touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid
down by the this Court as far back as in 1952.
In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed
thus:
"It is well to remember that in cases
where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
in the first instance be fully established
and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. Again, the
circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused."
A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC
1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence,
it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove
that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in
prosecution cannot merely be cured by false defence or plea.
The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before
conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must
be fully established. They are:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned must or should and not may be
established;
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that
is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved; and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so compete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
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The only circumstance which the Trial Court relied upon
to hold guilt was by referring to some text books on medical
jurisprudence. With reference to them it was held that case
of strangulation was clearly made out.
It cannot be said that the opinions of these authors
were given in regard to circumstances exactly similar to
those which arose in the case now before us nor is this a
satisfactory way of dealing with or disposing of the
evidence of an expert examined in this case unless the
passages which are sought to be relied to discredit his
opinion are put to him. This Court in Sunderlal v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 28), disapproved of Judges
drawing conclusions adverse to the accused by relying upon
such passages in the absence of their being put to medical
witnesses. Similar view was expressed in Bhagwan Das and
another v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1957 SC 589). Though
opinions expressed in text books by specialist authors may
be of considerable assistance and importance for the Court
in arriving at the truth, cannot always be treated or viewed
to be either conclusive or final as to what such author says
to deprive even a Court of law to come to an appropriate
conclusion of its own on the peculiar facts proved in a
given case. In substance, though such views may have
persuasive value cannot always be considered to be
authoritatively binding, even to dispense with the actual
proof otherwise reasonably required of the guilt of the
accused in a given case. Such opinions cannot be elevated to
or placed on higher pedestal than the opinion of an expert
examined in Court and the weight ordinarily to which it may
be entitled to or deserves to be given.
Apart from that, even if on the hypothetical basis it
is held that doubt could arise on the basis of
strangulation, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever to
connect the respondent-accused with the act of
strangulation, the conclusions of the Trial Court could not
have been maintained and the High Court which is entitled to
re-appreciate the evidence could and has rightly discarded
it.
There is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered
with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which
is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The
paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that
miscarriage of justice is prevented. No doubt a miscarriage
of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is
no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case
where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon
the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining
as to whether any of the accused really committed any
offence or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2002 (2) Supreme 567). The principle to be
followed by Appellate Court considering the appeal against
the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there
are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so in order
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to prevent miscarriage of justice resulting therefrom. If
the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant
and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated
in the process, it would be a compelling reason for
interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court
in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
(AIR 1973 SC 2622), Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat (1996 (4) Supreme 167), Jaswant Singh v. State of
Haryana (2000 (3) Supreme 320), Raj Kishore Jha v. State of
Bihar and Ors. (2003 (7) Supreme 152), State of Punjab v.
Karnail Singh (2003 (5) Supreme 508), State of Punjab v.
Pohla Singh and Anr. (2003 (7) Supreme 17) and Suchand Pal
v. Phani Pal and Anr. (JT 2003 (9) SC 17). In our view no
such error can be said to have been committed by the High
Court, nor any other infirmity to undermine the legality and
propriety of the findings of the High Court, warranting our
interference has been substantiated, in this case.
The inevitable result of this appeal is dismissal,
which we direct.