Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 619
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5245 OF 2024
SHANMUGAM @ LAKSHMINARAYANAN …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS .... RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2024
M. MURUGANANDAM …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
THROUGH THE REGISTRAR GENERAL .... RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2025
(@ Crl. A. Diary No. 45480 of 2024)
S. AMAL RAJ …. APPELLANT
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2025.05.02
16:58:09 IST
Reason:
2
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of
2024 is admitted.
2. The three appellants before us namely, Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan in Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024
(Contemnor No. 4 before the High Court), M. Muruganandam in
Criminal Appeal No. 4219 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 3 before the
High Court) and S. Amal Raj in Criminal Appeal arising out of
Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 7
before the High Court) stand convicted by the High Court for
committing contempt of Court and have been sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The
appellants have called in question the legality and validity of
the judgment and order of the High Court in the present
appeals.
3
FACTUAL MATRIX
3 . The District Munsiff Court, Tiruchengode passed a decree
dated 17.11.2004 in O.S. No. 212 of 2000 in favour of J.K.K.
1
Rangammal Charitable Trust ordering recovery of possession
and arrears of rent from the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3. The
Contemnors preferred appeal suits which were dismissed. The
Decree Holder preferred Execution Petition and when the Court
Amin went to execute the decree to effect delivery of
possession on 17.04.2018 the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 produced
interim orders passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P.
Nos. 1467 – 1469 of 2018 staying the decree.
3.1. The Decree Holder applied and obtained the copies of
the said orders produced by the Contemnors in Execution
Petition Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 2014 and also entered caveat
before the High Court. On verification, it was found, the said
orders produced before the Execution Court were fraudulently
created by committing forgery and impersonation in the name
of the Judge of the High Court of Madras.
1
“Decree Holder”
4
3.2 . The Decree Holder submitted a complaint to the High
Court and Superintendent of Police, Namakkal District on
03.05.2018 and 15.05.2018 respectively. The Registrar
General, High Court, forwarded the complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Namakkal on 18.07.2018.
The Decree Holder then preferred W.P. No. 22410 of 2018
before the High Court to direct the Superintendent of Police,
Namakkal to take action on the complaint dated 15.05.2018. In
the meanwhile, First Information Report in Crime No. 8 of 2018
was registered by the District Crime Branch, Namakkal for
offences under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal
2
Code, 1860 against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3/Judgment
Debtors. The writ petition was disposed of on 05.09.2018
directing the registry to place the matter before the Division
Bench, dealing with the criminal contempt matters, after
obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, for
the Division Bench to proceed with the matter in terms of
Section 15 (1) read with Section 18 (1) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The Superintendent of Police, Namakkal
2
‘IPC’
5
District, was also directed to monitor the investigation in DCB
Crime No. 8 of 2018.
3.3 . On 10.09.2018, the Contemnor No. 4/Shanmugam @
3
Lakshminarayanan was arrested by the District Crime Branch,
Namakkal and he made a statement about the manner in which
the fake order copies were prepared with the help of
4
Contemnor No. 6/P. Meiyappan in a Digital Net Centre at
Bhavani.
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3.4 . On 11.09.2018, Contemnor No. 3/M. Muruganandam
was arrested. He disclosed the manner in which the fraudulent
order copies were obtained by the Contemnor No. 4 and
Contemnor No. 7. The District Crime Branch, Namkkal
completed the investigation and submitted a report on
14.08.2019 in C.C. No. 537 of 2020 before the Judicial
Magistrate, Komarapalayam against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5.
3.5 . On account of the case bundle relating to W.P. No.
22410 of 2018 missing in the Registry, the criminal contempt
was not numbered from 2018 to 2022. On the Division Bench
being informed regularly, the bundle was traced, and the
3
‘C4’
4
‘C6’
5
‘C3’
6
contempt petition was numbered as 2493 of 2022. Initially,
statutory notice was issued to the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5 and
thereafter to the Contemnor No. 6 and Contemnor No. 7 when
they were also found to be involved in the process of
preparation of the fake order of the High Court. Since the
Contemnor nos. 1 and 2 died during proceedings, the same
stood abated against them.
3.6 . The Division Bench framed charges against
Contemnor Nos. 1, 3, 4 & 5 on 19.12.2022 to the following
effect:
“Since S. Sundaram (2nd contemnor) has died, no
charge could be framed against him.
st
2.That, you, Angamuthu (1 contemnor),
rd
Muruganandam (3 contemnor), Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan (4th contemnor) and
Thangamani (5th contemnor) along with the
deceased Sundaram submitted the photocopies of
the following three fake orders of this Court, all
dated 12.03.2018 to the bailiff, when he came for
executing the decree as set out above.
i.C.R.P.No.1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018
ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of
2018
The above three orders appear to have been
passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa
Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the
records of the Registry show that no such Civil
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Revision Petitions were even filed, and the said
Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on
12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these
three orders have been fabricated.”
3.7 . Basing the affidavits filed by the Contemnor Nos. 1
and 3 to 5, during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the
High Court suo motu impleaded Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 on the
ground that the material available on record including the police
report revealed that these two contemnors are also involved in
the preparation and handing over of the fake High Court’s
orders to the litigants, Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5. Accordingly,
charges were framed by the High Court on 16.04.2024 against
the Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 as under:
“That, you, P. Meiyappan (6th contemnor) and S.
Amal Raj (7th contemnor) along with Contemnor
Nos.3 to 5, including the deceased, P. Angamuthu
and S. Sundaram, created fake orders of this
Court, all dated 12.03.2018 and aided in producing
it to the bailiff, when he came for executing the
decree as set out in the order dated 19.12.2022:
i. C.R.P.No. 1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of
2018
ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of
2018
The above three orders appear to have been
passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa
Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the
records of the Registry show that no such Civil
8
Revision Petitions were even filed and the said
Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on
12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these
three orders have been fabricated.
The above act of yours prima facie attracts Section
2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which
is punishable under Section 12, ibid., in that, by
submitting the aforesaid three photocopies of the
orders of this Court, you have interfered with the
administration of justice, in the execution of
proceedings before the District Munsif,
Tiruchengode”
3.8 . The Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5 preferred Crl. O.P. No.
17492 of 2023 for reinvestigation/fresh investigation of the
crime registered against them. The Division Bench passed an
order on 21.09.2023 directing the DGP to form a Special Team
whereupon the DGP transferred the investigation to CBCID
(OCU) and renumbered as Crime No. 2 of 2023. A detailed
investigation was carried out by CBCID, and voluminous
incriminating materials were collected against the Contemnor
Nos. 4 to 6.
6
3.9 . P. Meiyappan/Contemnor No. 6 and S. Amal
7
Raj/Contemnor No. 7 were also arrested by the CBCID. The
statement of two witnesses namely, Thangaraj and Shanthi was
recorded under Section 164(5) of Cr. P. C. before the Judicial
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‘C6’
7
‘C7’
9
Magistrate No. II, Namakkal. Sample voices of C3 and C4 were
also recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for
comparison with the cell phone conversation held between
them. CBCID filed first status report in the contempt petition on
18.10.2023 and also verified the record relating to C.R.P. Nos.
1467 – 1469 of 2018. The material objects were recovered
from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani and sent to the Tamil
8
Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory . The CBCID filed second
status report in the contempt petition on 19.12.2023 and
thereafter third status report was filed on 12.02.2024. Basing
above status reports, C6 & C7 were impleaded .
3.10 . In his affidavit in response to the contempt notice,
the C3 admitted that in the Execution case he and other
tenants were guided by C4 to prefer revision before the High
Court. According to him, the Judgment Debtor, in three suits,
paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for preferring revision. On the
relevant date his wife handed over the copy of bogus interim
order to the Court Amin which was given to him by C4 through
one Mr. P. Meiyappan. He categorically states that since C4 was
handling his case for the last two decades, there was no
8
‘FSL’
10
occasion to doubt the genuineness of the High Court order.
When he contacted C4, he stated that one Mr. Thangapandian,
advocate had given the said order to him. This conversation
was recorded in the automated Samsung android phone. He
had given transcript of the conversation between him and C4 to
the police along with the certificate under Section 65-B (4) of
the Evidence Act, 1872.
3.11 . The High Court after considering the materials and
the submissions made by the appellants found that the three
appellants are responsible in preparation of the bogus High
Court interim orders and have accordingly sentenced them to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The High Court
found that the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 are also involved but
since they have died, the case stood abated against them.
Insofar as C6 is concerned, the High Court has given him the
benefit of doubt.
SUBMISSIONS
4. Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel and Mr. S.
Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants/contemnors would submit that the initiation of
11
contempt against the appellant/contemnors is barred by
limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 20 of
Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. It is also argued that formal
charges are not framed against the appellants/contemnors
without which contempt cannot proceed. It is vehemently
argued that standard of proof in a criminal contempt is the
same as required in a criminal case, therefore, the High Court
has erred in holding that standard of strict proof is not required
for conviction in a contempt matter. It is lastly submitted that
the High Court having given benefit of doubt to C6 and has
acquitted Contemnor No. 5, wife of the C3, the same yardstick
should have been applied against the appellant/C3 and thus, he
deserves to be acquitted.
5. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent/High Court
and Intervenor/Decree Holder have supported the impugned
order. According to them, the present appellants have been
found involved in creation of forged High Court order which
have rightly been dealt with by the High Court by punishing
them for committing contempt of Court. It is submitted that
when the contempt proceedings are drawn suo motu by the
High Court the law of limitation is not attracted. There being
12
sufficient material against the appellants/contemnors, it is not
a case where they have been found guilty and sentenced on
the basis of probabilities, but it is a case of cogent material
available against them.
ANALYSIS
6. The High Court has recorded the finding of guilt
against the appellants/contemnors on the basis of the report
filed by CBCID and the affidavits filed by the appellants in
response to the statutory notice issued against them. The
report of the CBCID was in turn founded on the statement of
witnesses as well as telephonic conversations held between C3
and C4 as also between C6 and C4. It has also come on record
that C4 has forwarded the format for the preparation of fake
stay order copies received from the advocate Thangapandian
through P. Meiyappan’s email. Thereafter, C4 prepared the fake
stay order copies and handed over the same to the accused,
Thangamani, Sundaram and Angamuthu through P. Meiyappan.
C4 further stated in his confession statement to the CBCID that
9
Contemnor No. 7/S. Amal Raj is the person who floated the
9
‘C7’
13
idea of preparing the forged High Court stay orders. The
properties were seized from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani
where the fake stay orders were prepared and the same were
sent to the FSL. The High Court has extracted the report of the
FSL in para 30 of the impugned order. Moreover, C3 in his
affidavit has alleged that C4 was the person who guided them
throughout in the litigation and it was he (C4) who handed over
fake orders through P. Meiyappan. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 15 &
16 of his affidavit have been reproduced by the High Court
which clearly supports the finding recorded by the High Court.
Thus, the case against the appellants/C3, C4 & C7 for
committing contempt has been found proved by the High Court
on the basis of cogent and reliable material available on record
and the same is recorded after considering their stand taken in
the affidavit.
7. Having deeply scrutinised the material, we are satisfied
that the finding recorded by the High Court does not suffer
from any illegality or perversity. The present is not a case
where it is not known as to who produced the fake interim
orders of the High Court or who prepared the same. The chain
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of events emerging from 18.04.2018 onwards, when the fake
orders were presented at the time when the bailiff tried to
effect delivery of possession, have been found established. As a
matter of fact, C3 admits that he submitted the fake orders
before the Court Amin. From the conversation recorded
between C3 and C4 as produced before the CBCID and as
mentioned in the affidavits, clearly accuses that it was C4 who
was responsible for handing over the orders through P
Meiyappan. It was C7 who floated the idea of preparing the
forged orders. Thus, all three appellants/contemnors have
rightly been convicted.
8. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish
for contempt is always for maintaining the purity of
administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the
courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when
the order of the court is forged and produced to gain undue
advantage. A misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and
wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a
favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference
with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is
15
found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she
knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are
not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated
order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold
him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he
or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication. [ See: In
10
Re: Bineet Kumar Singh ). Thus, C3, who is the beneficiary
of the fake interim orders is rightly held guilty of contempt.
11
9. In re: “Vinay Chandra Mishra” , this Court has
held that the Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and the
duty to protect the same is apart from the function of
adjudicating the disputes between the parties and it is for this
purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary
power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or
outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and
bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them
and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear
or favour.
10
(2001) 5 SCC 501
11
(1995) 2 SCC 584
16
10. It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the
appellants that they were not given proper opportunity to
defend, inasmuch as, the charges were not framed against
them in a formal manner nor explained to them. This argument
deserves to be rejected at the outset in view of the settled
proposition in “Vinay Chandra Mishra” (supra) in the
following words:
“ 26.……….The criminal contempt of court
undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an
offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law
and the statute law even in this country has always
been summary. However, the fact that the process
is summary does not mean that the procedural
requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting
the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree
of precision with which the charge may be stated
depends upon the circumstances. So long as the
gist of the specific allegations is made clear or
otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific
allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate
the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus
of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike
is that despite the objection that the Judge deals
with the contempt himself and the contemner has
little opportunity to defend himself, there is a
residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to
punish on the spot, but it is the only realistic way
of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure
does not offend against the principle of natural
justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the
prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge
personally but protecting the administration of
17
justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the
most effective deterrent against misconduct. The
Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of
the case and he must be able to take steps to
restore order as early and quickly as possible. The
time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt
proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the
main proceedings which paralyses the court for a
time and indirectly impedes the speed and
efficiency with which justice is administered.
Instant justice can never be completely
satisfactory, yet it does provide the simplest, most
effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing
with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the
contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded
by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his
defence, even summary procedure in the case of
contempt in the face of the court is commended
and not faulted.”
11. Much emphasis was laid by the appellants taking
12
shelter under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
to raise the plea of limitation. It was submitted that the
contempt proceedings should have been initiated within one
year from the date of production of the fake interim orders i.e.
18.04.2018. However, the notice was issued after four years in
the year 2022 and as such entire proceeding is barred by
12
“1971 Act”
18
limitation. Reliance is placed on “ Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian
13
& Ors.”
12. In “ Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya
14
Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar ” the following is
held:
“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
it was held that the High Court has inherent power
to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and to
adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a
fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor
to defend himself. But the procedure has now been
prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of
the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though the
contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court can be regulated by legislation by
appropriate legislature under Entry 77 of List I and
Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the
Parliament has enacted the Act of 1971, the
contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court is given a constitutional foundation by
declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under Articles
129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High
Court cannot be taken away by any legislation
short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section
22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this
Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of
the provisions of any other law relating to
contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot
be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The
above position of law has been well settled by this
13
(2001) 7 SCC 549
14
(1993) Supp (1) SCC 529
19
Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and
Judges of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2 SCC
571]holding thus:
“In any case, so far as contempt of a High
Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a
subordinate court, the Constitution vests these
rights in every High Court, so no Act of a
legislature could take away that jurisdiction and
confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.”
24. From the above judicial pronouncements of
this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of
the Supreme Court and the High Court being the
Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129
and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and
trammelled by any ordinary legislation including
the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and
their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not
subjected to any limit. It would be appropriate, in
this connection, to refer certain English authorities
dealing with the power of the superior court as
Courts of Record.
37. The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a
summary power as held in the cases of Sukhdev
Singh Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary and in Hira Lal
Dixit v. State of U.P.
38 . Peacock, C.J. laid down the rule quite
broadly in the following words in Abdool, Re:
[(1867) 8 WR Cr 32, 33)
“[T]here can be no doubt that every court of
record has the power of summarily punishing for
contempt.”
42. If we examine the facts of the present
case in the backdrop of the proposition of law,
the contentions raised by the appellant
challenging the procedure followed by the
High Court do not merit any consideration
since the appellant has been served with a
notice of contempt and thereafter permitted
to go through the records and finally has been
afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his
explanation for the charge levelled against
20
him. Incidentally, we may say that the
submission of the contemnor that the
impugned order is vitiated on the ground of
procedural irregularities and that Article 215
of the Constitution of India is to be read in
conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15
and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be
countenanced and it has to be summarily
rejected as being devoid of any merit.”
( Emphasis supplied )
13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “ Pallav Sheth ”
(supra) has held thus:
“ 30 . There can be no doubt that both this Court
and High Courts are courts of record, and the
Constitution has given them the powers to punish
for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly
show that this power cannot be abrogated or
stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and
Article 215 is absolute, can thereby any legislation
indicating the manner and to the extent that the
power can be exercised? If there is any provision
of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power
under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be
little doubt that such law would not be regarded
as having been validly enacted. It, however,
appears to us that providing for the quantum of
punishment or what may or may not be regarded
as acts of contempt or even providing for a period
of limitation for initiating proceedings for
contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which
abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction
under Article 129 or Article 215 of the
Constitution.
33. The question which squarely arises is as to
what is the meaning to be given to the expression
“no court shall initiate any proceedings for
21
contempt …” occurring in Section 20 of the 1971
Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal
contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies
not only to the contempt committed in the face of
the High Court or the Supreme Court but would
also be applicable in the case of contempt of the
subordinate court. The procedure which is to be
followed in each of these cases is different.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of
limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and
not sleep over its rights. In this background such
an interpretation should be placed on Section 20
of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous
result causing hardship to the party who may
have acted with utmost diligence and because of
the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner
cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the
section in the manner canvassed by Mr
Venugopal would mean that the court would
be rendered powerless to punish even
though it may be fully convinced of the
blatant nature of the contempt having been
committed and the same having been
brought to the notice of the court soon after
the committal of the contempt and within the
period of one year of the same. Section 20,
therefore, has to be construed in a manner
which would avoid such an anomaly and
hardship both as regards the litigants as also
by placing a pointless fetter on the part of
the court to punish for its contempt. An
interpretation of Section 20, like the one
canvassed by the appellant, which would
render the constitutional power of the courts
nugatory in taking action for contempt even
in cases of gross contempt, successfully
hidden for a period of one year by practising
fraud by the contemner would render Section
20 as liable to be regarded as being in
conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215.
22
Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be
avoided.
( Emphasis supplied )
42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to
the effect that initiation of proceedings under
Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when
the court formed the prima facie opinion that
contempt has been committed and issued notice to
the contemner to show cause why it should not be
punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20
which does not seem to be warranted and is not
only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate
injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be
interpreted having regard to the realities of
the situation. ( Emphasis supplied ) For
instance, in a case where a contempt of a
subordinate court is committed, a report is
prepared whether on an application to court or
otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate
court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a
High Court can take further action under Section
15. In the process, more often than not, a period of
one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20
put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would
mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate
court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied
that contempt has been committed the High Court
would become powerless to take any action. On
the other hand, if the filing of an application
before the subordinate court or the High
Court, making of a reference by a subordinate
court on its own motion or the filing of an
application before an Advocate-General for
permission to initiate contempt proceedings is
regarded as initiation by the court for the
purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or
stultify the power of the High Court to punish
for contempt which power, dehors the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in
Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an
interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise
23
that section with the powers of the courts to
punish for contempt which is recognised by
the Constitution.
( Emphasis supplied )
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two
categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the
court and that instituted otherwise than on the
court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each
case would necessarily be different. While in the
case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself
which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the
other cases initiation can only be by a party filing
an application. In our opinion, therefore, the
proper construction to be placed on Section
20 must be that action must be initiated,
either by filing of an application or by the
court issuing notice suo motu, within a
period of one year from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been
committed.
( Emphasis supplied )
46. The record discloses that the Custodian
received information of the appellant having
committed contempt by taking over benami
concerns, transferring funds to these concerns
and operating their accounts clandestinely only
from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax
Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-
1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in
contempt and notice issued by the Special Court
on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 provides that where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
24
any special or local law, the provisions contained
in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar
as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law.
This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has
held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands
prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in
consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.
47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia,
provides that where, in the case of any suit or
application for which a period of limitation is
prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right
or title on which a suit or application is founded is
concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his
agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document
necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or
the applicant has been fraudulently concealed
from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of
limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff
or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the
mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first
had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production. These
provisions embody fundamental principles of
justice and equity viz. that a party should not be
penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings
when the facts or material necessary for him to do
so have been wilfully concealed from him and also
that a party who has acted fraudulently should not
gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour
by virtue of such fraud.
48. The provisions of Section 17 of the
Limitation Act are applicable in the present case.
The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was
unearthed only on the Custodian receiving
25
information from the Income Tax Department,
vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming
aware of the fraud, application for initiating
contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-
1998, well within the period of limitation
prescribed by Section 20. It is on this
application that the Special Court by its order
of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be
treated as a show-cause notice to the
appellant to punish him for contempt.
( Emphasis supplied ) In view of the abovestated
facts and in the light of the discussion regarding
the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action
taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant
for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only
faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the
sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under
the circumstances, to examine the finding of the
Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or
contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was
not barred by Section 20.”
14. While the appellants have referred to para 44 of
“ Pallav Sheth” (supra), the respondent has relied upon
paragraph nos. 30, 41 & 42. Upon reading of the entire
judgment in the matter of “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is clearly
depicted that the contempt action must be initiated either by
filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu
within a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed. The originating
point for calculating the period of limitation has been
26
interpreted in para 42 of Pallav Sheth which is reproduced
again at the cost of repetition.
“ 42………………..On the other hand, if the filing of
an application before the subordinate court or the
High Court, making of a reference by a
subordinate court on its own motion or the filing
of an application before an Advocate-General for
permission to initiate contempt proceedings is
regarded as initiation by the court for the
purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the
power of the High Court to punish for contempt
which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the
Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20
would harmonise that section with the powers of
the courts to punish for contempt which is
recognised by the Constitution.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in paras
42 and 44 of “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is to be seen as to
when the application was preferred by the respondent/Decree
Holder for initiation of action against the appellants. The
present contempt proceeding has its root in WP No. 22410 of
2018 preferred by the Trust/Decree Holder. This writ petition
was preferred on 20.08.2018 i.e. immediately after four months
from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were produced before
the Court Amin. In this writ petition, prayer was made to
initiate action against the respondents for committing act of
27
forgery and fraudulent creation of bogus orders in the name of
the High Court. When the matter was posted before the learned
Single Judge it was informed by the Registry that the matter
was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the
administrative side and the Hon’ble Chief Justice has directed
police investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Deputy
Registrar, High Court of Madras gave a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Namakkal Division for investigation
and eventually Crime No. 8 of 2018 was registered in District
Crime Branch, Namakkal Division on 04.09.2018. When the
matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on
05.09.2018, the Court was of the prima facie opinion that
despite registration of FIR further action needs to be taken for
initiation of contempt proceedings under the Act, 1971, as
there is prima facie material to show that criminal contempt
has been committed. The jurisdiction to proceed for criminal
contempt being with the Division Bench, the learned Single
Judge of the High Court directed the Registry to place the
matter before the Division Bench dealing with the criminal
contempt matters, after obtaining necessary orders from
Hon’ble the Chief Justice, for the Division Bench to proceed with
28
the matter in terms of Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of
the Act, 1971. Thus, it is this date i.e. 05.09.2018 when the
contempt proceedings were drawn by the High Court though
actual notice was issued later on by the Division Bench in the
year 2022. Significantly, it requires special reference that for
about 4 years the case bundle of WP No. 22410 of 2018 was
missing in the Registry of the High Court. On repeated
information/request by the Decree Holder the bundle was
traced, and the contempt case was registered in 2022.
However, it does not mean that the contempt was initiated in
the year 2022.
15. It is significant to notice that the case bundle of writ
petition in the High Court was misplaced in the registry of the
High Court so as to render the High Court powerless to punish
for contempt even though it may be fully convinced of the
blatant nature of the contempt and the same having been
brought to the notice of the Court within one year from the
date of commission of contempt. Such situation was clearly
foresighted by this Court in “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), by
observing in para 41 that Section 20 of the Act, 1971,
29
therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid
such an anomaly and eventually concluded that the date of
initiation of suo motu contempt action is regarded as the
initiation by the Court for the purpose of Section 20. Therefore,
in the case in hand, initiation of contempt action shall be
treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when the learned
Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and this
date being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake
orders were presented before the Court Amin, we are of the
considered view that the present contempt action was not
barred by limitation.
16. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the
appellants is that the High Court has proceeded on an
assumption that the standard of strict proof required to convict
a person under the penal law need not be considered whereas
15
in Khushi Ram vs. Sheo Vati & Anr. , it is held that the
charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal
charge and it must be established beyond all reasonable doubt.
Basing above, it is argued that the charge having not proved
beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellants cannot be
15
(1953) 1 SCC 726
30
punished. However, the present is a case where the High Court
has initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted facts
that C3 produced fake interim orders of the High Court and the
same were prepared by C4 & C7. Despite observation by the
High Court, we are of the view that present is a case where it is
established beyond all reasonable doubt that the present
appellants/contemnors have either used or created fake High
Court interim orders. It is not a case of mere probability of
commission of offence rather it is a proved case of commission
of offence. Creating fake orders of the Court is one of the most
dreaded acts of contempt of court. It not only thwarts the
administration of justice, but it has inbuilt intention by
committing forgery of record. Therefore, the charge of
contempt is fully proved against the appellants beyond all
reasonable doubt.
17. For the foregoing, we have no hesitation in affirming
the finding of guilt of commission of contempt by the
appellants, as recorded by the High Court. The appeals are,
accordingly, dismissed.
31
However, insofar as imposition of sentence of simple
imprisonment for six months is concerned, the same appears to
be harsh, therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be
served if the appellants are sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for one month.
Accordingly, we confirm the conviction and modify the
sentence from simple imprisonment for six months to simple
imprisonment for one month. It is ordered accordingly.
The appellants shall surrender before the Registrar of the
High Court of Madras within 15 days from today to undergo the
sentence. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to
communicate this order to the concerned High Court for
compliance.
….…….………………………………………J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
…....….………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 02, 2025.
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 619
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5245 OF 2024
SHANMUGAM @ LAKSHMINARAYANAN …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS .... RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2024
M. MURUGANANDAM …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
THROUGH THE REGISTRAR GENERAL .... RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2025
(@ Crl. A. Diary No. 45480 of 2024)
S. AMAL RAJ …. APPELLANT
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2025.05.02
16:58:09 IST
Reason:
2
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of
2024 is admitted.
2. The three appellants before us namely, Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan in Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024
(Contemnor No. 4 before the High Court), M. Muruganandam in
Criminal Appeal No. 4219 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 3 before the
High Court) and S. Amal Raj in Criminal Appeal arising out of
Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 7
before the High Court) stand convicted by the High Court for
committing contempt of Court and have been sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The
appellants have called in question the legality and validity of
the judgment and order of the High Court in the present
appeals.
3
FACTUAL MATRIX
3 . The District Munsiff Court, Tiruchengode passed a decree
dated 17.11.2004 in O.S. No. 212 of 2000 in favour of J.K.K.
1
Rangammal Charitable Trust ordering recovery of possession
and arrears of rent from the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3. The
Contemnors preferred appeal suits which were dismissed. The
Decree Holder preferred Execution Petition and when the Court
Amin went to execute the decree to effect delivery of
possession on 17.04.2018 the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 produced
interim orders passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P.
Nos. 1467 – 1469 of 2018 staying the decree.
3.1. The Decree Holder applied and obtained the copies of
the said orders produced by the Contemnors in Execution
Petition Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 2014 and also entered caveat
before the High Court. On verification, it was found, the said
orders produced before the Execution Court were fraudulently
created by committing forgery and impersonation in the name
of the Judge of the High Court of Madras.
1
“Decree Holder”
4
3.2 . The Decree Holder submitted a complaint to the High
Court and Superintendent of Police, Namakkal District on
03.05.2018 and 15.05.2018 respectively. The Registrar
General, High Court, forwarded the complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Namakkal on 18.07.2018.
The Decree Holder then preferred W.P. No. 22410 of 2018
before the High Court to direct the Superintendent of Police,
Namakkal to take action on the complaint dated 15.05.2018. In
the meanwhile, First Information Report in Crime No. 8 of 2018
was registered by the District Crime Branch, Namakkal for
offences under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal
2
Code, 1860 against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3/Judgment
Debtors. The writ petition was disposed of on 05.09.2018
directing the registry to place the matter before the Division
Bench, dealing with the criminal contempt matters, after
obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, for
the Division Bench to proceed with the matter in terms of
Section 15 (1) read with Section 18 (1) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The Superintendent of Police, Namakkal
2
‘IPC’
5
District, was also directed to monitor the investigation in DCB
Crime No. 8 of 2018.
3.3 . On 10.09.2018, the Contemnor No. 4/Shanmugam @
3
Lakshminarayanan was arrested by the District Crime Branch,
Namakkal and he made a statement about the manner in which
the fake order copies were prepared with the help of
4
Contemnor No. 6/P. Meiyappan in a Digital Net Centre at
Bhavani.
5
3.4 . On 11.09.2018, Contemnor No. 3/M. Muruganandam
was arrested. He disclosed the manner in which the fraudulent
order copies were obtained by the Contemnor No. 4 and
Contemnor No. 7. The District Crime Branch, Namkkal
completed the investigation and submitted a report on
14.08.2019 in C.C. No. 537 of 2020 before the Judicial
Magistrate, Komarapalayam against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5.
3.5 . On account of the case bundle relating to W.P. No.
22410 of 2018 missing in the Registry, the criminal contempt
was not numbered from 2018 to 2022. On the Division Bench
being informed regularly, the bundle was traced, and the
3
‘C4’
4
‘C6’
5
‘C3’
6
contempt petition was numbered as 2493 of 2022. Initially,
statutory notice was issued to the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5 and
thereafter to the Contemnor No. 6 and Contemnor No. 7 when
they were also found to be involved in the process of
preparation of the fake order of the High Court. Since the
Contemnor nos. 1 and 2 died during proceedings, the same
stood abated against them.
3.6 . The Division Bench framed charges against
Contemnor Nos. 1, 3, 4 & 5 on 19.12.2022 to the following
effect:
“Since S. Sundaram (2nd contemnor) has died, no
charge could be framed against him.
st
2.That, you, Angamuthu (1 contemnor),
rd
Muruganandam (3 contemnor), Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan (4th contemnor) and
Thangamani (5th contemnor) along with the
deceased Sundaram submitted the photocopies of
the following three fake orders of this Court, all
dated 12.03.2018 to the bailiff, when he came for
executing the decree as set out above.
i.C.R.P.No.1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018
ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of
2018
The above three orders appear to have been
passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa
Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the
records of the Registry show that no such Civil
7
Revision Petitions were even filed, and the said
Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on
12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these
three orders have been fabricated.”
3.7 . Basing the affidavits filed by the Contemnor Nos. 1
and 3 to 5, during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the
High Court suo motu impleaded Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 on the
ground that the material available on record including the police
report revealed that these two contemnors are also involved in
the preparation and handing over of the fake High Court’s
orders to the litigants, Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5. Accordingly,
charges were framed by the High Court on 16.04.2024 against
the Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 as under:
“That, you, P. Meiyappan (6th contemnor) and S.
Amal Raj (7th contemnor) along with Contemnor
Nos.3 to 5, including the deceased, P. Angamuthu
and S. Sundaram, created fake orders of this
Court, all dated 12.03.2018 and aided in producing
it to the bailiff, when he came for executing the
decree as set out in the order dated 19.12.2022:
i. C.R.P.No. 1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of
2018
ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of
2018
The above three orders appear to have been
passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa
Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the
records of the Registry show that no such Civil
8
Revision Petitions were even filed and the said
Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on
12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these
three orders have been fabricated.
The above act of yours prima facie attracts Section
2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which
is punishable under Section 12, ibid., in that, by
submitting the aforesaid three photocopies of the
orders of this Court, you have interfered with the
administration of justice, in the execution of
proceedings before the District Munsif,
Tiruchengode”
3.8 . The Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5 preferred Crl. O.P. No.
17492 of 2023 for reinvestigation/fresh investigation of the
crime registered against them. The Division Bench passed an
order on 21.09.2023 directing the DGP to form a Special Team
whereupon the DGP transferred the investigation to CBCID
(OCU) and renumbered as Crime No. 2 of 2023. A detailed
investigation was carried out by CBCID, and voluminous
incriminating materials were collected against the Contemnor
Nos. 4 to 6.
6
3.9 . P. Meiyappan/Contemnor No. 6 and S. Amal
7
Raj/Contemnor No. 7 were also arrested by the CBCID. The
statement of two witnesses namely, Thangaraj and Shanthi was
recorded under Section 164(5) of Cr. P. C. before the Judicial
6
‘C6’
7
‘C7’
9
Magistrate No. II, Namakkal. Sample voices of C3 and C4 were
also recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for
comparison with the cell phone conversation held between
them. CBCID filed first status report in the contempt petition on
18.10.2023 and also verified the record relating to C.R.P. Nos.
1467 – 1469 of 2018. The material objects were recovered
from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani and sent to the Tamil
8
Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory . The CBCID filed second
status report in the contempt petition on 19.12.2023 and
thereafter third status report was filed on 12.02.2024. Basing
above status reports, C6 & C7 were impleaded .
3.10 . In his affidavit in response to the contempt notice,
the C3 admitted that in the Execution case he and other
tenants were guided by C4 to prefer revision before the High
Court. According to him, the Judgment Debtor, in three suits,
paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for preferring revision. On the
relevant date his wife handed over the copy of bogus interim
order to the Court Amin which was given to him by C4 through
one Mr. P. Meiyappan. He categorically states that since C4 was
handling his case for the last two decades, there was no
8
‘FSL’
10
occasion to doubt the genuineness of the High Court order.
When he contacted C4, he stated that one Mr. Thangapandian,
advocate had given the said order to him. This conversation
was recorded in the automated Samsung android phone. He
had given transcript of the conversation between him and C4 to
the police along with the certificate under Section 65-B (4) of
the Evidence Act, 1872.
3.11 . The High Court after considering the materials and
the submissions made by the appellants found that the three
appellants are responsible in preparation of the bogus High
Court interim orders and have accordingly sentenced them to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The High Court
found that the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 are also involved but
since they have died, the case stood abated against them.
Insofar as C6 is concerned, the High Court has given him the
benefit of doubt.
SUBMISSIONS
4. Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel and Mr. S.
Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants/contemnors would submit that the initiation of
11
contempt against the appellant/contemnors is barred by
limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 20 of
Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. It is also argued that formal
charges are not framed against the appellants/contemnors
without which contempt cannot proceed. It is vehemently
argued that standard of proof in a criminal contempt is the
same as required in a criminal case, therefore, the High Court
has erred in holding that standard of strict proof is not required
for conviction in a contempt matter. It is lastly submitted that
the High Court having given benefit of doubt to C6 and has
acquitted Contemnor No. 5, wife of the C3, the same yardstick
should have been applied against the appellant/C3 and thus, he
deserves to be acquitted.
5. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent/High Court
and Intervenor/Decree Holder have supported the impugned
order. According to them, the present appellants have been
found involved in creation of forged High Court order which
have rightly been dealt with by the High Court by punishing
them for committing contempt of Court. It is submitted that
when the contempt proceedings are drawn suo motu by the
High Court the law of limitation is not attracted. There being
12
sufficient material against the appellants/contemnors, it is not
a case where they have been found guilty and sentenced on
the basis of probabilities, but it is a case of cogent material
available against them.
ANALYSIS
6. The High Court has recorded the finding of guilt
against the appellants/contemnors on the basis of the report
filed by CBCID and the affidavits filed by the appellants in
response to the statutory notice issued against them. The
report of the CBCID was in turn founded on the statement of
witnesses as well as telephonic conversations held between C3
and C4 as also between C6 and C4. It has also come on record
that C4 has forwarded the format for the preparation of fake
stay order copies received from the advocate Thangapandian
through P. Meiyappan’s email. Thereafter, C4 prepared the fake
stay order copies and handed over the same to the accused,
Thangamani, Sundaram and Angamuthu through P. Meiyappan.
C4 further stated in his confession statement to the CBCID that
9
Contemnor No. 7/S. Amal Raj is the person who floated the
9
‘C7’
13
idea of preparing the forged High Court stay orders. The
properties were seized from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani
where the fake stay orders were prepared and the same were
sent to the FSL. The High Court has extracted the report of the
FSL in para 30 of the impugned order. Moreover, C3 in his
affidavit has alleged that C4 was the person who guided them
throughout in the litigation and it was he (C4) who handed over
fake orders through P. Meiyappan. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 15 &
16 of his affidavit have been reproduced by the High Court
which clearly supports the finding recorded by the High Court.
Thus, the case against the appellants/C3, C4 & C7 for
committing contempt has been found proved by the High Court
on the basis of cogent and reliable material available on record
and the same is recorded after considering their stand taken in
the affidavit.
7. Having deeply scrutinised the material, we are satisfied
that the finding recorded by the High Court does not suffer
from any illegality or perversity. The present is not a case
where it is not known as to who produced the fake interim
orders of the High Court or who prepared the same. The chain
14
of events emerging from 18.04.2018 onwards, when the fake
orders were presented at the time when the bailiff tried to
effect delivery of possession, have been found established. As a
matter of fact, C3 admits that he submitted the fake orders
before the Court Amin. From the conversation recorded
between C3 and C4 as produced before the CBCID and as
mentioned in the affidavits, clearly accuses that it was C4 who
was responsible for handing over the orders through P
Meiyappan. It was C7 who floated the idea of preparing the
forged orders. Thus, all three appellants/contemnors have
rightly been convicted.
8. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish
for contempt is always for maintaining the purity of
administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the
courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when
the order of the court is forged and produced to gain undue
advantage. A misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and
wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a
favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference
with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is
15
found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she
knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are
not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated
order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold
him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he
or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication. [ See: In
10
Re: Bineet Kumar Singh ). Thus, C3, who is the beneficiary
of the fake interim orders is rightly held guilty of contempt.
11
9. In re: “Vinay Chandra Mishra” , this Court has
held that the Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and the
duty to protect the same is apart from the function of
adjudicating the disputes between the parties and it is for this
purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary
power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or
outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and
bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them
and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear
or favour.
10
(2001) 5 SCC 501
11
(1995) 2 SCC 584
16
10. It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the
appellants that they were not given proper opportunity to
defend, inasmuch as, the charges were not framed against
them in a formal manner nor explained to them. This argument
deserves to be rejected at the outset in view of the settled
proposition in “Vinay Chandra Mishra” (supra) in the
following words:
“ 26.……….The criminal contempt of court
undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an
offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law
and the statute law even in this country has always
been summary. However, the fact that the process
is summary does not mean that the procedural
requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting
the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree
of precision with which the charge may be stated
depends upon the circumstances. So long as the
gist of the specific allegations is made clear or
otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific
allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate
the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus
of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike
is that despite the objection that the Judge deals
with the contempt himself and the contemner has
little opportunity to defend himself, there is a
residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to
punish on the spot, but it is the only realistic way
of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure
does not offend against the principle of natural
justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the
prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge
personally but protecting the administration of
17
justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the
most effective deterrent against misconduct. The
Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of
the case and he must be able to take steps to
restore order as early and quickly as possible. The
time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt
proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the
main proceedings which paralyses the court for a
time and indirectly impedes the speed and
efficiency with which justice is administered.
Instant justice can never be completely
satisfactory, yet it does provide the simplest, most
effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing
with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the
contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded
by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his
defence, even summary procedure in the case of
contempt in the face of the court is commended
and not faulted.”
11. Much emphasis was laid by the appellants taking
12
shelter under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
to raise the plea of limitation. It was submitted that the
contempt proceedings should have been initiated within one
year from the date of production of the fake interim orders i.e.
18.04.2018. However, the notice was issued after four years in
the year 2022 and as such entire proceeding is barred by
12
“1971 Act”
18
limitation. Reliance is placed on “ Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian
13
& Ors.”
12. In “ Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya
14
Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar ” the following is
held:
“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
it was held that the High Court has inherent power
to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and to
adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a
fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor
to defend himself. But the procedure has now been
prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of
the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though the
contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court can be regulated by legislation by
appropriate legislature under Entry 77 of List I and
Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the
Parliament has enacted the Act of 1971, the
contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court is given a constitutional foundation by
declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under Articles
129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High
Court cannot be taken away by any legislation
short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section
22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this
Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of
the provisions of any other law relating to
contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot
be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The
above position of law has been well settled by this
13
(2001) 7 SCC 549
14
(1993) Supp (1) SCC 529
19
Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and
Judges of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2 SCC
571]holding thus:
“In any case, so far as contempt of a High
Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a
subordinate court, the Constitution vests these
rights in every High Court, so no Act of a
legislature could take away that jurisdiction and
confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.”
24. From the above judicial pronouncements of
this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of
the Supreme Court and the High Court being the
Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129
and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and
trammelled by any ordinary legislation including
the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and
their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not
subjected to any limit. It would be appropriate, in
this connection, to refer certain English authorities
dealing with the power of the superior court as
Courts of Record.
37. The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a
summary power as held in the cases of Sukhdev
Singh Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary and in Hira Lal
Dixit v. State of U.P.
38 . Peacock, C.J. laid down the rule quite
broadly in the following words in Abdool, Re:
[(1867) 8 WR Cr 32, 33)
“[T]here can be no doubt that every court of
record has the power of summarily punishing for
contempt.”
42. If we examine the facts of the present
case in the backdrop of the proposition of law,
the contentions raised by the appellant
challenging the procedure followed by the
High Court do not merit any consideration
since the appellant has been served with a
notice of contempt and thereafter permitted
to go through the records and finally has been
afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his
explanation for the charge levelled against
20
him. Incidentally, we may say that the
submission of the contemnor that the
impugned order is vitiated on the ground of
procedural irregularities and that Article 215
of the Constitution of India is to be read in
conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15
and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be
countenanced and it has to be summarily
rejected as being devoid of any merit.”
( Emphasis supplied )
13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “ Pallav Sheth ”
(supra) has held thus:
“ 30 . There can be no doubt that both this Court
and High Courts are courts of record, and the
Constitution has given them the powers to punish
for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly
show that this power cannot be abrogated or
stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and
Article 215 is absolute, can thereby any legislation
indicating the manner and to the extent that the
power can be exercised? If there is any provision
of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power
under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be
little doubt that such law would not be regarded
as having been validly enacted. It, however,
appears to us that providing for the quantum of
punishment or what may or may not be regarded
as acts of contempt or even providing for a period
of limitation for initiating proceedings for
contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which
abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction
under Article 129 or Article 215 of the
Constitution.
33. The question which squarely arises is as to
what is the meaning to be given to the expression
“no court shall initiate any proceedings for
21
contempt …” occurring in Section 20 of the 1971
Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal
contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies
not only to the contempt committed in the face of
the High Court or the Supreme Court but would
also be applicable in the case of contempt of the
subordinate court. The procedure which is to be
followed in each of these cases is different.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of
limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and
not sleep over its rights. In this background such
an interpretation should be placed on Section 20
of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous
result causing hardship to the party who may
have acted with utmost diligence and because of
the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner
cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the
section in the manner canvassed by Mr
Venugopal would mean that the court would
be rendered powerless to punish even
though it may be fully convinced of the
blatant nature of the contempt having been
committed and the same having been
brought to the notice of the court soon after
the committal of the contempt and within the
period of one year of the same. Section 20,
therefore, has to be construed in a manner
which would avoid such an anomaly and
hardship both as regards the litigants as also
by placing a pointless fetter on the part of
the court to punish for its contempt. An
interpretation of Section 20, like the one
canvassed by the appellant, which would
render the constitutional power of the courts
nugatory in taking action for contempt even
in cases of gross contempt, successfully
hidden for a period of one year by practising
fraud by the contemner would render Section
20 as liable to be regarded as being in
conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215.
22
Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be
avoided.
( Emphasis supplied )
42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to
the effect that initiation of proceedings under
Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when
the court formed the prima facie opinion that
contempt has been committed and issued notice to
the contemner to show cause why it should not be
punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20
which does not seem to be warranted and is not
only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate
injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be
interpreted having regard to the realities of
the situation. ( Emphasis supplied ) For
instance, in a case where a contempt of a
subordinate court is committed, a report is
prepared whether on an application to court or
otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate
court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a
High Court can take further action under Section
15. In the process, more often than not, a period of
one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20
put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would
mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate
court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied
that contempt has been committed the High Court
would become powerless to take any action. On
the other hand, if the filing of an application
before the subordinate court or the High
Court, making of a reference by a subordinate
court on its own motion or the filing of an
application before an Advocate-General for
permission to initiate contempt proceedings is
regarded as initiation by the court for the
purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or
stultify the power of the High Court to punish
for contempt which power, dehors the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in
Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an
interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise
23
that section with the powers of the courts to
punish for contempt which is recognised by
the Constitution.
( Emphasis supplied )
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two
categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the
court and that instituted otherwise than on the
court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each
case would necessarily be different. While in the
case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself
which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the
other cases initiation can only be by a party filing
an application. In our opinion, therefore, the
proper construction to be placed on Section
20 must be that action must be initiated,
either by filing of an application or by the
court issuing notice suo motu, within a
period of one year from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been
committed.
( Emphasis supplied )
46. The record discloses that the Custodian
received information of the appellant having
committed contempt by taking over benami
concerns, transferring funds to these concerns
and operating their accounts clandestinely only
from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax
Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-
1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in
contempt and notice issued by the Special Court
on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 provides that where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
24
any special or local law, the provisions contained
in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar
as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law.
This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has
held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands
prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in
consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.
47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia,
provides that where, in the case of any suit or
application for which a period of limitation is
prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right
or title on which a suit or application is founded is
concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his
agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document
necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or
the applicant has been fraudulently concealed
from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of
limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff
or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the
mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first
had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production. These
provisions embody fundamental principles of
justice and equity viz. that a party should not be
penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings
when the facts or material necessary for him to do
so have been wilfully concealed from him and also
that a party who has acted fraudulently should not
gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour
by virtue of such fraud.
48. The provisions of Section 17 of the
Limitation Act are applicable in the present case.
The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was
unearthed only on the Custodian receiving
25
information from the Income Tax Department,
vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming
aware of the fraud, application for initiating
contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-
1998, well within the period of limitation
prescribed by Section 20. It is on this
application that the Special Court by its order
of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be
treated as a show-cause notice to the
appellant to punish him for contempt.
( Emphasis supplied ) In view of the abovestated
facts and in the light of the discussion regarding
the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action
taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant
for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only
faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the
sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under
the circumstances, to examine the finding of the
Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or
contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was
not barred by Section 20.”
14. While the appellants have referred to para 44 of
“ Pallav Sheth” (supra), the respondent has relied upon
paragraph nos. 30, 41 & 42. Upon reading of the entire
judgment in the matter of “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is clearly
depicted that the contempt action must be initiated either by
filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu
within a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed. The originating
point for calculating the period of limitation has been
26
interpreted in para 42 of Pallav Sheth which is reproduced
again at the cost of repetition.
“ 42………………..On the other hand, if the filing of
an application before the subordinate court or the
High Court, making of a reference by a
subordinate court on its own motion or the filing
of an application before an Advocate-General for
permission to initiate contempt proceedings is
regarded as initiation by the court for the
purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the
power of the High Court to punish for contempt
which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the
Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20
would harmonise that section with the powers of
the courts to punish for contempt which is
recognised by the Constitution.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in paras
42 and 44 of “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is to be seen as to
when the application was preferred by the respondent/Decree
Holder for initiation of action against the appellants. The
present contempt proceeding has its root in WP No. 22410 of
2018 preferred by the Trust/Decree Holder. This writ petition
was preferred on 20.08.2018 i.e. immediately after four months
from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were produced before
the Court Amin. In this writ petition, prayer was made to
initiate action against the respondents for committing act of
27
forgery and fraudulent creation of bogus orders in the name of
the High Court. When the matter was posted before the learned
Single Judge it was informed by the Registry that the matter
was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the
administrative side and the Hon’ble Chief Justice has directed
police investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Deputy
Registrar, High Court of Madras gave a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Namakkal Division for investigation
and eventually Crime No. 8 of 2018 was registered in District
Crime Branch, Namakkal Division on 04.09.2018. When the
matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on
05.09.2018, the Court was of the prima facie opinion that
despite registration of FIR further action needs to be taken for
initiation of contempt proceedings under the Act, 1971, as
there is prima facie material to show that criminal contempt
has been committed. The jurisdiction to proceed for criminal
contempt being with the Division Bench, the learned Single
Judge of the High Court directed the Registry to place the
matter before the Division Bench dealing with the criminal
contempt matters, after obtaining necessary orders from
Hon’ble the Chief Justice, for the Division Bench to proceed with
28
the matter in terms of Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of
the Act, 1971. Thus, it is this date i.e. 05.09.2018 when the
contempt proceedings were drawn by the High Court though
actual notice was issued later on by the Division Bench in the
year 2022. Significantly, it requires special reference that for
about 4 years the case bundle of WP No. 22410 of 2018 was
missing in the Registry of the High Court. On repeated
information/request by the Decree Holder the bundle was
traced, and the contempt case was registered in 2022.
However, it does not mean that the contempt was initiated in
the year 2022.
15. It is significant to notice that the case bundle of writ
petition in the High Court was misplaced in the registry of the
High Court so as to render the High Court powerless to punish
for contempt even though it may be fully convinced of the
blatant nature of the contempt and the same having been
brought to the notice of the Court within one year from the
date of commission of contempt. Such situation was clearly
foresighted by this Court in “ Pallav Sheth” (supra), by
observing in para 41 that Section 20 of the Act, 1971,
29
therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid
such an anomaly and eventually concluded that the date of
initiation of suo motu contempt action is regarded as the
initiation by the Court for the purpose of Section 20. Therefore,
in the case in hand, initiation of contempt action shall be
treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when the learned
Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and this
date being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake
orders were presented before the Court Amin, we are of the
considered view that the present contempt action was not
barred by limitation.
16. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the
appellants is that the High Court has proceeded on an
assumption that the standard of strict proof required to convict
a person under the penal law need not be considered whereas
15
in Khushi Ram vs. Sheo Vati & Anr. , it is held that the
charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal
charge and it must be established beyond all reasonable doubt.
Basing above, it is argued that the charge having not proved
beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellants cannot be
15
(1953) 1 SCC 726
30
punished. However, the present is a case where the High Court
has initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted facts
that C3 produced fake interim orders of the High Court and the
same were prepared by C4 & C7. Despite observation by the
High Court, we are of the view that present is a case where it is
established beyond all reasonable doubt that the present
appellants/contemnors have either used or created fake High
Court interim orders. It is not a case of mere probability of
commission of offence rather it is a proved case of commission
of offence. Creating fake orders of the Court is one of the most
dreaded acts of contempt of court. It not only thwarts the
administration of justice, but it has inbuilt intention by
committing forgery of record. Therefore, the charge of
contempt is fully proved against the appellants beyond all
reasonable doubt.
17. For the foregoing, we have no hesitation in affirming
the finding of guilt of commission of contempt by the
appellants, as recorded by the High Court. The appeals are,
accordingly, dismissed.
31
However, insofar as imposition of sentence of simple
imprisonment for six months is concerned, the same appears to
be harsh, therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be
served if the appellants are sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for one month.
Accordingly, we confirm the conviction and modify the
sentence from simple imprisonment for six months to simple
imprisonment for one month. It is ordered accordingly.
The appellants shall surrender before the Registrar of the
High Court of Madras within 15 days from today to undergo the
sentence. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to
communicate this order to the concerned High Court for
compliance.
….…….………………………………………J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
…....….………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 02, 2025.