Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7404 of 2000
PETITIONER:
Union of India & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/10/2002
BENCH:
G.B. PATTANAIK & RUMA PAL.
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6040, 6043, 6044, 6038, 6046, 6042, 6041,
6039, 6045, 6049, 6047, 6048 and 6050 of 2001 and C.A.
No. 3225 of 2002.
PATTANAIK, J.
This Appeal by the Union of India is directed against the
Judgment of Rajasthan High Court allowing the Writ Petition filed
before it. A private educational institution conducting courses leading
to the degree of Bachelor of Education filed a Writ petition
challenging the order passed by the Northern Regional Committee of
National Council for teachers education rejecting the application of
the institution for recognition of the B.Ed (Vacation Course). The
institution was directed not to admit students in the vacation course
from 1999-2000 onwards. In the Writ Petition, the constitutional
validity of the National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993
(Act 73 of 1993, hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) was also
challenged. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to hold
that the order de-recognising the vacation course is bad in law. The
High Court also struck down Section 17(4) of the Act.
The parliament enacted the Act and provided for the
establishment of a council for teacher education with a view to
achieving planned and coordinated development of the teacher
education system throughout the country and for regulation of proper
maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system.
Section 17 of the Act, with which we are concerned in the present
case, is extracted herein below:
Section 17. "Contravention of provisions of the Act and
consequences thereof. (1) Where the Regional Committee is,
on its own motion or on any representation received from
any person, satisfied that a recognised institution has
contravened any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules,
regulations orders made or issued thereunder, or any
condition subject to which recognition under sub-section (3)
of section 14 or permission under sub-section 15 was
granted, it may withdraw recognition of such recognised
institution for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Provided that no such order against the recognised
institution shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of
making representation against the proposed order has been
given to such recognised institution:
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Provided further that the order withdrawing or
refusing recognition passed by the Regional Committee shall
come into force only with effect from the end of the academic
session next following the date of communication of such
order.
(2) A copy of every order passed by the Regional
Committee under sub-section (1),-
(a) shall be communicated to the recognised
institution concerned and a copy thereof
shall also be forwarded simultaneously to
the university or the examining body to
which such institution was affiliated for
cancelling affiliation; and
(b) shall be published in the Official Gazette
for general information.
(3) Once the recognition of a recognised institution is
withdrawn under sub-section (1), such institution shall
discontinue the course or training in teacher education, and
the concerned University or the examining body shall cancel
affiliation of the institution in accordance with the order
passed under sub-section (1), with effect from the end of the
academic session next following the date of communication
of the said order.
(4) If an institution offers any course or training in
teacher education after the coming into force of the order
withdrawing recognition under sub-section (1), or where an
institution offering a course or training in teacher education
immediately before the appointed day fails or neglects to
obtain recognition or permission under this Act, the
qualification in teacher education obtained pursuant to such
course or training or after undertaking a course or training
in such institution, shall not be treated as a valid
qualification for purposes of employment under the Central
government, any State Government or University, or in any
school, college or other educational body aided by the
Central Government or any State Government."
On and from the date of enforcement of the Act, every
institution, offering or intending to offer the course or training in
teacher education, was required to make application to the Regional
Committee in such form and manner as may be determined by the
regulations as provided in Section 14 of the Act. In accordance with
the said provision the respondent institution made an application for
grant of recognition to the Bachelor of Education (vacation course).
This application, having been rejected by the Northern Regional
Committee of the Council, the respondent had approached the High
Court. Having regard to the Entry 66 of the List I of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution, the High Court did record a conclusion
that the Parliament has the legislative competence for enacting the Act
with a view for achieving planned and coordinated development of the
teacher education system. But so far as Section 17(4) of the Act is
concerned, the High Court held that the Parliament cannot make law
prescribing qualification for entry into the service under the State
Government and such law can be made only under the Proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution. In the opinion of the High Court,
when NCTE cannot force a State or State funded institution to employ
only teachers having a particular qualification like B.Ed or B.P.Ed. or
it cannot force the State Government for the employee to have B.Ed
degree then it cannot have power under any law to de-recognize any
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such degree for the purpose of employment and as such Sub-section
(4) of Section 17 is unconstitutional and ultra-vires of the
Constitution. Having struck down Section 17 (4) of the Act, the High
Court further directed the NCTE to issue certificate of recognition to
the B.Ed (vacation course) of the institution since the regulation of
B.Ed course imparted by the same institution was recognised by the
council.
It is contended, on behalf of the council, that sub-section (4) of
Section 17 is in fact a law dealing with coordinated development of
the teacher education system to provide consequences if an institution,
without obtaining recognition or after the recognition being
withdrawn, offers any course or training in teacher education.
According to the learned counsel, the legislation in pith and substance
is a legislation dealing with the topic of coordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher education coming
within the legislative Entry 66 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule
and even if it is construed to be an encroachment relating to service
under a State Government the same is merely consequential and,
therefore, the legislation cannot be declared to be ultra-vires.
Mr. Sanghi, appearing for the respondent, on the other hand
contended that though it would be within the competence of the
Parliament to make law for coordinated development of education but
if the law deals with the question of minimum qualification for the
service under the State Government the same would be a law referable
to Article 309 of the Constitution and not referable to a law dealing
with coordinated development of the teacher education system and
therefore, sub-section (4) of Section 17 must be held to be ultra-vires
of the Constitution.
In view of the rival submissions at the bar, the question that
arises for consideration is whether the impugned legislation can be
held to be a law dealing with coordinated development of education
system within Entry 66 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule or it is a
law dealing with the service conditions of an employee under the
State Government. The power to legislate is engrafted under Article
246 of the Constitution and the various entries for the three lists of the
Seventh Schedule are the "fields of legislation". The different entries
being legislative heads are all of enabling character and are designed
to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of
the Union and the State legislatures. They neither impose any
restrictions on the legislative powers nor prescribe any duty for
exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner. It has been
a cardinal principle of construction that the language of the entries
should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly
capable and while interpreting an entry of any List it would not be
reasonable to import any limitation therein. The rule of widest
construction, however, would not enable the legislature to make a law
relating to a matter which has no rational connection with the subject
matter of an entry. When the vires of enactment is challenged, the
court primarily presumes the constitutionality of the statute by putting
the most liberal construction upon the relevant legislative entry so that
it may have the widest amplitude and the substance of the legislation
will have to be looked into. The Court sometimes is duty bound to
guard against extending the meaning of the words beyond their
reasonable connotation in anxiety to preserve the power of the
legislature.
It is further a well-settled principle that entries in the different
lists should be read together without giving a narrow meaning to any
of them. Power of the Parliament as well as the State legislature are
expressed in precise and definite terms. While an entry is to be given
its widest meaning but it cannot be so interpreted as to over-ride
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another entry or make another entry meaningless and in case of an
apparent conflict between different entries, it is the duty of the court
to reconcile them. When it appears to the Court that there is apparent
overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of "pith and
substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of a legislation
and the entry within which it would fall. In case of conflict between
entries in List I and List II, the same has to be decided by application
of the principle of "pith and substance". The doctrine of "pith and
substance" means that if an enactment substantially falls within the
powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature
which enacted it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it
incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature.
When a law is impugned as being ultra-vires of the legislative
competence, what is required to be ascertained is the true character of
the legislation. If on such an examination it is found that the
legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature
then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though it might
incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. In
order to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire Act,
its object and scope and effect, is required to be gone into. The
question of invasion into the territory of another legislation is to be
determined not by degree but by substance. The doctrine of "pith and
substance" has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between the
powers of two legislatures but in any case where the question arises
whether a legislation is covered by particular legislative power in
exercise of which it is purported to be made.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of rule of construction,
if the provisions of the impugned statute, namely, the National
Council of Teacher Education Act, 1993 are examined and more
particularly Section 17(4) thereof which we have already extracted,
the conclusion is irresistible that the statute is one squarely dealing
with coordination and determination of standards in institutions for
higher education within the meaning of Entry 66 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule. Both Entries 65 and 66 of List I empower the
Central Legislature to secure the standards of research and the
standards of higher education. The object behind being that the same
standards are not lowered at the hands of the particular State or States
to the detriment of the national progress and the power of the State
legislature must be so exercised as not to directly encroach upon
power of Union under Entry 66. The power to coordinate does not
mean merely the power to evaluate but it means to harmonise or
secure relationship for concerted action. A legislation made for the
purpose of coordination of standards of higher education is essentially
a legislation by the Central legislature in exercise of its competence
under Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and sub-section (4)
of Section 17 merely provides the consequences if an institution offers
a course or training in teacher education in contravention of the Act
though the ultimate consequences under sub-section (4) of Section 17
may be that unqualified teacher will not be entitled to get an
employment under the State or Central Government or in a university
or in a college. But by no stretch of imagination the said provision can
be construed to mean a law dealing with employment as has been held
by the High Court in the impugned Judgment.
In our considered opinion, the High Court committed gross
error in construing the provisions of sub-section(4) of Section 17 of
the Act to mean that it is a legislation dealing with recruitment and
conditions of services of persons in the State service within the
meaning of Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution The High Court
committed the aforesaid error by examining the provisions of sub-
section (4) on its plain terms without trying to examine the true
character of the enactment which has to be done by examining the
enactment as a whole, its object and scope and effect of the
provisions. Even, the High Court does not appear to have applied the
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doctrine of "pith and substance" and, thus, committed the error in
interpreting the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 to mean to
be a provision dealing with conditions of service of an employee
under the State Government.
In the aforesaid premises, the conclusion of the High Court that
Section 17(4) is ultra-vires being beyond the competence of the Union
legislature cannot be sustained and the said conclusion is accordingly
set aside. On examining the statute as a whole and on scrutiny of the
object and scope of the statute, we have no manner of doubt that even
sub-section (4) of Section 17 is very much a law dealing with the
coordination and determination of standards in institution for higher
education coming within Entry 66 of the List III of the Seventh
Schedule and, thus, the Union legislature did have the competence for
enacting the said provision.
We are also of the further opinion that the de-recognition of the
B.Ed (Vacation course) cannot be nullified on the ground of failure to
comply with the principle of natural justice. In the judgment under
challenge, the High Court has held also that when the institution is
imparting the B.Ed (Vacation Course) then National Council for
Teacher Education could not have refused to recognise the said
course. We are unable to accept this reasoning inasmuch as the
NCTE is an expert body created under the provisions of the National
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 and the Parliament has
imposed upon such expert body the duty to maintain the standards of
education, particularly, in relation to the teachers education.
Education is the backbone of every democracy and any deterioration
in the Standard of teaching in the B.Ed course would ultimately
produce sub-standard prospective teachers who would be teaching in
schools and colleges throughout the country and on whose efficiency
the future of the country depends. Inasmuch as the teacher himself
has received a sub-standard education it is difficult to expect from him
a higher standard of teaching to the students of the schools or other
institutions. It is from this perspective, the conclusion of an expert
body should not be lightly tinkered with by court of law without
giving due weightage to the conclusion arrived at by such expert
body. From this standpoint, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court committed error in holding that there was no reasonable
justification for not recognising the B.Ed (Vacation Course) which
was being imparted by the institution of Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra
Teachers College. In the aforesaid premises, we set aside the
impugned Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal.
In other Civil Appeals which have been filed by the State of
Rajasthan, the respondents having been denied employment to them,
had approached the High Court for issuance of mandamus. The High
Court allowed the same in view of its judgment in Shah Goverdhan
Lal Kabra Teachers College case striking down Section 17 (4) of the
Act. Since the appeal of the Union Government against the said
Judgment has been allowed, Section 17(4) of the Act has been held by
us to be intra-vires, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The
counsel appearing for the respondents, however, contended before us
that there are several other grounds which are required to be examined
and since the impugned judgment proceeded because of invalidity of
the Section 17(4) of the Act, in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra Teachers
College case and the said judgment of the High Court having been
reversed by this Court the matter should be remitted back to the High
Court for reconsideration of other grounds. We are not in a position
to appreciate as to what other grounds are to be urged. However,
since the impugned judgment proceeds because of Section 17(4) of
the Act having been struck down, and the judgment of the High Court
in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra teachers college case having been
reversed by us, we set aside the impugned judgment in each of the
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appeals and allow the Civil Appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan.
We, however, remit the Writ Petitions back to the High Court for
being considered if any other point survives for consideration.